by Prit Buttar
Even Latvian communists adopted a pro-Russian (and implicitly anti-Latvian) attitude, perhaps out of a sense of self-preservation. Many sought to portray ethnic Russians as the saviours of the Latvian nation. Whilst some Latvian communists were opposed to Stalin’s clear intention to ‘Russify’ Latvia, it was over a decade before any felt bold enough to articulate nationalistic views without fear of immediately being branded ‘anti-communist’.
With the isolation of Army Group North, almost all of the Baltic States were back in Soviet hands, with only Courland and the city of Klaipėda still being held by the Germans. The details of the fighting for Klaipėda are beyond the scope of this account. The three German divisions within the city when it was surrounded – 58th Infantry Division, 7th Panzer Division and Grossdeutschland – first came under serious attack on 10 October. Despite extensive artillery and aerial bombardment, the attacks, which continued for three days, were beaten off with heavy losses; the support of German warships off the coast proved to be invaluable, with their ability to respond rapidly and accurately with massive firepower proving decisive at key points in the battle.38 After a pause of only two days, Bagramian tried again, and though the German 58th Infantry Division was forced back on the northern side of the city, the defensive line continued to hold. A final attack was made on 23 October, and this too failed to make significant headway. Thereafter, both sides slowly withdrew forces from the area, and the city was finally evacuated by the Wehrmacht in January 1945, as Soviet forces pressed into East Prussia.
As will be seen, Courland was the scene of bitter fighting for what remained of the war, every bit as intense and costly as the battles that had brought the Red Army to the Baltic coast. The status of the German forces trapped in Courland, though, was – and remains – controversial. Stalin dismissed the ‘bridgehead’ as little more than an open-air prison compound, where the remnants of nearly 30 German divisions were confined in an increasingly irrelevant part of Europe, while the main battlefront moved west. This view, which has been largely the opinion of Soviet and Russian writers in the post-war era, is in contrast to the German view, which was that the divisions of Army Group Courland, as it became known, played a vital role in tying down significant Soviet forces, which would otherwise have accelerated the collapse of the Eastern Front. The determined attempts by the Red Army to reduce Army Group Courland suggest that the Soviet leadership was not content merely with trapping and containing the German divisions, but to an extent, the German viewpoint may have been fuelled by the desire of the trapped German soldiers to believe that their continuing struggle was worthwhile. Hans Christern, commander of 4th Panzer Division’s panzer regiment, wrote after the war:
Who was actually tying down whom? In the Courland bridgehead, were we tying down Russian forces and thus preventing them from contributing to the overwhelming of the defences of German soil, which was carried out step by step in East Prussia? Or were the Russians tying us down? Was it their intention, by mounting major attacks, to deceive us that they regarded us as a dangerous threat to their deep eastern flank, which they had to eliminate at all costs? Or in reality did they want to prevent us from being available for the defence of ‘Fortress Germany’ when the final round began?
The battles in Courland left us no time to think through such doubts. But the doubts were there, and they tormented us. What could we do, other than push them to the backs of our minds, as the demands of the moment required, as we heard the endless noise of battle on the Courland front?39
The rationale for the Soviet assaults on Courland is not clear, and is likely to be complex. Firstly, Courland now represented the last significant area of ‘Soviet’ territory that had not yet been liberated. However inevitable the final surrender of German forces might be, the political significance of recovering this last patch of ‘Soviet’ soil was considerable. Secondly, when the Red Army invaded Latvia during the Latvian war of independence in the aftermath of the First World War, parts of Courland were the only areas that were not captured, and it was from these small pockets, particularly around the port of Liepāja, that the Latvian nationalists and their German allies drove the Red Army back. Whilst there was little prospect of German and Latvian forces repeating this feat in late 1944, Stalin was aware that circumstances might change rapidly. Like Churchill, he was already looking to the future beyond the defeat of Germany. There is ample evidence that even at this late stage, he feared that the Western Allies might decide to support Germany against the Soviet Union, in which case Hitler’s dream of using Courland as a base for future offensive operations might yet prove to have some basis in reality; the revival of Latvian fortunes in the Latvian war of independence was due in no small part to the presence of British warships in the Baltic and western support in the form of weapons, and Stalin knew first-hand that the British and Americans were able to supply their allies with considerable materiel. It therefore seems likely that the attempts to reduce Army Group Courland were driven by several motives.
