by Jim Bradbury
Harold Godwinson, it will be recalled, had summoned his forces early in the year. By September, when the most common period for invasion was over, he could hold his men together no longer, and the land and sea fyrds were dismissed. The ships were to dock in London. This did not, of course, leave him without any troops at all, but it did weaken the coastal defences, and it was clearly an exhausting year for both the troops who remained in arms and those who would shortly be recalled. John of Worcester’s description of this move suggests strongly that Harold retained the mounted part of his army.26 When Harold Godwinson heard of the landing of Hardrada in Yorkshire, he desperately sought to assemble a large force once more. But he could not do miracles, and the first line of defence had to be the local force of the northern earls, which had been defeated at Gate Fulford.
Hardrada rested on his laurels. He made an agreement with the citizens of York, and used his fleet at Riccall as a base. According to Gaimar, the invaders carried off cattle, but part of the agreement was for provision of food. The Norwegian king also demanded 150 hostages, leaving an equal number of his own men in the city.27 So while Harold was making a rapid and draining march north, Hardrada was replenishing his strength. Hardrada, awaiting the fulfilment of the agreement, brought his army to the fields near the River Derwent, close by the crossing at Stamford Bridge. But Hardrada had only occupied the site for a day when Harold of England made his unexpected appearance.
It would be of great interest to know what unmounted men Harold Godwinson had at his disposal. It is unlikely that men marched on foot from the south, while many of the northern men had been involved at Gate Fulford, and Harold’s haste did not allow time to wait and magnify his force. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that he went north ‘as quickly as he could assemble his force’. The parallels between this situation and that of Hastings are not often noted, but they are clearly worth consideration. Probably it was survivors from Gate Fulford, and some from areas near to Yorkshire, that provided the infantry for Harold at Stamford Bridge. At any rate, Godwinson raised a good army, ‘with many thousands of well-armed fighting men’. Harold’s march north has been seen by the historian of the battle as ‘one of the greatest feats of military manoeuvre in medieval history’, which is laying it on a bit thick, though it was certainly a creditable performance.28
The rapid march paid dividends. The invaders were taken by surprise. Godwinson reached Tadcaster on 24 September, less than 10 miles from York. There he rested overnight and then set off early next morning, Monday 25 September, to deal with Hardrada. He marched straight on through York, which shows that the citizens were not prepared to make any military effort to back their agreement with Hardrada. Godwinson headed eastwards from York, towards the Derwent and the enemy.
There is a bridge over the Derwent at Stamford Bridge now, and there was one then; the river is wide and deep and difficult to cross so the bridge was vital. It has been suggested that it was placed differently, but it is probably close to its ancient position.29 Hardrada’s army was in the open countryside on the far side of the river. It is flat, open ground, as it was then, damp and rather swampy. One reason to discount Snorri’s account of English cavalry is that the ground would have been most unsuitable for such warfare.30
The enemy army was in disarray. The alarm came too late. Some of the troops were still miles away with the fleet in Riccall. Hardrada’s only hope was to hold the bridge, and a few men made a valiant effort to do this. Early accounts, not only later legendary ones, mention the defence of the bridge by a big Norwegian, who held off the men trying to cross.31 He was overcome, or perhaps undercome, when the English sent a boat along the Derwent and a man from below thrust a weapon, probably a spear, through the planking of the bridge, killing the hero in a particularly painful manner. This story presents a problem: if the English had archers here, as generally accepted, why did they not shoot the man? If they did indeed have archers, the story would seem to be a fabrication. We are left with a doubt over both the presence of English archers and the tale of the defender of the bridge.
The English crossed the bridge. The Norwegians were still frantically attempting to get into some order, Hardrada prominent in his blue tunic. They tried to hold the area known as Battle Flats, slightly higher than the surrounding ground. Snorri says that the Norwegian king’s hauberk was called Emma, and that he fought two-handed with a sword.
