by Peter Hart
Captain Beauchamp Tudor St John, 1st Northumberland Fusiliers
The BEF fell back to beyond the River Marne in such a poor state that both Sir John French and the French High Command began to wonder whether they would ever be able to stand and fight again. They would have their answer soon enough.
Denouement: the Battle of the Marne
With disaster looming everywhere up and down the front, Allied attention now fell on the portly phlegmatic figure of General Joseph Joffre. The Germans were seeking absolute victory prior to turning their attentions to the Russian Army. Joffre knew that his armies were hurting, but he was also convinced that France was not yet beaten. The French Army was so huge that, just as Moltke the Elder had feared way back in the 1870s, a knock-out blow was extremely difficult for the Germans to deliver. An army of millions had an enormous capacity to absorb punishment. But the French needed sure leadership if they were not to fall apart at the seams. This, then, was Joffre’s moment. He had based his General Headquarters at Vitry-le-François, where early on he had established a routine that would continue through good times and bad. It may not have been exciting or dramatic but the decisions made at the regular meetings would at times decide the fate of nations.
GHQ at that time consisted of some fifty officers, counting those belonging to the Services (railways, subsistence, medical department, mail section, code section, motor-cars and headquarters commandant). The routine at GHQ, as established from the very start, continued unchanged throughout the war. There were two reports each day: the first called the Grand Report, was held in my office at 7 a.m; the second took place towards 8 pm. At the Grand Report there were normally present the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Rear, the Chiefs of Bureaux and the officers of my cabinet. At both the morning and evening meetings I was informed as to the contents of reports sent in from the various armies relating the events of the preceding twelve hours, together with all information gathered during that time concerning the enemy. Naturally, if important reports or despatches arrived during the course of the day or night they were immediately presented to me; but the principal interest attaching to the two daily reports consisted in what might be called ‘taking our bearings’. At the morning report the general situation was established. I frequently requested the officers present to express their personal opinions on the questions before us; after listening to what they had to say, I gave my decisions.28
General Joseph Joffre, General Headquarters, French Army
In many ways Joffre could only progress from the moment he accepted that his original assessments of the situation had been utterly mistaken: the wrong tactics had been followed and, to some extent, the wrong men had been put in charge of operations. One understandable response might have been panic, but that was not Joffre’s style. Slowly, methodically, he began working his way through the mass of problems that flowed across his desk.
It was apparent that the principles of the offensive which we had tried to inculcate in the army before the war had often been poorly understood and badly applied. From all points of the front came reports of mistakes made in handling troops, mistakes which had brought about heavy losses and sometimes reduced to nought the offensive and defensive qualities of the men. I was told that advanced guards, through a false comprehension of the offensive spirit, were nearly always sent into action without artillery support and occasionally got caught in close formation under the enemy’s artillery fire. Sometimes it would be one of the larger units which, moving forward with its flanks unguarded, would suddenly become exposed to unexpected and costly fire. The infantry was almost always launched to the assault when at too great a distance from its objective. Conquered ground was never organised before starting off to the attack of a new position; in this way, if the latter failed, the troops were driven back without even reaping the fruits of their first effort. Far and beyond all, the co-operation of the infantry and the artillery was constantly neglected.29
General Joseph Joffre, General Headquarters, French Army
Joffre issued orders to correct these mistakes, but in the press of battle it was difficult to get a whole army to adjust its long-standing mentality and for new ideas to penetrate. However, there was something he could do about the generals he considered to have been found wanting in action.
When the test came, a large number of our generals had shown that they were not equal to their task. Amongst them were some who in time of peace had enjoyed the most brilliant reputation as professors; there were others who, during map exercises, had displayed a fine comprehension of manoeuvre; but now, in the presence of the enemy, these men appeared to be overwhelmed by the burden of their responsibility. In some of the larger units there had been a complete abdication of command.30
General Joseph Joffre, General Headquarters, French Army
Joffre was determined to get the right men in charge. Once people were identified – rightly or wrongly – as too timid, too slow, too stupid or too old, then they were simply replaced by younger, better men.
Joffre also began to consider his tactical options if he was to counter the onrushing march of the German right wing now wheeling through northern France. His staff reviewed the situation but in the end, it was Joffre who decided on the course to be followed.
