by Plato
The cross-examination, part II. With a suspicious-sounding argument Socrates tries to show that Meletus’s formal charge contradicts itself. Meletus is made to claim that Socrates believes in no gods whatever, and, after confusing Socrates with Anaxagoras, is finally made to assent to the notion that the ‘supernatural things’ referred to in the charge could only be believed in by one who believed in gods.
It is quite clear by now, gentlemen, that Meletus, as I said before, has never paid the slightest attention to this subject. (b) However, I invite you to tell us, Meletus, in what sense you make out that I corrupt the minds of the young. Surely the terms of your indictment make it clear that you accuse me of teaching them to believe in new deities instead of the gods recognized by the State; isn’t that the teaching of mine which you say has this demoralizing effect?
‘That is precisely what I maintain.’
(c) Then I appeal to you, Meletus, in the name of these same gods about whom we are speaking, to explain yourself a little more clearly to myself and to the jury, because I cannot make out what your point is. Is it that I teach people to believe in some gods (which implies that I myself believe in gods, and am not a complete atheist, and so not guilty on that score), but in different gods from those recognized by the State, so that your accusation rests upon the fact that they are different? Or do you assert that I believe in no gods at all, and teach others to do the same?
‘Yes; I say that you disbelieve in gods altogether.’40
(d) You surprise me, Meletus; what is your object in saying that? Do you suggest that I do not believe that the sun and moon are gods,41 like other men do?
‘He certainly does not, gentlemen of the jury, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon a mass of earth.’
(e) Do you imagine that you are prosecuting Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus? Have you so poor an opinion of these gentlemen, and do you assume them to be so illiterate as not to know that the writings of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae42 are full of theories like these? And do you seriously suggest that it is from me that the young get these ideas, when they can buy them on occasion in the orchestra43 for a drachma at most, and so have the laugh on Socrates if he claims them for his own, especially when they are so peculiar? Tell me honestly, Meletus, is that your opinion of me? Do I believe in no god?
‘No, none at all; not in the slightest degree.’
You are not at all convincing, Meletus; not even to yourself, I suspect. In my opinion, gentlemen, this man is quite unable to restrain his insolence, and it is simply this which makes him bring this action against me – a kind of insolence or lack of restraint or youthful aggression. He seems to be devising a sort 27(a) of riddle for me, saying to himself, ‘Will the infallible Socrates realize that I am contradicting myself for my own amusement, or shall I succeed in deceiving him and the rest of my audience?’ It certainly seems to me that he is contradicting himself in this indictment, which might just as well run: ‘Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, but believing in the gods.’ And this is pure flippancy.
I ask you to examine with me, gentlemen, the line of reasoning which leads me to this conclusion. You, Meletus, will please answer my questions. (b) And will the rest of you all please remember, as I requested at the beginning, not to interrupt if I conduct the discussion in my customary way?
Is there anyone in the world, Meletus, who believes in human matters, and not in human beings? Make him answer, gentlemen, and don’t let him keep on making these continual objections. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but believes in equine matters? Or who does not believe in musicians, but believes in musical matters? No, there is not, my worthy friend. (c) If you do not want to answer, I will supply it for you and for these gentlemen too. But the next question you must answer: Is there anyone who believes in supernatural matters and not in supernatural beings?44
‘No.’
How good of you to give a bare answer under compulsion by the court! Well, do you assert that I believe and teach others to believe in supernatural matters? It does not matter whether they are new or old; the fact remains that I believe in them according to your statement; indeed you solemnly swore as much in your affidavit. But if I believe in supernatural matters, it follows inevitably that I also believe in supernatural beings. Is not that so? It is; I assume your assent, since you do not answer. (d) Do we not hold that supernatural beings are either gods or the children of gods?45 Do you agree or not?
‘Certainly.’
Then if I believe in supernatural beings, as you assert, if these supernatural beings are gods in any sense, we shall reach the conclusion which I mentioned just now when I said that you were testing me with riddles for your own amusement, by stating first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do, since I believe in supernatural beings. (e) If on the other hand these supernatural beings are bastard children of the gods by nymphs or other mothers, as they are reputed to be, who in the world would believe in the children of gods and not in the gods themselves? It would be as ridiculous as to believe in the young of horses or donkeys and not in horses and donkeys themselves. No, Meletus; there is no avoiding the conclusion that you brought this charge against me to try me out, or else in despair of finding a genuine offence of which to accuse me. As for your prospect of convincing any living person with even a smattering of intelligence that belief in the supernatural does not imply belief in the divine, and again that non-belief in gods does not imply non-belief in supernatural beings and heroes, it is outside 28(a) all the bounds of possibility.46
Socrates is committed to his activities as if to his position in battle; he will not be prevailed upon to give them up. This section is important, in that Socrates puts his obligation to Apollo (based on a dubious personal interpretation of the oracle) ahead of a hypothetical command from the city that he should stop philosophizing. This section is more rhetorical at first,47 becoming chatty later.
