by Peter Hart
The Austrio-Hungarian Army was already under relentless pressure in 1915. The addition of the Italians to its roster of enemies, which included the Russians and the Serbs, did not bode well. Indeed, the Austrian Chief of General Staff, General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, took the declaration of war by the Italians as a personal affront. Yet in another sense the Italian timing was dreadful as it coincided with the advent of a massively increased level of support from Germany for the ailing Austria-Hungary on the Eastern Front. This would greatly ease the situation for the Austrians and allow them to reinforce the Italian Front in a manner which otherwise would have been impossible.
The Austrians had carved out extremely strong defensive works on the mountainous Trent and Alpine fronts, carefully using the terrain to their best advantage. Trenches, dugouts and gunpits were often blasted from the solid rock and covered by barbed wire. Given the precipitous nature of the ground these positions would prove almost impregnable. Much work was also undertaken behind the lines to improve road and rail communications. The defences on the Isonzo sector was not so well progressed, although the Austrian line was still intimidatingly strong, tucked on to the hills and ridges just behind the Isonzo River. In the Upper Isonzo the river ran through a deep gorge surrounded by the Bainsizza Plateau and Julian Alps. The Isonzo then ran through the Gorizia area, named after the town on its west bank. Overlooking and dominating the sector were a series of mountains all heavily fortified: Monte Sabotino and Monte Podgora in an Austrian bridgehead to the west, and Monte Santo, Monte San Gabriele and Monte San Daniele to the east. Finally, as the Isonzo flowed down to the Adriatic, it passed the dominant Carso Plateau on its east bank, running parallel to the sea and rising up to 1,000 feet, with one of the key positions being Monte San Michele.
Shortly after the declaration of war, the Italians began their advance across the border, pushing forward to the Isonzo, while the Austrians fell back across the flood plain to the higher ground east of the river. At first the Italians made some useful gains, including the town of Caporetto in the north, and some progress in the Julian Alps east of the Isonzo, but ultimately their offensive ground to a halt. The First Battle of the Isonzo followed shortly afterwards, with frontal attacks on the Austrian bridgehead opposite Gorizia and on the Carso Plateau commencing on 23 June. But these merely confirmed that any further advances would be extraordinarily difficult. Even where the Italians made small gains they were promptly hurled back by Austrian counter-attacks. The battle set a pattern for what would follow: the Italians used simplistic frontal tactics, relying on courage, élan and press of numbers to overwhelm the outnumbered Austrians, and in which hope they would be sadly disappointed. Cadorna showed himself to be an utterly inflexible leader, supremely self-confident, apparently learning nothing from the rebuffs; indeed, he considered that failure originated in a lack of determination from his officers and men.
In the Second (commencing on 18 July), Third (commencing on 18 October 1915) and Fourth Battles of the Isonzo (commencing 10 November 1915), the story was essentially the same as the Italians charged forward time and time again – a story retold as tragedy. Although he had scraped together every possible gun from forts and naval sources, Cadorna still had nothing like enough guns or shells, or indeed the gunners with the skills to target accurately Austrian strongpoints. The shortage of mortars was also clearly a severe disadvantage. In murderous fighting, the Italians managed briefly to capture the key tactical positions, like Monte San Michele overlooking Gorizia, only to be thrown off them again by determined Austrian counter-attacks. Eventually December brought mutual exhaustion and the fighting petered out as both sides tried to cope with the freezing cold of winter in the mountains. By this time the Italians had suffered up to 250,000 casualties and the Austrians over 128,000.
The next Italian assault, the Fifth Battle of the Isonzo, commenced on 11 March 1916 as part of the co-ordinated Allied response to the German Verdun offensive, but nothing much had been achieved before the Austrians launched their own Tyrolean offensive, driving out of the mountains across the Asiago Plateau sector of the Trentino Salient with the intention of breaking through on to the coastal plain and severing the Italian communications running east to the Isonzo and Alpine fronts. This attack was conceived by Conrad, who was desperate to stamp down on the Italians, whom he still considered as traitors to the cause of the Central Powers. This planned offensive would cause a considerable amount of friction with Falkenhayn, who believed that it was a distraction from the main battle against Russia and France.
