by Prit Buttar
12th Mechanised Corps was commanded by Major General Nikolai Mikhailovich Shestopalov, a former cavalryman. He dispatched his 23rd and 28th Tank Divisions towards the enemy, but the attack was doomed from the start. Ammunition and fuel shortages, combined with insufficient time to gather the various sub-units into an orderly whole, and a complete lack of knowledge of the whereabouts of German units, resulted in a piecemeal attack.
23rd Tank Division was deployed to the west of 28th Tank Division. Near Kutaliai, 23rd Tank Division encountered elements of the German 11th and 1st Infantry Divisions, and though it made some initial progress, a confused battle continued for a day before the exhausted Soviet division was forced back, abandoning many of its tanks as they ran out of fuel. A little to the east, the Soviet 28th Tank Division attacked south against the 1st and 21st Infantry Divisions; the two sides first encountered each other at dusk on 23 June:
Between 12 and 15 tanks drove down the road running south-east from Kaltinėnai. At the same moment, Gefreiter Hasse from 14 Coy, Inf.Reg.22, had brought his gun into position at the road fork a kilometre north of the Butkaičiai estate. The gunner shot up six of the rapidly advancing tanks at close range, even though the gun was almost overrun.12
Hasse was probably fortunate that the tanks he faced were either T26 or BT7 models; his 37mm gun would have been ineffective against the heavier Soviet armour.
The German axis of advance was towards the north-east, while the Soviet armour was attempting to attack southwards. Three days of fighting followed, with the increasingly bewildered Soviet units struggling to react to enemy movements. Through a mixture of enemy action, mechanical breakdowns and fuel shortages, the two Soviet divisions lost all but 45 of their original 749 tanks, and were driven back in a chaotic retreat.13 For the commander of 28th Tank Division, Ivan Danilovich Cherniakhovsky, it was a chastening baptism of fire. He survived the setback, and eventually rose to command a front during 1944–45.
Kuznetsov’s other major armoured formation, 3rd Mechanised Corps, was deployed north-west of Kaunas, and it too set off in its pre-planned counter-attack. Its commander, Alexei Vasileevich Kurkin, sent 5th Tank Division and 84th Motorised Division to support the hard-pressed units of 11th Army, struggling to hold back Busch’s 16th Army on the approaches to Kaunas. The remaining unit of 3rd Mechanised Corps, 2nd Tank Division, drove north-west into the area where Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Group was operating.
Meanwhile, Brandenberger was busy making preparations for the second day of combat. Much of 8th Panzer Division’s firepower was now transferred to Kampfgruppe Crisolli, so that it could make the most of its remarkable breakthrough. But for most of 23 June, the battlegroup remained stationary near Ariogala. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, Brandenberger wished to bring forward other combat elements of his division, to avoid stops at a later stage for regrouping. Secondly, supplies had to be brought forward. The poor road network over which the Wehrmacht was operating hindered both of these factors; Scheller’s battlegroup, hurrying to catch up with Crisolli, was ordered off the main road for two hours by corps-level traffic police while 3rd Motorised Infantry Division was given priority. But an additional factor was that German reconnaissance had spotted the impending attack of the Soviet 2nd Tank Division, and given that Crisolli’s battlegroup at Ariogala was the closest German unit, it seemed likely that this was the intended target of the Soviet attack. Consequently, an order to advance swiftly to Kėdainiai was cancelled, and the German forces in Ariogala – increasing in strength as more elements of 8th Panzer Division arrived – adopted a defensive posture. It was only in mid-afternoon that it became clear that the Soviet armoured force was headed for Raseiniai, and was completely oblivious to the presence of 8th Panzer Division; indeed, it seems that the Soviet High Command had lost all track of where the German division was.
As the axis of the Soviet attack became clear, Hoepner briefly debated whether he should divert 8th Panzer Division to join what was to become the battle of Raseiniai. After some deliberation, he decided that the division should press on towards its original objective. However strong the Soviet force was, the increasing dislocation caused by a swift advance to the Daugava was more important. Consequently, at 1700hrs, he ordered 8th Panzer Division to push on through Kėdainiai towards Šėta.14 The German forces around Raseiniai would have to deal with the Soviet 2nd Tank Division on their own.