My own preference consisted in creating on the outer wing of the enemy a mass capable, in its turn, of enveloping his marching flank. If we were to have time to assemble in the region of Amiens a force large enough to produce a decisive effect against the marching flank of the enemy, it was necessary to accept a further retreat of our armies on the left. But we had reason to hope that by making good use of every obstacle by which the enemy’s advance might be retarded, and by delivering frequent counter-attacks, these armies need not fall back farther than the general line of the Aisne, prolonged by the bluffs running from Craonne to Laon and La Fère. The Third Army would rest on the fortifications of Verdun, which would thus serve as a pivot for the general movement in retreat. The French Fourth and Fifth Armies, the British Army and the Amiens group, constituted with forces taken from our right wing, would furnish a mass capable of resuming the offensive at the moment the enemy, debouching from the wooded regions of the Ardennes, would have to fight with this difficult ground lying behind him. My conception was a battle stretching from Amiens to Rheims with the new army placed on the extreme left of our line, outside of the British and in a position to outflank the German right.31
General Joseph Joffre, General Headquarters, French Army
To build up this powerful new army on the left of the line, Joffre had to act decisively, taking risks in stripping divisions or even corps from the armies already fully engaged in fighting the Germans right along the front. This meant taking up a decidedly defensive posture in most places, which, given the disaster of 22 August, was probably no bad thing. Nevertheless it would prove an amazing achievement in the midst of such a hectic campaign; more than that, it was a logistical marvel. But the end result was the creation of a new Sixth Army on the left flank of the fast retreating BEF. Victory has many fathers but Joffre certainly deserves much credit for his decisive role in setting in motion the course of events that others would drive to victory. In one particular matter, Joffre needed all his calm to maintain any semblance of Entente Cordial.
French came in, accompanied by General Murray, his Chief of Staff. I expected to find the same calm officer whose acquaintance I had made a few days before; but, to my great surprise, the British Commander in Chief started out immediately in a rather excited tone to explain that his army had been violently attacked, and that, the evening before, General Haig’s corps had been obliged to fall back on Guise and the Cavalry Corps on Bohain (that is to say, into the zone assigned to the French Fifth Army); that his II Corps and General Snow’s 4th Division were being pressed by the enemy in the direction of Le Catelet. He explained to me that since hostilities had begun his troops had been submitted to such hardships that he could not
for the moment contemplate resuming the offensive. He considered the situation as being very delicate. More than once he made complaints concerning the manner in which the Fifth Army, his neighbour, had acted. He accused this army of having broken off the fight and left him completely isolated. In reply, I said to the Field Marshal that all the Allied troops without exception had been pushed hard by the enemy and that he must not suppose that the British Army was the only one which had suffered from the severe conditions of the campaign.32
General Joseph Joffre, General Headquarters, French Army
The British perception of the retreat was centred around their own concerns, while giving scant consideration to the situation of the French. But from the French perspective the BEF was failing to pull even its meagre weight, falling back faster than either the French Fifth Army on the right or the Sixth Army, still under creation, on the left. Indeed, Joffre was forced to order an unwilling Lanrezac to launch a counter-attack against the German Second Army on 29 August to relieve pressure on the faltering BEF. Throughout, the pace of the BEF retreat forced Joffre continually to adapt his plans over the next few days. He had originally hoped to stop the withdrawal on the Somme but this was doomed, so the Marne or even the Seine would be where he planned finally to hold. Joffre summed up his newly cautious demeanour.
In the presence of the enemy’s wide encircling movement against our left, it was evident that we could not accept battle immediately. The engagement of one of our armies would bring on that of all our forces. The Fifth Army would find itself in a situation which the advance of the German First Army, aided by the incursion of the German Cavalry Corps, would render extremely perilous. The slightest check would run the risk of becoming transformed into an irremediable defeat. Besides this, our troops had been marching and fighting continuously; they were worn out and greatly needed to have their ranks filled up. Our situation in the coalition imposed upon us the duty of holding out as long as possible, while keeping the maximum number of German forces occupied in front of us and wearing them down by attacks undertaken upon every favourable occasion; but we had to avoid any decisive engagement as long as we did not hold enough trumps in our hand to give us a distinct chance of success.33
General Joseph Joffre, General Headquarters, French Army
This might be Joffre’s last opportunity to avoid disaster. Timing would be all-important. In the meantime the Fifth Army and the BEF would continue to fall back, with the Third Army acting as the pivoting point, anchoring the two retreating armies to the rest of the French line. Joffre also dismissed the pessimistic Lanrezac, replacing him with the far more aggressive General Franchet d’Espèrey, who had already distinguished himself as a corps commander during the fighting on the Charleroi Front.
Yet by this time the Germans were also encountering ever-increasing difficulties. Their plans demanded a great deal of the troops on the right wing.
The First Army had now completed two-thirds of the wheel through Brussels on Paris. The requirements of the strategic situation made it impossible to give any rest days in the true sense of the word. Marches and fights, battles and marches, followed one another without interval.34
General Alexander von Kluck, Headquarters, First Army
The sheer distances covered were staggering, with the infantry marching between fifteen and twenty miles a day, a physically exhausting schedule even if they were not then required to fight as well. Even as the German right wing advanced it was decreasing in strength. The equivalent of three corps had already been left behind to counter Belgian forces at Antwerp, to occupy Brussels and to invest the remaining fortress towns. Worse still, the Russian offensive on the Eastern Front was beginning to take effect: Moltke believed that victory was in sight over France and he had detached two corps (one from the Second Army and one from the Third) and despatched them east. All told, this severely reduced the weight of the German right wing and gaps began to open between the Third, Second and First Armies. Moltke acted to counter this by foreshortening the original planned line of advance circling round Paris. Instead, the Second, Third and Fifth Armies were to turn south early; ‘The intention is to drive the French in a south-easterly direction from Paris. The First Army will follow in echelon behind the Second Army and will be responsible for the flank protection of the armies.’35 This did not sit well with von Kluck. He was proud of the achievements of his men and was determined to press onwards, eschewing the lesser role of flank guard to any French troops massing in the Paris region.
