by Peter Hart
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, General Headquarters, BEF
Haig’s view may have been depressing – indeed, distressing – to politicians and others seeking an easy way to victory, but the grim reality was that the German Army had not yet been eroded to the point whereby there was much chance of victory in the immediate future.
Battle of Messines
After the debacle of Arras, Allied attention turned to Haig’s long-awaited Flanders offensive. The final splutterings of the Arras offensive had been diversionary in nature, fought to deflect attention from both the problems of the French and the burgeoning preparations already being started in Flanders. But now underpinning everything was the necessity to focus German attention on the BEF and thereby allow the French Army more recovery time. Before any operations to clear the Ypres Salient could begin it was necessary to push the Germans back from their positions on the ‘heights’ of the Messines Ridge to the immediate south. Preparations had long been underway, by General Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army, and since 1915 an incredible series of deep-driven tunnels had been burrowed under the ridge and filled with explosives. Early in 1917, the process had been accelerated in anticipation of the attacks planned to capitalise on the promised success of the Nivelle offensive. The planning for the Flanders offensive was dogged throughout by the necessity of choosing between the ‘bite and hold’-style approach with restricted objectives and the natural desire to maximise possible gains to capitalise on the enormous allocation of resources represented by such an offensive. Plumer in particular was inclined to restrict his horizons initially to just the Messines and Pilckem Ridges; this was not enough for Haig, who preferred a more ambitious agenda with built in contingency plans to maximise potential gains. Seeking a more aggressive approach than that offered by Plumer, Haig selected General Sir Hubert Gough to command the main Ypres offensive, while Plumer commanded the opening assault on Messines Ridge. There would, however, still be a delay of some weeks after Messines as the artillery were moved northwards to amass in front of Ypres. The original plan was that the BEF attack would be supported by a parallel French attack, but this had to be abandoned when the mutinies proliferated across the French Army. Haig would have to go it alone, which meant that the Germans too would be free to concentrate all their attentions on Flanders. This may have benefited the weakened French but it promised pain and suffering for the BEF.
The Messines plans produced by Plumer represented another high point in the development of the ‘bite and hold’ tactics. There would be a 4-day barrage followed by the intended detonation of twenty-one mines containing a million pounds of high explosive underneath key German defensive positions all along the length of the ridge. Plumer originally planned an advance of only 1,500 yards but Haig, not unnaturally in view of the almost incalculable expenditure of valuable military resources, wanted to attempt both the seizure of the German second line at the back of the ridge and the Oosttaverne Line on its rearward slopes. All together this would entail a total advance of some 3,000 yards. To achieve this Plumer had been given nine assault divisions, with three more as a reserve force. In all he had a total of 2,266 guns of which 1,510 were field artillery and the rest were the heavy artillery required to take on the German batteries and destroy reinforced concrete strongpoints. In the preliminary bombardment 3,561,530 shells were fired. The plans for the creeping barrage to protect the advancing troops were also gaining in complexity, for it was now mixed with barrages directed at a sequence of identified strongpoints further ahead of the troops. Once these objectives had been achieved the creeping barrage would then settle as a standing barrage just ahead of the new lines in order to protect them from the inevitable German counter-attacks. The infantry would be accompanied in their attack by some seventy-two tanks, while throughout the attack the massed Vickers machine guns of the Machine Gun Corps would be firing over their heads spraying millions of bullets over the target areas. But the eye-catching innovation was the sheer size of the mines. Captain Oliver Woodward of the 1st Australian Tunnelling Company was on tenterhooks as he waited to detonate his mine under Hill 60.
I approached the task of final testing with a feeling of intense excitement. With the Wheatstone Bridge on an improvised table, I set out to check the leads and as each one in turn proved correct I felt greatly relieved. At 2.25 am I made the last resistance test and then made the final connections for firing the mines. This was a rather nerve-racking task as one began to feel the strain and wonder whether the leads were correctly joined up. Just before 3 am, General Lambart took up his position in the firing dugout. It was his responsibility to give the order, ‘Fire!’ Watch in hand, he stood there and in a silence that could almost be felt he said, ‘Five minutes to go.’ I again finally checked up the leads and Lieutenants Royle and Bowry stood with an exploder at their feet ready to fire should the dynamo fail. Then the General, in what seemed to be interminable periods, called out, ‘Three minutes to go!’ ‘Two minutes to go!’ ‘One minute to go!’ I grabbed the handle firmly and in throwing the switch over my hand came in contact with the terminals, so that I received a strong shock that threw me backward. For a fraction of a second I failed to realise what had happened, but there was soon joy in the knowledge that Hill 60 mines had done their work.19
Captain Oliver Woodward, 1st Australian Tunnelling Company, AIF
The explosion was cataclysmic – and even before the ground had settled the massed British artillery had burst into life.