The English charged straight in and broke the Norwegians apart, though fighting continued until ‘late in the day’.32 Snorri has men from the fleet arriving while the battle was in progress, and one of them, Eystein Orri, took up Hardrada’s fallen banner Landwaster, thus prolonging the battle. The conflict was ‘very fierce fought on both sides’, becoming ‘a most bitter battle’, but it turned into a massacre.33
There was a massive slaughter. A few escaped, among them Hardrada’s marshal, Styrkar. Snorri gives an account of how he got away in just a shirt and helmet. He came upon a cart whose driver had a leather coat and offered to buy it, but the man said he knew Styrkar was a Norwegian and refused. Styrkar cut off his head, took the coat and the horse, and rode to the coast. The English pursued the defeated troops to the coast, where some of the ships were set on fire.34
Three hundred invading ships had arrived, five hundred according to one account, and twenty-four at most sufficed to take away the survivors.35 Hardrada’s son Olaf was one of those allowed to go. Among the dead left on the field were the old warrior Harold Hardrada, and Tostig, the embittered brother of the English king. The local legend that Hardrada survived to live the life of a peasant in a hut may safely be discounted. According to Orderic Vitalis, there was still in his day ‘a great mountain of dead men’s bones’ marking the field.36
Harold Godwinson’s career and reign was short and tragic, but he had his moment of glory. The Norwegian invasion was probably greater in terms of numbers than the Norman one which followed. Harold must have gained enormous confidence from his decisive victory. Had Hastings gone the other way, he would have been seen as one of our greatest warrior kings, which indeed he was. In the long run, Stamford Bridge had important consequences: it narrowed the field of competitors for control of England to two, and it did much to shift England away from the Scandinavian threat which had dogged it for a long period.
And so we move in our narrative to the last and most fateful invasion of England in 1066. William of Normandy had made careful preparations. We have seen how he made the marriage alliance with Flanders, repaired the damage that had been done to his relations with the papacy, and pushed Norman power beyond his frontiers so that he now had little fear of attack. According to William of Poitiers, he had also obtained a promise of fidelity from Sweyn Estrithsson, king of Denmark.37 Some Normans were keen on a conquest of England, but the Conqueror had also to persuade unenthusiastic nobles, and partly for this purpose held councils to seek advice – at Lillebonne, Bonneville and Caen. Wace says the barons were summoned, and the debate lasted ‘a great while’ over what animals and what aid they could afford. Some claimed they had no obligation to serve over the sea. William resolved the problem by talking to the barons individually.38
The Conqueror had prepared the way by propaganda. It seems as if William at least was convinced that Edward had offered him the succession to the English throne. He had enforced upon Harold an oath which, whatever its exact contents, to Norman eyes meant that Harold should have supported William’s rights in England. When Harold himself accepted the crown, William began his preparations to make it his by force. All the Norman sources give Harold’s perjury as the justification for William’s invasion.39
William needed men. Some came to him from obligations enforced in Normandy. Some were loyal military men in his household. Others came as allies or hired men, sometimes the distinguishing line was thin, from Flanders, Boulogne, Brittany, Maine and other parts of France. William of Poitiers says that men were attracted by the justice of the cause, and by the generosity of the Conqueror, by which he pr
esumably means either in pay to hired men or in promises of what might be gained on the expedition. Orderic Vitalis saw them ‘panting for the spoils of England’.40
The constant attempts to calculate a figure for William’s force seems unprofitable. Unless we believe Wace’s 696 we do not know the number of ships involved, and we do not know how many of which type; there are no reliable figures from contemporary evidence for any section of the force.41 Of course, one can get a rough idea from the length of time to disembark, from the ground covered in the battle and so on, but beyond such a rough guess – 5,000 to 10,000 as a grand total is a usual figure – there seems no point in making apparently precise but in effect meaningless estimates.42
