by Sadler, John
Auchinleck was painfully aware of the political capital invested in the ‘last ditch’ position at Matruh. Britain’s faltering credibility would slide yet further and there was the inevitable knock-on effect on civilian morale in the Delta, where anti-colonial sentiment was already hopeful of an Axis victory. He had thus decided to make a stand at Matruh whilst allowing his army the necessary flexibility to fall back toward the El Alamein position, perhaps the worst of both worlds as it implied any withdrawal would literally be under the enemy guns.
This obvious difficulty would be compounded by the fact the principal Corps positions were so far apart. Battle was joined on 27th June. ‘Pike’ was the code for retreat and both British Corps were to converge on Minqar Omar which lay some 30 miles east. Gott had already acted but his disengagement soon ran into difficulties. Though 1st Armoured withdrew smoothly, the New Zealanders ran into opposition. Freyberg had been wounded and Brigadier Inglis took over to find the division boxed in around Minqar Quaim.
The Kiwis reacted vigorously, broke through the ring, inflicting loss upon the enemy. In Matruh, General Holmes was completely out of touch and was even planning a counter-attack. This came to nothing and by 28th June his corps was isolated and encircled. Holmes then planned for breakout: Both 50th and 10th Indian divisions would begin to move after 21.00 hrs and hasten south for 30 miles before swinging eastwards into the vicinity of Fuka.
British formations, thrown into brigade groups and moving in columns, endured a dangerous passage. Axis forces were already at Fuka where 21st Panzer had overrun the remnant of 29th Indian Brigade and a series of sharp, confused actions ensued. 10th Indian Division, in particular, suffered considerable casualties. Thus the decision to stand at Matruh had precipitated a further debacle and the Panzerarmee seemed unstoppable. In accordance with the notion of diminishing power of the offensive, Rommel should have run out of steam. The rule applied doubly in the desert where supply difficulties imposed such severe constraints, but DAK had, in part been sustained by captured materiel in Tobruk, and more garnered in the wake of Eighth Army’s precipitate and frequently headlong retreats.
Prior to Rommel’s offensive supplies had been stockpiled for ‘Acrobat’ – the onward Allied rush into Tripolitania. Now, the hard-pressed rear echelon units of the RAOC and RASC struggled to salvage or destroy their precious stores in the confusion of defeat. Prodigies of deliverance were indeed effected but such was the scale and extent of the build-up that much still fell into Axis hands. If the Axis were doing well on the ground, however, their grasp of the skies was crumbling. Squadrons of Kesselring’s planes were being fed into the endless mincer of the Eastern Front whilst sorties from Malta were exacting an increasing toll. The pendulum had not yet swung for the final time.
Farewell to Siwa
Rommel’s seemingly unstoppable run of successes spelt the end for LRDG at Siwa. It was no longer a secure FOB, so ‘A’ Squadron went back to Kufra and the rest withdrew into the Nile Valley. Aside from being demoralising, these moves complicated patrol operations. From the Nile, LRDG teams had to either pass through the lines at El Alamein or negotiate the horrors of the Qattara Depression. The road watch along the coast highway was being conducted some eight hundred miles west of Cairo and six hundred northwest of Kufra. Cooperation with Middle East Commandos also came to an end in July.
Matruh had been another reverse for Allied arms, yet despite this setback, Auchinleck had kept the army in being. This, as he and Dorman-Smith had identified, was the prime objective. Only by preserving mobile field forces could the British position in the Middle East be saved. He had now gone beyond Wavell’s ‘worst case’ and was considering how best to defend the Delta itself should he be pushed that far.
Meanwhile there was the ground south of El Alamein, a strip of desert some 38 miles in extent that lay between salt marsh and sea to the north and the impassable Qattara Depression, where no tank could tread. Here was ground that favoured a defensive battle, to be fought by an army markedly inferior in armour and less mobile than its opponent, one that needed time to rebuild and replenish.
