American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us

by Steven Emerson

  Outraged, President Clinton lobbed a few cruise missiles into Afghanistan, trying to hit bin Laden’s underground headquarters. He also pursued two more tracks: preparing a commando arrest team for insertion into Afghanistan, while at the same time getting the Taliban to cooperate in forcing the surrender of bin Laden to the United States. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson was dispatched to Afghanistan and Pakistan to negotiate with the Taliban for the handover of bin Laden. Yet after months of discussions at various levels of both governments, nothing happened.

  The U.S. military effort finally petered out. President Clinton and the rest of the country were distracted by the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Events in Afghanistan seemed very remote. An entire Presidential election and change of administration occurred without any further developments. On the legal front, however, major progress was made. Four men were quickly arrested after the bombing and in 2001, a New York federal jury returned guilty verdicts against all four, including Wadih el-Hage. The exhibits and trial proceedings provided a riveting view into the shadowy world of al Qaeda. The evidence revealed an umbrella organization that shelters a wide range of Islamist groups, including Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and the Armed Islamic Group, plus a raft of Iraqi, Sudanese, Pakistani, Afghan, and Jordanian terror “cells.” Each functions semi-autonomously and has the capacity to carry out its own recruiting and operations. All these groups coordinate through al Qaeda’s “Shura Council,” a kind of board of directors that includes representatives from all the constituents far and wide. The board meets on a regular basis in Afghanistan to review and approve proposed operations. Most representatives have maintained close relationships with each other since the end of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets. They are a smooth and efficient operation.

  We learned from the trial that when operations in one place are shut down, the rest of the network soldiers on, virtually unaffected. Even if bin Laden himself were to be killed, this Islamist network would survive and in all likelihood continue to expand, sustained by its ideological adhesion. Islamism is the fuel that fires the group and the glue that holds it together.

  Perhaps the most disconcerting revelations from the trial concern al Qaeda’s entrenchment in the West. All of the organization’s procurement of such material as night-vision goggles, construction equipment, cell phones, and satellite telephones, for example, was from the West, including from such countries as the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Bosnia, and Croatia. Chemicals purchased for the manufacture of chemical weapons came from the Czech Republic.

  During the long waits between terrorist attacks, al Qaeda’s member organizations maintained readiness by operating under the cover of nonprofit, tax-deductible religious charities and civil rights organizations. These “NGOs”—nongovernmental organizations—many of which still operate, are headquartered in the United States and Britain, as well as in the Middle East. The Qatar Charitable Society, for example, was identified by a witness at the Embassy bombings trial as one of bin Laden’s de facto banks, raising money and transferring funds all around the globe.

  Operating in the freewheeling and tolerant environment of the United States, bin Laden was able to set up a whole array of “cells” in a loosely organized network that included Tucson, Arizona; Brooklyn, New York; Orlando, Florida; Dallas, Texas; Santa Clara, California; Columbia, Missouri; and Herndon, Virginia.

  *

  One of Osama bin Laden’s most important “policy objectives” in his worldwide jihad has been to recruit American citizens to aid in his terrorist endeavors. Despite the loathing of the United States apparent in his accumulated statements and fatwas, he has understood the freedom that an American passport can confer upon its possessor. With an American passport, a bin Laden operative could travel virtually anywhere in the world without question or detection as a member of a terrorist apparatus. The indictment filed against bin Laden and his compatriots following the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania notes that bin Laden “made efforts to recruit United States citizens…in order to utilize the American citizens for travel throughout the Western world to deliver messages and engage in financial transactions for the benefit of al Qaeda and its affiliated groups and to help carry out operations.”10

  I have already discussed the case of Ali Mohammed, bin Laden’s “Special Operations Man” (in Chapter 3) and that of Wadih el-Hage, bin Laden’s personal secretary. Another telling example of bin Laden’s recruitment of American citizens is the story of Khalil Said Khalil Deek.

