Perhaps upset that the president did not grant his request for army patrols, Morgenthau decided to conduct his own inspection of White House security that evening. He was shocked by what he found. “I just made an inspection . . . and in the whole rear of the White House only three men,” he complained to the Secret Service. And the agents hardly seemed trained to handle an emergency. “I asked one man to take out his gun. He started tugging away . . . and after about two minutes got the gun out.” The inspection provided Morgenthau with little assurance that the Secret Service was capable of protecting the president. “Anybody could take a five ton truck with 20 men and they could take the White House without any trouble.”21
Morgenthau, however, was not the only official inspecting the added security arrangements that evening. Around 2:00 a.m. on the morning of December 8, Secret Service chief Frank Wilson decided to conduct his own review. He found the agents on the White House detail were “on their toes.” He was shocked, though, to find a police officer, the one on duty closest to the president’s bedroom, resting comfortably in a chair, “snugly wrapped in a blanket.” Wilson noted that the officer was “so nearly asleep that I was not even challenged as I approached.”22
In the days that followed, a host of security experts descended on the White House and made recommendations for making it safer. With images of the London blitz in mind, they were especially concerned with the possibility of an attack from the air. The army’s bomb experts advised the Secret Service that the White House was especially vulnerable to a bomb blast. According to Reilly, they concluded that “the mortar of the original part of the White House was made from ground oyster and clam shells and the entire White House would immediately crumble in the event of a direct or near hit.”23
Security experts introduced a number of possible solutions, some more practical than others. Some, for example, suggested that the White House be painted black to make it less visible. Another idea mentioned was to move the seat of government farther inland and away from the coast. There was even a discussion about changing the direction of the Potomac and Anacostia rivers. It was not as crazy as it sounded. As Reilly pointed out, “No camouflage of the White House is practical while the confluence of these rivers remains a mile from the mansion. A pilot would find it quite simple to hit the White House by flying up either river and getting his ‘fix’ at the confluence.”24
Since no one previously had seriously considered the possibility of enemy planes dropping bombs on the nation’s capital, the Secret Service had to develop new strategies for protecting the president. They created ten safe houses in the Washington, D.C., area where they could take FDR in the event of an attack. If necessary, a plane stood ready to whisk him away from D.C.
The Secret Service also proposed a number of alterations to the White House to make it more resistant to an air assault. On December 15, they provided Morgenthau with a list of suggested changes, which included covering the skylights with six inches of sand topped with a layer of tin. They also wanted to cover the roof with sandbags and have machine guns installed. The west colonnade, which the president passed through on his way to the Oval Office, would be equipped with movable steel barricades. The Secret Service also recommended that bulletproof glass, along with roll-down steel curtains, be installed in all of the windows of rooms used by the first family, especially FDR’s Oval Study. In addition, the guards proposed that all of the outer doors have “light and air or gas locks” so that the house could be quickly sealed.25
Roosevelt objected to most of the added security measures, and only a few were implemented. FDR understood the symbolic value of the White House and likely worried about the psychological impact on the public if they saw pictures of the grounds surrounded by heavily armed guards, or if word leaked that elaborate new security measures were being put into place. The Secret Service did add bulletproof glass halfway up the windows of the Oval Office directly behind the president’s desk, and a concrete “bomb barrier” was poured along the west wall of the Executive Office Building. Most of the other suggestions, however, remained on the drawing board for the rest of FDR’s presidency.
The Secret Service did, however, implement some significant changes. For both Morgenthau and the Secret Service, constructing a bomb shelter beneath the White House was a top priority. Since no shelter existed, they decided to use a large vault under the Treasury Department as a temporary refuge. The vault, which was used to store contraband opium and currency, was supported by walls constructed of heavy armored plates and reinforced with concrete. “The shelter had an office and a bedroom for the President and a relatively large outer office planned for use by the staff,” Tully recalled. “Bunks were built along the walls of this larger room and emergency telephone facilities were also crowded in.”26
A few days after Pearl Harbor, the government started construction of a tunnel to connect the shelter, located in the basement of the Treasury Building, to the White House. Security experts recommended building a zigzag path from the White House to the vault, pointing out that a straight tunnel would leave the president vulnerable to flying debris. “The tunnel was 761 feet long, about 7 feet wide and 7 feet high, and of a zigzag design intended to lessen danger from concussion in the event of a direct or close bomb hit,” recalled Wilson. The shelter itself was stocked with twenty-four cases of Poland water, two hundred pounds of food, twelve beds, twenty-four blankets, twelve first-aid kits, and a portable toilet.27