Never could I have imagined such a sight. First, there was a double shock that shook the earth here 15,000 yards away like a gigantic earthquake. I was nearly flung off my feet. Then an immense wall of fire that seemed to go halfway up to heaven. The whole country was lit with a red light like in a photographic darkroom. At the same moment all the guns spoke and the battle began on this part of the line. The noise surpasses even the Somme; it is terrific, magnificent, overwhelming. It makes one almost drunk with exhilaration and one simply does not care about the fact that we are under the concentrated fire of all the Hun batteries. Their shells are bursting round now as I write at 3.40am, but it makes one laugh to think of their little efforts compared to the ‘Ausgezeichnete Ausstellung’ that we are providing. We are getting our revenge for 1914 with a vengeance.20
Major Ralph Hamilton, Headquarters, 106th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery
For the Germans the impact of the massive explosions was incredible.
The earth roared, trembled, rocked – this was followed by an utterly amazing crash and there, before us in a huge arc, kilometres long, was raised a curtain of fire about one hundred metres high. The scene was quite extraordinary; almost beyond description. It was like a thunderstorm magnified one thousand times! This was followed by thousands of thunderclaps, as the guns opened up simultaneously, adding their contribution to the power just unleashed. The wall of fire hung in the air for several seconds, then subsided to be replaced by the flashes of the artillery muzzles, which were clearly visible in the half light. For an instant we just stood, mesmerised by the spectacle. There was no question of returning to the rear to have wounds dressed, because hardly had the wall of fire died away to nothing than the entire earth seemed to come to life. Scrabbling their way forward from hundreds of starting points came steel-helmeted men. Line upon line of infantrymen emerged and the enemy launched forward.21
Second Lieutenant Meinke, 176th Infantry Regiment
The infantry went over the top, sweeping over the utterly shattered German front line positions on the forward crest. After a short pause they moved on at 07.00, with the battalions leapfrogging to maintain the impetus of the assault. The Germans were unable to hold them and Haig was proved right as his men pushed through to take the fortified village of Wytschaete by 09.00. After a further break to re-organise, the infantry began to attack the reverse slope positions at 15.10. By this time they were beyond the range of the British field artillery and, without the massed support of the guns, casualties began to increase s
harply. Even so, the Oosttaverne Line was safely in British hands before the end of the day. Subsequent painful tidying-up operations would finally succeed in attaining all the British objectives within the week, although they suffered a total of 24,562 casualties during the battle as a whole. None the less the Battle of Messines was a triumph for Plumer. His methodical tactics had overwhelmed a strong German fortress in a key location with the capture to boot of 7,354 prisoners, 48 guns, 218 machine guns and 60 mortars. With the Messines Ridge under British control the way was open for Gough’s assault on the German lines that almost encircled Ypres.
The Third Battle of Ypres
Haig’s motives in the great Flanders offensive of the Third Battle of Ypres have often been questioned, but he had several compelling reasons. He was required by the situation of the French to distract the Germans and prevent them from launching a devastating attack on the wavering poilus. Haig believed that more attacks might bring the German Army to the point of collapse. He based this on the reports of his chief intelligence officer, Brigadier General John Charteris: ‘It is a fair deduction that, given a continuance of the existing circumstances and of the effort of the Allies, Germany may well be forced to conclude a peace on our terms before the end of the year.’22 This would prove an optimistic assertion, as the German armies on the Western Front would ultimately be refreshed and restocked by the divisions freed from the Eastern Front following the collapse of the Russians. Action was also necessary, according to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, First Sea Lord, to clear the Belgian coast in order to eradicate the German submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge. Tactical objectives included the Passchendaele Ridge overlooking Ypres, the German rail junction at Roulers, clearing the German threat to the Channel ports, and removing the necessity of maintaining the Ypres Salient, which was a constant drain on British manpower. This all added up to a strong case but Haig was exposed to a considerable amount of interference from Lloyd George. The British Prime Minister marshalled his arguments against the offensive to considerable effect.
The Cabinet must regard themselves as trustees for the fine fellows that constitute our army. They are willing to face any dangers, and they do so without complaint, but they trust to the leaders of the nation to see that their lives are not needlessly thrown away, and that they are not sacrificed on mere gambles which are resorted to merely because those who are directing the War can think of nothing better to do with the men under their command. It is therefore imperative that before we embark upon a gigantic attack which must necessarily entail the loss of scores of thousands of valuable lives, and produce that sense of discouragement which might very well rush nations into premature peace, that we should feel a fair confidence that such an attack has a reasonable chance of succeeding. A mere gamble would be both a folly and a crime.23
Prime Minister David Lloyd George
Whatever the merits of this his credibility was then undermined when he followed up with an appeal for more resources for the Italian campaign. Here Haig and the Chief of Imperial General Staff, General Sir William Robertson, stood together on solid ground, able to demonstrate the crucial importance of concentrating on the main enemy – Germany – on the Western Front, rather than embarking on any Italian adventures. In the end Cabinet approval of the offensive was granted, although with the proviso that it should be abandoned if things went wrong.
Haig had originally intended swiftly to follow up the capture of Messines Ridge with his Ypres Offensive, but the delays multiplied, reflecting the logistical difficulties of waging a war which required thousands of guns and millions of shells to be amassed in the muddy ground of the Ypres Salient. The infantry, too, had to be moved up to the line. Training and planning had to be perfected. All this took time.
