by Nic Compton
The Third Class well deck would be a very inconvenient place to carry a boat and almost an impossible place to launch a boat from, because of the overhang. To launch a boat would be a most dangerous thing to attempt in that portion of the ship.
Edward Wilding – Naval Architect, Harland & Wolff
The Board of Trade insists on a ladder being provided up to the level from each compartment. On this ladderway at the after end of B deck, there is a hinged gate which anyone can lift and walk through – on the port and starboard sides. That is the only thing preventing Third Class passengers in the ordinary course getting up to the boat deck. There is no lock on it, and no means of locking it provided.
I went at a slow walking pace, from the very lowest part of the Third Class accommodation on to the boat deck. On one occasion one of the assessors accompanied me; on one occasion one of the Board of Trade Counsel, and on one occasion the Counsel for the Third Class passengers. The times varied a little, but they were always between three and three and a half minutes. That is right down from the lowest Third Class cabin that was occupied.
Harold Lowe – Fifth Officer
They did not know how to man or care for lifeboats. They were the same men as you get in every mercantile marine, not the British alone. You will find the best sailors going in the British marine; but that does not matter. It is the same in the American, and just the same everywhere.
A sailor is not necessarily a boatman; neither is a boatman a sailor, because they are two very different callings. I might pride myself that I am both – both a sailor and a boatman. A sailor may go to sea for quite a number of years and never go into a boat, never touch an oar, whereas you put a boatman in a ship and put him to do a job, and he is useless. He does not know anything about it. That is trying to convert a boatman into a sailor. They are both very different callings. That is the reason why many of the sailors could not row.
That is about all I have to say about the sailors not being boatmen.
‘Come at once. It is a CQD, old man’
Joseph Boxhall – Fourth Officer
After seeing all the men were well established with their work, I went to the chart room and worked out the ship’s position. I worked it out for 11.46. I computed it by star observations that had been taken by Mr Lightoller that same evening; and they were beautiful observations. I have the position in my head: forty-one, forty-six, north; fifty, fourteen west [41° 46’ N, 50° 14’ W]. That is the position I worked out; that was the position at the time she struck.
I submitted the position to the captain, and he said, ‘Take it to the Marconi room.’ I found the two operators there, Phillips and Bride. There was too much noise of the steam escaping, so I wrote the position down for them and left it on his table there. He [Phillips] saw it. He made a call, and he was listening, and I did not interrupt him.
Then I heard someone report a light ahead. I went on the bridge and had a look to see what the light was. It was two masthead lights of a steamer. I could see the light with the naked eye, but I could not define what it was. By the aid of a pair of glasses, I found it was the two masthead lights of a vessel, probably about half a point on the port bow, and in the position she would be showing her red if it were visible, but she was too far off then.
Then I saw her sidelights; I saw her green light and the red. She was end-on to us. Later I saw her red light. This is all with the aid of a pair of glasses. Afterwards, I saw the ship’s red light with my naked eye, and the two masthead lights. The only description of the ship that I could give is that she was, or I judged her to be, a four-masted steamer, judging by the position of her masthead lights. A sailing vessel does not show steaming lights, or white lights.
Captain Smith was standing by my side, and we both came to the conclusion that she was close enough to be signalled by the Morse lamp. So I signalled to her. The captain said, ‘Tell him to come at once, we are sinking.’ So I sent that signal out, ‘Come at once, we are sinking.’
There were a lot of stewards and men standing around the bridge and around the boat deck. Of course, there were quite a lot of them quite interested in this ship, looking from the bridge, and some said she had shown a light in reply, but I never saw it. I even got the quartermaster to fire off the distress signal and to signal with the Morse lamp, while I watched with a pair of glasses to see if I could see signs of any answer. But I could not see any. Captain Smith also looked, and he could not see any answer.
After I first saw the masthead lights, she must have been still steaming, but by the time I saw her red light with my naked eye she was not steaming very much. So she had probably gotten into the ice, and turned around. I judged her to be about five miles away, and I arrived at it in this way. The masthead lights of a steamer are required by the board of trade regulations to show for five miles, and the signals are required to show for two miles. I could see her lights quite clearly: I think we could see her lights more than the regulation distance, but I do not think we could see them 14 miles. Whatever ship she was had beautiful lights.
And then she turned round. She was turning very, very slowly, until at last I only saw her stern light.
Harold Bride – Assistant Telegraphist
I woke up of my own accord at about a quarter to 12. I had promised to relieve Mr Phillips earlier than usual. He had a big batch of telegrams from Cape Race that he had just finished. He told me that he thought the ship had got damaged in some way, and that he expected that we should have to go back to Harland & Wolff’s.
Mr Phillips was going to retire, when the captain came in. He said, ‘You had better get assistance.’ When Mr Phillips heard him, he came out and asked him if he wanted him to use a distress call. He said, ‘Yes. At once.’ Mr Phillips immediately sent CQD MGY about half a dozen times – CQD is a recognised distress call, and MGY is the code call of the Titanic.
