Coming under continual fire from Federal artillery, around 3:00 p.m. Longstreet ordered Micah Jenkins to quiet the annoying enemy guns. While Longstreet thought it was understood that Jenkins would silence the cannons with sharpshooters, Jenkins, “second to none in either courage or ambition,” was only too anxious for a dash at a battery. He went after the Federal guns with more intensity than Longstreet had intended, driving the Federal pickets of the 1st and 3rd, but was driven back by the 7th and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves. McCall then moved the 12th to the narrow timber on the left front of his line. General Truman Seymour ordered six companies of the 12th to occupy two log huts on the Whitlock property, and the others built up a rough breastwork made of log rails.94
Chapter 8
DESPERATE FIGHTING AT WHITLOCK’S FARM95
Lee soon returned from his meeting with Holmes. With little promise of help from the troops on the river road and still no hint of attacks by Huger and Jackson, time was running out. Porter Alexander noted that “for hours we stood there waiting—waiting for something which never happened. Every minute that we waited was priceless time thrown away.” He lamented, “Our great opportunity was practically over, and we had not yet pulled a trigger.” Lee only had one-third of his army on hand, but if he was going to strike a blow to McClellan’s army, it was now or never. He ordered the attack.96
Longstreet commanded the attack to begin. James Kemper’s brigade moved out first. Due to the lack of cohesion in the Federal command, there was not a contiguous line between McCall’s left and Hooker’s division. As luck would have it, Kemper would be heading directly for this weak point in the Union line. Were he able to drive through to the Willis Church Road, he could cut off the northern portion of the Federal army. Kemper sent his staff along the line to ensure that the advance was made in good order. He placed the 24th Virginia on his left, with the 7th, 1st, 11th and 17th in order, left to right. He put Arthur Rogers’s Loudoun Artillery on a small elevation. The ground was uneven, “almost precipitous,” a mix of open fields and thick woods, with undergrowth that entangled the men. The ground rose and fell, and it was swampy in places. Keeping lines in order was very challenging. For example, seven companies of the 17th were delayed for some time by the “nearly impassable nature of the swamp at the point at which they crossed.” Federal batteries were directly to Kemper’s front, firing round shot and exploding shells at the attackers. As they pushed back the Federal pickets, Kemper’s men were driven by the intensity of the enemy fire, and the whole brigade charged forward at double-time. Despite orders to the contrary, his soldiers sought to “reach the enemy’s line by the directest route and in the shortest time.” He added that “a more impetuous and desperate charge was never made than that of my small command against the sheltered and greatly superior forces of the enemy.” Kemper’s men crossed a swamp and then double-timed through the dense woods, despite his orders to the contrary. He realized that any effort to slow and re-form would be futile and would cause further confusion.97
After advancing between 1,000 and 1,200 yards, and going through yet more woods, Kemper’s men came upon another clearing and the twenty-pound Parrott guns of the German (or “Dutch”) Batteries. Two of John Knieriem’s cannons were in front, with Otto Diederich’s four guns about 100 yards behind them, to the left of the Whitlock house. Two more of Knieriem’s guns were to the rear. In front of Kemper’s brigade waited the six companies of the 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, posted in an “imperfect and hastily constructed breastwork and a house near by.” Members of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, fighting on foot, backed the 12th. Kemper remembered the attack, saying that the batteries and infantry “poured an incessant fire of shell, grape, canister and lead upon my line,” causing serious damage. Captain James Cooper’s battery, to the right, added to the fire. The men of the 12th, behind the log breastworks, fired volleys into the attackers.98
Kemper noted that “the left of my line was entirely unsupported, and greatly to my surprise and disappointment, for I had supposed that the movement of my brigade was part of a general advance along our entire lines.” The lack of support was, in part, because his men had advanced too quickly; other troops were not yet in position. This problem would vex the Confederates all through the battle. None of the attacks would be properly timed, and units attacked singly instead of en masse. Poor coordination of attacks, owing in large part to the difficult nature of the ground, made proper communication and organization exceedingly difficult.99
David Johnston, of Company D, 7th Virginia, remembered, “[W]hen our brigade had cleared the woods, it entered, in a most confused state, an open field, at the farther side of which, some four hundred yards in front of us, was a Federal battery with heavy infantry supports.” The shots from the enemy cannons “had been ploughing and ploughing through the woods from which we advanced to attack.” Outrunning any support they might have had, the men were “rushing wildly upon the enemy, who quietly and coolly awaited our coming.” He said that the Federals had laid out a trap for them, with guns in the front and infantry supports on the right and left.
