by Nic Compton
I was at the wireless apparatus from Tuesday night to the time of docking. Mr Cottam spent a great majority of the time in the actual transmission, and I was preparing the messages for him for transmission, and myself I did a certain amount.
Arthur Rostron – Captain, SS Carpathia
From the very commencement, I took charge of the whole thing and issued orders that every message sent would be sent under my authority, and no message was to be sent unless authorised by me. My orders were: first of all, the two official messages. The two official messages were to the Cunard Company and the White Star Company, as regards the accident, telling them that I had got an approximate number of passengers aboard and was returning to New York. That was to the White Star Company, and the other one was to our company telling them that I was proceeding to New York unless otherwise ordered, and considered New York the best, for many considerations.
After those two messages were sent, I sent a press message to the Associated Press, practically in the same words as I had sent to the companies, over my signature. Those were the three first messages that were sent. After these messages were sent, we began sending in the names of the First Class passengers. This was by the Olympic on Monday evening. We got the first, and I think all the Second Class passengers off by the Olympic. Then we lost touch.
Cottam, the Marconi operator, was constantly at his instrument, the whole time. He is a young man, I should think about 25 years old, employed by the Marconi Company.
There was absolutely no censorship whatever. I controlled the whole thing, through my orders. I placed official messages first. After they had gone, and the first press message, then the names of the passengers. After the names of the passengers and crew had been sent, my orders were to send all private messages from the Titanic’s passengers first in the order in which they were given in to the purser; no preference to any message.
Harold Bride – Assistant Telegraphist
News was not withheld by Mr Cottam or myself with the idea of making money, but because, as far as I know, the captain of the Carpathia was advising Mr Cottam to get off the survivors’ traffic first. Quite 75 per cent of this we got off.
Harold Cottam – Marconi Officer, SS Carpathia
There was no information at all – I did not get any news ashore at all. The captain said, ‘Do not deal with anything otherwise than official traffic and passengers’ messages.’ That was the captain’s orders. I cannot go beyond the captain’s orders.
I was working for the shipping company, handling official messages all the time. I had a good many messages from Mr Ismay, and I had other Cunard messages; and when I was not busy with those, I was on passenger traffic.
I could not cope with the work at all. I sent more than 500 messages, about half official and half passenger. All the passengers’ names had to go, and the survivors’ names. I did not get the survivors’ messages all off. I had not sufficient time; I could not do an impossibility. When I docked in New York, there was one wireless station that had between 150 and 200 messages for me that I had not time to take on the way along.
Bruce Ismay – Managing Director, IMM
There was absolutely no embargo; and I asked for no preferential treatment for any messages that I sent. I do not know that any was given.
Harold Cottam – Marconi Officer, SS Carpathia
I had a message from the company asking me to meet Mr Marconi in the Strand Hotel, and I was preparing to get ashore as she touched. We were getting into the dock when the message came. Bride was writing it down, and I looked over as he was taking it. I do not remember anything about it. I was running about the ship at the time. The meeting was within less than an hour of docking.
I didn’t talk during all the voyage, from the catastrophe up to the time of arriving in New York. I did not say anything; I sent out nothing. Because I had the passengers’ messages and official traffic to get off before I could provide newspapers with news. That was not the most important thing to do. The captain told me to ignore all stations other than those I was in communication with and could benefit by.
Harold Bride – Assistant Telegraphist
On arrival in New York, Mr Marconi came on board with a reporter of the New York Times. Also Mr Sammis [chief engineer at Marconi] was present, and I received $500 for my story, which both Mr Marconi and Mr Sammis authorised me to tell.
I stayed with relatives and awaited orders from the Marconi Company, who have been most considerate and kind, buying me much needed clothes and looking after me generally.
I am glad to say I can now walk around, the sprain in my left foot being much better, though my right foot remains numbed from the exposure and cold, but causes me no pain or inconvenience whatever. I greatly appreciate the cable the company so kindly sent me and thank them for the same.
Lady Lucy Duff Gordon – First Class Passenger
After we arrived in New York, we had dinner with several friends. Mr Merritt, the editor of the Sunday Americanu, who is a great friend of ours, was there. After he had left us about half an hour he telephoned to me, and he said, ‘Mr Hearst has just rung me up, and must have your story of the Titanic wreck for tomorrow morning’s newspaper.’ He said, ‘May I tell your story as I have heard it?’ I said, ‘Yes,’ and he tells me afterwards that he telephoned to their head office all he knew about it, and then a clever reporter put all that into words and it appeared next morning in the New York American. It was published all over – everywhere. It is rather inventive, and the last little bit is absolutely a story. My signature was a forgery. Absolutely.