For the most part this ground is featureless, till one reaches the rock-strewn hills that flank the waste of marsh and dune announcing the depression. Even these are no more than 700 feet above sea level but much nearer the sea are the twin eminences, rounded hillocks or ‘tells’ of which Tel el Eisa and Tel el Makh Khad would prove significant. The terrain is everywhere barren; loose, deepening sand alternating with unyielding rock which emerges in the narrow lateral ridges Miteirya, Ruweisat and Alam el Halfa.
These insignificant features would assume considerable importance in the fighting to come, and blood would be poured out in torrents to secure them. Once taken, such features were heartbreakingly difficult to fortify, horribly exposed. In places the ground dipped into shallow depressions (‘deirs’), natural saucers. That Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith should focus on the potential here was nothing revelatory, as the Alamein position had been identified as a natural defence line for the Delta some years beforehand.
Efforts at constructing a line of fortifications had been begun in the early days but operational priorities had relegated the endeavour. Initially, the plan had been for the creation of three heavily defended localities at El Alamein and the coast, at Bab el Qattara (Qaret el Abd) and at Naqb Abu Dweis. By the coast some positions were completed, wired and mined, in the centre there was rather less completed, and in the south very little. Water supplies were, however, on hand along the axis of the intended front.
Rommel, on 30th June, was poised for the attack. His men were utterly weary and suffering from the customary shortage of supply. He did not pause but moved straight into the offensive. His limited reconnaissance was soon to be found wanting for he had failed to appreciate the strength of the South Africans dug in around El Alamein. His plan was that both 90th Light Division and DAK would charge the gap north of Deir el Abyad. Whilst the Light Division would seek to replicate its earlier success in interdicting the coast road and thus isolating the Alamein garrison, DAK would sprint south to swing around behind 13 Corps. As ever the Italian formations were given a subordinate role, one division assaulting Alamein from the west, another behind 90th Light and the remainder trailing the panzers.
Matters did not go according to plan. Foul conditions delayed the progress of German armour, and 90th Light bumped the Alamein defences and suffered under the intense weight of fire the South Africans brought down upon them. DAK found Deir el Shein unexpectedly held by 18th Infantry Brigade and a fierce battle erupted. Newly arrived and inexperienced, 18th Brigade had struggled to dig into the stony surface and had limited support.
Nonetheless, the brigade fought hard against lengthening odds and with a crumbling perimeter, their few ‘I’ tanks and guns disabled. Despite a very gallant stand, the survivors were forced to surrender by evening on 1st July. The loss of the brigade was yet another blow, and an intervention by 1st Armoured Division was so long delayed as to be too late. DAK had won another tactical victory, but at the cost of a badly disrupted timetable.
90th Light, having extricated itself from initial contact, sought to resume its headlong dash, but intense fire from South African positions descended like a deluge and stopped any advance dead in its tracks. The Desert Air Force was living up to its role as the main striking arm, and the Axis sprint was grinding to a halt. DAK had suffered significant reported losses in available tank strength, and its supply columns had been bombed incessantly. By 2nd July Rommel was still making no progress and resolved to throw his armour behind the assault on the coast road.
Auchinleck had quickly appreciated that Allied outposts were exposed, and moved to concentrate his forces. Both sides attacked during the afternoon of 2nd July. In the north General Pienaar’s South Africans again resisted the Axis strike, aided by mobile elements drawn from 10th Indian Division. 90th Light was, once more, harassed by the incessant attentions of Desert Air Force and could make no headway. To the
south and west, just beyond Ruweisat Ridge, British and German armour were heavily embroiled. At the end of a hard day’s fighting, neither side could claim victory, but the Axis offensive had not progressed.
During the hours of darkness air attacks continued till battle was rejoined on the morning of the 3rd. There was yet more heavy fighting south of Ruweisat Ridge. In the south, Freyberg’s New Zealanders scored a signal success when they overran the artillery component of Ariete Division, netting a fine haul of prisoners and captured guns. 5th New Zealand Brigade was in action against the Brescia division at El Mreir. By now the Axis formations were severely ground down. Rommel reported his own divisions could only muster 1,000 or 1,200 men apiece, and incessant aerial bombardment was playing havoc with already overstretched supply lines. Skirmishing continued throughout 4th July but the main German effort was, for the moment, spent. It had been a failure.