The Austrians attacked on 15 May. This was an amazing venue for modern warfare, the jagged ridges of the great mountains liberally slashed by yawning chasms, the splintering rock magnifying ten-fold the effect of bursting shells to produce a flensing spray of deadly splinters. The heavy Austrian guns took their terrible effect on the Italians, who were forced back across the Asiago Plateau. For a while it even looked as if the Austrians might break through to the Po River and the coastal plains. At this point a mixture of exhaustion and the knock-on effects of the successful Brusilov offensive on the Russian Front began to impact on the Austrian effort. Conrad was forced to divert divisions to help shore up the Eastern Front and the Austrians slowed to a halt. Taking advantage of this, the Italians managed to divert some troops from the Isonzo front and counter-attacked hard on 16 June, regaining much ground as the Austrians fell back to their prepared defensive positions. The Italians suffered some 147,000 casualties, the Austrians 81,000. Neither side could really afford this rate of attritional fighting.
Yet the Italians were determined to press on and, on 6 August 1916, they launched the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo. The Austrians had been weakened by the transfers to the Eastern Front and so, by dint of concentrating their forces, the Italians managed to at last to capture the town of Gorizia and make some gains on the Carso Plateau, although the fighting was as ferocious as ever. This victory, in conjunction with its relative success in holding the Trentino offensive, had a considerable beneficial effect on morale throughout the Italian Army. Indeed, the Italians were even emboldened enough to declare war finally on Germany on 28 August. Sadly, the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Battles of the Isonzo (14 September–14 November 1916) soon dissipated any Italian optimism as they repeatedly attacked the Austrian lines seeking to expand their gains around Gorizia and the Carzo Plateau. Progress was almost non-existent, but casualties soared, with the Italians losing another 69,000 casualties and the Austrians 75,000. Throughout the long Isonzo campaigns, the Italians had failed to make any significant advances in their tactical thinking, still relying on courage and numbers to breach the Austrian lines, with the support of limited and largely unfocussed artillery barrages. Overall, Cadorna was driving his men on, setting a much higher tempo of offensive operations than had been established by the British, French or Russian generals. Units were being committed into battle on a far more regular basis, even during winter, which provided little respite due to the severity of the climatic conditions. Cadorna was a harsh disciplinarian and an enthusiastic devotee of using the threat of the death penalty to keep his men up to the required performance.
Operations resumed with the bombardment for the Tenth Battle of the Isonzo on 12 May 1917. By this time the British and French had at last been convinced by Italian appeals for additional artillery, with the British responding by deploying several batteries of 6-inch howitzers to the front, despite Haig’s misgivings at moving such valuable resources from the Western Front. On their arrival, the British found the Italian soldier an enigma.
Of all armies I should say that it is most difficult to gauge the standard of the Italians. One is constantly confronted with surprises. The Italian is capable of doing everything, and is a master at doing nothing. As regards physique he is, I think, unsurpassed though of low stature, his strength is remarkable. He can carry more than a British or French soldier. Infantry may be seen straggling along a road, the reverse of our idea of ‘smart’, but he will walk all
day and feed on little. He is practically never drunk and, though illiterate, extremely handy and ingenious. He has no idea of punctuality or time. 8 o’clock may mean 8.30 or 9.00. But when he works, he works extremely well. The morale of the Italian is easily affected. As an Italian officer said to me, ‘Tell him he is a brave man, and he becomes one!’ Hence the regiments with good traditions are excellent, those without traditions or with bad reputations are very bad, and the contrast is stronger than in other armies.2
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Buzzard, Headquarters, 144th Heavy Artillery Group, Royal Artillery
Despite these artillery reinforcements, little changed as the Italians sought to batter their way forward all along the Isonzo Front. At first things seemed to be going better, as Monte Kuk, north of Gorizia, was captured. There was also progress on the dreaded Carso Plateau, although in the end the Italians were thwarted by the heights of Monte Hermada which guarded the route through to Trieste. An Austrian counter-attack was fended away and in the end the Italians had more than 157,000 casualties, while the Austrians suffered some 75,000.
