Invisible Chess Moves

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Invisible Chess Moves Page 11

by Emmanuel Neiman


  27. f5xg6 Rf7-e7

  28. Rb3-b8 Re7-e8

  When Capablanca obtained this favourable position, after a logical game, both players were aware that there could be no doubt about the final result.

  White’s advantage is decisive for several reasons:

  - The domination of the open file and the invasion of the back rank.

  - The mate threats induced by the white pawn encrusted on g6.

  - The alignment of three black pieces on the same horizontal line.

  - The lack of connection between the unprotected c2 rook and the rest of Black’s army.

  What would you play as White? The Cuban hero played

  29. Qa6-a8

  And Black resigned, although he could have claimed an advantage in the final position!

  This is a typical ‘Capablancan’ game, where the stronger player dictates the proceedings, realizes a well-thought-out plan and finishes elegantly. The problem is that neither Capablanca nor Thomas could have imagined that Black might have counterchances in the final position, because White had been ‘logically’ winning all day long. Thomas estimated that here the demonstration should end, and resigned.

  Nevertheless, after 29.Qa8, Black could have defended successfully.

  1. Can you see how Capa could have won in the diagram position?

  2. Can you see a defence for Thomas after 29.Qa8?

  Here are the answers to these questions.

  1. Two other moves were easily winning for White:

  A) The most accurate is probably 29.Qb5! and on 29…Rc1+ 30.Kf2 Rc2+ 31.Ke1 Rc1+ 32.Kd2 Rxb8 33.Qxb8 White wins;

  B) The more straightforward is 29.Rxe8 Qxe8 30.Qa4!. Black has to go for 30…Rxg2+ 31.Kxg2 Qxg6+ 32.Kh1 when White is winning.

  2. Had Black replied

  29. … Rc2xa2!

  he would not have been lost anymore. Suddenly the offside rook comes back into play and defends the back rank after the surprising circuit Rc2xa2xa8xe8 (compare with the Yusupov-Kortchnoi fragment from Chapter 2). This is certainly an unexpected move, but nothing invisible under normal conditions between two of the best players of the time. The only saving move is a capture of a pawn, with which Black attacks the queen.1

  Even 29…Rc1+ comes into consideration; after 30.Rxc1 Rxb8 the game continues – granted, White is a little better here.

  After 29…Rxa2 30.Qxa2 Rxb8 Black is very slightly better. The best move for White would have been 30.Qb7!. Thanks to his activity White has equality, for example: 30…c5 31.Rxe8 Qxe8 32.Qb8 Ra8 33.Qxe8+ Rxe8 when the extra pawn is easily compensated for by the activity of his pieces.

  The example that follows shows the fascination that was exerted by Capablanca on his contemporaries, and even on admirers long after his death. Sometimes admiration excludes the possibility of a critical perspective and thus constitutes another kind of blindness. The following case was – with right regarded as a model game for eighty years.

  Winter,William

  Capablanca,Jose Raul

  Hastings 1919 (5)

  In Chess Fundamentals Capablanca explains that Black is mechanically winning with the white bishop jailed on g3. ‘A simple examination will show that White is minus a bishop for all practical purposes’ This is a very attractive thesis, but a false one, as recently shown by Kasparov in My Great Predecessors Part 1; White probably had a quite simple draw. However, dozens of chess treatises gave this position without any further analysis or verification and took the conclusions of the famous player for granted.

  In the game White played 1.Rh1. Capablanca then launched a pawn attack on the queenside (…c6, …b5, …c4) and won easily thanks to his virtual extra piece: 1…Ke6 2.h4 Rfb8 3.hxg5 hxg5 4.b3 c6 5.Ra2 b5 6.Rhal c4−+ and Black won.

  In the diagram position, Kasparov showed that White could also have jailed Black’s bishop with

  1. c2-c4!!

  Here’s Kasparov’s analysis:

  1. … c7-c6

  2. Rf1-c1 Rf8-b8

  3. b2-b3

  White must keep everything blocked on the light squares.

  3. … b7-b5

  4. Rc1-c3! Rb8-b6

  5. Kg2-f1 b5xc4

  6. d3xc4 Ra8-b8

  7. Ra1-a3!=

  Of course one may argue that these are old examples and that the average level of play at the beginning of the 20th century was far from our modern standard – but this is debatable, at least as far as Capablanca is concerned.

  Gelfand,Boris

  Lautier,Joel

  Belgrade 1997 (5)

  1. d2-d4 d7-d5

  2. Ng1-f3 e7-e6

  3. c2-c4 d5xc4

  4. e2-e3 Ng8-f6

  5. Bf1xc4 c7-c5

  6. 0-0 a7-a6

  7. e3-e4!? Nf6xe4

  8. d4-d5 Bf8-e7

  9. Rf1-e1 e6xd5

  10. Qd1xd5 Ne4-d6

  11. Bc4-d3 0-0

  12. Bc1-f4

  12. … Nd6-f5?!