The pendulum was poised for a decisive swing.
Notes
1 Included by kind courtesy of the Fusiliers Museum of Northumberland.
2 Gott, Lieutenant-General William, Henry, Ewart CB, CBE, DSO & Bar, MC 1897–1942 (‘Strafer’). Having served with distinction in the KRRC with the BEF ‘Strafer’ Gott, (so-named in WWI after Gott strafe England), was stationed in Egypt in 1939 commanding 1st Battalion KRRC. A series of rapid promotions followed for this blunt, soldierly figure who, had he not died in an air crash would have commanded Eighth Army and not Montgomery.
3 Wynter, p. 87.
4 Ibid., p. 91.
5 Ibid., p. 92.
6 Ibid., p. 93.
7 Lloyd Owen, p. 57.
8 Wynter, p. 94.
9 Ibid., p. 97.
10 Lloyd Owen, p. 63.
11 Ibid., p. 58.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 65.
14 Wynter, p. 103.
15 Lloyd Owen, pp. 65–66.
16 Wynter, pp. 105–106.
17 Lloyd Owen, p. 68.
18 Wynter, p. 109.
19 Ibid., p. 111.
20 Lloyd Owen, p. 61.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 71.
23 Wynter, p. 117.
24 Lloyd Owen, p. 72.
25 Morgan, p. 42.
26 Ibid., p. 43.
27 Lloyd Owen, p. 75.
28 Morgan, p. 43.
29 Wynter, p. 118.
30 Ibid., p. 119.
31 Lloyd Owen, p. 75.
32 Wynter, p. 122.
33 Lloyd Owen, p. 77.
34 Wynter, pp. 126–127.
35 Ibid., p. 130.
36 Lloyd Owen, p. 85.
37 Wynter, p. 132.
38 Lloyd Owen, p. 89.
39 Wynter, p. 135.
40 Ibid., p. 136.
41 Ibid., p. 139.
42 Ibid., p. 140.
43 Ibid., p. 143.
44 Ibid., p. 144.
45 Ibid., p. 146.
46 Lloyd Owen, p. 93.
47 Wynter, pp. 147–148.
48 Ibid., p. 151.
49 Lloyd Owen, p. 95.
50 Wynter, pp. 153–154.
51 Ibid., pp. 154–155.
CHAPTER 5
Sting of the Scorpion, 1942
What did I see in the desert today,
In the cold pale light of the dawn?
I saw the Honeys creaking out,
Their brave bright pennants torn;
And heads were high against the sky,
And faces were grim and drawn.
—L. Challoner, Desert Victory 1943
When the Allied advance in the winter of 1942 carried them far to the west, further than they’d been before, they would approach past Agheila that great soaring folly of Il Duce’s new and short-lived empire, the Arco Philaenorum. This impressive if pointless piece of architecture, as previously mentioned, our fellows dubbed ‘Marble Arch’.
Bill Kennedy Shaw recalls how, filtering in the great haze of desert heat, the sea to one side, bare stripped desert inland, the arch appears as a speck, a pimple, as incongruous as any mirage, yet one that looms larger and more substantial as you get closer. Not far away, only a couple of hundred yards or so to the southwest, stands a far more ancient altar, a memorial to classical rivalry between Carthage and its neighbouring city, Cyrene. Conflict, in North Africa has a very long pedigree.1 By the time of the final Allied breakthrough and the last great swing of the North African pendulum, the men of LRDG were very familiar with this particular grandiose landmark.
Alam Halfa
Auchinleck, though much concerned with the state of Eighth Army, could never ignore other threats which loomed over his wide satrapy. An Axis breakthrough in the north would be calamitous, threatening Iran, Iraq and Syria, all volatile in themselves. As the Soviets were not in the habit of sharing plans it was difficult to ascertain if the northern front could be secured.
