Merkel has been much criticized for this vagueness. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the then Foreign Minister, and later SPD Leader of the Opposition, said there was a “responsibility to keep promises” that had been made in such a significant place as the Knesset, which had raised expectations. But what are these expectations? In Israel itself, the “reason of state” has not produced any importunate demands. None of its politicians has insisted that Merkel should explain the meaning of the phrase. The country looks after its own security, and the last thing it expects is guarantees of solidarity from Germany or even NATO. If they want anything at all, the Israelis would wish to use German anti-aircraft systems such as the Patriot as a fall-back option, as they did during the Iraq war. Nor will Merkel's words intimidate Iran. It is certainly a matter of making a clear political statement, such as the one Germany has made many times regarding the Iranian nuclear programme: Iran must disclose its plans and be subject to controls. In practice, however, sanctions and export controls have attracted severe criticism from countries such as the USA, which called for more determined action from Germany in isolating Iran.
And then there is Merkel herself: she has not said anything to clarify the question. Even among her inner circle there are different shades of interpretation. Some speak of symbolism, a political statement. The fact is that Germany cannot be neutral on the subject of Israel, and in a war against Iran that could be demonstrated in many ways: financial assistance, no-fly zones, weapons. Yet it is unrealistic for Germany to contemplate sending troops. True, Merkel has always pointed out that after a peaceful solution to the problems between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Germany could make a contribution on the ground – such as providing soldiers to man a buffer zone in the Jordan valley. But Israel would not take kindly to that, nor would it be easy to get a majority in the Bundestag to approve a German military presence anywhere near Israel. As for the possibility of German soldiers having to open fire on Israelis in a conflict – that is unthinkable.
Merkel realizes that when it comes to the military protection of Israel, she has raised expectations that no one will be able to meet. The reason-of-state argument will probably fade away eventually, when she is no longer Chancellor. Nonetheless, her unequivocal declaration of faith follows the logic of her Middle East policy, which has been working in very practical ways towards a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. When Merkel first became Chancellor, she seized the moment in the key areas of her policy towards Israel. Her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, had left Israel and the two-state solution to his Foreign Minister, while he concentrated on economic relations with the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. In the immediate aftermath of the Iraq war, the United States and President George W. Bush were weakened as guarantors of order. Later, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, after intensive preliminary work with Germany, invested much political capital in setting up a peace process, although the negotiations at Annapolis failed at the eleventh hour.
Merkel acquired much political capital for herself from the Israelis, not only for speaking out so convincingly on German responsibility and guilt, but also for meeting a key demand of the Israeli government by recognizing the “Jewish character of the State of Israel”. This phrase implies a number of political consequences: first there is the idea that in order to retain its present character, Israel must be a religious state. However, this concession to the religious lobby ignores the question of what will happen to the Arab minority in the country and what rights they will have. Second, the phrase gives voice to the expectation that there must be a two-state solution. The demographic reality in the area occupied by the Israelis and Palestinians could not be clearer. A single state with a Jewish character cannot expect to hold its own, because the Jews are clearly in a minority. If Israel were to refuse to allow the Palestinians to have their own state, and thus under international law remain an occupying power in Palestine, then a Jewish minority would dominate an Arab majority, and the democratic character of Israel and its unique characteristic in the region would be destroyed, and it would become an apartheid state.
Before she became Chancellor, Merkel made sure that the phrase concerning the “Jewish character of the state” was in the CDU party manifesto. The majority of MPs had not noticed the fine distinction, but experts on foreign policy such as Wolfgang Schäuble had heated arguments with Merkel. Schäuble's warnings now seem justified. Under the Netanyahu government the possibility of a two-state solution has retreated into the distance, and a number of people now believe that it cannot be achieved because of the policy over the settlements – in which case Merkel ought to change the wording. But she not only enshrined the mention of “Jewish character” in the party manifesto, but also in the coalition agreement with the SPD and later the FDP. To Israel this is evidence of good faith, a sign that Germany and Israel are coming together.
The confidence that she inspired came in useful to Merkel in the war in Lebanon in 2006. At the request of the governments of both countries, Berlin sent inspectors to Beirut airport, while ships from the German navy lay off the Lebanese coast to intercept illegal supplies of armaments to Hezbollah. This operation provoked fierce arguments in the Bundestag – it was the first dispatch of German soldiers to the immediate vicinity of Israel. In the end Merkel got her way, and in the process established her reputation in the Arab camp as a credible mediator. Israel's Prime Minister Olmert described her as “a real friend”, and said that Europe was lucky to have her.