  12…Be6!? 13.Qh5 g6 14.Qh6 Nc6∞ and now White has the choice of taking the draw with 15.Rxe6 and 16.Bxg6, or playing for an attack.

  13. Nb1-c3± Be7-f6

  13…Qxd5 14.Nxd5 Bd8 15.Bxf5 Bxf5 16.Bd6±.

  14. Bd3xf5 Qd8xd5

  15. Bf5xh7+ Kg8xh7

  16. Nc3xd5

  White has regained his pawn, with a superior position.

  16. … Nb8-d7

  16…Nc6 offered better chances though White keeps a neat advantage: 17.Kxf6+ gxf6 18.Bd6 Rd8 19.Bxc5±.

  17. Bf4-d6 Rf8-d8

  18. Nd5xf6+ Nd7xf6

  19. Bd6xc5 Bc8-g4

  White now introduces a clever exchanging operation, in order to get rid of the opposite-coloured bishops.

  20. Bc5-e7! Rd8-d7

  21. Nf3-g5+ Kh7-g6

  22. Be7xf6 Kg6xf6

  The paradoxical 22…gxf6!? was a better practical saving chance.

  23. Ng5-e4+ Kf6-g6

  24. f2-f3

  White is a clear pawn up, without compensation for Black.

  24. … Bg4-f5

  25. Ra1-d1 Ra8-d8

  26. Rd1xd7 Rd8xd7

  27. Kg1-f2 b7-b6

  28. Re1-e2 Rd7-d3

  29. Re2-e3 Rd3-d4

  30. Re3-b3 b6-b5

  31. Kf2-e3 Rd4-c4

  31…Rd1 was more resilient.

  32. Rb3-c3+−

  Now it is completely over.

  32. … Rc4-b4

  On 32…Ra4 simplest is 33.Ra3 Rxa3+ 34.bxa3 Be6 35.Nc5 Bxa2 (35…Bc8 36.Ke4+−) 36.Nxa6.

  33. b2-b3

  The rook is trapped.

  33. … Bf5-e6

  34. g2-g4

  Closing the net. The rook will be taken after Nd2 and a2-a3.

  34. … a6-a5

  35. f3-f4 Be6-d5

  35…Bxg4 36.Nf2 Bf5 (36…Be6 37.Nd3) 37.a3.

  36. Ne4-d2 a5-a4

  37. a2-a3 Rb4xb3

  38. Nd2xb3 a4xb3

  This position has been reached after a brilliant demonstration by Gelfand in all phases of the game: daring opening play with a pawn sacrifice, well-calculated complications in the middlegame and a smooth conversion of the advantage with perfect technique – in short, a model game by White!

  In order to deepen our understanding of this theme, we must consider a few psychological factors: Gelfand had an impressive score against Lautier, a superior rating, and he is playing with white. Throughout the game he has been in a commanding position, and he has dominated his opponent quite easily. At the end of the game, it is as if Lautier is continuing mechanically, by inertia. One player is certain of the win, the other is convinced that he will lose.

  If we look at the position, White is an exchange up, he has a well-centralized king – the win is almost within reach. Black has only one trump, the advanced passed pawn on b3, which should be quickly eliminated by White.

  What do you play here?

  39. Rc3-c5??

  When asked about this game, Gelfand acknowledged that he relaxed, thinking the game was over: ‘I thought that the position was totally won and
missed an easy tactic’.

  39.Kd2 is the simplest win, with the idea Kc3-b2 and Rxb3, for example 39…b2 40.Kc2. Or first 39.Rc1.

  39. … Bd5-c4??

  The fantastic 39…b4! would have won for Black (40.axb4 b2−+; 40.Rc1 b2−+) 40.Rxd5 bxa3 with a classical case of two pawns on the sixth rank being unstoppable for a lone rook.

  40. Ke3-d2 1-0

  Another, more recent game involves the same Gelfand, several years later during the first round of the World Championship tournament played in Mexico.

  Anand,Viswanathan

  Gelfand,Boris

  Mexico City Wch 2007 (1)

  We are in the middle of a calm, relatively dull game, which has followed theoretical lines for a long time. Both players still have time and energy left. And both would show great form in this tournament (Anand ended first, Gelfand shared second).

  The psychological invisibility here is linked to those situations where a player – most often both players – ‘accepts’ the probable result of the game. By unconscious repression, in the Freudian sense of the term, they refuse to consider any move that does not lead to the expected (desired?) result.