Johnston continued, “If a reader has never been in a fierce battle he does not know how a man’s courage is most severely put to the test.” The men of his regiment were advancing from woods, over an open field, with no hope of shelter. Men would think “the enemy is posted in that lumber across the field, and before we move many yards he will open on us with shot and shell; this is perhaps my last day.” Many were right. It would get worse; they approached the Federal position, and the shell was changed to canister. “Gap after gap yawns through the line, only to be speedily closed again.” When they got close, they would be met with an avalanche of small arms fire. “As we go on men grip their muskets tighter; their eyes flash, their teeth shut hard, only to open with a cry of rage as they rush upon the guns and bayonet the cannoneers.” J.P. Jordan remembered, “[A] rifle shot took away my haversack and canteen and severely bruised my left hip.” Soon afterward, a ball broke his collarbone, and later he “was hit on the foot by another ball.”100
Kemper’s men drove on, firing into the defenders as they charged. Edgar Warfield, of the 17th Virginia, cited Porter Alexander’s comments that it was difficult to control the line in the thick underbrush, but “the impetuosity of the charge broke the enemy’s line.” The Federals pulled back. With the Confederates firing at his battery from a distance of only sixty yards, twenty-two of Knieriem’s horses had been shot, and he was forced to pull out his two forward Parrotts, the limbers and two of the caissons. He left his rear-most guns in place. Diederichs continued to blast away with canister and shells “used with very short fuse” until his ammunition was exhausted; then he, too, had to pull his four guns back. Colonel John Taggart, the commander of the 12th, said that the attackers tried to use a ravine to swing around his position. Fearing that they were about to be surrounded, the 12th hastily withdrew. Colonel James Childs of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry said that the 12th “broke in a most disorderly manner, without firing a shot at the enemy, and falling back upon the ranks of my men frightened the horses and compelled them to join in their disgraceful flight.” He rallied his men a few hundred yards to the rear. Even though their line had been broken, the Federal fire had taken its toll. Kemper later wrote, “The ground which they gained from the enemy is marked by the graves of some of my veterans, who were buried where they fell…[showing] the points at which they dashed against the strongholds of the retreating foe.”101
“Kemper’s Attack.” Map by Hal Jespersen.
The attack rolled on. Having broken McCall’s line, Kemper’s Brigade next approached the farm lane that led to Willis Church Road. Placed near the farm road was the First Brigade of Hooker’s division, under the command of Brigadier General Cuvier Grover. His 16th Massachusetts Volunteers were to the immediate east of the road and “received and repulsed the heaviest and most persistent attempts of the enemy to break the lines.” Grover noted that the “steadiness and determinatio
n” of his first line checked Kemper’s advance and caused the attackers to withdraw.102
His men had captured McCall’s line at the Whitlock farm, but Kemper could not hold without adequate support. Woods and underbrush encircled them, and Kemper was justifiably concerned about his precarious position. The Virginian said that “the inferior numbers which had alarmed the enemy and driven him from his breastworks and batteries soon became apparent to him, and he at once proceeded to make use of his advantage.” With no reinforcements in sight, and with large bodies of the enemy on both of his flanks, Kemper had no choice but to pull back. His men began to retire in order, but soon things became more chaotic, requiring serious effort on the part of their leaders to maintain organization. Kemper sent out messages as to where to re-form, but the terrain made the task very difficult indeed and he would presently be hit by a Union counterattack.103
Not realizing that Kemper was about to pull back, McCall ordered Colonel Seneca Simmons to support the left. McCall also had called on his division’s last reserves. Sumner’s Second Corps had been stationed as a reserve near the Nelson house, but when two brigades, Dana’s and Gorman’s, had been sent to the White Oak Bridge area to support Smith against a possible attack by Jackson, it left only Burns’s brigade of the Second Corps to back up McCall.104
Simmons had taken the 5th, 8th and 10th Pennsylvania Reserves and elements of other units from his right. At that moment, Jenkins was preparing to attack, and most of McCall’s support facing Jenkins had been taken away. He would be in a precarious position if Jenkins were to advance. Moving to the left against Kemper’s assault, Simmons formed his units for attack and said, “Brigade! Forward, Charge!” With bayonets fixed, the men “sprang up and with a savage yell, rushed madly.” Colonel James Kirk of the 10th said that the horses of the retreating batteries caused “wild confusion” among his men. He plunged into the flank of the attacking Confederates, “completely routing the enemy, killing large numbers, and capturing about 60 prisoners.” As for Simmons, his men begged him to get down from his horse because he was too easy a target. Unwilling to dismount, he quickly fell, mortally wounded. McCall’s adjutant, Captain Henry Biddle, was also mortally wounded, hit three times as he tried to deliver orders. The Federals drove to the Whitlock house, and the Confederates attempted to re-form. Kemper and his officers did all they could do to organize their brigade, but they were forced to pull back. As he retreated, Kemper saw Lawrence O’Bryan Branch’s brigade of A.P. Hill’s division moving up on his right.105
“Simmons’ Counterattack.” Map by Hal Jespersen.