Chapter 10
COURLAND, OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1944
Following the disbandment of the Livonian Brothers of the Sword in 1562, the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia was created from the area of Latvia between the west bank of the River Daugava and the Baltic Sea. Its first duke was Gotthard Kettler, the last Master of the Sword Brothers. Although he was a vassal of the King of Poland, Kettler, whose family came from Westphalia, ran his duchy on strictly German lines, supported by the German nobility, and reduced most of the native population to the status of serfs.1
Jacob Kettler, grandson of the first Duke of Courland, came to power in 1642. He travelled widely throughout Western Europe, and became an enthusiastic proponent of western mercantilism and colonialism. A ship from the duchy had visited the West Indies in 1637, and established a colony on Tobago, which was promptly destroyed by the Spanish. In 1654, three years after Courlanders had established Fort Jacob on an island in the mouth of the Gambia River, the warship Das Wappen der Herzogin von Kurland (‘The Arms of the Duchess of Courland’) arrived off the coast of Tobago, and succeeded in establishing a new colony called Jacobsstadt. The entire island was named ‘New Courland’, much to the irritation of the Dutch, who established their own colony; aided by an influx of Huguenot refugees from France, this colony rapidly outgrew the Courland outpost. In 1652, Swedish troops occupied Courland, and Duke Jacob was taken prisoner. In the years that followed, his formidable fleet of armed merchantmen was destroyed, and the two colonies seized by the Dutch.
Although Tobago was briefly returned to Courland at the end of the Northern Wars in 1660, Duke Jacob lacked the power to keep the colony alive, and the foreign adventures of the Courland aristocracy came to an end late in the 17th century. Jacob’s descendants showed little of his energy and creativity, and in 1795, the duchy became part of the Czar’s empire following the Third Partition of Poland.
For much of 1918, the Duchy of Courland was revived as part of a German attempt to create a pro-German client state in the Baltic region, and the Baltic German residents of the area played a complex role in the Latvian war of independence. On the one hand, they fought actively to drive the Red Army from Latvia, but on the other hand, they had little interest in supporting the nationalist cause, and were closely allied to Rüdiger von der Goltz and the Freikorps. Consequently, many were expelled by the Latvian government at the end of the war. More left as part of the Heim ins Reich agreement with the Soviet Union following the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.
During the years of German occupation, some of the Baltic Germans returned to their lands, and in late 1944, they and the local Latvian population found themselves trapped with the German 16th and 18th Armies in the Courland peninsula. Hitler refused to regard the enclave as a ‘pocket’, and insisted that it be referred to as the Courland Bridgehead. This had a far more positive connotation, he told his subordinates, and once the Battle of the Atlantic was brought to a successful conclusion by the advent of the new Type XXI U-boats, it woul
d be possible to resume offensive operations in the east; Courland would form an essential springboard for such an offensive. However, for the moment, the peninsula had to be held at all costs. On 21 October, the order of the day from Schörner for the two German armies made Hitler’s views clear to the rank and file:
The Führer has ordered that Courland will be held and, initially, that the army group is to go over to the defensive in the present main line of resistance. Our mission is that not one single foot of ground in the area we hold will be given up. I cannot emphasise this enough. We are to pin the 150 major enemy formations facing us, to smash them wherever the opportunity appears and, in so doing, to aid in the defence of the homeland.
Effective immediately, all means are to be completely exhausted to strengthen our defence. The main defensive area must be developed to such a depth that it can withstand any and all attacks.
Accordingly, we must fortify and fortify again!
Every soldier who is not employed in positions with weapon in hand must work several hours a day with the shovel. It is impossible to do too much to adequately fortify the main defensive area, the road network and the trails!