The first answer was from the Frankfurt, ‘OK. Stand by.’ That meant he had got our message and would let us hear from him in a minute or so. Mr Phillips told me to go to the captain and report that he was in communication with the Frankfurt.
I went to report to the captain. He was on the boat deck, the starboard side, if I remember. He was superintending the loading of the lifeboats. He wanted to know where the Frankfurt was. I told him we would get that as soon as we could.
Next was the Carpathia. She sent her latitude and longitude and told us she had turned around and was steaming full speed. I took the message to the captain. He was in the wheelhouse, and came back with me to the cabin. He asked Mr Phillips what other ships he was in communication with. He interrupted Mr Phillips while he was establishing communication with the Olympic, so he was told the Olympic was there.
Harold Cottam – Marconi Officer, SS Carpathia
The receiver was on my head. I was waiting for a confirmation of a previous communication I had had with the Parisian. I had taken my coat off and should have finished for the night. I would have, if I had ever caught the Parisian, but I did not catch him; apparently he had gone to bed. The hour was about eleven o’clock, New York time.
The first message from the Titanic was, ‘Come at once. It is a CQD, old man.’ ‘CQD’ is the distress call. ‘Old man’ is simply a complimentary remark that is passed in wireless-telegraph service. Then he sent his position.
I confirmed it before reporting it to the bridge. I asked him if he intended me to go straight away to the bridge and get the ship turned round immediately, and he said, ‘Yes, quick.’ I reported it to the officer on watch first, and, from him, to the captain. The ship was turned round immediately, and headed for the position.
The captain told me to tell the Titanic that all our boats were ready and we were coming as hard as we could come, with a double watch on in the engine room, and to be prepared, when we got there, with lifeboats. The captain gave me our position, and I went straight away back to the cabin and sent it. I got no acknowledgement of that message.
I kept in touch with the Titanic the
whole time, and helped him to communicate. After I had sent our position, he said he could not read signals because of the escape of steam and the air through the expansion joint; the water rushing into the hollow of the ship was driving the air through the joint, right across the deck just outside the cabin. It would not only be the noise; it would also be the trembling of the ship. He said he could not read them well, so I simply stood by and helped him with the communications.
Arthur Rostron – Captain, SS Carpathia
At 12:35am on Monday, I was informed of the urgent distress signal from the Titanic. The wireless operator had taken the message and run with it up to the bridge, and gave it to the first officer who was in charge, with a junior officer with him, and both ran down the ladder to my door and called me. I had only just turned in. It was an urgent distress signal from the Titanic, requiring immediate assistance and giving me his position. I cannot say whether it was CQD or SOS. The position of the Titanic at the time was 41° 46’ N, 50° 14’ W. We were only 58 miles away from them.
Immediately on getting the message, I gave the order to turn the ship around, and immediately I had given that order I asked the operator if he was absolutely sure it was a distress signal from the Titanic. I asked him twice. He simply told me that he had received a distress signal from the Titanic, requiring immediate assistance, and gave me his position; and he assured me he was absolutely certain of the message.
I picked up our position on my chart, and set a course to pick up the Titanic. The course was north 52° west true, 58 miles from my position. I then sent for the chief engineer. In the meantime, I was dressing and seeing the ship put on her course. The chief engineer came up, and I told him to call another watch of stokers and make all possible speed to the Titanic, as she was in trouble. Our speed ordinarily is about 14 knots, but we worked up to about 17½ knots that night. That was about the highest speed we made.
As soon as I put her on the course for the Titanic’s position, I doubled the lookouts, and took all the precautions I possibly could. I knew there was ice about, because the Titanic told me he had struck ice. Therefore, I was prepared to be in the vicinity of ice when I was getting near him, because if he had struck a berg and I was going to his position I knew very well that there must be ice about.
Although I was running a risk with my own ship and my own passengers, I also had to consider what I was going for; I had to consider the lives of others. Of course there was a chance we would encounter ice, but at the same time I knew quite what I was doing. I considered that I was perfectly free, and that I was doing perfectly right in what I did.
I went full speed, all we could – I did, and doubled my lookouts, and took extra precautions and exerted extra vigilance. Every possible care was taken. We were all on the qui vive.
Harold Bride – Assistant Telegraphist
After the Olympic, we did not get any replies. We had transmitted to the Frankfurt our position, but we had received nothing from him in return. He had told us to stand by. I believe she was bound east, but I cannot say for certain. I do not think there was any communication established with the Frankfurt before we sent the distress signal.
Mr Phillips told me that, judging by the strength of the signals received from the two ships, the Frankfurt was the nearer. He was under the impression that when the Frankfurt had heard the CQD and got our position, he would immediately make it known to his commander and take further steps. Apparently he did not. The captain asked us where the Frankfurt was, but we told him we could not tell him.