Branch had been ordered to attack at the same time as Kemper, but his men were not ready. Further, he had to march through the confusing terrain, and consequently, he attacked late. He had no guide, but he “took the direction to whence came the shells.” When they finally arrived on the field, Branch’s men attacked and pushed the enemy back from the Whitlock house “for nearly a mile.” While Branch’s men certainly drove the defenders, a mile was an exaggeration—this would have pushed the Federals past east of the Nelson house by a few hundred yards. As his men were attacking the Federals, Branch noticed that the enemy troops were “rapidly accumulating as they fell back.” He was advancing toward Hooker’s line and saw the Union troops that extended past his flank. Branch was approaching the 26th Pennsylvania and the 2nd New Hampshire. George Wells, lieutenant colonel of the 26th Pennsylvania, saw that McCall “seemed to be holding his own, when suddenly he gave way and the attack fell upon our own lines.” Owing to the nature of the ground, Wells could only bring the fire of one company to bear upon the attackers, but in combination with the 2nd New Hampshire, it was enough to hold the attackers off. With the enemy in his front and on his flanks, Branch decided that it was best to rein in his attack and pull back. It was about this time that McCall ordered the companies of the 9th back to the support of Cooper to meet Jenkins’s attack there.106
Lawrence O’Bryan Branch. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Pickett’s Brigade was approaching the battlefield, marching up the Long Bridge Road. The commander, Colonel Eppa Hunton, had taken over General Pickett’s brigade after the latter was wounded at Gaines’s Mill but was quite ill himself. Command fell to Colonel John Strange. He moved the brigade to the right of the road and formed a line of battle. Captain James Dearing’s artillery was to their front and firing, and the men were ordered to lie down. When ordered to advance around 5:00 p.m., they obeyed, advancing on Branch’s right, but the terrain and the retreat of some of Branch’s men made it difficult to keep the lines in order. The inability of Kemper’s, Branch’s and Hunton’s brigades to coordinate was lamented by Kemper, who later said, “If it had been possible for these brigades to have advanced simultaneously with my own the victory of the day would have been achieved on the right of our line with comparatively little difficulty and at an early hour.” The terrain had been consistently causing havoc on Longstreet’s attack. Strange said that they had advanced “over such broken ground and through an almost impassable marsh, as well as encountering a brigade [Branch’s] in full retreat, which forced its way through our ranks.” Marching on, they were fired on by the enemy hidden in woods on their right. A shower of canister caused them to move by the left flank. The Confederates soon forced the four remaining companies of the 12th Pennsylvania Reserves to pull out, along with Diederich’s four cannons.107
Strange’s brigade emerged within a few hundred yards of the abandoned Federal guns and encountered a large force. At first, he assumed that they were friends, “until convinced to the contrary by the open, honest display of the old flag, whereupon I ordered a fire, and a charge drove them from the battery back to their line in the woods beyond.” These were the guns in the rear section of Knieriem’s battery. Strange was tempted to turn the recaptured guns on the retreating enemy but found that friendly troops were in his line of fire and decided to hold off.108
Strange continued to attack McCall’s Pennsylvanians, driving them from the Whitlock area. Soon the brigade was within sight of the goal of seizing the Wills Church Road and cutting off the Federal retreat. As the last line of defense, Major Roy Stone of the 1st Pennsylvania Rifles saw the Federal troops in full retreat and ordered his men to lay down and allow the withdrawing troops to pass over them. His men then delivered a volley and continued to fire “for some minutes,” but they were receiving murderous fire. Stone said his soldiers “were falling fast and I should soon have none left.” He gave the order to retire “just in time to escape being surrounded.” It was a desperate hour for the Union defenders in that sector, and at that time, their brigade commander, Truman Seymour, decided to wander off in the direction of Franklin at White Oak, possibly seeking assistance.109