  Deek was born in 1958 in the village of Nazlit Issa on the West Bank, which was at the time a part of the Kingdom of Trans-jordan. He first came to the United States to pursue university studies in computer science in 1981. In 1991, Deek became a naturalized citizen living in the suburbs of Los Angeles, California. In either 1997 or 1998, Deek moved to Peshawar, Pakistan. In the second week of December 1999, he was arrested in Pakistan and subsequently extradited to Jordan on December 17, 1999, in order to stand trial for participating in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist attacks in Jordan and for the possession and manufacturing of explosives to use unlawfully in cooperation with a number of other suspected terrorists who were arrested in Jordan. In an odd twist Deek, after being in prison in Jordan for seventeen months, was released without charge on May 23, 2001. His whereabouts are currently unknown.

  The other suspected terrorists who were arrested in Jordan were convicted of plotting to carry out terrorist attacks during the millennium celebrations. Some of these individuals were even sentenced to death. At the same time, in the United States, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian who received training in camps operated by bin Laden, was arrested when he tried to smuggle explosives, and materials used to construct explosives, over the Canadian border into Washington state. Ressam was intercepted by U.S. Customs officers at the border. After his conviction, Ressam confessed to U.S. authorities of a plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport during the millennium celebrations.

  One of Ressam’s accomplices was an individual named Abu Doha. In a sealed complaint filed against Abu Doha in the Southern District of New York, it was alleged that he had conspired “to use a weapon of mass destruction…against persons within the United States….”11 Ressam, in compliance with a cooperation agreement with the government, stated that while training in Afghanistan, an Algerian cell was formed and that he was one of its leaders.12 Abu Doha was to facilitate the travel of members of the cell in and out of Afghanistan and into the countries where terrorist activities were to take place.13 Deek was doing something similar, according to the complaint: “by Deek’s own account…Deek has helped facilitate the travel of various individuals to training camps in Afghanistan so that they may participate in Islamic jihad terrorist activities.”14 The complaint elaborated:

  Recovered from Deek at the time of his arrest were various papers, computers and computer disks. Contained within this material were various terrorist training manuals as well as sketches and formulas for various explosive devices and materials. The computers were downloaded and several e-mails were retrieved. At least two of the e-mails, dated September 25 and 29, 1999, discuss providing funds, personnel, and material support for the Afghan training camps.15

  In fact, one of the documents found in Deek’s possession at his arrest was a CD-ROM version of the 7,000-page Encyclopedia of Jihad which provided unparalleled detail of how to conduct terrorist activities of every type. Deek was actually aiding terrorists in Afghanistan in gaining access to the training camps there, and also to different countries throughout the world. The question arises: what was he doing in the United States prior to his departure to Pakistan, and why did the Jordanian authorities release him?

  As one of the first people to investigate Deek, I was able to determine that he had changed his name in 1996 to Joseph Adams. According to Deek’s brother, Tawfiq Deek, who lives in Anaheim, California, this change was to facilitate Khalil’s procuring a new passport in order to be able to
travel to Jordan where he would be able to enter the West Bank to visit his father.16 Deek’s brother insisted that he had last been in the United States in 1997; however, information surfaced that Khalil Deek was a “crew leader” for an organization called Charity Without Borders from March through August 1998 on a contract procured from the State of California. One of the purposes of this entity, according to their own documentation, was to “educate, feed, clothe, and shelter anyone in any country that is in need of our help.” In addition, Charity Without Borders received grant money from the State of California for waste disposal. Joseph Adams’s name was listed on invoices submitted to the state long after he had allegedly left the United States.

  Authorities suspect that some of the monies flowing through this entity might have made their way to bin Laden’s organization. Deek shared a bank account with Abu Zubaydah, an alleged close associate of bin Laden. Was money from the Charity Without Borders projects with the State of California used to fund terrorist activities? We may never know the answer to this question.