Undaunted, Cadorna readied himself for his next attempt, the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo, which commenced on 18 August. The Italians attacked either side of Gorizia, this time making some progress on both the Bainsizza Plateau to the north and edging forwards towards Monte Hermada. Colonel Charles Buzzard, one of the senior British heavy artillery officers attached to the Italians, was quite astounded at the complete lack of sophistication in the artillery tactics employed by the Italians on the Carso Plateau. To him the following characteristics were painfully evident:
1. Almost entire lack of information supplied to the Heavy Artillery. We were never told which way the infantry would attack, the hours named were never adhered to. 2. Fire was lifted far too soon: infantry had no support in passing over four or five hundred yards of open and difficult ground. We could have kept on firing until the infantry was 200 yards from objectives. 3. Austrian prisoners say that during our bombardment all their men were in caverns, and they hardly lost any; the trenches were quite wrecked: no shells can touch their caverns. 4. The remarkable thing is that with such utter lack of co-operation between artillery and infantry, the Italian infantry ever take any of their objectives. The artillery preparation is good, a large number of the infantry are quite heroic; but to advance behind a proper creeping barrage is unheard of.3
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Buzzard, Headquarters, 144th Heavy Artillery Group, Royal Artillery
The Italian successes, if such they can be called, were at crippling expense (166,000 Italian casualties against an estimated 85,000 Austrians) and were negligible in terms of real territorial gains, but at the same time had some tactical promise if only they could keep driving forward. But the Italians were fast tiring and unable to press home any advantage. Indeed, Cadorna was forced to put his forces on to a defensive status, while they reorganised themselves, built up their reserves and rested ready to renew the attack in 1918. However, the Austrians were, if anything, in a worse state: exhausted from the long war with Russia, Serbia and now the Italians. On the Italian Front, as everywhere else, it was evident that the Austrians desperately needed support from the Germans; unfortunately for the Italians, they got it.
Ludendorff was only willing to supply German troops for offensive operations, not just to shore up the line, which he considered to be a waste of his valuable resources. The collapse of the Russians on the Eastern Front had given him a last chance to bring the war to a close. His plan was to knock Italy out of the war prior to the great assault he planned for the Western Front in 1918. He also had in mind another experiment with the assault tactics so effectively trialled by General Oskar von Hutier’s Eighth Army at Riga on the Eastern Front in September 1917. This time he brought in General Otto von Below to command the composite German–Austro-Hungarian Fourteenth Army (consisting of seven German and a number of Austrian divisions). Inserted into the line in the Upper Isonzo sector facing the town of Caporetto, this formidably well-trained force was to spearhead the whole attack. Von Below made their priorities absolutely clear.
The ruling principle for any offensive in the mountains is the conquest and holding of the crests, in order to get to the next objective by these land bridges. Even roundabout ways on the crests are to be preferred to the crossing of valleys and deep gorges, as the latter course takes longer and entails greater exertions. The valleys are to be used for the rapid bringing up of closed reserves, the field artillery and supply units. Every column on the heights must move forward without hesitation; by so doing opportunities will arise to help a neighbour who cannot get on, by swinging round in rear of the enemy opposing him.4
General Otto von Below, Headquarters, Fourteenth Army
The bombardment opened at 02.00 on 24 October, a wave of gas, high explosive and smoke shells lashing the Italian batteries, command posts and strongpoints, splaying across the trenches.
