Eleanor of Castile: The Shadow Queen

by Sara Cockerill

Both his status and his interests – he was by no means of the warrior caste – make him an unlikely intimate for Edward, though perhaps more so for Eleanor. She and Burnell were also to share an interest in property acquisition – on his part probably fuelled by the need to provide for the family with which his mistress about now began to provide him. From this point in time he became settled in their establishment, from which he was to emerge as a major player in due course. Aside from the versatility and outstanding intelligence which his later years were to reveal, it was probably no small part of his success that he seems to have been a man of unusually happy manners, with an ability to endear himself to people in all stations of life – as not just one but two of the contemporary annalists remarked on his death.24

  If Eleanor had indeed begun to be aware of the need to find people who would be properly loyal to her and Edward’s joint interests, this was a lesson which would only be reinforced by the upheavals which were shortly to come, as a miscellaneous group of court powers coalesced into opposition to the king. The new alliance was based on a very diverse group of self-interests and grudges.

  The first part of it was the Savoyard faction, always previously more or less in tune with the king because the queen’s power came to her through him. Edward’s move to the Lusignans had given rise to a determination in the Savoyard faction that something must be done, given that their main power at court came from controlling Edward as heir to the throne – particularly once news of the fact that Edward had mortgaged properties to the Lusignans came out in early 1258. The concern became more urgent once a fatal attack was made by Aymer de Valence’s men on one of the queen’s advisers and the king, when confronted about the matter, refused to act against his brother.25

  The second element was that the Lusignans had roused Simon de Montfort to the point of action. Montfort had long cherished a particular grudge against the Lusignans. The most significant (but not the sole) element in Montfort’s dislike was money. Throughout Montfort’s career, however high flown the expressed ideals, his actions can usually be reconciled with his financial interest; perhaps understandably, given his need to provide for four sons and his shortage of transmissible land. In the case of the Lusignans, they trod on his toes in the very significant matter of his wife’s dower assignment.

  Eleanor Montfort had been entitled to a third of the value of the Marshal estates on the death of her first husband, William Marshal II. However, those lands were now in the hands of William de Valence (now styling himself ‘Lord of Pembroke’) in his role as husband to the remaining Marshal heiress, and he had defeated Montfort’s attempts to get actual dower lands settled on Eleanor. As a result, Montfort had to wait for Pembroke to pay the equivalent fee, which he did not, so persistently that ultimately Henry assumed the obligation to pay the fee instead. He, too, consistently failed to keep up to date with payments, often using grudges against Montfort as a reason to refuse payment. Then, to add insult to injury, while remaining in arrears to Montfort, Henry could find money to pay yet more fees by way of presents to his Lusignan brothers. This was a very powerful grudge indeed – so powerful that it was later to lead to international complications. To add to this, Pembroke had ‘taken out’ one of the most valuable heiresses to come on the market in a generation, who (given the likely age of the respective parties) might have enriched one of Montfort’s sons.

  The bad blood between Montfort and Pembroke was notorious and extreme. In May 1257, the two quarrelled violently at court in front of the king. Pembroke accused Montfort of treachery, an accusation which reaped a predictably furious response given the work which Montfort had done for Henry in the past in Gascony and the ingratitude with which he had been repaid. A fist fight was only avoided by royal intervention. A similarly violent quarrel broke out a year later in April 1258 when Pembroke accused Montfort and Gloucester of giving aid and comfort to the Welsh. As a result, Montfort, adding up his grudges against the Lusignans and his almost equally strong sense of grievance over his treatment in relation to his efforts in Gascony, was ready to consider confrontation with the king.26

  Yet the grievances of a party of foreigners brought to power by the king and another outsider, whose roots in England were very slight, would probably not have been enough. What carried these grievances over into crisis was their joinder to the less specific, but nonetheless strongly felt, discontentment of the powerful English nobles who joined with them. Two of these issues, the question of aliens and the Sicilian folly, have been outlined above. But to this were joined other, more fundamental questions – deriving from the way that Henry had driven the country into the ground by policies adopted and pursued without consultation with even his most powerful subjects. Added to this there were complaints more generally about heavy financial demands and a neglect of the local administration which gave rein to oppressive local officials and magnates.27

