by Prit Buttar
On 20 December, Betzel left for Germany, intending to combine a visit to Berlin for discussions with higher commands with some well-earned leave at home. Unlike on previous occasions, it seems that the Germans had not detected Soviet preparations for renewed fighting, at least not on any significant scale. On 21 December, heavy artillery fire fell on the lines of the German I Corps. By mid-morning, reports reached I Corps and 18th Army of pressure particularly on 218th, 132nd and 225th Infantry Divisions, around the villages of Laci, Stedini, Cubas and Zanenieki. The attacking forces were from 4th Shock Army, which deployed 15 rifle divisions in the assault, with substantial armoured support. At the same time, VI SS Corps came under heavy attack, where a shortage of reserves allowed the Soviet forces to penetrate right into the depths of the defenders’ positions. In I Corps’ sector, an immediate counter-attack at Laci eased the situation, and 4th Panzer Division was ordered to restore the front line at Stedini. For the moment, VI SS Corps would have to fend for itself.
In the absence of Clemens Betzel, 4th Panzer Division was under the command of Oberst Hans Christern, the commander of the division’s 35th Panzer Regiment. He had served with armoured units throughout the war, including a time organising the training of tank crews when the Tiger tank was introduced in 1942. An ebullient, energetic leader, he was popular amongst his men, and constantly led from the front in the traditional style of all good panzer commanders. When he reached the headquarters of I Corps at 1150hrs, he was ordered to move an armoured battlegroup to a preparation area near Labdomas. Christern raised doubts about this plan:
Oberst Christern objected that based on reconnaissance the previous day, the approach to the armoured battlegroup’s preparation area would be most difficult and time-consuming. The terrain was mainly low-lying swamp with sandy ridges. The roads were partly dykes. He suggested that the entire division except for 33rd Panzergrenadier Regiment’s commander’s battlegroup [which had already been detached from the division] should assemble in the reconnoitred area north of Zanenieki, from where deployment in any direction had been reconnoitred. This was turned down.15
Christern’s suggestion was entirely in keeping with the principles of Auftragstaktik, and his frustration at the restrictive nature of his orders can be imagined. Although the ground was relatively firm following recent frosts, it was badly rutted, making movement by wheeled units particularly difficult. To make matters worse for Christern, his division was ordered to maintain strict radio silence during its movement. Early in the afternoon, 4th Panzer Division was ordered to move 12th Panzergrenadier Regiment to the same assembly area, putting further pressure on roads that he already regarded as unsuitable.
Christern’s difficult time commanding a division for the first time steadily worsened. Although he was given control of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 510 and its valuable Tiger tanks, they only added to congestion and degradation of the roads. As vehicles laboured through the mud and confusion, orders changed yet again. During the evening, I Corps ordered Christern to dispatch the armoured battlegroup to a new preparation area at Ozolini, where it would join with elements of 225th Infantry Division to mount a counter-attack. At this stage, only a single battalion of panzergrenadiers had reached the originally designated preparation area. Forbidden to use radio communication, Christern had to dispatch officers to locate the units of the armoured battlegroup, so that they could be informed of these new orders. To complicate matters still further, Soviet aircraft made harassing raids along all roads throughout the day.
At about 0130hrs on 22 December, Christern reached the headquarters of 225th Infantry Division. The division’s commander, Walter Risse, had been out of contact with higher commands for most of the day, and the arrival of Christern and his staff would have provided a timely boost to his confidence. As the night drew on, with constant Soviet air raids and artillery fire, elements of Christern’s division continued to struggle into their preparation area. By first light, the armoured battlegroup had managed to assemble, but had left large numbers of vehicles broken or bogged down in its wake. Only seven Pz.IVs and 24 Panthers were still running, out of 28 Pz.IVs and 40 Panthers that had set out on the difficult march. Half of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 510’s Tigers had also failed to reach the preparation area. Nevertheless, as it grew light, a force of 20 Panthers and ten Tigers, supported by a few half-tracks of panzergrenadiers, formed up to launch a counter-attack.
