After emphasising that now is the time and the opportunity to turn the tables on Carthage, to do to Africa what Hannibal did to Italy, Scipio ends on a characteristic note of restraint and exaltation combined: “ Though Fabius has depreciated my services in Spain, I will not attempt to turn his glory into ridicule and magnify my own. If in nothing else, though a young man, I will show my superiority over this old man in modesty and in the government of my tongue. Such has been my life, and such the services I have performed, that I can rest content in silence with that opinion which you have spontaneously formed of me.”
The Senate, however, were more concerned with the preservation of their own privileges than with the military arguments, and demanded to know if Scipio would leave the decision with them, or, if they refused, appeal, over their heads, to the people’s verdict. They refused to give a decision until they had an assurance that he would abide by it. After a consultation with his colleague, Scipio gave way to this demand: Thereupon the Senate, a typical committee, effected a compromise by which the consul to whose lot Sicily fell might have permission to cross into Africa if he judged it to be for the advantage of the State. Curiously, Sicily fell to Scipio!
He took with him thirty warships, which by great energy he had built and launched within forty-five days of the timber being taken from the woods; of these twenty were quinqueremes and ten quadriremes. On board he embarked seven thousand volunteers, as the Senate, afraid to block him but keen to obstruct him, had refused him leave to levy troops.
The story of how, beset with difficulties and hampered by those he was aiming to save, he took this unorganised band of volunteers and trained it to be the nucleus of an effective expeditionary force finds a notable parallel in our own history. Sicily was to be Scipio’s Shorncliffe Camp, the place where he forged the weapon that was to be thrust at the heart of Carthage. But Scipio, unlike Sir John Moore in the Napoleonic War, was himself to handle the weapon his genius had created, and with it to strike the death-blow at Hannibal’s power. His vision penetrating the distant future, a quality in which he perhaps surpasses all other great commanders, enabled him to realise that the tactical key to victory lay in the possession of a superior mobile arm of decision—cavalry. It is not the least tribute to his genius that to appreciate this he had to break loose from the fetters of a great tradition, for Rome’s military greatness was essentially built on the power of her legionary infantry. The long and splendid annals of Roman history are the testimony to its effectiveness, and only in Scipio’s brief passage across the stage do we find a real break with this tradition, a balance between the two arms by which the power of the one for fixing and of the other for decisive manoeuvre are proportioned and combined. It is an object-lesson to modern general staffs, shivering on the brink of mechanicalisation, fearful of the plunge despite the proved ineffectiveness of the older arms in their present form, for no military tradition has been a tithe so enduring and so resplendent as that of the legion. From his arrival in Sicily onwards Scipio bent his energies to developing a superior cavalry, and Zama, where Hannibal’s decisive weapon was turned against himself, is Scipio’s justification.
How unattainable must this goal have seemed when he landed in Sicily with a mere seven thousand heterogeneous volunteers. Yet within a few days the first progress was recorded. At once organising his volunteers into cohorts and centuries, Scipio kept aside three hundred of the pick. One can imagine their perplexed wonder at being left without arms and not told off to centuries like their comrades.
Next he nominated three hundred of the noblest born Sicilian youths to accompany him to Africa, and appointed a day on which they were to present themselves equipped with horses and arms. The honour of nomination for such a hazardous venture affrighted both them and their parents, and they paraded most reluctantly. Addressing them, Scipio remarked that he had heard rumours of their aversion to this arduous service, and rather than take unwilling comrades he would prefer that they would openly avow their feelings. One of them immediately seized this loophole of escape, and Scipio thereupon released him from service and promised to provide a substitute on condition that he handed over his horse and arms and trained his substitute in their handling. The Sicilian joyfully accepted, and the rest, seeing that the general did not take his action amiss, promptly followed his example. By this means Scipio obtained a nucleus of picked Roman cavalry “ at no expense to the State.”
His next measures show not only how his every step tended towards his ultimate object, but also how alive he was to the importance of foresight in securing his future action. He sent Lælius on an advance reconnoitring expedition to Africa, and in order not to impair the resources he was building up repaired his old ships for this expedition, hauling his new ones upon shore for the winter at Panormus, as they had been hastily and inevitably built of unseasoned timber. Further, after distributing his army through the towns, he ordered the Sicilian States to furnish corn for the troops, saving up the corn which he had brought with him from Italy—economy of force even in the details of supply. Scipio knew that strategy depends on supply, that without security of food the most dazzling manoeuvres may come to nought.
Furthermore, an offensive, whether strategical or tactical, must operate from a secure base—this is one of the cardinal axioms of war. “Basis” would perhaps be a better term, for “ base ” is apt to be construed too narrowly, whereas truly it comprises security to the geographical base, both internal and external, as well as security of supply and of movement. Napoleon in 1814, the Germans in 1918, both suffered the dislocation of their offensive action through the insecurity of their base internally. It is thus interesting to note how Scipio sought among his preparatory measures to ensure this security. He found Sicily, and especially Syracuse, suffering from internal discontent and disorder which had arisen out of the war. The property of the Syracusans had been seized after the famous siege by covetous Romans and Italians, and despite the decrees of the Senate for its restitution, had never been handed back. Scipio took an early opportunity of going to Syracuse, and “ deeming it of the first importance to maintain trust in Rome’s plighted word,” restored their property to the citizens, by proclamation and even by direct action against those who still clung fast to the plundered property. This act of justice had a wide effect throughout Sicily, and not only ensured the tranquillity of his base but won the active support of the Sicilians in furnishing his forces for the expedition.