  The confederation which came into place on 12 April 1258 therefore contained not just the foreigners Montfort and Peter of Savoy but also John FitzGeoffrey and Peter de Montfort, English lords who had allied themselves with the Savoyard faction, along with the earls of Gloucester and Norfolk and Norfolk’s brother Hugh Bigod, representing the English high nobility. When the parliament convened in April was treated by Henry with his usual high-handedness, and no sign of amelioration in his approach to his siblings appeared, the decision was made to confront the king.

  On the morning of 30 April 1258, Henry was confronted by a mass of knights and barons, swordless but attired as for battle, led by the confederation of magnates. Henry’s first reaction was to ask if he was a prisoner. Instead, the barons outlined their terms – the expulsion of the Lusignans and a promise of consultation with the magnates in the form of a committee of twenty-four on future policies. The barons’ revolt had begun; civil war would follow in its train.28

  6

  Dissent, Defeat, Victory

  At the start of the revolt, Eleanor had been in England for two and a half years and was still only sixteen years old. By the time it drew to a close in 1265, she was twenty-three and had lived through a political storm and personal vicissitudes which marked her for life. Therefore, the revolt and the war which followed cannot be ignored. And yet for seven years the press of events and the constant realignments of loyalty and interest which took place at the English court push her almost entirely out of sight. Almost the only way to find Eleanor and understand what she was doing and the effect which this major event had on her is therefore to follow Edward, whose movements and political manoeuvrings are well covered.

  On 2 May, Henry agreed to the Barons’ terms. Edward, too, was required to consent, and his actions were very interesting – and revealing.

  Putting the debate in context, when looking at the list of the main barons involved, it might at first seem probable that Edward would consent gladly – the list is thick with those who were or had been in his household, such as John FitzGeoffrey, Peter de Montfort and Peter of Savoy. However, Edward’s recent move to the Lusignans was thorough enough for him to make it very plain that he did not support the moves of these men who were officially closely associated with him. It also appears more than possible that it was Edward, in concert with the Lusignans, who came up with the first scheme to frustrate the practical effect of the oath; when the time came to nominate his twelve councillors, the king nominated William, Aymer and Guy de Lusignan and their brother-in-law John de Warenne among his. Edward’s involvement in this rather puerile gesture is certainly suggested by the nomination not just of Warenne, his friend and Eleanor’s relation, but also Edward’s cousin and friend Henry of Almain. Indeed, one of the complaints that was made against the Lusignans at Oxford two months later was that they had encouraged Edward to subvert the whole reform movement.1

  Thus the Provisions of Oxford (as the results of the June parliament at Oxford have become known) provided for control of both Henry and Edward. The committee of twenty-four was replaced with one of fifteen, arrived at by a system
of election designed to produce a pro-baronial/Savoyard result – including the queen’s key men Boniface and Peter of Savoy. Everything done by the major officers of state, the Chancery or by way of grants had to be approved by the council. The clear implication was that Henry was incapable of running his own affairs and was back under tutelage. To keep Edward under control, it was ordered that all lands and castles alienated by Henry III were to be restored to the Crown. This included Henry’s grants to Edward – the source of his money.2