The German defences at Ypres were carefully laid out in accordance with the principles of defence in depth. A thinly held front line and forward zone ran along the low Pilckem Ridge, with a second line tucked away on the reverse slope. Behind this were a series of additional lines stretching back up on to the Passchendaele Ridge, while the whole area was dotted with concrete pillboxes and fortified farm buildings. These were carefully sited to catch advancing troops in deadly machine gun crossfire. The overall concept was to slow down and break up the British attacks, leaving the survivors vulnerable to German counter-attack divisions held back beyond the reach of the British artillery. One new weapon beginning to make its presence felt among the British troops was the German mustard gas contained in their Yellow Cross gas shells. Falling with an almost inaudible ‘plop’ and relatively odourless, this gas caused severe blisters, temporary blindness and dreadful internal damage if it was inhaled. As it lingered both in the air and on the ground, soldiers were forced to wear their gas masks for days.
The British plans featured the usual tensions over the question of advancing in stages or attempting to maximise initial gains by going for the Second and Third Lines. This argument could never be fully resolved, as it all depended on what happened. If the attack was a success then it would be irresponsible not to be ready to leap successive German lines – many senior British commanders felt that the opportunities to do so had been missed on the first day of the Battle of Arras a few months before. But then again, if the deeper lines were included in the original barrage then its impact might be diluted and total failure ensue. The depth of the German defensive system also meant that delays were inevitable as the field artillery was moved forward at each stage. In the end Haig resolved to maximise gains within the overall context of a staged advance – not, therefore, an attempt to secure an immediate breakthrough.
The plans emphasised the importance of artillery – this was the British way. The Fifth and Second Armies amassed 3,091 guns, which was twice as many as the Germans had in that sector. The bombardment would last for fifteen days, followed by a thunderous creeping barrage to accompany the attacking infantry across No Man’s Land. They would also be accompanied by tanks, although these were restricted in what they could do by the difficult ground conditions.
The final stages of the barrage were beyond belief.
A flooded Amazon of steel flowed roaring, immensely fast, over our heads and the machine gun bullets made a pattern of sharper purpose and maniac language against that diluvian rush. Flaring lights, small ones, great ones, flew up and went spinning sideways in the cloud of night; one’s eyes seemed not quick enough; one heard nothing from one’s shouting neighbour.24
Lieutenant Edmund Blunden, 11th Royal Sussex Regiment
It was a desperate business for Germans gunners who were attempting to return fire.
Darkness alternates with light as bright as day. The earth trembles and shakes like a jelly. Flares illumine the darkness with their white, yellow, green and red lights and cause the tall stumps of the poplars to throw weird shadows. And we crouch between mountains of ammunition (some of us up to our knees in water) and fire and fire, while all around us shells upon shells plunge into the mire, shatter our emplacement, root up trees, flatten the house behind us to the level of the ground, and scatter wet dirt all over us so that we look as if we had come out of a mud-bath. We sweat like stokers on a ship; the barrel is red-hot; the cases are still burning hot when we take them out of the breech; and still the one and only order is, ‘Fire! Fire! Fire!’until one is quite dazed.25
Gerhard Gurtler, German Artillery
When the Allied infantry attacked at 03.50 that morning they did so with varying degrees of success. Two divisions of the French First Army on the left flank reached all their objectives and even pushed on to contest the streets of Bixschoote. On their right the British swept up on the low rise of the Pilckem Ridge and over into the shallow Steenbeek Valley that lay behind to capture St Julien. There they encountered a steadily increasing resistance centred around pillboxes and the Gheluvelt–Langemarck Line lying in front of the London Ridge promontory of the main Passchendaele–Gheluvelt Ridge. If one man’s story tells the story of thousands, let it be that of Company Ser
geant Major John Handley of the 1/6th King’s Liverpool Regiment, who went over the top with his company headquarters in the third wave.
Following the white tape, I was horrified to find myself tangled up in our own wire. Knowing from experience that the enemy would rain a deluge of blasting shells on our front line within three minutes – at the most – I frantically tore myself through the obstructing wire, hurrying forward out of the most dangerous area. When I felt clear I looked about me, but in the darkness could see no one. There was no sign of those who should have been following me i.e. the acting captain, his servant, signallers, first aid men, stretcher bearers, and so forth. As far as I could make out I was alone. But I went forward, till suddenly I fell, tripped up by the German wire. As I plunged into the mud several rifle shots flashed and cracked from the enemy trench just in front of me. The bullets whizzed past my head and, incidentally, for weeks afterwards, I was partially deaf in the left ear. My rifle was useless, choked with mud. Pulling out a hand grenade, I released the lever and lobbed it as near as I could to the area from which the shots came. Bobbing up to see the explosion, I saw several heads silhouetted against the flash. I had aimed well. At that moment one of our Lewis gun teams came up and I led them into the German trench where, in the half light of dawn, we only found one badly wounded Hun.26