Immediately, Brandenberger dispatched his reconnaissance battalion towards Kėdainiai, followed by the rest of the division. The town was captured at 0330hrs on 24 June, with its vital bridge intact. The next objective was Šėta, about six miles further east. Relieved that the day spent waiting around Ariogala had not resulted in any apparent strengthening of the Soviet lines, Brandenberger pressed on. Remnants of the Soviet 5th and 33rd Rifle Divisions attempted to hold Šėta, to no avail. Although the nearest neighbouring German unit was 27 miles away, Brandenberger reaped the benefits of being right at the front of the thrust: he could see for himself the complete chaos brought about by his rapid advance. Sensing that a pause would probably be more dangerous than continuing the drive, he pressed on to Ukmergė, reaching the town towards the end of the day, an advance of 30 miles from Ariogala. Despite reports of Soviet forces approaching him from almost all points of the compass – even as Šėta was being captured, Kampfgruppe Crisolli beat off an attack by about 15 Soviet tanks, including the division’s first encounter with a KV1 – and with some elements of his division still strung out over a distance of up to 36 miles, Brandenberger remained bullish about his prospects, and drove Crisolli forward an additional six miles from Ukmergė before calling a halt for the day.
Further to the north-west, though, the German armour around Raseiniai was having a far less comfortable time. Igor Nikolaevich Soliankin had commanded the Soviet 2nd Tank Division for a year. He had 300 tanks at his disposal, including 50 heavy KV1s, and a small number of KV2s. His division began to move north-west on 23 June, but did not encounter the enemy until late the following day. Meanwhile, XLI Panzer Corps was advancing north-east towards the town of Raseiniai. 6th Panzer Division had divided into two battlegroups. Kampfgruppe Seckendorf had a rifle battalion, a motorcycle battalion, a tank battalion, and engineering, anti-tank and anti-aircraft support, and was tasked with pushing up to Raseiniai along the main road from the south, while Kampfgruppe Raus, a little further west, advanced on a converging axis, with a battalion each of infantry and tanks. The division’s reconnaissance battalion moved ahead to seize crossings over the River Dubysa, to the north-east of Raseiniai. Although it is a small river, the steep sides of the Dubysa valley offered the retreating Red Army a potential defensive line, and Generalmajor Franz Landgraf, commander of 6th Panzer Division, was anxious to secure a substantial bridgehead as soon as possible.
At first, in the face of scattered and uncoordinated resistance, the battlegroups made good progress, rapidly securing Raseiniai while the reconnaissance battalion began to cross the Dubysa and set up a perimeter on the east bank. During the afternoon of 24 June, Seckendorf moved his units forward towards the bridges held by the reconnaissance battalion, while Raus set off northward, to secure additional crossings near Katauskiai. At about the same time, Soliankin’s armour reached the perimeter of the German reconnaissance battalion, and immediately attacked with about 100 tanks:
The battalion might have held out longer, had it not been for the monster tanks, whose 70-cm tracks literally ground everything in their path into the earth – guns, motorcycles, and men. There was not a single weapon in the bridgehead that could stop them. After the massacre, the tanks waded through the Dubysa, easily crawling up the 45-degree banks.15
As the Soviet tanks breasted the top of the western valley slope, they ran into Seckendorf’s battlegroup, which was hastily deploying into a defensive line. To the horror of the Germans, they discovered that the heavyweight KV1s were almost invulnerable to German anti-tank fire. The mass of Soviet armour rolled forward relentlessly, breaking
through the defensive line and penetrating to the division’s artillery positions a little to the rear.