  Finally, everyone was to swear to uphold the Provisions – formally, in church, at a ceremony which involved the excommunication of all opposed to the Provisions and was supervised by Boniface of Savoy. When the Lusignans refused to take the oath, De Montfort made plain that the revolt had teeth, warning Pembroke,‘You must know without a shadow of a doubt that you will lose your castles or your life.’ In the face of this, the Lusignans, accompanied by Edward, fled to Winchester, where they were pursued by the baronial party. The Lusignans were escorted to the coast and forced to leave, which they finally did on 14 July. They were pursued by the evil wishes of Eleanor of Provence, who prevailed upon King Louis not to allow them to remain in his lands either, because of the fact that the Lusignans had ‘defamed’ her. Yet, even in the face of such open hostility from his mother, Edward still did not abandon them: on 28 June 1258, Edward appointed Geoffrey de Lusignan seneschal of Gascony and granted the Isles of Oleron and the Channel Isles to his brother Guy. However, within a few weeks he was forced to cancel the grants.3

  In the face of this defiance, a council of four was appointed to supervise his affairs, with all correspondence requiring to be ‘signed off’ by the councillors. Interestingly, this period of quasi-supervision of Edward’s affairs coincides with two more of Eleanor’s rare overt appearances in the documents. In September 1258 we find her, like a good, dutiful princess, attending the consecration of Salisbury Cathedral in the train of her mother-in-law. And again, on New Year’s Day 1259, she is to be glimpsed at Mortlake, receiving a knight from the Viscount of Béarn and giving him sapphire rings – provided by Eleanor of Provence. Put into context, these formal displays suggest that supervision was being exercised over Eleanor too, directly by Eleanor of Provence.4

  The supervision of Edward’s household appears to have been of short duration, as Edward repositioned himself politically over the next few months – improving relations with the Earl of Gloucester to the point of a formal alliance which he concluded in March 1259. Although the alliance was of short duration, it is interesting in showing Edward’s focus at the time and also in listing his supporters. As to the first matter, Edward’s aim is expressly stated in the agreement to be the recovery of his lands – and Gloucester agreed to counsel Edward and to aid him in achieving this goal. Edward’s concern at this time is therefore not the broader issues of royal control, but his own lands – his own present business. Secondly, however, the agreement lists supporters of Edward who Gloucester agrees to back. The people identified include Henry of Almain, Earl Warenne, Philip Basset, Robert Walerand, Roger Clifford, Roger Leyburn, Hamo Lestrange and William la Zouche. Aside from Henry of Almain and Earl Warenne, whose links to Edward and Eleanor have already been examined, this list contains a number of the Marchers with whom Edward had already allied in 1257 and who were to be his jousting companions in future. The list therefore shows signs of Edward continuing to surround himself with like-minded laymen whose prime loyalty was to him.

  What is still more interesting about this agreement is its true likely motive. Aside from being useful if Gloucester could do anything to help Edward regain his castles, it probably represented a deliberate attempt to make common cause with Gloucester, not with a view to the welfare of the English properties but to that of Gascony. For Gloucester was slated to attend the last round of negotiations for the peace treaty with France, the Treaty of Paris. Edward’s concern was that all the English royal family were supposed to renounce their rights to the Angevin inheritance of Normandy, Maine, Touraine and Anjou, which he perceived as weakening his current tactical position as Lord of Gascony as well as his future position as King of England with historical claims to these regions.5

  This point of interest – opposition to the Treaty of Paris – was also to help bring Edward and Eleanor into closer communion with Simon de Montfort. De Montfort had an interest in Gascony by reason of family claims and his own long residence there as seneschal. He also had, through his wife, an interest in the claims in France which the Treaty of Paris was to put aside. He may well already have been planning to use the need for her consent to force Henry to deal with his financial claims in relation to her dowry and his own expenditure in Gascony. Until these were adequately dealt with, the Montforts, too, would oppose the Treaty of Paris.