Enthusiasm continued to grow over the course of the next few months, when prisoners, both alive and dead, were exchanged by Israel and Hezbollah, an operation facilitated by Germany. Later, German secret-service contacts proved useful when, after being imprisoned in the Gaza Strip for five years, the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, a symbol of Israeli self-determination, was exchanged in 2011 for over a thousand Palestinian prisoners. Merkel presided over this important phase of European mediation in the Middle East, telephoning and travelling constantly to the region, maintaining equilibrium in the uncertain atmosphere of the European Union and doing important preliminary work for the USA's peace conference in Annapolis. Overall, as the Foundation for Science and Politics put it, the Chancellor made efforts to bring balance to the process. In particular she developed a close relationship with the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora and the Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas. But Merkel soon realized the limits of her influence when she came down openly on Israel's side after the 2009 war in Gaza. After a change of government in Israel in the spring of 2009, when Benjamin Netanyahu took over, her mediation efforts collapsed. Netanyahu gradually destroyed all hope of breathing new life into the peace process. UN reports of war crimes and human-rights violations during the Gaza conflict put the relationship under enormous strain, as did Israel's unusually violent reaction to the Gaza flotilla and their policy on settlements.
The final break with Netanyahu came in the autumn of 2011. For months, the Palestinians had been skilfully building up diplomatic pressure, and during the United Nations General Assembly they tried to force a reassessment of their status. It was clear that any attempt to be recognized as a state would fail in the Security Council. But their demand for reassessment enjoyed a great deal of support around the world. Merkel and the EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, tried to broker a deal, forcing the Middle East Quartet to make a statement – but just before the breakthrough came, Jerusalem issued a rebuff: Netanyahu had agreed to the building of new settlements in the eastern part of the city.
Merkel was furious. She felt that Netanyahu had betrayed her. So when the Israeli Prime Minister tried her patience several more times in the late spring of 2012 – among other things, the content of confidential telephone calls was published in the Israeli press – Merkel drew her own conclusions. To phrase it in diplomatic language, “relations cooled”. A year later, in November 2012, the Palestinians finally succeeded in getting their status upgraded by the Unite
d Nations: they would now be described as a “non-member observer state”. This time Germany did not stand by Israel; like many other European countries they abstained from the vote, making it clear that in essence they supported the Palestinian policy of becoming a member state. In the difficult political situation between Germany and Israel, Merkel had come full circle. But it seems that the real test is yet to come.
Russia and Putin: Parallel Lives
A Much Loved Country, a Difficult President
Vladimir Putin must have known exactly what he was doing in the case of the dog. The Russian President loves dogs, but Angela Merkel does not. In fact she is afraid of them, especially after being attacked by a dog called Bessi in August 1995. Merkel was out cycling near her weekend cottage in the Uckermark, when her neighbour's gun dog went for her and bit her knee. After that Merkel gave up cycling and still tends to give dogs a wide berth. A man like Putin knows that kind of thing. He has an instinct for it.
So when Angela Merkel, who had just been sworn in as Chancellor, went on an official visit to Moscow in January 2006, the overtly muscular Putin presented her with a cuddly toy dog. It sat on the arm of her chair until her foreign-affairs adviser, Christoph Heusgen, had a chance to pick it up and whisked it out of the Kremlin as unobtrusively as possible. This was the first part of the malicious little act. The second came a year later. This time Putin received Merkel at his official residence on the Black Sea. The door suddenly burst open and his black Labrador, Koni, came bounding into the room, sniffed at Merkel and then lay down at her feet. Cameras recorded the scene: Merkel with lips pursed, legs tightly crossed, Putin with his legs apart, leant back in his chair, eyelids patronizingly lowered – what might be described as a sadistic pose. Obviously, Merkel doesn't like that kind of thing. Ever since then, her meetings with Putin have stuck strictly to the official programme and observed the correct protocol, so dogs are kept well away.
As with the United States, in her heart Merkel knows two Russias – her private Russia, and what might be referred to as her “business” Russia. As we have seen, Angela Kasner came to know this private Russia through language competitions at school, trips to the country, and reading its literature – Tolstoy and Dostoevsky are among her favourite authors. Contrary to rumours, she never studied in Russia, but she did visit Moscow, as well as the south of the country and the Caucasus. This aspect of Russia has positive associations for the Chancellor, who loves the Russian language and is fluent in it. But political Russia is inseparable from Vladimir Putin.
Putin had been President for five years when she became Chancellor. Later he swapped roles and spent some time as Prime Minister before returning as head of state in 2012. Ever since Merkel became Chairman of the CDU, Putin has been the leader of Russia. Not only that, they are almost the same age – Putin is two years older than her – and have followed similar paths in life, almost as if they were mirror images. Putin spent five years in Dresden, where he witnessed the collapse of the GDR and the Warsaw Pact and became fluent in German. Merkel grew up in the Soviet garrison town of Templin, showed her gift for languages by learning Russian, and like Putin experienced the fall of the Wall at first hand. While Merkel had always glorified the West, and demonstrated her love of freedom by following Western politics, 1989, the great year of change, certainly didn't transform Putin into an ardent democrat. Whenever Merkel and Putin meet, two world views collide. For Merkel, the fall of the Berlin Wall was a liberating experience, whereas for Putin, a lieutenant colonel in the KGB, it was a deeply traumatic event. He sees the collapse of the Soviet Union as a historic defeat.