Meanwhile Lælius had landed at Hippo Regius (modern Bona), about 150 miles distant from Carthage. According to Livy the news threw Carthage into a panic, the citizens believing that Scipio himself had landed with his army, and anticipating an immediate march on Carthage. To ward this off seemed hopeless, as their own people were untrained for war, their mercenary troops of doubtful loyalty, and among the African chiefs Syphax was alienated from them since his conference with Scipio, and Masinissa a declared enemy. The panic did not abate until news came that the invader was Lælius, not Scipio, and that his forces were only strong enough for a raid. Livy further tells us that the Carthaginians took advantage of the respite to send embassies to Syphax and others of the African chiefs for the purpose of strengthening their alliance, and envoys were also sent to Hannibal and Mago to urge them to keep Scipio at home by playing on the fears of the Romans. Mago had, earlier, landed at Genoa, but was too weak to act effectively, and to encourage him to move towards Rome and join Hannibal, the Carthaginian Senate sent him seven thousand troops and also money to hire auxiliaries.
If these facts be true, they would on the surface suggest that Scipio lost an opportunity and was unwise to put the Carthaginians on their guard by this raid of Lælius’s, and this impression is strengthened by the words ascribed to Masinissa. For Livy says that Masinissa came, with a small body of horse, to meet Lælius, and complained that “ Scipio had not acted with promptness, in that he had not already passed his army over into Africa, while the Carthaginians were in consternation, and while Syphax was e
ntangled in wars with neighbouring States, and in doubt as to the side he should take; that if Syphax was allowed time to settle his own affairs, he would not keep faith with the Romans.” Masinissa then begged that Lælius would urge Scipio not to delay, promising that he, though driven from his kingdom, would join Scipio with a force of horse and foot.
When, however, we appreciate the situation from a military angle it appears in a different light. Lælius landed at the port which was nearest to Numidia, and which was not only 150 miles distant from Carthage, but with a wide belt of hill country intervening. When Scipio himself landed it was at a spot only some twentyfive miles distant. Hence Lælius’s expedition can have been in no sense a reconnaissance against Carthage, and the clear deduction is that it was a reconnaissance to discover the state and feeling of the African States where Scipio hoped to find allies, and in particular to get in touch with Masinissa. As we have shown, Scipio had realised that a superiority in the cavalry arm was the key to victory over the Carthaginians, and he looked to the Numidian chief for his main source. His appreciation of the latter’s brilliant cavalry leadership on the battlefields of Spain had inspired him to win Masinissa over. Thus the inherent probability is that Lælius’s mission was primarily to discover if the Numidian would actually hold to his new alliance when Roman troops landed on African soil, and if so, what were the resources he could contribute. If the Carthaginians were really panic-stricken at a raid so distant, the fact but helped to confirm Scipio’s view of the moral advantage to be gained from a thrust at Carthage. As for the warning thus given, the danger of putting the Carthaginians on their guard, this had already been given by Scipio’s speeches in the Senate and his preparations. Where consent for his expedition had to be wrung from a reluctant Senate, where the forces and resources for it had to be raised without State help, strategic surprise was out of the question from the outset. Here were exemplified the chronic drawbacks of a constitutional system of government for conducting war. It is one of Scipio’s supreme merits that he obtained completely decisive results, though lacking the tremendous asset of political control. He, the servant of a republic, is the one exception to the rule that throughout the history of war the most successful of the great captains have been despots or autocrats. Countless historians have lavished sympathy on Hannibal for the handicap he suffered through lack of support from home, and laid all his set-backs at the door of the Carthaginian Senate. None seem to have stressed Scipio’s similar handicap. Yet to Rome there was none of the physical difficulty in sending reinforcements that Carthage could plead as an excuse. In this lack of support—nay worse, the active opposition—from the Roman Senate lies unquestionably the reason of Scipio’s delay of a year in Sicily to prepare for the expedition. He had to find unaided his own resources in Sicily and Africa. How groundless as well as irrational was Masinissa’s complaint, if he made it, is shown by the fact that when, in 204 B.C., Scipio landed in Africa, the “ landless prince,” to quote Mommsen, “ brought in the first instance nothing beyond his personal ability to the aid of the Romans.” Few generals have been so bold as Scipio when boldness was the right policy, but he was too imbued with the principle of security to strike before he had armed himself and tempered his weapon by training. The wonder is not at Scipio’s delay of a year, but that he moved so soon, and with a force that in numbers if not in training was still so puny for the scope of his task. But this seeming audacity was made secure by his strategy after the landing, and Zama was its justification. It is an ironical comment on the value of their judgments that the same historians who criticise Scipio for his tardiness in 205 B.C., tax him with rashness for the smallness of the force with which he sailed in 204 B.C.! One of these, Dodge, when dealing with the first year, remarks that “ Scipio does not seem to have been very expeditious about the business. In this he resembled M‘Clellan, as well as in his popularity.” Later, dealing with Scipio’s embarkation, Dodge says: “ Some generals would have declared these means insufficient ; but Scipio possessed an abundance of self-confidence which supplemented material strength in all but severe tests.” Such criticism is a boomerang recoiling on the critic.