Once again, FDR remained dubious. Although construction went forward, the president opposed the idea of a bomb shelter and never visited it. “Henry, I will not go down into the shelter unless you allow me to play poker with all the gold in your vaults,” he joked with Morgenthau.28
The Secret Service also began exploring additional protective measures, including the creation of a traveling speaking rostrum that would screen the president from a bomb blast or an assailant with a gun. A few months after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Secret Service contracted with a company to create a steel protective shield that would be hidden inside a standard rostrum. In the event of an emergency, an agent could press a button that would extend a six-foot, three-inch steel shield that would encase the president. “It is semi-circular in shape to afford full protection from all frontal angles,” the service reported.29
The agency also set up a new alarm system to alert agents when FDR moved around the White House. It had become standard practice for the usher to sound three alarms to notify the staff that the president was moving from the mansion to the executive offices. Those charged with protecting the president now set up their own system to track FDR’s movements. “Whenever the Supervisor is notified the President is about to leave his quarters, or his office in the West Wing,” instructed a Secret Service guide, he was now required to inform all White House police officers and agents on duty.30
Although FDR bristled at most of the added security measures, he did see the new focus on security as an opportunity to expand the White House, a project he had been contemplating for some time. Remarkably, while processing the original reports about the Japanese assault, and laying the groundwork for America’s entry into World War II, FDR had the wherewithal to plan future construction projects. According to White House architect Lorenzo Winslow, FDR called him on the afternoon of December 7 and told him to start planning to construct new buildings. “Mr. Roosevelt called me, and I went down to the White House that evening,” he told a reporter in 1961. “He wanted to discuss more office space for the expansion he knew would be needed.” FDR said that steps should be taken at once to provide space in temporary buildings on the South Lawn of the White House, Winslow reflected in his memoirs, “and he gave me a detailed list of the people who would be housed in the quarters.” The next morning, before going to Congress to deliver his war message, FDR summoned Winslow to his bedroom and suggested that instead of designing temporary buildings, he should create a permanent East Wing. “It has always been interesting to me that he should have be
en concerned with this while he must have been thinking of so many other things,” Winslow recalled.31
FDR had wanted to build a new East Wing for three years to accommodate his growing White House staff. At the time, the East Wing looked much as it had when his cousin Theodore Roosevelt had built it in 1902. Until 1941, it served as the social entrance to the White House and contained guard stations, a colonnaded corridor, and a long cloakroom. Despite the enormous new burdens of war that had been thrust upon him, FDR found the time to offer specific design ideas for the new addition. Picking up on FDR’s suggestions, Winslow drew up plans by the end of the month. The army decided to add to his design by calling for the construction of a permanent air-raid shelter under the new wing.
Construction on the new wing commenced within months, and the first occupants moved in during the spring of 1942. Although construction was not completed until after the war, the new wing quickly filled up with executive-branch offices. Roosevelt also replaced the old cloakroom with a movie theater. A secure bomb shelter sat beneath the East Wing, complete with seven-foot-thick concrete walls laced with steel. The shelter consisted of one large room with a presidential private area in the middle that contained a bedroom and bathroom.
If there was a direct security threat to the president, the assumption was that alien residents from Germany, Italy, or Japan would be the likely perpetrators. Within hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Washington moved to round up potential suspects. The fear of domestic terrorism would lead to one of the most serious violations of civil liberties in American history and leave a dark stain on FDR’s leadership.
Reporters noticed that Solicitor-General Charles Fahy had slipped into the White House at around 7:00 p.m. When he tried to leave, they cornered him to find out what he had been doing. Reluctantly, he admitted that he had a brief meeting with the president. When pressed, he whispered, “My visit had to do with the aliens—the Japanese—living in the United States.”32
Fahy was referring to the roughly 92,000 Japanese Americans living in the United States in December 1941. The first-generation immigrants, known as Issei, had mostly arrived before 1907. Although they were longtime U.S. residents, the federal government had prevented them from becoming naturalized citizens. Their children, the Nisei, were born in the United States and therefore claimed full citizenship. A much smaller group, the Kibei, were American born but raised and educated in Japan. Roughly, about 90 percent of all Japanese Americans were clustered on the West Coast, around San Francisco and Los Angeles. The Japanese also made up about 30 percent of the territory of Hawaii’s total population.
As tensions between the two countries increased in the late 1930s, FDR had grown worried about the loyalty of the Japanese community within U.S. borders. He and his military advisers had watched as a “fifth column” of German spies aided Hitler’s lightning-fast conquest of Europe. There must be similar networks in the United States, he assumed. At the urging of his military advisers, FDR approved steps to investigate and neutralize potential subversive activity among Japanese residents in Hawaii.