The second and third positions, the road barriers, the ambush locations and the bunkers for quarters must be created in an extremely short time. Combat engineers must be pulled out of the main line of resistance and employed in building positions. It is important that the civilian population, without exception, also be used for this work.2
The construction of adequate defensive positions was a daunting task. Nearly 10 per cent of Courland is comprised of lakes, and the region has over 100 rivers, ranging from large streams to the Daugava. Generally, the area is fairly flat, especially nearer the coast, with modest hills inland. The swampy terrain made the digging of trenches difficult; in many areas, it was impossible to dig deeper than about a yard before the trenches began to fill with water. Construction materials such as concrete were in short supply, and the passive resistance of the local population made any mass mobilisation of manpower almost impossible, even if tools and materials had been available for them to use.
Despite their disparaging opinions about the German forces trapped in Courland, the Soviet High Command remained determined to seize the territory as soon as possible. Bagramian received orders from Moscow that a new offensive was to begin on 27 October, and in a conference with his army commanders on 20 October, he decided to attack between Pikeliai and Priekule. The attack would be led by 6th Guards Army and 4th Shock Army and a rifle corps from 51st Army. As the attack widened, 5th Guards Tank Army would join the advance. The railway line from Jelgava to the port of Liepāja was to be reached by the end of the second day. As Bagramian’s armies advanced from the south, Yeremenko’s 42nd army, 10th Guards Army and 3rd Shock Army would advance from the east, pushing into what was expected to be a rapidly collapsing German position.3
In addition to the forces he originally planned to use, Bagramian was pleased to have 61st Army assigned to him. However, the force was not as powerful as he might have expected. The army had been involved in constant fighting for several months, its commander reported, and its divisions were significantly weakened. Nevertheless, Bagramian decided to insert 61st Army between 4th Shock Army and 6th Guards Army, with the intention of attacking north from Vainode.4
The Germans were aware of the impending attack, and in order to disrupt Soviet preparations, X Corps ordered 14th Panzer Division to push the front line forward. The attack began on 24 October, catching the Soviet forces by surprise and making good initial progress. Seeing a possible opportunity to make further gains, X Corps ordered 4th Panzer Division to dispatch a company of tanks to support an advance by 30th Infantry Division. 4th Panzer Division was being held in a rear area, and it took until mid-afternoon for its armour to reach and cross the front line. By the time General Betzel joined his lead elements, he found that they were making minimal progress, and almost all of the tanks committed to the attack were bogged down in swampy ground. By the end of the day, the attack was abandoned, and the tanks laboriously hauled back.5
The first battle of Courland commenced on 27 October. The day started with dense fog, and the Soviet artillery and aerial preparation did not commence until the mist began to lift. By then, ground units had already commenced their attacks, seizing jumping-off positions in the sector held by Nordland. Assigned to support III SS Panzer Corps, 4th Panzer Division dispatched a panzergrenadier regiment, supported by the division’s 37 operational Panther tanks, to the village of Audari, to the northeast of Priekule.
Commanders on both sides waited impatiently for hard news from the front; for 4th Panzer Division, information arrived from a small group of tanks led by Oberleutnant Gerlach. Deployed to support the original front line before the Soviet assault, the Panther tanks continued to hold out all day, helping to break up the Red Army’s attacks. At first, the Soviet 67th, 51st and 75th Guards Rifle Divisions appeared to be making good progress, pushing back the western flank of 30th Infantry Division and penetrating perhaps three miles into the German positions to the east of Priekule. As the picture became clearer, 4th Panzer Division was ordered to counter-attack, in order to restore the front. Shortly after midday, Betzel’s division attacked in two groups, and in heavy fighting, drove 51st and 67th Guards Rifle Divisions back towards their start line. Combat continued until long after nightfall, leaving the Soviet troops in possession of the eastern half of their gains. Even in this sector, the leading units were at least five miles short of their objective, the vital railway line running east from Liepāja.