  It appears that it was at around this point that Edward ceased to focus solely on his lands and really began to grapple with the approach which he should adopt in relation to the more substantive issues of government. So from this time forward there is evidence of Edward putting himself forward as a supporter of reforms in justice and administration. For example, in August 1259 Edward wrote to his lieutenant at Chester arguing the necessity to maintain good government at all times ‘if on account of the influence of anyone common justice is denied to anyone of our subjects by us or our bailiffs we lose the favour of God and man and our lordship is belittled. We wish therefore that common justice shall be exhibited to everyone.’ This may, of course, be regarded as a cynical exercise in rebranding, but it is entirely consistent with Edward’s later approach both in relation to the baronial reform movement and in terms of legal and administrative reform when king and should therefore be regarded as a more fundamental change.6

  Whence had this shift in outlook come? I believe that this move can probably be traced, at least in part, to Eleanor. It is just possible that Edward himself came to consider the merits of the reformist approach, despite his early opposition. However, the likelihood is that some of his closest advisers – among whom we can number Eleanor and very possibly Robert Burnell (who would later play such an important part in the legal reforms which Edward introduced) – were involved in this change of heart. Eleanor’s involvement particularly seems probable when one considers that the first and second parts of the Siete Partidas deal with the importance of lawmaking, indicating that a good legislator should possess mindfulness of God, a love of justice, a knowledge of the law and a willingness to change laws if necessary as well as model provisions for temporal and public law. They canvassed in detail the duties of the king towards God, the people, and the country.7

  More evidence of Edward’s change of approach is found at the time of the autumn parliament in 1259, when unrest was surfacing from the lesser nobility about the pace of reform – or more accurately the lack of pace of reform. Although the Crown had been neatly hamstrung, the wider concerns of the reformers, in particular as to administrative abuses by magnates, had gone next to nowhere. This was substantially because Gloucester was opposed to any inquiry into and reform of his own administration. De Montfort was unwilling to oppose Gloucester until his own concerns were addressed – one of which was an arbitration under Gloucester’s aegis which was due to report by 1 November over the vexed question of the dower rights.

  In any event, the parliament of October 1259 opened with a protest by a group picturesquely described as ‘the community of the bachelors of England’. It was directed to the council and specifically to Edward and complained in terms about the failure to progress on the wider issues – which were of great practical moment to local society. No one knows who the ‘community of bachelors’ was. The likelihood is that it was a group of the knightly class, and this reading is supported by the fact that the term ‘bachelors’ was used to describe young men (knights) who were in attendance at tournaments. Still further support is given by the fact that Edward had recently become a keen participator in tournaments, and had attended three that year.

  Edward
’s reaction to the protest was startlingly different to his response to the original reformist pledge – he swore immediately to support the bachelors to the death in fighting for the community of England and the common good. Putting all this together, the address to Edward and his response bear all the signs of being staged as an opportunity to let Edward publicise his change of position. The protest and Edward’s intervention led to the promulgation of the Provisions of Westminster, which provide the high-water mark of the actual reform movement (as opposed to the anti-royalist elements of the disputes). These provisions abolished a number of abuses and dealt with a miscellany of practical grievances – rights of suit, distraint, exemption from jury service. It is significant that not until Edward’s reign were such matters seriously considered again. Again, therefore, we can see that Edward’s manifesto as future king is being ‘trailed’ by Edward and his team, among whom we must count Eleanor.8

  To reinforce his move to the reformers, two days later Edward entered into a formal agreement to ‘aid and counsel’ Montfort and maintain the baronial enterprise. This agreement was witnessed by Henry of Almain, Earl Warenne and Roger Leyburn – all members of his clique. However, as with the earlier alignment with Gloucester, the alliance seems to have been of a multifaceted nature, and also to have had reference to Gascony, Montfort’s financial issues and the threat to both posed by the Treaty of Paris, which was yet to be finalised. Finally, again as with the Gloucester Treaty, an alliance with one of the central members of the council freed Edward up to make moves to regain his English lands, and movement on this front soon followed. Between mid-October and mid-November, Henry, Eleanor of Provence, Montfort, Gloucester and Peter of Savoy all departed for France in preparation for the ratification of the Treaty of Paris on 4 December 1259, leaving England under the Bigod brothers, who were sympathetic to Edward’s recent approach to reform.9