Merkel also had another fear: Cameron might misread her signals and take advantage of the hard line that she was adopting with the crisis-hit countries, as well as her sympathy for his demand for a repatriation of powers. If the British Prime Minister insisted too much on these demands, then ultimately she might be the only one who would be able to keep Britain in the EU. Cameron might exploit the fact that the Germans wanted to keep Britain in the EU at any cost, because it suited their interests. But Merkel doesn't like veiled threats. If it reached that stage then she would decide whether the price was too high, and if in doubt she would decline.
And then there was a third concern – the scenario that in Berlin was always described using an English expression: “accidental exit”. Hopes of a referendum might be too high, there could be a backbench revolt, an unexpected result at the next general election, and then a country that was unable to handle the consequences. At which point the situation would be beyond saving.
Among the vast array of other problems faced by the European Union, therefore, Merkel was keen that her British counterpart should get the right message: Cameron should not overestimate his position, he should not count on her being too accommodating. The German government saw some serious contradictions in Cameron's logic: it wasn't possible to speak of the single market as if it were a form of Holy Grail and at the same time demand to be treated as an exception to its rules and regulations. As much as Merkel supported the principle of subsidiarity and felt that too much of the political decision-making had been transferred to civil servants and the European Commission, she would never overestimate her own power and demand that treaties be changed unless she were absolutely certain that she could achieve what she wanted.
So no, there wouldn't be a new British rebate, not even in the form of symbolic treaty changes. If treaties did have to be changed, it would only happen if it were required by the EU's new institutional structure, or by the creation of a banking union within the Eurozone. From the epicentre of the euro crisis, things looked quite different to how they seemed from Downing Street. And so in Berlin there is always a note of sympathy in people's voices when they talk about Great Britain and its romantic view of a world that has long since changed.
The Prospects for Merkel?
The Post-Political Chancellor
As yet, no clear verdict can be given on Angela Merkel's policies. The crisis has taken Merkel prisoner, and events are still racing ahead. It will be a long time before the misery comes to an end in Greece and Spain. The markets are still nervous. France is only just embarking on its most difficult phase of self-discovery since the end of the Second World War. In Germany, the election year of 2013 will be dominated by anxiety about the euro.
Only when the crisis has abated will we know what part of the rescue – or the collapse – of the euro can be attributed to Merkel. Those around her say, “If it goes wrong we will know at once, if it goes well then it might be appreciated in twenty years’ time.” This is classic modesty. Nonetheless, the Chancellor has risked a great deal, although she could have made things easier for herself. She prescribed a drastic remedy for the whole continent which Germany itself might not have survived. Not only that, there is a school of thought that says that the more the crisis affected the weaker nations of Europe, the more Germany benefited – from low interest rates, from its strong economy, its attraction as a place for highly qualified people to come and work. On one hand this gave her a powerful position in Europe. On the other, it laid her open to attack and increased the risks for herself. If Merkel does fall, it will be a heavy fall.
In private, the Chancellor has said how much she dislikes having to play the part of an economic hardliner. She does not like being portrayed as a cold-hearted person, obsessed with economics. When she visited Portugal, Greece or Spain she was greeted with swastika flags, demonstrators burned effigies of her, her face was shown with a Hitler moustache painted on it. None of this leaves Merkel unmoved. She is constantly at odds with herself over the right way out of the crisis, she weighs up all the different arguments again and again – and yet she always comes to the same conclusion: no one has yet been able to show her a better way. Should she have agreed to throw money at Greece at the start of the crisis? To provide funding from the European Central Bank without imposing conditions? To introduce Eurobonds, or a shared pooling of debt? Aside from the legal and domestic difficulties, Merkel thinks not: if she had done so, then any incentive for reform would have been lost. Eurobonds that were not controlled by the European government would be a serious flaw in the system. On its own, Germany would have been unable to bear the enormous burden of debt that weighs on the countries of the Eurozone – “Our powers have limits,” she repeated again and again in 2012. And if it is unable to compete on a global level, Europe's economic system would collapse: of that she is firmly convinced.
Make cuts and reform – or protect people from every hardship and take on an ever-increasing amount of debt? Merkel never accepted that alternative; it is not the way she works. She has only one commandment – or, as she would say, only one axiom: the euro must be protected. And, since she is a systematic person, from this axiom derive several corollaries. For instance: the euro must be protected – and when the crisis is over, it must be stronger than before. Or: the euro must be protected, if possible with the agreement of all members of the Eurozone. She has continually said: “I would like Greece to stay in the euro,” but not: “Greece will stay in the euro come what may.”
She keeps her options open. Greece could indeed leave the single currency. If that happens, Merkel will at least want to have arguments demonstrating why she had to support Greece for so long, and why, of all the possible options, its eventual exit from the euro was the best choice for the rest of the Eurozone. For if Greece is unable to remain in the Eurozone, then at least it has to be possible to control the consequences for the euro. Among the labyrinthine complexities of her decisions, this is how Merkel defines her aim: she always wants to have more arguments on her side than there are on the side of those who disagree with her. She wants to play safe.