  *

  There is a tantalizing postscript to the story of Osama bin Laden’s American operations. Did Osama himself once consider coming here? We are certain that bin Laden’s second-in-command of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri of the Egyptian Al-Jihad organization, came to the United States in 1995 on a fundraising mission. As stated by Ali Mohammed, “In the early 1990s, al-Zawahiri made two visits to the United States, and he came to United States [sic] to help raise funds for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.”17

  If bin Laden himself considered coming to the United States, it was in connection with Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a Jordanian resident who is bin Laden’s brother-in-law. In April 1994, Khalifa was implicated by Jordanian authorities in the bombing of a theater on the outskirts of Amman. Accusing Khalifa of financing the operation, a Jordanian court put out a warrant for him. On December 1, 1994, Khalifa entered the United States after successfully applying for a visa. Even though he was under sentence of death in Jordan, he had no trouble slipping through U.S. immigration. It was not until two weeks later that U.S. officials realized their mistake. Khalifa was arrested on December 16 in Morgan Hill, California, and held without bond during deportation hearings. He was eventually extradited to Jordan and forced to stand trial with ten other defendants. While the other ten defendants were convicted and sentenced to death, Khalifa won acquittal.

  During his years in the Philippines, Khalifa helped spread terror around the world while serving as president of a branch office in the Philippines of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), a charity organization funded by both private Saudi individuals and the Saudi government. Based in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, IIRO, along with its bona fide charitable efforts, provided cover for Osama bin Laden’s efforts around the globe. Through IIRO, bin Laden and Khalifa supported the Abu Sayyaf Group, an Islamic terrorist group in the Philippines.18 After the dual bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the government of Kenya deregistered the IIRO chapter in Nairobi for its alleged connections to the attacks. In January 1999, Indian authorities accused Sheikh al-Gamdin, president of the IIRO offices in Asia, of masterminding a plot to blow up the American consulates in Calcutta and Madras.19 Meanwhile, according to Western intelligence experts, IIRO funneled more than $20 million a year to Islamic extremists in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.20 Throughout this reign of international terror, Khalifa managed to stay out of reach of the law.

  The intriguing footnote is this. When Khalifa applied for an American visa in 1993, someone else applied with him. We have obtained the visa application from the state department through the Freedom of Information Act. The name is blacked out—but the individual is described as a male Saudi passport holder whose origins were in Yemen. Bin Laden’s families are Yemeni nationals who live in Saudi Arabia only because of the success of his father’s construction company in working with the Saudi government. Is it conceivable that in 1994 he was feeling the heat in Sudan and, like to many other international terrorists, decided to explore the possibilities of seeking temporary sanctuary in the United States? Whoever it was ultimately changed his mind and did not obtain a visa. But even the possibility is tantalizing, and chilling.

  Chapter Eight

  Fighting Back

  A Story of Unsung Heroes

  DESPITE THE FACT that militant Islamicist voices are heard from a large number of American mosques, and despite the sinister public-relations campaign of radical charitable organizations such as the American Muslim Council, the fact remains that militant Islamist views are confined to a relatively small slice of all American Muslims. Many courageous moderate Muslims have stood up to be counted against the voices of extremism—despite threats of violence. These activists are heroes, since there is no more dangerous thing to do than to denounce the faith of a fundamentalist. They deserve to be celebrated and supported in any way possible.

  On January 7, 1999, one of the single most courageous of these heroes, Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, appeared before an open forum at the U.S. State Department entitled “Islamic Extremism: A Viable Threat to U.S. National Security.” A panel of State Department officials were present, along with a huge contingent of so-called leaders from the American Muslim community.

  Sheikh Kabbani’s testimony was a breath of fresh air. Although he represents a large organization (he is the head of the Islamic Supreme Council of America), he did not pretend to speak for all Muslims. “I cannot speak on behalf of all Muslims, as many nonprofit organizations in America do,” he said. “Immediately when something happens in the Middle East, they send media alerts saying they are speaking on behalf of the whole Muslim community, which is completely incorrect. I will say that it is an opportunity to address you and to give you the authentic, traditional voice of Islam. It is a voice…which [stands for] moderation and tolerance and love…and living in peace with all other faiths and religions.”