Arthur Rostron – Captain, SS Carpathia
I had previously to this sent a wireless to the White Star Line asking them to send a couple of tugboats down to quarantine to take these lifeboats away, as I would not be able to come into dock with those boats up in the davits or on the forecastle head. There were none there, and so I was worrying about these. It was a dirty night, coming up the river last night, and I was worrying about what I was going to do with the boats. I had the boats lowered half way to the water, to avoid any waste of time. When we got right off the dock, I asked them to send some tugboats out to take the boats away, as I could not dock until they were gotten out of the way. After that I do not know anything about them.
It was reported to me that 705 was the number of survivors, and we took three dead bodies from one of the boats. Not counting the 705, there was another man, a passenger we took up from the boat, who died two or three hours after we got him on board. We landed in New York 705.v
Charles Lightoller – Second Officer
It is very difficult indeed to come to any conclusion. Of course, we know now the extraordinary combination of circumstances that existed at that time which you would not meet again once in 100 years; that they should all have existed just on that particular night shows, of course, that everything was against us.
In the first place, there was no moon. I daresay it had been the last quarter or the first quarter. Then there was no wind, not the slightest breath of air. And most particular of all in my estimation is the fact, a most extraordinary circumstance, that there was not any swell. Had there been the slightest degree of swell I have no doubt that berg would have been seen in plenty of time to clear it.
The moon we knew of, the wind we knew of, but the absence of swell we did not know of. You naturally conclude that you do not meet with a sea like it was, like a table top or a floor, a most extraordinary circumstance, and I guarantee that 99 men out of 100 could never call to mind actual proof of there having been such an absolutely smooth sea.
Arthur Rostron – Captain, SS Carpathia
The whole thing was absolutely providential. I will tell you this, that the wireless operator was in his cabin, at the time, not on official business at all, but just simply listening as he was undressing. He was unlacing his boots at the time. He had this apparatus on his ear, and the message came. That was the whole thing. In ten minutes, maybe he would have been in bed, and we wou
ld not have heard the messages.
It was very remarkable, and, as I say, the whole thing was providential, as regards our being able to get there.
Charles Lightoller – Second Officer
There is no doubt we might make some improvements, which shipbuilders are trying to do all the time, and the White Star, as far as I know them, in particular. We have instructions, particularly to the commander and officers. As far as our side of it is concerned – the officers on deck – every suggestion we have to offer is met with every consideration, and is deeply considered. Anything that tends toward the improvement of the ship, or members of the ship, is immediately carried out.
Part Five
Extracts from the inquiry verdicts
WAS THE TITANIC GOING TOO FAST?
The US Inquiry
The speed of the Titanic was gradually increased after leaving Queenstown. The first day’s run was 464 miles, the second day’s run was 519 miles, the third day’s run was 546 miles. Just prior to the collision the ship was making her maximum speed of the voyage – not less than 21 knots, or 24½ miles per hour.
The British Inquiry
The entire passage had been made at high speed, though not at the ship’s maximum, and this speed was never reduced until the collision was unavoidable. Yet the evidence establishes quite clearly that Captain Smith, Mr Murdoch, Mr Lightoller and Mr Moody all knew on the Sunday evening that the vessel was entering a region where ice might be expected.
Why, then, did the Master persevere in his course and maintain his speed? The answer is to be found in the evidence. It was shown that for many years past, indeed, for a quarter of a century or more, the practice of liners using this track when in the vicinity of ice at night had been in clear weather to keep the course, to maintain the speed and to trust to a sharp lookout to enable them to avoid the danger. This practice, it was said, had been justified by experience, no casualties having resulted from it.
I acceptw the evidence as to the practice and as to the immunity from casualties which is said to have accompanied it. But the event has proved the practice to be bad. Its root is probably to be found in competition and in the desire of the public for quick passages rather than in the judgement of navigators. But unfortunately experience appeared to justify it.
In these circumstances I am not able to blame Captain Smith. He had not the experience which his own misfortune has afforded to those whom he has left behind, and he was doing only that which other skilled men would have done in the same position.
It was suggested at the bar that he was yielding to influences which ought not to have affected him; that the presence of Mr Ismay on board and the knowledge which he perhaps had of a conversation between Mr Ismay and the chief engineer at Queenstown about the speed of the ship and the consumption of coal probably induced him to neglect precautions which he would otherwise have taken. But I do not believe this. The evidence shows that he was not trying to make any record passage or indeed any exceptionally quick passage. He was not trying to please anybody, but was exercising his own discretion in the way he thought best. He made a mistake, a very grievous mistake, but one in which, in face of the practice and of past experience, negligence cannot be said to have had any part; and in the absence of negligence it is, in my opinion, impossible to fix Captain Smith with blame.
WERE THERE ENOUGH LIFEBOATS?
The US Inquiry
The Titanic was fitted with 16 sets of double-acting boat davits of modern type, capable of handling two or three boats per set of davits. The davits were thus capable of handling 48 boats, whereas the ship carried but 16 lifeboats and four collapsibles, fulfilling all the requirements of the British Board of Trade. The total lifeboat capacity was 1,176. There was ample lifebelt equipment for all. Including the crew, the Titanic sailed with 2,223 persons aboard, of 1,517 were lost and 706 were saved.