For all her outward self-confidence, Merkel has always been prone to doubts. In spring 2012 she was described in the most glowing terms; Bild praised her to the skies. It gave the impression that the crisis was under control. That summer, she welcomed the European Central Bank's announcement that when conditions were right it would buy an unlimited number of government bonds. But this was too much good news. She immediately felt that efforts were beginning to relax in the crisis-hit countries. For six months, Greece haggled over the details of an austerity programme that had long been decided and accepted in principle. New debts were mounting up. Once again, Merkel realized that the euro would not be rescued simply by a fiscal compact or a reconstruction plan. The euro would survive or fall with little Greece. In the autumn of 2012 she was accused of not facing up to the truth: Greece would never be able to repay its debts, and the wealthier European nations, Germany first and foremost, would have to foot the bill. Nonetheless, she didn't want to agree to a new cut in those debts – at least not at that stage. Because what incentive would that be – not only for Greece, but for the other troubled countries? If the pressure was relaxed there would be no European economic governance.
Merkel has sometimes wondered why she is credited with such omnipotence. Because during all the years of crisis, she has been subject to endless constraints: German domestic politics, the Federal Constitutional Court, election dates, changes of government, her coalition partners, extremely unstable alliances in the EU – she has always had to depend on her allies. Perhaps the biggest problem in the third phase of the crisis was the change of president in France. Merkel had been strong in Europe for so long, partly because she had an ally in Nicolas Sarkozy. Nothing could be done politically in Europe against the combined power of Germany and France.
But then the situation changed. François Hollande became French President. Suddenly she lacked the necessar
y weight to impose her political will on Europe. During the French election campaign she had made the mistake of supporting her friend Nicolas Sarkozy. It was something that Hollande wouldn't forget in a hurry. More significant, however, was that the new President was caught in a web of election promises and the political expectations of his supporters. His ideas about how to resolve the crisis were diametrically opposed to Merkel's. For some months, the Chancellor spoke of him among her inner circle only as “her counterpart”. The tensions were palpable.
Merkel doesn't share the political convictions of her father figure, Helmut Kohl. He always said that a German Chancellor does well to bow twice to the Tricolour. Merkel had no wish to bow. She was too confident of her own analysis of the crisis for that – and if she wanted Europe to continue competing with China and South-East Asia, if she didn't want it to sink into economic and demographic hibernation, then she couldn't fall in with what Hollande wanted. This is her real motive, the rationale behind all her initiatives. Europe, which represents nine per cent of the world's population, produces twenty-five per cent of its GDP, and also accounts for fifty per cent of its public expenditure. But for how much longer?
Yet should she have courted Hollande more assiduously? One thing is certain: Merkel is not given to Kohl's Rhineland joviality. She prefers to play her now familiar game: weighing up the pros and cons, making demands, exerting pressure and finally making concessions if she has gained something in return. She pins her hopes on time, which has become her closest ally. Hollande will also realize the value of time when the markets show him how little prospect there is for his economic policy.
Yet despite Merkel's rational approach, there is also anxiety. Where is all this logic leading? What do calculation and countercalculation achieve? Among all the weighing-up of risk, has she missed a decisive, shining opportunity that she might have enjoyed shaping – or which she could have used as a launch pad? The crisis is wearing people down; few events in post-war history have tried public patience for so long. There must be an end to it at some point, but, as a stoic, Merkel is making no promises. She asks for more patience, more endurance. At some stage the public will either sense that there is a price to be paid, or will demand a firm decision. People are getting uneasy. But Merkel is not a Chancellor to take things lightly; she is the antithesis of Schröder, and thus lacks the impulsive, emotional approach that can make crises of this kind more bearable. She may overreach herself, play poker a little too long when she ought to have already made a decision – perhaps to give Greece the thumbs-down.
Someone who is close to Merkel and understands her well has said that the Chancellor is the perfect post-political politician. It was meant as a compliment, because there are a great many post-political politicians. To be post-political means not committing yourself, letting yourself drift, having few or no convictions, always being flexible, waiting for the right moment. In an overly regulated system that rips up its ideologies, these are no bad qualities to possess.
Merkel initially leaves critical matters to other politicians: reform of the armed forces? That was Guttenberg's job. The Libya debacle? Westerwelle was landed with that. Her government's aggressive policy of selling arms abroad? That was taken up by the Federal Security Council, whose members are sworn to secrecy. Merkel prefers links to her not to be too strong and, where they do exist, such as with Israel, she likes to be able to withdraw gently. When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu began going too far with his settlements policy, Merkel gave him the cold shoulder. In November 2012, when the Palestinians managed to raise their status at the United Nations, Germany turned away from Israel.
Seven years as Chancellor in an atmosphere where the crises came in unusually swift succession can wear down even a woman with an iron constitution and an inexhaustible appetite for work. Merkel has become lonely in office, even more so than Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder at the same point in their Chancellorship. She tends to reject external advice; she has had too many bad experiences. She circumvents Party hierarchies and prefers to communicate directly with the grass roots. The middle ranks of the CDU feel marginalized, the party is short of promising senior members. There are no strong characters, no one with a will of their own to take over from Merkel. Instead, she surrounds herself with people like herself: rational, technocratic, analytical. All of them master tacticians. Post-political politicians. Broad-brush strategists with big mouths have no place in the Chancellor's world.