The increasing demands of campaigning in the Far East, where one disaster followed another, also drained resources. Auchinleck simply did not have sufficient troops to fight in the desert whilst creating a viable defence to the north. The question was: which constituted the greater imperative, to hold Egypt or the Persian oilfields? By 12th July Churchill cabled that as it was impossible to do both, defeat of Axis forces in Cyrenaica must remain the absolute priority. Despite the considerable gains German offensives in southern Russia appeared to be achieving, it was unlikely that a complete breakthrough could be anticipated before the onset of winter halted operations. The question, however, remained: could Auchinleck, increasingly perceived as a spent force, deliver the long hoped for victory?
Both he and Dorman-Smith were painfully aware Eighth Army was not placed to deliver a decisive blow. Though Rommel had been halted, this was only a check and not a reverse. Allied efforts to assume the offensive in July had been, at best, disappointing. There were significant gaps in Eighth Army’s tactical competence and these would have to be resolved.
Dorman-Smith was confident that a renewed Axis offensive could be successfully countered and that a ‘modern defensive battle’ could be waged in the El Alamein sector. Rommel did not have sufficient infantry reserves for a blow to the north, therefore he would be obliged to attempt another wide, flanking move from the south. At this time, Auchinleck wished to formally appoint Brigadier Freddie de Guingand as chief of staff, freeing Dorman-Smith to return to his preferred job in the Delta.
Auchinleck, when penning his own further appreciation a day later than the first, took all of his subordinates’ thinking into account. He examined the prospects for an offensive, in the north, centre and south. Each was fraught with difficulty but he echoed General Ramsden in viewing the vicinity of Miteirya Ridge as most promising. A break-in here could corral the Axis forces in the north and expose those in the south. In essence, the plan for the forthcoming offensive comprised the following elements:
A major blow in the north;
Diversionary activity and phoney preparations to the south;
Disruption of enemy supply and communications;
To create a defended zone behind the main El Alamein line to defeat any Axis thrust from the south;
To ensure armoured forces were fullly prepared to exploit any breakthrough(s).
This was to prove Auchinleck’s legacy. Far from being washed-up he had, with his subordinates, produced the blueprint for final victory in the Western Desert, even though full credit has traditionally gone to his successor. No sooner was this appreciation committed to paper than Eighth Army staff, under de Guingand’s able control, began working up detailed plans. This would be the true ‘tight’ battle, planned in detail and intensively trained for. Previous operations had failed but the lessons derived from those mistakes would lay the groundwork for final success. It should be noted that Rommel, for all his brilliance, did not appear to learn from past errors. This defect would cost him dear and ensure his eventual defeat.
Hand in hand with the need for intense preparation and training, was recognition that key operations,
particularly mine clearing, should be standardised. In consequence a clear doctrine for gapping and clearing mines emerged. This emphasised the need for intense artillery bombardment to smother the enemy gun line, followed by a creeping barrage and the establishment of forward positions, enabling sappers to approach their task. Full fire support could thus be directed to cover the dangerous work of the mine clearance teams. As soon as possible the lead elements of the armour should advance to test the gap, supported by anti-tank guns. Behind this vanguard the main body with infantry support would then move forward, broadening the gap as required.
The Prime Minister wanted a new broom; a general who was imbued with an innate flair for difficult diplomacy. Churchill expected his new C-in-C to lead the onslaught against the Axis personally, and proposed to hive off the ‘northern’ Iraq/Iran sector, leaving the C-in-C Middle East better placed to concentrate his energies in the Western Desert. Dorman-Smith and others who Churchill saw as tainted with the Auk’s brush were to be cleared out.
Churchill had been impressed by Gott, but random fate relegated him to one of history’s tantalising ‘what ifs’. On 7th August his plane was ambushed by fighters from JG 27 and he was killed. Not all in Eighth Army mourned his sudden taking off. Bernard Montgomery thus gained Eighth Army as Alan Brooke preferred, but ironically by default. Auchinleck, having been summarily removed was offered the truncated northern command, more of an insult than a compromise, and understandably declined. Alexander, in taking over his new command, was blessedly free of the peripheral entanglements that had bedevilled his predecessors.