  Anand, under slight pressure here, has just played the mistaken 1.Rg1-e1. Happy with a draw with black against the favourite of the event and following the logic of an equally matched game, Gelfand did not check whether his opponent had just blundered, he took:

  1. … Re4xe1+

  and drew. In an email to the authors he wrote: ‘I saw the idea of Rf4 in some other line, but did not spot it here. I did not believe that Black had an advantage, so I was not looking for it’. A typical explanation for not ‘seeing’ a move: you don’t look for it! This is the key to psychological invisibility. Both players had anticipated a draw long ago, and that is why they did not notice that after the simple tactic 1…Rxf4! 2.Nxf6+ (2.Qxf4? Bg5−+) 2…Qxf6

  Analysis diagram

  Black has a clear advantage: 3.Bd4 3.Bxa7b6, with threats of …Rf2, is very dangerous. 3…Qf5.

  Another case illustrates a variation on this psychological threat: in the next game, Kasparov needed a draw to ensure the tournament win. Let’s not forget that Lautier was never an easy prey for Garry; he was the only contemporary player with a plus score against him.

  Lautier,Joel

  Kasparov,Garry

  Tilburg 1997 (11)

  In this highly simplified ending, a draw looks imminent after the disappearance of the queenside pawns, for example: 1.Kf1 Rb8 2.Bc3 e5 3.Rc7 Kf8 4.Rxc6 Bxb4 5.Bxb4+ Rxb4=. But the players forgot about the back-rank mate, and when Lautier offered a draw playing

  1. Ra7-c7?

  Kasparov quickly accepted, but he could have obtained a clear advantage after 1…c5 (or 1…Rb8 2.Kf1 c5) 2.Kf1 Rb8 3.b5 Rxb5 4.Bc3 Rb3. The win is not certain, but Black is a pawn to the good and can press for a win without any risk.

  Let’s see another game where only one player was affected, but with the same psychological characteristics – and we urge the reader to try and find the decisive move (see diagram after 30.Nd7).

  Bradford,Joseph

  Byrne,Robert

  Greenville ch-USA 1980 (1)

  1. Ng1-f3 Ng8-f6

  2. g2-g3 b7-b6

  3. Bf1-g2 Bc8-b7

  4. 0-0 e7-e6

  5. c2-c4 Bf8-e7

  6. b2-b3 0-0

  7. Bc1-b2 c7-c5

  8. Nb1-c3 d7-d5

  9. Nf3-e5 Nb8-c6

  10. c4xd5 Nc6xe5

  11. d5-d6 Bb7xg2

  12. d6xe7 Qd8xe7

  13. Kg1xg2 Ra8-d8

  14. Kg2-g1 Ne5-c6

  15. d2-d3 Nf6-g4

  16. Qd1-d2 f7-f5

  17. Ra1-d1 e6-e5

  18. f2-f3 Ng4-f6

  19. Qd2-g5 Qe7-e6

  20. Qg5-h4 Nc6-d4

  21. e2-e3 Nd4-c2

  22. Bb2-c1 Nc2-b4

  23. d3-d4 e5-e4

  24. d4xc5 Rd8xd1

  25. Rf1 xd1 b6xc5

  26. f3xe4 f5xe4

  27. Bc1-a3

  Clear positional domination by the grandmaster, who equalized quickly in the opening and then progressively built up a small and eventually decisive advantage leading up to this position, where he is obviously winning.

  This is exactly the type of psychological circumstances that often provoke a lack of objectivity and lapses in concentration. Black is the stronger player (grandmaster vs amateur), he has played better, and now has a ‘crushing’ advantage.2

  27. … Qe6-e5?!

  27…Nd3 would have given a big advantage;

  27…Nxa2!! was completely winning: 28.Nxa2 Qxb3 29.Rf1 Qxa3 30.Rf2 Qxe3 and Black wins.

  28. Nc3-a4?!

  28.Bb2! Nd3 29.Ba1 c4 offered some chances of resistance.

  28. … Nf6-d5−+

  29. Na4xc5 Nd5xe3

  If 29…Qf5 30.Kh1 Qf3+ 31.Kg1 Qxd1+ 32.Kg2 Qf1 mate.

  30. Nc5-d7

  Now is the time to put an end to White’s resistance. How would you finish this game?

  30. … Qe5-d4??