A Swiss observer once accused Merkel of representing the state of experts, the politics of predictability. She satisfies the German longing for consensus – no squabbling please, we like harmony. As an observation this is not wholly inaccurate, seeing that the Opposition gave Merkel a free hand in the crisis, and even on the difficult subjects of war and peace supported the policies that she initially drafted with them. This makes German foreign policy a matter of uniformity, as if it were a civic duty to observe a truce in difficult times. Or is it that Merkel carries everyone with her? Is there perhaps no alternative to her way of doing things? Because the truth is that all sides fear the euro monster at the gates. They are all afraid of the moment when citizens will have to be told what their share of the bill is. The rational Merkel fears this too, but she hopes that by that time the figures will be sufficiently in her favour for her to be able to say: I did my best, all the alternatives would have been worse for the country.
Merkel's style forms the basis for Merkel's power. And yes, Angela Merkel is deeply conscious of power. She knows exactly who will not go along with her system. She demands no ideological loyalty, because she herself, as the archetypal post-political politician, does not make ideology a criterion of power. Instead she demands acceptance of her ideas, participation in her world of logic and counter-logic, of rational calculation and superior arguments. If she is faced with a strong argument she immediately looks for a stronger one – or uses her opponent's to bolster her own. Vladimir Putin has adopted this method. It is the only challenge to her authority that Merkel will accept. Anyone who wishes to get the better of her ideologically or boorishly will come up against a hard, slippery surface. Merkel doesn't indulge in such confrontations.
This is the secret of her power: Angela Merkel will only get involved in an argument if she knows that she will win in the end. Those who undermine the state while boasting of their invulnerability – like any number of bankers during the financial crisis – will incur her wrath. She then turns her mind to revenge. It won't be felt immediately, perhaps not until many years later. But you can be certain that Merkel won't accept being belittled. Nor will she accept being pressurized, especially not in her own camp, whether by the party or her Cabinet. If a minister is unable to do what his or her position demands and, after having made great promises simply offloads it onto her, then their time is up. This is what Wolfgang Tiefensee discovered when he was Minister of Transport, Construction and Urban Development and wanted to dump the European Galileo satellite project, which was incurring higher and higher costs, on EU heads of government.
Blatant demonstrations of power are not Merkel's style. She doesn't shout: she speaks quietly. She doesn't bang her fist on the table; she would rather work late for a couple of nights and wear down her opponent. She considers a vote of confidence in the Bundestag a sign of weakness. If she were forced to ask for one, then she would know her time had come. However, when the coalition government denied her a majority in the last major vote on the euro in the summer of 2012, she didn't lose any sleep over it. Thanks to the opposition she had the necessary numbers, in this case a two-thirds majority. Had it been extremely close, those in the CDU who didn't vote with her would have been asked to reconsider their position. The most important thing was that the consensus held the parties together – anything else was secondary.
The euro crisis is the greatest challenge to her power. Merkel cannot really get a grip on her opponent. There are too many incalculable factors, too many players who have an influence on the game. She know
s that it is events and personalities that will decide her fate – perhaps the FDP, over whose success in the 2013 general election she has only limited influence. Or the Greek Cabinet, or the Spanish Prime Minister, or the financial markets when the next French government bond is issued. Her day of reckoning will come when she least expects it – she knows that too. But what will she leave behind?
With her hardline policy during the crisis, Merkel has managed to create a new role for Germany. Isolated in the centre of Europe, the country is encountering more hostility than at any other time in more than half a century of communally constructed European history. And yet it is also much admired. This doesn't make Merkel a popular figure in many parts of Europe. The France of Hollande has moved away from her – out of weakness, because of its inability to introduce reforms, while ignoring major global trends. All this mitigates in favour of Germany and its Chancellor, yet the unequal distribution of power in Europe is still dangerous. If Merkel wants to build a new Europe, with a strong, joint economic government, with supervision of the banks, with better democratic controls, then she will have to make it clear to the German people that they will be subject to a new system, one that will react as mercilessly to them as to anyone else if they break the rules.
Above all, the other European countries have to be confident that a new, independent power has not suddenly emerged in their midst, one that requires a counterbalance. The new Europe cannot be a German Europe – that would never work. Merkel would be doing the continent and her own country no favours by preaching only productivity, low labour costs and getting up early. But the continent must also realize that its welfare, freedom and security will be endangered if the jointly agreed rules are broken.
Merkel seems surprisingly relaxed in her familiar, daily rounds. Her conscience is clear. She has led Germany for longer than anyone ever expected. The fact that she has managed to govern the country in the first place was something that was by no means certain on the eve of the 2005 election. And she lives in the knowledge that eight years as Chancellor is a respectable achievement. Several of her predecessors didn't last that long. Her ambition is for a third term – that would be like ennoblement. But from the first day after re-election she would also be burdened with the knowledge that time is running out. Merkel is enough of a realist to know that. Years of crisis have taken their toll. The business of government wears out those who take it on.
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