So it is hardly surprising that their personal relationship has an enormous influence on German-Russian relations in general. In this instance foreign policy definitely has a personal dimension. Nor is it surprising that meetings between the two leaders are still sometimes marked by biting sarcasm. While a considerable amount of respect has also grown between them over the years, the rivalry has never quite disappeared, and the slightest cooling in their relationship is keenly felt. When Merkel received Putin in Berlin just after he had been reinstated as President, she chided him in stern, maternal tones that he was late as usual – possibly an allusion to Mikhail Gorbachev, who once said that “life punishes those who come too late”.
Putin retorted that that was the Russian character – surely she knew that by now. The two of them have had some heated arguments. Merkel and her advisers will never forget a visit to the Black Sea in 2007. The year before she had won respect at home because she had used her first visit to Moscow after her election to meet Russian opposition politicians. Putin, who doesn't have many women in his entourage, had to learn that he wasn't dealing with someone to whom he could suggest a fashion show as evidence of German-Russian cooperation.
But the first real test of strength took place in Sochi. On the agenda were the oil and gas industries, matters of security, Ukraine – all the usual topics. Putin played the KGB officer. Sometimes he shouted, then he would lower his voice and speak softly and insistently, using obscenities, scribbling on documents, pointing at figures, waving his arms about – the whole gamut of communication methods taught by the secret service. Not surprisingly, this behaviour reminded Merkel of the Stasi. She stood up to him; her old reflexes were suddenly aroused. Those who were there said later that he squeezed her arm at one point.
This sparring atmosphere still remains between Merkel and Putin. Yet the Russian President has learnt a lot by it, and now tries to beat Merkel at her own game. For example, if the Chancellor criticizes the way the Russian authorities deal with foreign donations to political parties, Putin counters by referring to the German law on charities and societies and the conditions imposed on political activity. His message is: so what's the difference? In these clashes it is sometimes difficult not to get the impression that the Chancellor and the President are like an old married couple who have long got used to each other's ploys. As Merkel would say, you have to be on the qui vive with him. And Putin is always on his guard as well.
This fundamental mistrust hasn't prevented Merkel from pursuing policies beneficial to Russia when they coincide with her own convictions. In April 2008, for instance, as we have seen, she resisted fierce pressure from the United States when they wanted to smooth the way for Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO. At the NATO summit in Bucharest it was Merkel who refused to implement what was called the Membership Action Plan for these two unstable nations. The USA wanted to strengthen Georgia in particular, and use it as a bulwark and outpost on Russia's southern borders, as well as a gateway to Central Asia, which is rich in raw materials. Merkel baulked – there were too many unresolved conflicts, a constant danger of war, an unstable democracy and an odd choice of President in Saakashvili, whose only claim to fame so far was paying court to Washington.
President George W. Bush reacted angrily, whereas Putin showed his gratitude. As Merkel saw it, her decision was entirely objective – after all, she had every reason to snub Putin. The Russian President had offended her the year before at the Munich conference on security, when he delivered a violent polemic against the West, as if they were on the verge of war. Merkel had sat stony-faced and said nothing – as did the entire Western security establishment.
Merkel had great hopes for Putin's interim President, Dmitri Medvedev, who took office in the spring of 2008. Although the handover of power was carefully controlled and the new President was the protégé of the old one, the Chancellor hoped that it would now be easier to do business with Russia. She had long been among those who thought that the two men might represent two extremes, and that one day Medvedev would break free of Putin and develop a style of his own. She refused to accept the theory that as the representative of an authoritarian and bureaucratic Russia, Putin had Medvedev, who supported the oligarchs, on a leash. In the end the mystery was solved by Medvedev's presidency itself, when the outgoing head of state revealed the real plan for the handover of power at a press conference: their excha
nge of roles had been planned months before. Merkel was deeply disappointed – she had been duped.
The worst crisis involving Russia came in Medvedev's time in office when, at the beginning of August 2008, the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, attacked the breakaway province of South Ossetia after a series of provocations and counterprovocations. Long, detailed studies were written about the outbreak, causes and course of those hostilities: today they can be summed up in a few words. Saakashvili overestimated his own power and wanted conflict. Expecting support from abroad, he provoked people and reacted to taunts; he attacked and promptly fell into a Russian trap. Russia responded with a counter-attack and occupied South Ossetia, which has since declared independence but has been recognized by only four states – naturally including Russia.
Merkel followed the crisis in the shadow of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who had just taken over the presidency of the EU, and was whirling back and forth between the warring parties like a dervish. Her main concern was for the United States, in case they were forced to show more than political solidarity with Saakashvili. Her anger, however, was directed at Russia, which was flexing its muscles by parading columns of tanks in the heart of Georgia, far from South Ossetia. The Chancellor stood with Sarkozy and had to weather a fair amount of criticism, particularly from the USA: if Saakashvili had been allowed to join NATO three months earlier, there would have been no war. Merkel was indirectly accused of giving the green light to Russia, because her decision meant that this might be the last opportunity to consolidate the borders in the southern Caucasus.
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