The message of the Supreme Command, in accordance with which the First Army was to follow in echelon behind the Second, could not be carried out under the circumstances. The intention to force the enemy away from Paris in a south-easterly direction was only practicable by advancing the First Army.36
General Alexander von Kluck, Headquarters, First Army
But as the German First Army wheeled round to push in a south-easterly direction, von Kluck was turning a naked flank to the newly created French Sixth Army.
By this time Joffre had managed to create a significant concentration of forces on his left flank, having judged the manifold risks to a nicety. All along a great stretch of the front from Switzerland to the Verdun fortress sector the situation had stabilised into a defensive stalemate. Now the French had gained superiority at the decisive point. When the German change in axis was finally confirmed on 4 September, Joffre, encouraged by Military Commander of Paris, General Joseph Gallieni, was ready to launch his Sixth Army into the badly exposed flank of von Kluck’s First Army, while the BEF and the Fifth Army counter-attacked as vigorously as they could. Joffre also managed finally to overcome the innate caution of Field Marshal Sir John French. Joffre’s amusing account of their meeting at the Château de Vaux-le-Pénil has the ring of truth.
I put my whole soul into the effort to convince the Field Marshal. I told him that the decisive moment had arrived and that we must not let it escape – we must go to battle with every man both of us had and free from all reservations. ‘So far as the French Army is concerned,’ I continued, ‘my orders are given and, whatever may happen, I intend to throw my last Company into the balance to win a victory and save France. It is in her name that I come to you to ask for British assistance, and I urge it with all the power I have in me. I cannot believe that the British Army will refuse to do its share in this supreme crisis – history would severely judge your absence.’ Then, as I finished, carried away by my convictions and the gravity of the moment, I remember bringing down my fist on a table which stood at my elbow, and crying, ‘Monsieur le Marshal, the honour of England is at stake!’ Up to this point French had listened imperturbably to the officer who was translating what I said, but now his face suddenly reddened. There ensued a short impressive silence; then, with visible emotion he murmured, ‘I will do all I possibly can!’ Not understanding English, I asked Wilson what Sir John had said. He merely replied, ‘The Field Marshal says, “Yes!”’ I had distinctly felt the emotion which seemed to grip the British Commander in Chief; above all, I had remarked the tone of his voice, and I felt, as did all the witnesses to the scene, that these simple words were equivalent to an agreement signed and sworn to. Tea, which was already prepared, was then served.37
General Joseph Joffre, General Headquarters, French Army
The tea is, surely, the conclusive touch. The scene was set: the Battle of the Marne would commence on 6 September 1914. Joffre issued a chilling order of the day.
We are about to engage in a battle on which the fate of our country depends and it is important to remind all ranks that the moment has passed for looking to the rear; all our efforts must be directed to attacking and driving back the enemy. Troops that can advance no farther must, at any price, hold on to the ground they have conquered and die on the spot rather than give way. Under the circumstances which face us, no act of weakness can be tolerated.38
General Joseph Joffre, General Headquarters, French Army
What followed was a complex battle
that defies easy explanation. By this time the German right wing was actually outnumbered by the French divisions rushing up from the south. As the German First Army tried to turn to face the assault from the French Sixth Army along the line of the River Ourcq, a huge chasm of some thirty miles opened up between von Kluck and the Second Army on his left flank. Amidst the chaos, the men of the BEF, having dutifully about-turned, found themselves advancing alongside the French Fifth Army into the gap between the German First and Second Armies. There was no great battle, no huge drama, but the penetration between their armies threatened utter disaster for the Germans and on 9 September Moltke ordered his right wing to retreat towards the River Aisne. The Battle of the Marne proved a stunning strategic triumph for the French. As might be expected there were many claimants for the laurels of victory, but there is no doubt who would have been blamed had it all gone wrong: Joffre. Therefore, the greatest credit should go to him.
Over the next few days, the German First and Second Armies fell back on the heights of the Chemin des Dames Ridge which rose up to 600 feet behind the Aisne. This was an obvious position for them to stand and fight, gaining time for a much-needed reorganisation. Joffre used all his considerable powers of persuasion to drive on his armies in close pursuit, but it was physically impossible for the exhausted troops. By the time they reached the Aisne on 12 September the Germans had dug a line of trenches along the heights and established their artillery on the rear slopes. The Battle of the Aisne is often presented as a British affair, but to their left and right were the French Sixth and Fifth Armies. Neither the BEF nor the French had the artillery, or tactical skills, required to turn the Germans out of such a strong natural defensive position, especially as the Germans began to move up reinforcements to plug any remaining gaps in their lines. The Allied response on 14 September was to dig in directly facing the German trenches. From Switzerland to the Aisne, the front was stabilising. The fighting had been hard. At times the Germans had seemed close to success, but the French armies had shown a resilience in defence that had thwarted any decisive breakthrough.