4th Panzer Division’s counter-attack epitomised the flexibilities of German operational doctrine that had played such a huge part in initial German successes in the war. Betzel was given a broad operational mission, and rapidly deployed his force in two groups. He accompanied the advancing battlegroups, and as their eastern flank became increasingly exposed, he was able to redeploy the division’s reconnaissance battalion to deal with any threat. As was the case in all such operations, the division Chief of Staff, Peter Sauerbruch, took command of division headquarters and ensured coordination and communication between all elements, giving Betzel freedom to ensure that the combat formations of the division were used to maximum effect. According to the division’s combat returns, the day’s fighting cost it two Panther tanks destroyed (and several other tanks damaged, though repairable), 25 dead and 77 wounded; it claimed to have destroyed 23 Soviet tanks and assault guns and 24 anti-tank guns, and killed or taken prisoner over 400 enemy soldiers. Schörner acknowledged its efforts the following day in a personal message.6
At the same time that Bagramian’s troops were struggling to make headway near Priekule, Yeremenko attacked the German ‘bridgehead’ from the east. 215th Infantry Division had only recently taken up positions defending the German line to the south-west of Dobele, and early on 27 October, spotted Soviet troops of 42nd Army assembling in their trenches. Artillery fire was immediately called down upon the Soviet preparation areas, at the same moment that Yeremenko began his own preparatory bombardment. Confused fighting raged all day, and during the afternoon, 215th Infantry Division’s battalions began a fighting withdrawal to their secondary positions near Lake Lielauce. Here, with support from reserves – a battalion of assault guns and a battalion from 121st Infantry Division – the Soviet attack was first halted, then turned back. Towards dusk, as a single company of infantry, the last reserves of 215th Infantry Division, moved forward, they encountered a strong Soviet column moving in the opposite direction, and led by their energetic commander, Leutnant Werner Mozer, the Germans overwhelmed the Soviet troops in close-quarter fighting. The action earned Mozer the Knight’s Cross, and brought the day’s fighting in the sector to an end.7
The withdrawal of 215th Infantry Division towards Lake Lielauce also saw the first appearance of another new development on the Courland front. A military judge advocate was sent to the rear area by Schörner, accompanied by detachments of military
police. Any soldiers found retreating without specific orders were marched before the judge advocate and faced charges of cowardice unless they were able to justify themselves. This practice became widespread under Schörner’s command, first in Courland and later when he moved to Army Group Centre, and resulted in the execution of dozens of men, many of whom had done nothing wrong; in some cases, they were acting on verbal instructions, but this was not an acceptable excuse to the judge advocate. The rigidity of this attitude contrasts strongly with the German doctrine of operational orders being given in a fluid and flexible manner, often without resort to written instructions. The measure was intended to prevent panic and defeatism amongst the front-line troops, and its impact is hard to determine. Whilst the almost arbitrary execution of soldiers was repugnant to front-line troops, most appear to have regarded Schörner’s hard-line attitude with approval; after all, they were still in the front line themselves, and had little sympathy for those who showed less resolve than themselves. Similarly, Schörner’s insistence that rear area units be ruthlessly ‘combed out’ to release personnel for front-line service was a measure widely supported by combat soldiers.
On 28 October, Bagramian’s forces attacked again, once more after a heavy artillery bombardment. The main effort fell on the German lines to the immediate east of Priekule, with heavy fighting raging all day in the woody and swampy terrain. 4th Panzer Division was involved in almost continuous combat until late afternoon; under pressure from four guards rifle divisions and at least two tank brigades, it was driven back in places, but barely a mile. The price paid by both the attackers and defenders was a heavy one. For his energetic leadership, Betzel was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross.
The following day, it was the turn of the Germans to mount an attack. 4th Panzer Division assembled a group consisting of its Panther battalion, a battalion of panzergrenadiers, and a battalion of combat engineers, supported by a regiment from 30th Infantry Division, and advanced on the village of Asīte from the north. Almost immediately, the assault group ran into the Soviet 29th Rifle Division, preparing to attack in the opposite direction. At close quarters, the two sides suffered further heavy casualties, and 4th Panzer Division was driven back to its start line. Here, it came under attack through the rest of the day, often having to improvise its defence: at one point, on the extreme eastern flank of the division, two Panthers, one towing the other, beat off an attack by seven Soviet assault guns and two tanks at close range.8