Although the administration worried to some extent about German and Italian spies, the Japanese came under much closer scrutiny. FDR had long harbored negative attitudes toward Japanese Americans. Early in his career, he called both the Issei and the Nisei a “menace” and “chronic irritation” to their white neighbors. During the 1920s, he opposed Japanese immigration to America. Unlike many nativists, Roosevelt did not consider Japanese racially inferior, and he deplored racial prejudice. Like most Americans, however, he believed the Japanese were incapable of assimilating into mainstream society and therefore potentially more dangerous than German and Italian Americans.33
In 1940, Congress had acted on those general fears by passing the Alien Registration Act. The law required all resident aliens over the age of fourteen to register with the government. Each year they had to go to their local post office, where they were fingerprinted, photographed, and instructed to provide authorities with accurate and up-to-date information about where they lived and worked. To keep track of the resident aliens, the Justice Department set up an Aliens Division, which worked closely with the FBI and military intelligence, to establish detailed Custodial Detention Lists, also known as “ABC Lists,” of perceived security threats.34
In the months leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the attorney general and the FBI had assured FDR of the loyalty of the Japanese community in America. The only spies they could identify were paid agents of the Japanese government. Roosevelt was unconvinced and, in typical fashion, assigned a special agent to bypass traditional channels and report directly to him. On November 7, exactly a month before Pearl Harbor, his representative, Curtis B. Munson, reported, “There is no Japanese ‘problem’ on the Coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese.”35
There was no evidence that the Japanese community was involved in subversive activity and overwhelming evidence that they were in fact loyal to the United States. Yet in their brief ten-minute meeting on the evening of December 7, FDR instructed Fahy to implement Emergency Proclamation 2525, which authorized the FBI to arrest any aliens in the continental United States whom it deemed “dangerous to public peace and safety.” He gave little thought to the matter and approved the request without debate or discussion. He promised to formally sign the proclamation the following day.36
Even before FDR approved the new security measures, FBI agents and local police had formed task forces to find those listed by the Aliens Division as dangerous. By late Sunday afternoon, FBI agents had fanned out throughout Southern California, raiding private homes to detain suspicious Japanese. According to the Los Angeles Times, nearly two hundred were arrested in the hours after the attack. The Times reported that thousands more would likely be detained after the formal declaration of war.37
In the New York metropolitan region, a special task force of one hundred FBI agents, along with city police and detectives, scoured the city, shutting down Japanese businesses and arresting Japanese nationals on their target list. Those arrested were taken to Ellis Island, where they were held indefinitely until they received further instructions from Washington. Estimates suggest that a few hundred were detained. New York mayor Fiorello La Guardia directed Japanese nationals to stay in their homes. The police closed the Nippon Club on West Ninety-third Street. Police escorted the twelve members at the club to their respective homes. Additionally, New York City policemen visited every Japanese restaurant in the city. They allowed diners to finish their meals before closing the restaurants and escorting the owners and staff to their homes.38
Also on December 7, the Treasury Department under Morgenthau started waging economic warfare against Japanese-owned businesses in the United States. The government invoked a “total embargo” on shipments of every kind to Japan and its occupied territories, making it illegal for an American to transact business with Japan. On Sunday evening, Morgenthau sent some 4,000 agents to forcibly sever all economic ties between Japan and the United States. Treasury agents also visited and assumed control of every Japanese bank in the United States. The government froze the assets of Japanese nationals, preventing them from withdrawing money from their bank accounts to buy food and other necessities. (At the urging of the first lady, the Treasury Department later allowed each family to withdraw one hundred dollars per month for living expenses.)39
What began as a relatively modest security program prior to Pearl Harbor quickly morphed into a massive violation of civil liberties. Stories circulated about plots among Japanese residents to aid an enemy landing on the coast of California. Deeply embedded racism reinforced the fear of sabotage. Newspapers vilified Japanese residents, calling them “mad dogs, yellow vermin and nips.” Business interests saw an opportunity to eradicate competition from Japanese farmers. The entire political establishment of California clamored for action against Japanese residents.
The Japanese living on the West Coast were obvious and easy targets. Th
ere were too many German and Italian aliens to arrest them all, and they exercised considerable political clout, especially in the Midwest and East. There were also too many Japanese Americans in Hawaii to be moved. Those of Japanese descent on the West Coast thus became the chief available targets for American frustration and hostility. “These people were not convicted of any crime,” Eleanor wrote years later, “but emotions ran too high, too many people wanted to wreak vengeance on Oriental looking people. There was no time to investigate families or to adhere strictly to the American rule that a man is innocent until he is proven guilty.”40
Roosevelt, preoccupied with the military and diplomatic demands of fighting a global war, and largely indifferent to violations of civil liberties, would eventually give in to the pressure. According to Stimson, he and Roosevelt discussed the possibility of evacuating the Japanese from the West Coast on February 11, 1942. FDR expressed no opinion. He considered it a military matter, and he left it up to the War Department to develop a policy. Stimson, in turn, handed the issue off to Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy, who was responsible for domestic security. McCloy believed that he was given “carte blanche” by the president “to do what we want” with the Japanese.41
On March 21, 1942, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the forced evacuation of Japanese residents on the West Coast. More than 100,000 people, many of them American citizens, were told to dispose of their property however they could before being rounded up and taken to government “relocation” centers scattered throughout the West. Attorney General Francis Biddle, who opposed the measure, claimed FDR showed no regret in signing it into law. “I do not think he was much concerned with the gravity or implications of this step,” he wrote. “He was never theoretical about things. What must be done to defend the country must be done. The military might be wrong. But they were fighting the war. Nor do I think that the constitutional difficulty plagued him—the Constitution has never greatly bothered any wartime President.”42
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