  Sheikh Kabbani’s most controversial assertions of the day were twofold: 80 percent of all mosques and Muslim charitable organizations in the United States had been taken over by “extremists” who did not represent the mainstream community; and Osama bin Laden represented an imminent threat to America, possibly through his attempted acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the audience were other Muslim leaders whom he was branding as extremists, and the meeting ended amid shouted accusations. Afterward, radicalized Muslim organizations immediately charged that he was slandering all Muslims. A consortium of nine Muslim organizations combined to issue a press release condemning his testimony. There were threats on his life. But in the end his warnings proved to be spectacularly prescient. Only after September 11, 2001, did members of the press belatedly realize that there was substance to what Sheikh Kabbani had been saying.

  Kabbani was raised in Lebanon, the nephew of that country’s grand mufti, or religious head. As a boy he traveled widely with a Sufi master (he later married his mentor’s daughter). He went to high school at a French school, and then switched to an evangelical Christian academy, both in Beirut. He graduated with a chemistry degree from the American University there. With Lebanon embroiled in civil war, Kabbani came to the United States in 1991 to enlighten people about the teachings of Sufism. His Islamic Supreme Council of the Americas claims eight thousand contributors and participants, and runs 23 centers. He speaks Arabic, French, and English energetically, gesticulating and pouring words from his flowing white beard. In 1999, in a profile in the Los Angeles Times, he told reporter Teresa Watanabe that he planned to form a Muslim antiterrorist council to uncover the links between Muslim organizations in America and international terrorist networks. “We are afraid this [militant Islam] will spread to the United States. We are afraid this kind of doctrine controlling mosques will lead to military actions,” he said.1

  As a scholar and student of Muslim history, Sheikh Kabbani frequently enlists the story of Muhammad against modern extremists:

  [Muhammad] established his first state afte
r having received the message for thirteen years. He established a state in a city called Medina, located in Saudi Arabia now. First it had Jews, it had Christians, it had people of all kinds of different faiths, and he never fought with anyone. He never killed anyone, but was always educating and giving the message of God, as Moses, as Jesus [did]. For eighteen months [Muhammad] directed his faith to worship God toward the place of Jesus and the place of Moses, where they were born and where they brought their message, in order to show that there is a completion, and a connection between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This was also to earn the respect of the Jews and the Christians in order to educate them about the message of Islam and show them that it is not hostile to Judaism and Christianity. It was one of the main themes in Islamic history that the Prophet tried many times to make peace treaties and to extend his hand to the Jews and to the Christians in his area, wherever he was living. Later, when the religion was well established, he turned his face towards Mecca while Jews and Christians were living in the same town.2

  Kabbani is highly critical of the Wahhabism movement that has given birth to many of today’s extremists. “It began in the seventeenth and eighteenth century,” he testified.

  The man who brought it to the tribes was a Muslim scholar by the name of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This was in the Eastern part of what we call Saudi Arabia during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. These ideas were going forth and back. Sometimes they were put down and other times they were supported. There was a struggle with the Muslims trying to keep them down with the support of the Ottoman Empire. They were successful until the Ottoman Empire dissolved and finished in the middle of 1920 and the new regime came—it was the secular regime of Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk]. They then found an opportunity in the tribes, which no longer had the support of the Ottoman Empire in that area. They had freedom to go and change the ideas and brainwash the minds of Muslims in this area. Slowly, slowly in the many years from 1920 until today they were very successful in establishing a new ideology in Islam that is very extremist in its point of view. It was not so militant [at first], however; it didn’t take the form of militancy, but it took the form of revival or renewal of Islamic tradition.3