The Frankfurt called us up at a considerably long period afterwards, I should say over twenty minutes afterwards, and merely asked us what was the matter. It struck me he did not seem to be able to realise the position we were in. We made it very clear to him. If you call CQD and give your position, then there is no necessity for another ship to inquire further into the matter, because you could not call CQD unless you were in need of assistance. Any operator hearing a CQD, giving a ship’s position, when on the job would immediately, without inquiring further into the matter, go to his captain and inform him. It would be a waste of time asking anything about it. The less time spent in talking, the more time can be spent in getting to the ship. We could not send anything more than CQD. CQD is the whole thing in a nutshell.
Mr Phillips responded rather hurriedly and told him he was a fool. He told him to keep out and not interfere with our communication, because we were in communication with the Carpathia, and we knew that the Carpathia was the best thing doing.
We received several messages from the Olympic from time to time, but to the best of my recollection they were not delivered because Captain Smith was busy and we presumed he would be worried, and we let them go. One message I remember was that the commander of the Olympic told Captain Smith to have his lifeboats ready. Captain Haddock [of the Olympic] was sending us communications until the time we left the cabin for good.
Harold Cottam – Marconi Officer, SS Carpathia
When I came back from the bridge and sent my position he was in communication with the Frankfurt. After the Titanic first sent her position, the Frankfurt operator got up apparently, and he came back in twenty minutes and asked what was the matter. I did not hear it all because I was running backwards and forwards from the bridge reporting the whole time.
There used to be a certain amount of rivalry, before the Marconi company amalgamated with the Telefunken. But the CQD call ought to be quite sufficient for any man who understands the English language, or the German language, for that matter. When a man sends his position and CQD, the first thing to do is to turn right around and steer for that position. The position of the Frankfurt to the Titanic did not matter at all. He ought not to have hesitated a minute.
He told him to ‘keep out’ because if he had not done it he would have been a nuisance, as we were in good, satisfactory communication. When a man takes twenty minutes to answer in a case like that, when two hours is between life and death, a fool is about the only fit thing you can call him. I should have told him the same. I should not give up a certainty for an uncertainty, when I was working the certainty.
After that the communications ceased from what I could hear. That was about 10.45pm New York time [12.35am ship’s time].
Guglielmo Marconi – Chairman, Marconi International
The call of the Berlin convention, which has only been recently introduced, is this SOS call, but the Marconi companies have used and use the CQD call. The Frankfurt was equipped with wireless made in Germany under my patents, and belonged to one of what I may call the Marconi companies. I should state that the international signal is really less known than the Marconi signal.
James Moore – Captain, SS Mount Temple
At 12.30am on 15 April I was awakened by the steward with a message from the Marconi operator. The message was: ‘Titanic sends CQD. Requires assistance. Position 41° 46’ N, 50° 14’ W. Come at once. Iceberg.’
I immediately blew the whistle on the bridge. I have a pipe leading down from the bridge to my cabin, and I blew the whistle at once. I told the second officer to turn the ship around at once and put her on north 45° east, and to come down at once. When he came down, we took the chart out and found out where the Titanic was and steered north 65° east true by the compass in the direction of the Titanic. We were about 49 miles away.
After I was sufficiently dressed, I went down to the chief engineer and I told him that the Titanic was sending out messages for help, and I said, ‘Go down and try to shake up the fireman, and, if necessary, even give him a tot of rum if you think he can do any more.’ I believe this was carried out. I also told him to inform the fireman that we wanted to get back as fast as we possibly could.
‘We were saving life’
Hugh Woolner – First Class Passenger
Very shortly afterwards I noticed the ship was down by the head. When I left No 4 and went to No 6, she was distinctly down by the head, and I think it was while working at that boat it was no
ticed that she had a pretty heavy list to port. My notice was called to this by Mr Wilde calling out, ‘All passengers over to the starboard side.’ That was an endeavour to give her a righting movement, and it was then I noticed that the ship had a list. But it would have been far more noticeable on the starboard side than on the port.
Charles Lightoller – Second Officer
I then proceeded to put out No 6 and lower away. I put the women and children in myself. There were no orders. I stood with one foot on the seat just inside the gunwale of the boat, and the other foot on the ship’s deck, and the women merely held out their wrist, their hand, and I took them by the wrist and hooked their arm underneath my arm.
We were not undertaking a boat drill then; we were saving life, and were using the men to the best of my knowledge and ability. As a rule, I put about two seamen in a boat. There is no use in sending too many men away and then finding yourself short. If I didn’t have a seaman there I had to put a steward there. Sometimes there would be three seamen in a boat. As soon as the boats were lowered to the level of the rail, I would detail one man to jump in and ship the rudder, one man to cast adrift the oars, and one man would see that the plugs were in, and it would take three men.
I used my own judgment about the strength of the tackle to decide how many to put in. In the first boat I put about 20 or 25 women and two seamen. Two was quite sufficient under the conditions. We wanted them up on deck, lowering away the boats.
I knew that it was not practicable to lower the boats full of people. I should not think they were capable of being lowered full of people. I have never seen them full of people, but if they are only supposed to carry 65 people afloat, it hardly seems feasible that they would carry 65 people when suspended at each end. It does not seem seamanlike to fill a boat chock full of people when it is only suspended at each end. It is to guard principally against accidents in lowering.