It will be noted in this connection that 60 per cent of the First Class passengers were saved, 42 per cent of the Second Class passengers were saved, 25 per cent of the Third Class passengers were saved, and 24 per cent of the crew were saved.
The British Inquiry
Under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, a table showing the minimum number of boats to be placed under davits, and their minimum cubic contents, was issued by the Board of Trade. This table was based on the gross tonnage of the vessels to which it was to apply, and not upon the numbers carried, and it provided that the number of boats and their capacity should increase as the tonnage increased. The table, however, stopped short at the point where the gross tonnage of the vessels reached ‘10,000 and upwards’. As to all such vessels, whatever their size might be, the minimum number of boats under davits was fixed by the table at 16, with a total minimum capacity of 5,500 cubic feet.
After 1894, steamers were built of a much larger tonnage than 10,000, the increase culminating in the Titanic, with a gross tonnage of 46,328. As the vessels built increased in size, so one would have thought the necessity for increased lifeboat accommodation would grow; but the Rules and Table remained stationary, and nothing was done to them by way of change. Thus it will be seen that the boats carried by this class of vessel are also quite inadequate as an effectual means of saving life should a disaster happen to a ship with her full complement of passengers on board.
It cannot be that the provision for boat accommodation made in 1894 for vessels of 10,000 tons and upwards remained sufficient to 1910, when vessels of 45,000 tons were being built.
The gross tonnage of a vessel is not, in my opinion, a satisfactory basis on which to calculate the provision of boat accommodation. Hitherto, I believe, it has been accepted as the best basis by all nations. But there seems much more to be said in favour of making the number of lives carried the basis and for providing boat or raft accommodation for all on board. When naval architects have devised practical means for rendering ships unsinkable, the question of boat accommodation may have to be reconsidered, but until that time arrives boat accommodation should, where practicable, be carried for all on board.
This suggestion may be thought by some to be extravagant. It has never been enforced in the mercantile marine of Great Britain, nor, as far as I know, in that of any foreign nation. But it appears, nevertheless, to be admitted by all that it is possible, without undue inconvenience or undue interference with commerce, to increase, considerably in many cases, the accommodation hitherto carried, and it seems, therefore, reasonable that the law should require an increase to be made. As far as foreign-going passenger and emigrant steamships are concerned, I am of opinion that, unless justification be shown for deviating from this course, such ships should carry boats or rafts for all on board.
WERE THIRD CLASS PASSENGERS PREVENTED FROM REACHING THE LIFEBOATS?
The US Inquiry
The testimony is definite that, except in isolated instances, there was no panic. In loading boats no distinction was made between First, Second, and Third Class passengers, although the proportion of lost is larger among Third Class passengers than in either of the other classes. Women and children, without discrimination, were given preference.
The British Inquiry
It had been suggested that the Third Class passengers had been unfairly treated; that their access to the boat deck had been impeded, and that when at last they reached that deck, the First and Second Class passengers were given precedence in getting places in the boats. There appears to have been no truth in these suggestions. It is no doubt true that the proportion of Third Class passengers saved falls far short of the proportion of the First and Second Class, but this is accounted for by the greater reluctance of the Third Class passengers to leave the ship, by their unwillingness to part with their baggage, by the difficulty in getting them up from their quarters, which were at the extreme ends of the ship, and by other similar causes.
The interests of the relatives of some of the Third Class passengers who had perished were in the hands of Mr Harbinson, who attended the inquiry on their behalf. He said
at the end of his address to the Court: ‘I wish to say distinctly that no evidence has been given in the course of this case which would substantiate a charge that any attempt was made to keep back the Third Class passengers… I desire further to say that there is no evidence that when they did reach the boat deck there was any discrimination practised either by the officers or the sailors in putting them into the boats.’
I am satisfied that the explanation of the excessive proportion of Third Class passengers lost is not to be found in the suggestion that the Third Class passengers were in any way unfairly treated. They were not unfairly treated.
WHY WEREN’T THE BOATS FILLED PROPERLY?
The US Inquiry
The vessel was provided with lifeboats, as above stated, for 1,176 persons, while but 706 were saved. Only a few of the ship’s lifeboats were fully loaded, while others were partially filled. Some were loaded at the boat deck, and some at the A deck, and these were successfully lowered to the water. The twentieth boat was washed overboard when the forward part of the ship was submerged, and in its overturned conditions served as a life raft for about 30 people.
The lack of preparation during loading was most noticeable. There was no system adopted for loading the boats; there was no direction whatever as to the number of passengers to be carried by each boat, and no uniformity in loading them. On one side only women and children were put in the boats, while on the other side there was almost equal proportion of men and women put into the boats, the women and children being given the preference in all cases. The failure to utilise all lifeboats to their recognised capacity for safety unquestionably resulted in the needless sacrifice of several hundred lives which might otherwise have been saved.