As a matter of fact, gentlemen, I do not feel that it requires much defence to clear myself of Meletus’s accusation; what I have said already is enough. But you know very well the truth of what I said in an earlier part of my speech, that I have incurred a great deal of bitter hostility; and this is what will bring about my destruction, if anything does; not Meletus or Anytus, but the slander and jealousy of a very large section of the people.
(b) They have been fatal to a great many other innocent men, and I suppose will continue to be so; there is no likelihood that they will stop at me. But perhaps someone will say, ‘Do you feel no compunction, Socrates, at having pursued an activity which puts you in danger of the death penalty?’ I might fairly reply to him, ‘You are mistaken, my friend, if you think that a man who is worth anything ought to spend his time weighing up the prospects of life and death. (c) He has only one thing to consider in performing any action; that is, whether he is acting justly or unjustly, like a good man or a bad one. On your view the heroes who died at Troy would be poor creatures, especially the son of Thetis.48 (d) He, if you remember, made so light of danger in comparison with incurring dishonour that when his goddess mother warned him, eager as he was to kill Hector, in some such words as these, I fancy, “My son, if you avenge your comrade Patroclus’s death and kill Hector, you will die yourself; ‘Next after Hector is thy fate prepared’,”49 – when he heard this warning, he made light of his death and danger, being much more afraid of an ignoble life and of failing to avenge his friends. “Let me die forthwith,” said he, “when I have requited the villain, rather than remain here by the beaked ships to be mocked, a burden on the ground.” Do you suppose that he gave a thought to death and danger?’
The truth of the matter is this, gentlemen. Where a man has once taken up his stand, either because it seems best to him or in obedience to his orders, there I believe he is bound to remain and face the danger, taking no account of death or anything else before dishonour.
(e) This being so, it would be shocking inconsistency on my part, gentlemen, if when the officers who
m you chose to command me assigned me my position at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium,50 I remained at my post like anyone else and faced death, and yet afterwards, when God appointed me, as I supposed and believed, to the duty of leading the philosophic life, examining myself and others, I were then through fear of death or of any other danger to desert my post. That would indeed be shocking, 29(a) and then I might really with justice be summoned to court for not believing in the gods, and disobeying the oracle, and being afraid of death, and thinking that I am wise when I am not. For let me tell you, gentlemen, that to be afraid of death is only another form of thinking that one is wise when one is not; it is to think that one knows what one does not know. (b) No one knows with regard to death whether it is not really the greatest blessing that can happen to a man; but people dread it as though they were certain that it is the greatest evil; and this ignorance, which thinks that it knows what it does not, must surely be ignorance most culpable. This, I take it, gentlemen, is the extent, and this the nature of my superiority over the rest of mankind; and if I were to claim to be wiser than my neighbour in any respect, it would be in this: that not possessing any real knowledge of what awaits us in Hades, I am also conscious that I do not possess it. But I do know that to do wrong and to disobey my superior, whether god or man, is bad and dishonourable; and so I shall never feel more fear or aversion for something which, for all I know, may really be a blessing than for those evils which I know to be evils.
(c) Suppose, then, that you acquit me, and pay no attention to Anytus, who has said that either I should not have appeared before this court at all, or, since I have appeared here, I must be put to death, because if I once escaped your sons would all immediately become utterly corrupted by putting the teaching of Socrates into practice. Suppose that, in view of this, you said to me, ‘Socrates, on this occasion we shall disregard Anytus and acquit you, but only on one condition: that you give up spending your time on this quest and stop philosophizing.51 If we catch you going on in the same way, you shall be put to death.’ (d) Well, supposing, as I said, that you should offer to acquit me on these terms, I should reply, ‘Gentlemen, I am your very grateful and devoted servant, but I owe a greater obedience to God than to you; and so long as I draw breath and have my faculties, I shall never stop practising philosophy and exhorting you and indicating the truth for everyone that I meet. I shall go on saying, in my usual way, “My very good friend, you are an Athenian and belong to a city which is the greatest and most famous in the world for its wisdom and strength. (e) Are you not ashamed that you give your attention to acquiring as much money as possible, and similarly with reputation and honour, and give no attention or thought to truth and understanding and the perfection of your soul?” And if any of you disputes this and professes to care about these things, I shall not at once let him go or leave him; no, I shall question him and examine him and put him to the test; and if it appears that in spite of his profession 30(a) he has made no real progress towards goodness, I shall reprove him for neglecting what is of supreme importance, and giving his attention to trivialities. I shall do this to everyone that I meet, young or old, foreigner or fellow-citizen; but especially to you my fellow-citizens, inasmuch as you are closer to me in kinship. This, I do assure you, is what my god commands; and it is my belief that no greater good has ever befallen you in this city than my service to my god; for I spend all my time going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to make your first and chief (b) concern not for your bodies or for your possessions, but for the highest welfare of your souls, proclaiming as I go, “Wealth does not bring goodness, but goodness brings wealth and every other blessing, both to the individual and to the State.” Now if I corrupt the young by this message, the message would seem to be harmful; but if anyone says that my message is different from this he is talking nonsense. And so, gentlemen,’ I would say, ‘You can please yourselves whether you listen to Anytus or not, and whether you acquit me or not; you know that I am not (c) going to alter my conduct, not even if I have to die a hundred deaths.’