William also needed ships. Normandy like England has a long coast, and fishing was an important industry. Some ships were certainly available. But the Norman duchy, despite its Viking past, had not given much attention to naval warfare, and in 1066 perhaps the major need was a large fleet of transport ships. There had been minor expeditions to England in support of the claims of the sons of Aethelred II, and the Normans had used a fleet for the invasion of Sicily.43 But the expedition of 1066 broke new ground, requiring the transport of a full ducal army of invasion, including warhorses. Wace says that all the ports of Normandy were in a stir.44 William needed to augment his fleet. His allies, including Flemings and Bretons, probably gave some aid, but he also needed to build ships, which we see being accomplished on the Tapestry. Men are shown felling trees with axes, trimming them, and using drills, hand axes and adzes to build the ships.45
In the case of William’s activities, we are well informed. William of Poitiers was the duke’s chaplain. It is true that he only came to England after 1066, and did not take part in the expedition of that year. His description of it, and of the battle, is therefore at second hand. But he was well placed to get the facts from the best informed men. These were, of course, for the cleric, all on the Norman side, and his account is inevitably biased. We need to beware of this, but we do not need the same provisos over knowledge which had to be made in the case of Snorri writing about Hardrada.46
William of Poitiers tells us a little of his hero’s youth: of his being knighted, holding reins, sword, shield, helmet and lance, wearing ‘princely garb’. At that time, he made vows to protect the Church and give good government. But mostly the early days are an account of the dangers and rebellions which we have already followed. The writer’s bias is shown, for example, by an account of William’s taking of Alençon, but without mention of either the insults about his bastardy or the vicious revenge that the Conqueror took. The chronicler clearly says that the Confessor promised William the crown of England ‘by a lawful gift’ and as his heir, and that the English magnates assented. He says that the hostages, Harold’s younger brother Wulfnoth and his nephew Hakon, were given to guarantee this promise. Poitiers adds that Harold’s visit was on the Confessor’s orders, and to confirm the offer of the crown. He details Harold’s promises as being to do all in his power towards gaining the throne. Wace, with hindsight, goes so far as to say that Edward forbade him to go in case he was drawn into a snare.47
When Edward the Confessor died, William of Poitiers says that Harold took the throne without waiting for a proper election, thus ‘breaking his oath’. The duke then decided to take his revenge and at once ordered the building of ships, the collection of equipment, arms and men, according to Poitiers assembling an army of fifty thousand soldiers. The Conqueror kept his eyes and ears open for developments in England; spies were used by both sides. William of Poitiers tells of an English spy captured by the Normans and sent back with a message to Harold which contained a warning. William’s advisers also informed him of Harold’s strength in England, and tried to dissuade him from his project, but he began to make arrangements for how Normandy should be governed in his absence. William proclaimed, ‘we have enough ships. Soon we shall have triumph, honour and glory.’
Then followed a period of waiting which must have tried the nerves of William and all his men. It is possible that he deliberately delayed to some extent, knowing of Hardrada’s invasion. It would suit William well to let his two rivals hammer out their differences, leaving him with one rather than two enemies to defeat. He may also have thought that the later he left it the more likely that Harold would have problems keeping his army and fleet at the ready. The eventual timing of his trip worked perfectly. But it cannot have been all calculation.
The Norman sources make it clear that he had to wait for a favourable wind for the vital crossing, and chafed at the delay. The weather was against him for several weeks. William of Poitiers says they waited a month in the mouth of the Dives, at Dives-sur-Mer, which was not far from Caen and lay between Varaville to the west and Bonneville to the east. He kept his troops under strict discipline, provisioning them well and forbidding forage. ‘Weak or unarmed, any man might move about the district at his will, singing on his horse, without trembling at the sight of soldiers.’48
According to the Carmen: ‘for a long time foul weather and ceaseless rain prevented [William] from leading the fleet across the Channel, while [he] awaited the favour of the winds; and the troubled sea forced [him] to put back, and gusts of the east wind curled the ocean waves’.49 It is almost certain that William would have come to England earlier had the weather allowed it, so he had fortune as well as planning on his side.