CHAPTER VIII.
A POLITICAL HITCH.
THE interval between the return of Lælius and the embarkation for Africa is occupied, apart from material preparation, by two episodes of significance. The first is Scipio’s apparent “side-show” at Locri; the second, the political imbroglio which for a time threatened his ruin and that of his plans. Both deserve study for the light they shed on his character as a commander and a man.
Locri lay on the underpart of the toe of Italy (near modern Gerace), and was in Hannibal’s possession. After his brother Hasdrubal’s defeat at the Metaurus, Hannibal had fallen back on Bruttium, the southernmost province of Italy, and here he held at bay the consular armies, who dared not advance to seek out the scarred but indomitable lion in his mountain fastnesses.
Some Locrians who had gone outside the walls were captured by a Roman raiding party, and taken to Rhegium—the port adjacent to Sicily,— where they were recognised by the pro-Roman Locrian nobles, who had found sanctuary there when their town fell into Carthaginian hands. Certain of the prisoners, who were skilled artisans and had been in the employment and trust of the Carthaginians, suggested that, if ransomed, they would be willing to betray the citadel at Locri. The nobles, eager to regain their town, at once ransomed the artisans, and after concerting a plan and signals, sent them back to Locri. Then, going to Scipio at Syracuse, they told him of the scheme. He saw the opportunity, and despatched on the venture a detachment of three thousand men under two military tribunes. Exchanging signals with the conspirators inside, ladders were let down about midnight, and the attackers swarmed up the walls. Surprise magnified their strength, and the Carthaginians in confusion fled from the citadel to a second citadel on the farther side of the town. For several days encounters occurred between the two parties without decisive result. Alive to the danger to his garrison, and to the threatened loss of an important point, Hannibal moved to the rescue, sending a messenger ahead with orders to the garrison to make a sortie at daybreak as a cloak to what he hoped would be his surprise assault. He had not, however, brought scaling ladders with him, and so was forced to postpone his attack a day while he was preparing these and other materials for storming the walls.
Scipio, who was at Messana, received word of Hannibal’s move, and planned a countersurprise. Leaving his brother in command at Messana, he embarked a force, and, setting sail on the next tide, arrived in the harbour of Locri shortly before nightfall. The troops were hidden in the town during the night, a concealment made possible by the townspeople favouring, though not openly taking, the side of the Romans. Next morning Hannibal launched his assault in conjunction with the sortie from the Carthaginians’ citadel. As the scaling ladders were bering brought forward, Scipio sallied out from one of the town gates and attacked the Carthaginians in flank and rear. The shock of the surprise dislocated and disorganised the Carthaginians, and, his plan upset, Hannibal fell back on his own camp. Realising that the Romans, because of their grip on the town, were masters of the situation, he withdrew during the night, sending word to his garrison in the citadel to make their way out as best they could and rejoin him.
For Scipio this“ side-show” was a very real asset. Apart from the personal prestige he gained from his success in this first encounter with the dreaded Hannibal, scoring a trick even off the master of ruses, he had helped the Roman campaign in Italy by curtailing Hannibal’s remaining foothold in that country—and without any diminution of his own force. But, beyond these personal and indirect gains, his success had an important bearing on his own future plan of operations. For he had“ blooded” his troops against Hannibal, and by this successful enterprise given them a moral tonic, which would be of immense value in the crucial days to come. It is unfortunate that for this episode, as for Lælius’s reconnaissance in Africa, we have no Polybius to reveal to us the motives a
nd calculations which inspired Scipio’s moves. The loss of Polybius’s books on this period must be replaced by deduction from the facts, and from the knowledge already gained of Scipio’s mind. To those who have followed his constant and far-sighted exploitation of the moral element during his Spanish campaigns, there can be little doubt that he seized on the Locri expedition as a heavensent chance not only to test and sharpen his weapon for the day of trial, but to dispel in his troops the impression of Hannibalic invincibility.
The second episode arose out of the subsequent administration of recaptured Locri. When Scipio had sent the original force to seize the town, he had instructed Quintus Pleminius, the propraetor at Rhegium, to assist the tribunes, and when the place was captured Pleminius, by virtue of his seniority, assumed the command until Scipio arrived. After the repulse of Hannibal’s relieving force, Scipio returned to Sicily, and Pleminius was naturally left in chief command of the town and its defence, though the detachment from Sicily remained under the direct command of the tribunes.
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