Both the KV1s and the even heavier KV2s seemed to be unstoppable. A courier from 1st Panzer Division witnessed the fighting:
Our companies opened fire from 700 meters. We got closer and closer, but it didn’t disturb the enemy. Soon we were only about 50–100 meters from each other. A fantastic engagement opened up – without any German progress. The Soviet tanks continued their advance and our armour-piercing projectiles simply bounced off. The Soviet tanks withstood point-blank range fire from both our 50mm and 75mm guns. A KV2 was hit more than 70 times, and not a single round penetrated. A very few of the Soviet tanks were immobilized and eventually also destroyed as we managed to shoot at their tracks, and then eventually brought up the artillery to hammer them at close range. Assault engineers then attacked by foot with satchel charges.16
Unfortunately for Soliankin’s division, the limitations imposed by their lack of radios, poor training and outdated doctrine made themselves felt all too soon. The tanks diverged and set off on individual battles, rather than concentrating on a single objective. There was almost no infantry support, and the tanks soon began to run short of fuel and ammunition. Nevertheless, there were still difficult moments ahead for the Germans, who found themselves driven back most of the way to Raseiniai. A single tank – a KV1 in some accounts, a KV2 in others – succeeded in penetrating deep into the German position, shooting up a column of German trucks in the process, and stopped on a road across soft ground. Four 50mm anti-tank guns from 6th Panzer Division’s anti-tank battalion engaged it, hitting it several times; the tank returned fire, knocking out each gun in turn. A heavy 88mm gun from the division’s anti-aircraft battalion – the most potent anti-tank gun of its day – was laboriously manoeuvred behind the Soviet tank. It opened fire at about 800 yards range, but before it could score a hit, the KV1 knocked it out.
Under cover of darkness, German combat engineers crept up to the tank with satchel charges, which failed to destroy it, though they may have damaged its tracks. As it grew light on 25 June, German tanks fired on the Soviet behemoth from nearby woodland, while a second 88mm gun was brought around to attack the KV1 from behind. Several shots were fired, but only two penetrated the tank. As German infantry approached, the battered Soviet tank attempted to fight them off with machine-gun fire, but grenades thrown through its hatches finally brought its resistance to an end. In some accounts of the battle, the Germans showed their respect for such a brave foe by burying the crew with full military honours, while other accounts suggest that the crew escaped during the night after running out of ammunition.17
The exhausted Soviet tanks finally came to a halt immediately to the east of Raseiniai. Meanwhile, the Germans were swiftly regaining their composure. 6th Panzer Division was ordered to contain the Soviet thrust along its western and southern edges, with Seckendorf’s badly mauled battlegroup playing a blocking role, and Raus’ battlegroup moving along the Dubysa valley to the site of the initial battle between the reconnaissance battalion and Soliankin’s tanks; 1st Panzer Division, which had crossed the Dubysa at Lyduvėnai, a little to the north of Raseiniai, abandoned its plans to continue its northerly advance and executed a sharp turn to the right. While 36th Motorised Infantry Division deployed in its place at the northern tip of the German advance, 1st Panzer Division followed Raus’ battlegroup along the Dubysa, and then pushed further east and south, into the rear of Soliankin’s division. The Soviet 11th Rifle Division, which had been too badly battered by 1st Panzer Division to make any offensive move of its own, could only watch helplessly as the Germans manoeuvred with impunity. 48th Rifle Division, already badly cut up by German air attacks, should have been supporting the Soviet armour, but after the heavy German air attacks of the previous day, was still struggling to organise itself. Many of its units were overrun by the German armour and routed. Barely a day after the start of the war, it had lost 70 per cent of its personnel, and all of its heavy equipment. Its commander, Major General Pavel Vasileevich Bogdanov, was taken prisoner. Later in the war, he appeared to join the German cause, becoming intelligence officer to the 1st Russian National SS Brigade. However, he deserted in 1943, and joined a local partisan unit, which promptly placed him under arrest. He was imprisoned until 1950, when he was condemned to death as a traitor and executed.
According to the war diary of 1st Panzer Division, its spearheads made contact with troops of 6th Panzer Division at Sokaiciai at 0838hrs on 25 June, completing the encirclement of the Soviet 2nd Tank Division. Fighting continued for another day, but the outcome was never in doubt. Almost all of Soliankin’s 2nd Tank Division was within the encirclement, unable to retreat as its vehicles were out of fuel; only a single BT7 tank and 400 men escaped.18 Soliankin died with his division, and the Germans counted over Soviet 200 tanks destroyed or abandoned. Their own losses were substantial, but importantly, they ended the battle in possession of the contested ground: their repair teams would eventually be able to return many of their vehicles to action.