It was a dark and rainy night and in no time a thousand gun muzzles were flashing on both sides of Tolmein. In the enemy territory an uninterrupted bursting and banging thundered and re-echoed from the mountains as powerfully as the severest thunderstorm. We saw and heard this tremendous activity with amazement. The Italian searchlights tried vainly to pierce the rain, and the expected enemy interdiction fire on the area around Tolmein did not materialise, for only a few hostile batteries answered the German fire. That was very reassuring and, half-asleep, we retired to our cover and listened to the lessening of our own artillery fire. At daybreak our fire increased in volume. Down by St Daniel heavy shells were smashing positions and obstacles and occasionally their smoke obscured the hostile installations. The fire activity of our artillery and mortars became more and more violent. The hostile counter-fire seemed to be rather weak.5
Lieutenant Erwin Rommel, Württemberg Mountain Battalion
The German and Austrian infantry had the good fortune to attack in misty conditions. Rommel and his detachment felt their way forward through the mountainous terrain, trying to avoid direct clashes with Italian strong-points, always seeking to circumnavigate them, take them from the rear and press on. His vivid account of mountain warfare shows the kind of tactics employed, but also how well he had assimilated von Below’s instructions to concentrate on the peaks.
The ascent proved to be very difficult. Lieutenant Streicher and I followed 40 yards behind the new point. Close behind us came the crew of a heavy machine gun carrying their disassembled gun on their shoulders. At this moment a 100lb block of stone tumbled down on top of us. The draw was only 10 feet wide and dodging was difficult and escape impossible. In the fraction of a second it was clear that whoever was hit by the boulder would be pulverised. We all pressed against the left wall of the fold. The rock zigzagged between us and on downhill, without even scratching a single man. Happily, the supposition that the Italians were rolling stones down on us was false for the point had dislodged the stone. Finally the steep draw was behind us. In pouring rain, wet to the skin, we climbed the slope through dense undergrowth, looking and listening intently in all directions. The wood in front of us thinned out. If we moved rapidly then we might capture the hostile garrison without firing a shot. I singled out Lance Corporal Kiefner, a veritable giant, gave him eight men and told him to move down the path as if he and his men were Italians returning from up front, to penetrate into the hostile position and capture the garrison on both sides of the path. Again long, anxious minutes passed and we heard nothing but the steady rain on the trees. Then steps approached, and a soldier reported in a low voice, ‘The Kiefner scout squad has captured a hostile dugout and taken seventeen Italians and a machine gun!’ I then had to decide whether I should roll up the hostile position or break through in the direction of Hevnik Peak. I chose the latter. The elimination of the Italian positions was easy once we had possession of the peak. The farther we penetrated into the hostile zone of defence, the less prepared were the garrisons for our arrival, and the easier the fighting.6
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Lieutenant Erwin Rommel, Württemberg Mountain Battalion
Nothing seemed to stop the Fourteenth Army and within just a day the Italians had fallen back up to fifteen miles, thereby uncovering the defences of first the Bainsizza Plateau, then Gorizia and finally the Carso Plateau. As the Italians began to fall apart small detachments like Rommel’s had an entirely disproportionate effect.
We went downhill through the bushes with our machine guns and carbines at the ready and we soon saw the hostile position below us. It was heavily garrisoned. From above we looked down on the bottom of the trench. The enemy had no cover against our fire. The enemy did not suspect what threatened him. The assault squads made ready and we shouted down to the hostile garrison and told them to surrender. Frightened, the Italian soldiers stared up at us to the rear. Their rifles fell from their hands. They knew they were lost and gave the sign of surrender. My assault squads did not fire a single shot. Not only did the garrison of the positions between us and Jevszek, about three companies strong, surrender; but, to our great surprise, the hostile trench garrison as far north as the Matajur road also laid down its arms. An Italian regiment of thirty-seven officers and 1,000 men surrendered in the hollow 700 yards north of Jevszek. It marched up with full equipment and armament, and I had trouble finding enough men to carry out the disarmament.7