Christern had been assured that the wooded area to the south-east of the area he would be attacking was still in German hands. There was considerable consternation, therefore, when the group came under heavy fire from that direction, especially as the battlegroup lacked the artillery and infantry required to clear the area. The attack faltered and ground to a halt, and all Christern could do was attempt to assemble a defensive line.
Early in the afternoon, General Theodor Busse, commander of I Corps, arrived in Christern’s headquarters. He advised those present that he had been told by Boege, commander of 18th Army, personally to ensure that 4th Panzer Division and 225th Infantry Division restored the former front line. Struggling across the impossible landscape, under constant aerial and artillery fire, the German units made little headway. 23 December saw further fighting, in which one of 4th Panzer Division’s panzergrenadier divisions was almost destroyed, for little gain. Orders to retake positions continued to arrive, with no regard for the realities on the ground. During the afternoon, Busse appeared to lose patience, and ordered that 4th Panzer Division was now subordinated to 225th Infantry Division. Generalleutnant Risse was to take overall command.
For Christern and the officers of 4th Panzer Division, this must have come as a blow to their pride. 4th Panzer Division had served with great distinction on the Eastern Front, and had never been criticised in this manner before. It must have been particularly galling that the division’s failures were in no way due to its personnel – despite Christern’s objections, he had been forced by higher commands to deploy his forces in unsuitable terrain, and orders had been changed repeatedly. The requirement for urgent action was not compatible with an insistence on absolute radio silence, but again, the division’s requests for this restriction to be lifted had been dismissed. However, several factors within the division worked against it. Had Betzel been present, he would probably have been far more assertive and might have had more influence on Busse and Boege, neither of whom appeared willing to take advice from a mere Oberst. Christern’s temporary assignment as division commander also resulted in his panzer regiment – and therefore the armoured battlegroup – being commanded by Major Toelke, a newcomer to the division, which may have led to further friction in the chain of command. To compound matters further, the division’s chief of staff, Peter Sauerbruch, had also been replaced recently. There were, therefore, a number of officers in key positions who were not familiar with their roles, and whom their superiors did not appear to regard with any great confidence.16
The newly formed Gruppe Risse, consisting of 225th Infantry Division and those elements of 4th Panzer Division not detached to other units, was now tasked with a further counter-attack to restore the front line at Podnieki. For the moment, though, a counter-attack was out of the question, as Risse struggled to prevent a powerful Soviet drive from splitting his forces in two. Just as it seemed that the Red Army might be able to achieve a significant breakthrough, the attack ran directly into 4th Panzer Division’s combat engineer battalion, which threw it back in disarray. It is a measure of the severity of the German losses that by the end of the day, 4th Panzer Division was reduced to only 13 operational tanks, having started the day with over 30.17
The weather was cloudy and significantly above freezing on 24 December, ensuring a widespread softening of the terrain. The counter-attack by Gruppe Risse finally began, but ran into a further Soviet attack, scheduled for the same sector of the front at about the same moment. It was a wooded area, broken by tracks and firebreaks, and confused fighting continued all day. The Germans tried to push for
ward to the line of the small River Zana, while the Soviet forces struggled to break free of the woodland to the north-east of the river. Neither side was able to achieve its objective. The energetic efforts of 4th Panzer Division’s combat engineers first to stop the previous day’s thrust by the Red Army, then to reverse it and drive through the dense woodland towards the Zana, earned the battalion commander, Hauptmann Beukemann, the Knight’s Cross. But exhaustion was setting in on both sides. As the day drew to a close, Risse cautiously suggested that the crisis was past, and that his combined group had survived.