  A) 30…Qd6 is game over. It has the same ideas as the game move, but without the latter’s inconveniences, for example: 31.Rb1 31.Rxd6 Rf1#; 31.Qh5 Qxd7 32.Bxb4 Qxd1+. 31…Qd2 31…Qxd7−+; 31…Qd4−+. 32.Qh3 Qf2+ 33.Kh1 Nd3 34.Bxf8 Qf3+ 35.Kg1 Nf4;

  B) Also, 30…Qf5, forcing the variation 31.Nxf8 Nxd1 32.Qxh7+ Qxh7 33.Nxh7 Nc2 34.Ng5 Nxa3 35.Nxe4, gives a big, probably winning advantage to Black, e.g. 35…Nb5 36.a4 Nd4

  Byrne’s move looks like the most direct way to finish the game: Black attacks the rook and has the additional threat of a discovered check. Most players would first consider this move, which is attractive for many reasons: a queen sacrifice (which cannot be accepted) linked with various direct and indirect threats. It is difficult to resist such a powerful way to end the game. Unfortunately for Black, the game is indeed finished, but in White’s favour!

  31. Qh4xh7+!

  Oh dear!

  31. … Kg8xh7

  31…Kf7 32.Rxd4.

  32. Nd7xf8+

  With check…

  32. … Kh7-g8

  33. Rd1xd4 Nb4-c2

  34. Rd4xe4

  Black resigned.

  Another example, from a game played during the unofficial World Championship between Kasparov and Short. The challenger was largely dominated in the match (he lost 6-1, though he offered good resistance in most of the games) and we can remember Kasparov saying when asked who his challenger would probably be: ‘It will be Short and it will be short’.

  At this point Kasparov was leading 4-0 (with 4 draws) and the match was basically over. In this game White is two pawns up, so it will soon be 5-0… or so both players were thinking.

  Kasparov,Garry

  Short,Nigel

  London Wch m 1993 (9)

  The simplest technique consists in progressively advancing White’s pawn and king while leaving the rook behind the passed a-pawn. Every time the black rook plays, the a-pawn advances. So the black king has to wait, and White can use zugzwang in order to force him to occupy unfavourable positions.

  This is all quite obvious, and Kasparov had certainly seen it. But both players fell victim to the same illusion, that White could win whatever he played. So White impatiently played:

  1. e3-e4?

  The technical 1.Ra3 would put Black in zugzwang: 1…Kf5 2.e4+ Ke5 3.Ke3 with an elementary win, for example: 3…Ke6 4.Kd4 Kd6 5.Kc4 Kc6 6.Kb4 Kb6 7.Rd3+− Re5 8.Rd6+ Kb7 9.Rd4 etc.

  Short answered in the same vein with the passive

  1. … Ke5-e6?

  Black could have drawn with the counterattacking move 1…Rc5!.

  Analysis diagram

  Typically the kind of move that you must look for in a seemingly hopeless position. The variations are quite easy, but none of the players could imagine that another result than ‘1-0’ was possible at this moment in the game, and in the match, so the move became invisible.

  Black is threatening to give check on c3, then to take the e-pawn, with a draw: the a-pawn will be lost,
and anyway an a-pawn isn’t enough to win such a position:

  A) 2.Ra3 Rc4 3.a5 Rxe4 (3.Rb3 Rxa4 is an elementary draw) 4.a6 Rf4+! 5.Ke3 Rf8= and the second white pawn is quickly lost;

  B) The other try 2.a5 fails to 2…Rc3+ 3.Kf2 Kxe4 4.a6 Rc8 5.a7 Ra8 and draw.

  Now White is winning again, which he did after

  2. Kf3-e3 Ke6-d6

  3. Ke3-d4 Kd6-d7

  4. Kd4-c4 Kd7-c6

  5. Kc4-b4 Ra5-e5

  6. Ra1-c1+ Kc6-b6

  7. Rc1-c4 1-0

  In his book Kasparov’s Fighting Chess 1999-2005 the Hungarian writer Tibor Karolyi offered an interesting view on Kasparov’s technical problems at the end of his career. Having dedicated all his opening preparations to finding violent attacking positions with both colours, thanks to his second Dokhoian, he lacked practice in the endgame because he hardly ever reached this phase of the game. His endgame play progressively deteriorated and became a relative weakness. Kramnik, for example, explained after and even during the London match that he was not afraid to deliberately enter inferior endings against Kasparov.

  B – Blunders in World Championship matches

  World Championship matches are a rich source of mistakes, for several reasons. One is the objective pressure on the players’ nerves, which affects their play and creates ideal conditions for blunders to occur. The second is a consequence of the match formula: extensive preparation is done in order to exploit one’s own strengths, but the opponent’s main goal will be to avoid this, so generally this is not very relevant.

  Another big part of the preparation consists in detecting the opponent’s weaknesses, and finding means to play in a style that does not suit him. Both players will try to go for positions where the opponent may play badly, even if his does not mean exploiting their own strong points. For example, against Topalov in 2010, Anand more or less repeated Kramnik’s match strategy against the Bulgarian in 2006, playing a lot of the same openings In two games he agreed to enter an open fight in the Grünfeld-Indian. He was crushed in the first game and in great danger of losing in the second.

 

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