His fleet assembled at the mouth of the Dives, and in neighbouring ports. On 12 September he was able to move, but only as far as St-Valery-sur-Somme, at the mouth of that river, and that with difficulty. Probably from the weather, William suffered a set-back on the short journey from the Dives to St-Valery, and men were drowned. William of Poitiers says they were buried in secret, obviously so as not to dishearten the army. Perhaps to rebuild morale, and to ask for a favourable wind, William organised a religious ceremony, parading the relics of St-Valery before the men. It was at St-Valery that William of Poitiers says they received the standard (vexillum) from Pope Alexander II (1061–73), which put them under the protection of St Peter.50
The Carmen says that at St-Valery they faced another ‘long and difficult delay’ … looking ‘to see by what wind the weathercock of the church was turned’; it was ‘cold and wet, and the sky hidden by clouds and rain’.51 A recent article has discussed the problems for William’s fleet facing the possible dangers of a lee shore, the difficulties of the tricky Channel tides, and the weather conditions most likely caused by Atlantic lows.52 There is no doubt that William was wise to be cautious in deciding when to sail. He may also have been well informed as to developments within England, with his own frigates operating at sea during the period of waiting.53
At last on 27 September the wind relented, and the crossing began. Masts were raised, horses brought on board, sails hoisted, arms stowed. Soldiers flocked on to the ships like doves into a dovecote.54 A herald announced the positions for the ships in the fleet on the voyage. By evening, the force was embarked and they set sail, to the sound of drums, trumpets and pipes, anchoring just out to sea. William’s ship was the Mora, given him by his wife Matilda, which further enhances the likelihood of a considerable input to the fleet from Flanders. Wace says it had a figurehead of a boy with a bow and arrow, which pointed towards England as they sailed.55
When they began the invasion crossing, William’s own ship led the way with a lantern fixed to its mast for others to follow, while a trumpet was used for signals. It must have been a somewhat motley fleet, gathered from all possible sources as it was, and with leaders who had little experience of such endeavours. Much of the fleet consisted of transports, and many were loaded down with men, provisions and horses. William’s ship found itself moving too far ahead, and contact was lost with the fleet.
Whether by fortune or by planning, the English fleet as well as the men of the land fyrd had been disbanded when William sailed, and such troops as could be raised had been taken off north, so there was no opposition to the crossin
g or the landing. At first light, the look-out from the masthead could not see the fleet. The Conqueror’s ship weighed anchor and waited until the others appeared. William, to show he was not dismayed, ate a breakfast accompanied by spiced wine, ‘as if he were at home’. Then the look-out spotted the first four ships, and soon the fleet hove into view ‘like a forest of sails’. Before long they were reunited, and sailed into Pevensey Bay where they disembarked on 28 September, completing the process during the afternoon. It was said that very few men were lost on the crossing; one who did perish was the unfortunate soothsayer, who had failed to forecast his own demise.56
Notes
1. Barlow, Edward, p. 213; Barlow (ed.), Vita, p. 6.
2. Barlow, Edward, p. 300.
3. Barlow (ed.), Vita, p. 112.
4. Barlow (ed.), Vita, p. 116.
5. Barlow (ed.), Vita, p. 122.
6. Barlow (ed.), Vita, pp. 80–2, 112, 118–20, 122–4; Barlow, Edward, pp. 249–52; Wace, ed. Taylor, p. 93; Wace, ed. Holden, ii, pp. 101–2, ll. 5809–10. On the latter see M. Bennett, ‘Wace and warfare’, ANS, xi, 1988, pp. 37–58; Bayeux Tapestry, pl. 30.
7. John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 598.
8. Barlow (ed.), Vita, pp. 151–3; Barlow, Edward, pp. 269, 282.
9. Bayeux Tapestry, pl. 29–30.
10. John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 601; Whitelock et al. (eds), Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 140; Bayeux Tapestry, pl. 31.
11. Bayeux Tapestry, pl. 31.
12. Douglas, William, pp. 181–2; William of Poitiers, ed. Foreville, p. 146; John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, pp. 590–2, 600; Whitelock et al. (eds), Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 140; Cubbins (ed.), Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, p. 79.