The third battle of Courland was not confined to the sector held by Busse’s corps. A little further to the east, Soviet forces made determined efforts to advance on Saldus, putting the 205th and 215th Infantry Divisions under great pressure. A panzergrenadier regiment from 12th Panzer Division was committed to shore up the line. Although 215th Infantry Division lost over 600 men killed, wounded or missing, Soviet losses were even higher. Like the men of 4th Panzer Division, the Soviet tank crews struggled with almost impossible conditions. By the end of the fighting, a guards tank regiment reported that it had been reduced to only five serviceable tanks.18 In addition to breakdowns, the losses from German action were heavy. Major Josef Brandner’s Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 912, deploying rapidly from its holding position in Saldus, ran straight into the advancing Soviet tanks, as Brandner described:
We moved widely dispersed to avoid presenting the Russians with a closed up target that would be easy to engage with artillery. But we also had to be ready for the oncoming Russian tanks.
I saw the muzzle flash of an enemy tank’s main gun. The round burst just to the right of us. The driver grasped the situation in the blink of an eye. He pulled back the right lateral and we were then in firing position facing our opponent.
I gave a fire command to my gunner and give him the range.
‘Identified!’ he reported. Seconds later, the first round left the barrel. A jet of flame spurted from the enemy; the targeted T34 exploded.
Exactly 400m further away a second T34 broke through and reached the main supply route.
‘Damn it! Misfire!’ the gunner called out.
The loader cursed. All that took place within a few seconds. Both of the assault guns that were following me were already involved with other T34s. There was nothing they could do to help us. Why didn’t the T34 fire? What was going on?
At that moment it fired and the round took off the top of a tree right above us.
I was glued to the enemy with the scissors telescope. He seemed that close to us already in the magnification of the optics. Then my assault gun bucked and I saw the brilliant rosette of flame marking the impact on the front of the T34. The Russian crew bailed out and disappeared into the underbrush.
Then there was a heavy artillery barrage on the stretch of road in front of us. The enemy had spotted the brigade’s approach and wanted to put us out of action before we had really joined the fight.
A radio message from the second assault gun battery came in: ‘Friendly infantry abandoning the position to the right of us and falling back before the Russians.’
But there was no way we could support the right flank. The tight-packed groups of armour were thundering toward us in two assault wedges. The duelling began. T34 and Josef Stalin tanks fired with everything they had. Nevertheless, we managed to knock out several of them right at the beginning.
The gunners and loaders worked like men possessed. The drivers took evasive actions. Rounds zipped past us. Tanks – tanks – tanks, wherever you looked.19
As he attempted to pull back with the retreating German infantry, Brandner received a radio message from his left flank, where one of his batteries was under heavy pressure. Under almost constant artillery and mortar bombardment, his battery continued to inflict losses on the advancing Soviet tanks, and the German infantry now rallied and counter-attacked, restoring the front line. For his efforts, Brandner was awarded the Knight’s Cross.20
On Christmas Day, 4th Panzer Division beat off the last Soviet attacks in its sector, particularly the woodland where the division’s combat engineers, now supported by the reconnaissance battalion, were in position. As the Soviet infantry attacked, the Germans called in artillery support, which proved effective at breaking up many of the attacks; however, the fire from one of the division’s batteries fell on the positions of the Germans themselves. Unable to identify which battery was firing short, the defenders stoically endured. During the evening, orders arrived for the division to withdraw; it was to move to the sector held by VI SS Corps, further to the east.