Socrates represents his activity as a benefaction to the city. This is presented more like an old man’s story than as a piece of court oratory.
Order, please, gentlemen! Abide by my request to give me a hearing without interruption; besides, I believe that it will be to your advantage to listen. I am going to tell you something else which may provoke a clamour; but please restrain yourselves. I assure you that if I am what I claim to be, and you put me to death, you will harm yourselves more than me. Neither Meletus nor Anytus can do me any harm at all; they would not have the power, because I do not believe that the law of God permits a better man to be harmed by a worse.52 No doubt my accuser (d) might put me to death or have me banished or deprived of civic rights; but even if he thinks, as he probably does (and others too, I dare say), that these are great calamities, I do not think so; I believe that it is far worse to do what he is doing now, trying to put a man to death unjustly. For this reason, gentlemen, far from pleading on my own behalf, as might be supposed, I am really pleading on yours, to save you from misusing the gift of God by condemning me. (e)If you put me to death, you will not easily find anyone to take my place. To put it bluntly (even if it sounds rather comical) God has assigned me to this city, as if to a large thoroughbred horse which because of its great size is inclined to be lazy and needs the stimulation of some stinging fly. 31(a) It seems to me that God has attached me to this city to perform the office of such a fly; and all day long I never cease to settle here, there, and everywhere, rousing, persuading, reproving every one of you. You will not easily find another like me, gentlemen, and if you take my advice you will spare my life. But perhaps before long you may awake from your drowsing, and in your annoyance take Anytus’s advice and finish me off thoughtlessly with a single slap; and then you could go on sleeping till the end of your days, unless God in his care for you sends someone to take my place.
If you doubt whether I am really the sort of person who would have been sent to this city as a gift from God, you can convince yourselves by looking at it in this way. Does it seem human (b) that I should have neglected my own affairs and endured the humiliation of allowing my family to be neglected for all these years, while I busied myself all the time on your behalf, going like a father or an elder brother to see each one of you privately, and urging you to set your thoughts on goodness? If I had got any enjoyment from it, or if I had been paid for my good advice, there would have been some explanation for my conduct; but as it is you can see for yourselves that although my accusers unblushingly charge me with all sorts of other crimes, there is (c) one thing that they have not had the impudence to pretend on any testimony, and that is that I have ever exacted or asked a fee from anyone. The witness that I can offer to prove the truth of my statement is good enough, I think – my poverty.
Socrates’ failure to participate in public affairs is attributed to the timely intervention of his supernatural sign. Euthyphro (3b) shows how the very existence of such a sign could have been held against Socrates, and he might have been better advised not to introduce it. Similarly he would have been better advised not to suggest in a fiercely democratic court that any person committed to justice could not survive if he played a full part in the political life of his city. He also reprovingly draws attention to the time when he opposed unconstitutional action favoured by the people, and recalls a similar incident when he was given orders by the notorious Thirty Tyrants. Neither story could have improved his standing with the jurors very much.
It may seem curious that I should go round giving advice like this and busying myself in people’s private affairs, and yet never venture publicly to address you as a whole and advise on matters of state. The reason for this is what you have often heard me say before on many other occasions: that I am subject to a divine (d) or supernatural experience, which Meletus saw fit to travesty in his indictment. It began in my early childhood – a sort of voice which comes to me; and when it comes it always di
ssuades me from what I am proposing to do, and never urges me on. (e) It is this that debars me from entering public life, and a very good thing too, in my opinion; because you may be quite sure, gentlemen, that if I had tried long ago to engage in politics, I should long ago have lost my life, without doing any good either to you or to myself. Please do not be offended if I tell you the truth. No man on earth who conscientiously opposes either you or any other organized democracy, and flatly prevents a great many wrongs and illegalities from taking place in the state to which he 32(a) belongs, can possibly escape with his life. The true champion of justice, if he intends to survive even for a short time, must necessarily confine himself to private life and leave politics alone.
I will offer you substantial proofs of what I have said; not theories, but what you better appreciate – facts. Listen while I describe my actual experiences, so that you may know that I would never submit wrongly to any authority through fear of death, but would refuse at any cost – even that of my life. It will be a commonplace story, such as you often hear in the courts;53 but it is true.
The only office which I have ever held in our city, gentlemen, was when I served on the Council. It so happened that our (b) tribe Antiochis was presiding54 when you decided that the ten commanders who had failed to rescue the men who were lost in the naval engagement55 should be tried en bloc; which was illegal, as you all recognized later. On this occasion I was the only member of the executive who opposed your acting in any way unconstitutionally, and voted against the proposal; and although the public speakers were all ready to denounce and arrest me, and you were all urging them on at the top of your (c) voices, I thought that it was my duty to face it out on the side of law and justice rather than support you, through fear of prison or death, in your wrong decision.