The battle of Raseiniai resulted in a brief pause in the German advance, as 1st Panzer Division was forced to divert its forces for the encirclement. By its conclusion, Kuznetsov’s front had no substantial armoured assets left, but the consequences of the action were far more widespread. Like other such engagements along the vast front line, it showed the Germans that their assumptions about the superiority of their armour were wildly optimistic. It was one of many battles that stimulated development of larger, heavier German tanks, though it would take nearly two years before these vehicles appeared in any significant numbers.
Elsewhere, German progress was far more straightforward. Lithuanian nationalists in Kaunas, part of the Lithuanian Activist Front, commenced their uprising on the first day of the war. There was sporadic fighting with the Soviet garrison, resulting in the deaths of about 200 insurgents, but the first decisive success for the Lithuanians came on 23 June when they seized a radio station, and later that day broadcast an appeal to the Germans to bombard the Soviet forces that were already leaving the city. At the same time, the radio station declared the creation of a provisional Lithuanian government. A day later, the reconnaissance battalion of 123rd Infantry Division reached Kaunas, followed by sections of the neighbouring 121st Infantry Division. Lithuanians lined the streets in large numbers to greet the German forces, hoping that they came as liberators rather than as conquerors. There were uprisings elsewhere against the Soviet forces, many – though not all – of them coordinated by the Lithuanian Activist Front. In some cases, entire companies of Lithuanian soldiers, whose units had been incorporated into the Red Army, either deserted en masse or actively turned against the Soviets.19
Whilst the bulk of the German troops invading Lithuania were part of Army Group North, the Vilnius area fell within the remit of Army Group Centre. 7th Panzer Division, part of 3rd Panzer Group, reached the town of Alytus at midday on 22 June, where two key bridges were seized over the River Niemen. As the division’s tanks attempted to exploit their two bridgeheads, they ran into dug-in Soviet tanks on the high ground to the east, and suffered heavy losses. Repeated Soviet counterattacks followed, but by dusk the two bridgeheads had coalesced and the Soviet forces were driven off.
After a night spent recovering and repairing damaged vehicles, 7th Panzer Division pushed on towards Vilnius the following morning, at first hindered more by burning woodland and fallen trees across the road than by Soviet resistance. Immediately to the west of Vilnius, the division’s reconnaissance battalion ran into tougher resistance, but outflanked the Soviet defences and succeeded in seizing vital bridges required for a further advance. By the evening, elements of the reconnaissance battalion, reinforced by tanks, secured the high ground to the south-east of Vilnius, and as darkness fell armoured columns pushed north and seized the eastern parts of the city.20
Early the following morning, the division’s motorcycle battalion captured the airfield ou
tside Vilnius. As the division’s tanks secured the eastern parts of the city, the infantry moved into the centre at first light:
The city was decorated with Lithuanian flags, and the advancing troops were greeted with jubilation. Substantial materiel and food supplies were seized at the railway station, and about 50 aircraft were captured by German troops at the airfield. The infantry brigade, following the advance of the panzer regiment, took up positions south of the city. From the south, enemy armoured battlegroups launched repeated attacks on the division’s columns and positions south of Vilnius; they were all beaten off.21
While Reinhardt’s XLI Panzer Corps was delayed by the fighting around Raseiniai, its neighbouring formation, LVI Panzer Corps, continued to advance, aided greatly by the increasing dislocation in the Soviet front line: 8th Army was being driven north along the coast, while 11th Army found its line of retreat to the north cut off by the advancing German armour, and fell back to the east. In between, there were only scattered elements, and Manstein’s corps was ideally positioned to take advantage of the gap that yawned ever wider in the Soviet lines. After a brief pause late on 24 June, to allow essential fuel and ammunition to be brought forward, Brandenberger once more organised his division’s battlegroups. Crisolli was to advance on the right flank directly towards Daugavpils, with Scheller’s battlegroup on the left; still lagging some distance behind, Scheller would join the advance as soon as he could, while Crisolli was to set off at first light on 25 June. After an advance of only nine miles, Crisolli was halted by determined Soviet resistance near Trakiniai. The Soviet forces fought a determined action to hold the line of yet another small river, and were only driven out when a group of German tanks made use of a nearby ford and outflanked them. By early afternoon, Brandenberger was with Crisolli’s battlegroup as it motored into Utena, having advanced a further 33 miles, slightly halfway from its morning start line to its objective at Daugavpils.