Private Tobias Yoder of the 10th Pennsylvania’s Company A was one of the lucky ones that day. A buckle had been shot from his hat, and a shell fragment had hit his coat. Quickly he was hit by seven bullets, two piercing his lungs, one of which shattered his shoulder blade. Two of the bullets passed through his blanket roll and hit him in his side. One lodged in his hipbone and another near his spine. Amazingly, he survived. Captured and sent to prison, he lived until the age of seventy.110
During a lull in the fighting, Private Warfield began to look after the wounded. Coming upon a Union soldier with a scalp wound, his “attention was attracted to the cap he had with him.” Quickly recognizing the name cut into the visor as having belonged to his brother, Warfield asked where the Yankee had come into possession of it. The wounded soldier replied that “he had lost his own and had taken this one from a dead Confederate soldier lying near him.” Warfield asked whether the soldier had really died, to which the Yankee replied, “They had both fallen within arm’s reach of each other.” The Yankee and Warfield’s brother had started the attack about thirty yards from each other. Warfield discovered that his brother “fell, shot through the breast, and was bayoneted in the stomach after he fell.” During the same lull, Federal soldier G.W. Wi
lson saw a Federal soldier have mercy on a wounded Confederate by taking him water. As soon as he left the spot, three Confederates fired on him. The soldier’s comrades quickly captured those doing the firing. Regardless, the merciful soldier would be wounded himself shortly afterward.111
Seeing how close the Confederates were to seizing the Willis Church Road, Second Corps commander Edwin Sumner sent an urgent message to the White Oak area to recall Dana’s and Sully’s brigades, which would have to hurry two miles in the heat, over dust-choked roads, in order to arrive in time. Fortunately, Sedgwick had sent for them at the first sign of trouble, and they were already on their way, double-timing as often as possible. Sumner then sent in his final brigade, that of William Burns. Burns had four regiments, and he ordered the 69th and 106th Pennsylvania to Hooker’s right, along the farm road that ran to the east of the Whitlock place. Edmund Kirby’s battery was set up on a rise near the Nelson house, with the 72nd Pennsylvania positioned to its right and the 71st placed behind. Despite some of McCall’s men approaching him, retreating in confusion, Kirby opened fire with solid shot and shell. He stated that the attackers “did not approach nearer than 500 yards to my position, but kept up a terrible fire of artillery and musketry upon us from their position in the woods, where they lay concealed.”112
Burns’s reinforcements from White Oak soon began to arrive. Dana said they had double-quicked over the two-mile distance “to make all possible haste. Very many men broke down on the road, and those who arrived at Nelson’s farm, although in excellent sprits, showed the marks of great fatigue.” They had hurried over the road where “dust was so thick a man could not see ten feet.” These were the same men who earlier in the day had rushed to the bridge to support Franklin. The 19th Massachusetts rested for just a moment and then drove into the wood line. The 20th Massachusetts, 7th Michigan and 42nd New York joined the force temporarily commanded by Colonel William R. Lee, who was leading for Dana. The four regiments advanced, but the ground was sloped and enemy fire played havoc with the unit order. They had to stop three times to redress lines. Corporal Isaac Sampson, a twenty-year-old farmer of Company K of the 20th Massachusetts, lost his leg to a round shot. Sergeant Compass had his breast and bowels torn away by an exploding shell. The 19th Massachusetts was separated from the others as it allowed a battery to pass. To the right of the now three-regiment attacking formation was the 20th Massachusetts, with the 7th Michigan on its left and the 42nd New York beside the 7th. Colonel Lee was soon knocked out of command, as he had a hard collision with an artillery horse and was not able to lead. Major Revere took over the lead (he would have two horses shot from under him).113
The Battle of Glendale Page 7