VI SS Corps consisted at this stage of 93rd and 227th Infantry Divisions, 21st Luftwaffe Field Division, and 19th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division (2nd Latvian). Soviet forces had attempted to turn the left flank of the corps in order to capture Dzukste, and confused fighting had left the front line in a shambles, with neither side able to say with any certainty where their units were. One regiment of Latvians, operating in support of the neighbouring Luftwaffe Field Division, lost nearly 60 per cent of its personnel to artillery fire, but managed to pull back in some semblance of order. Ongoing attacks against the well-constructed positions of the Latvian division made little headway, but a considerable penetration was achieved on the seam between the Latvians and the Luftwaffe division, advancing most of the way to the village of Lestene. In their wake, a small group of Latvians was surrounded in Dirbas, but continued to fight on. But the advance marked the high tide of the Soviet effort, and attempts to push on over the next two days made almost no headway. Still encircled a mile or more behind the Soviet front line, the Latvians in Dirbas, under the command of Obersturmführer Ancans, continued to resist. Finally, late on Christmas Day, Ancans withdrew with 35 survivors, carrying many of their wounded with them back to Latvian lines. Ancans, who had himself been wounded, was awarded the Knight’s Cross.21
Some elements of 12th Panzer Division had already been dispatched to the VI SS Corps’ area, and 4th Panzer Division now followed. Wheeled elements would make their own way to the new sector, while tracked units were moved by train. When they arrived in VI SS Corps’ area, the panzer officers were relieved to find that although the terrain was dotted with woodland and swampy areas, it was relatively more open than the landscape where 4th Panzer Division had laboured so strenuously in preceding days. By the end of 27 December, most of the division had arrived in Dzukste, with some elements already assigned to support 227th Infantry Division and 19th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division. Perhaps as further fallout of the criticisms directed at the division by Busse, the division was subordinated to Generalleutnant von Bodenhausen’s 12th Panzer Division, forming Gruppe Bodenhausen. Counter-attacks made some headway the following day, but eventually ground to a halt due to inadequate infantry support; it seems that some of 227th Infantry Division’s units were too exhausted or weakened to advance. To add insult to injury, three of 4th Panzer Division’s Pz.IV tanks were shot up by German assault guns as they withdrew.
On 29 December, Betzel returned to Courland, and resumed command of his division from a relieved Oberst Christern. On the last day of the year, Soviet forces penetrated into the positions of 93rd Infantry Division, and 4th Panzer Division once more moved to a new area. Here, they found that the attack was led by the 308th Latvian Rifle Division, made up largely of newly recruited Latvian troops with Russian officers. The panzer division’s reconnaissance battalion immediately counterattacked, followed by other elements of the division as they arrived, led personally by Betzel. In a wild counter-attack that continued long into the night, 4th Panzer Division drove the Soviet forces back to their start lines. Fighting continued for the next two days before both sides came to an exhausted halt.22
The contrast between this successful counter-attack and the failed operation by 4th Panzer Division at the beginning of the third battle of Courland could not be greater. Many of the factors that led to a successful counter-attack on 31 December were the exact opposites of thos
e on 21 December. Unlike Busse, Obergruppenführer Walther Krüger did not interfere with the panzer division’s internal arrangements, and other than ordering a counter-attack to restore the front line, he left the details to Betzel. The terrain was more favourable for armoured operations, and the division was back under the control of its experienced commander; likewise, Christern was back with his panzer regiment. The Soviet forces facing 4th Panzer Division on 31 December also put up less determined resistance than those ten days earlier.
This was also one of the few occasions that Latvian troops faced each other across the battlefield. Generally, the Soviets tried to avoid such battles, especially when they involved relatively new Latvian battalions of the Red Army; these often contained men who had served the Germans in a variety of roles, and were regarded as politically unreliable. The longer established Latvian rifle regiments were a different matter, but of course they contained large groups of soldiers who might be Latvian in terms of ethnicity, but had been living in the Soviet Union when they were recruited. These regiments also contained significant numbers of non-Latvian soldiers and officers, another factor that made their possible encounters with pro-German Latvians less ‘risky’. As soon as they realised that the 308th Rifle Division was up against 19th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division (2nd Latvian), the Soviet leadership swiftly arranged for the division to be relieved, and redeployed it elsewhere. The troops of 19th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division fought alongside the panzer divisions during the German counter-attack, and performed well, not least because they had the good fortune to capture Soviet prisoners on 28 December who revealed the intention of the Red Army to attack the following day. The Latvians were able to position their artillery accordingly, and inflict major losses on the Soviet forces with a timely bombardment.
