International GAAP® 2019: Generally Accepted Accounting Practice under International Financial Reporting Standards

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benefit of the investor;

  • the investor can dominate either the nominations process for electing members

  of the investee’s governing body, or obtaining proxies from other holders of

  voting rights;

  • the investee’s key management personnel are related parties of the investor (for

  example, the chief executive officer of the investee and the chief executive officer

  of the investor are the same person); or

  • the majority of the members of the investee’s governing body are related parties of

  the investor. [IFRS 10.B18].

  When the above factors and the indicators set out below are considered together with

  an investor’s rights, IFRS 10 requires that greater weight is given to the evidence of

  power described above. [IFRS 10.B21]. Sometimes, there will be indications that an

  investor has a special relationship with the investee, which suggests that the investor

  has more than a passive interest in the investee. The existence of any individual

  indicator, or a particular combination of indicators, does not necessarily mean that the

  power criterion is met. However, having more than a passive interest in an investee may

  indicate that the investor has other rights that give it power over the investee or provide

  evidence of existing power over the investee. For example, IFRS 10 states that this

  might be the case when the investee:

  Consolidated financial statements 409

  • is directed by key management personnel who are current or previous employees

  of the investor;

  • has significant:

  • obligations that are guaranteed by the investor; or

  • activities that either involve or are conducted on behalf of the investor;

  • depends on the investor for:

  • funds for a significant portion of its operations;

  • licenses, trademarks, services, technology, supplies or raw materials that are

  critical to the investee’s operations; or

  • key management personnel, such as when the investor’s personnel have

  specialised knowledge of the investee’s operations; or

  • the investor’s exposure, or rights, to returns from its involvement with the investee

  is disproportionately greater than its voting or other similar rights. For example,

  there may be a situation in which an investor is entitled, or exposed, to more than

  half of the returns of the investee but holds less than half of the voting rights of the

  investee. [IFRS 10.B19].

  As noted at 4.2.3 above, the greater an investor’s exposure, or rights, to variability of

  returns from its involvement with an investee, the greater is the incentive for the

  investor to obtain rights sufficient to give it power. Therefore, having a large exposure

  to variability of returns is an indicator that the investor may have power. However, the

  extent of the investor’s exposure does not, in itself, determine whether an investor has

  power over the investee. [IFRS 10.B20].

  4.6

  Determining whether sponsoring (designing) a structured entity

  gives power

  IFRS 10 discusses whether sponsoring (that is, designing) a structured entity gives an

  investor power over the structured entity.

  In assessing the purpose and design of an investee, an investor considers the

  involvement and decisions made at the investee’s inception as part of its design and

  evaluate whether the transaction terms and features of the involvement provide the

  investor with rights that are sufficient to give it power. Being involved in the design of

  an investee alone is not sufficient to give an investor control. However, involvement in

  the design may indicate that the investor had the opportunity to obtain rights that are

  sufficient to give it power over the investee. [IFRS 10.B51].

  An investor’s involvement in the design of an investee does not mean that the investor

  necessarily has control, even if that involvement was significant. Rather, an investor has

  control of an investee when all three criteria of control are met (see 3.1 above),

  considering the purpose and design of the investee. Thus, an investor’s involvement in

  the design of an investee is part of the context when concluding if it controls the

  investee, but is not determinative.

  In our view, there are relatively few structured entities that have no substantive

  decision-making. That is, virtually all structured entities have some level of decision-

  making and few, if any, are on ‘autopilot’ (see 4.1.2 above). In such cases, if that decision-

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  6

  making can significantly affect the returns of the structured entity, the investor with the

  rights to make those decisions would have power. This is because IFRS 10 clarifies that

  an investor has power when it has existing rights that give it the current ability to direct

  the relevant activities, even if those relevant activities only occur when particular

  circumstances arise or specific events occur (see 4.1.1 above).

  However, a structured entity with limited decision-making requires additional scrutiny

  to determine which investor, if any, has power (and possibly control) over the structured

  entity, particularly for the investors that have a potentially significant explicit or implicit

  exposure to variable returns. Careful consideration is required regarding the purpose

  and design of the structured entity.

  In addition, the evaluation of power may require an analysis of the decisions made at

  inception of the structured entity, including a review of the structured entity’s governing

  documents, because the decisions made at formation may affect which investor, if any,

  has power.

  For a structured entity with a limited range of activities, such as certain securitisation

  entities, power is assessed based on which activities, if any, significantly affect the

  structured entity’s returns, and if so, which investor, if any, has existing rights that give

  it the current ability to direct those activities. The following considerations may also be

  relevant when determining which investor, if any, has power (and possibly control):

  • an investor’s ability to direct the activities of a structured entity only when specific

  circumstances arise or events occur may constitute power if that ability relates to the

  activities that most significantly affect the structured entity’s returns (see 4.1.1 above);

  • an investor does not have to actively exercise its power to have power over a

  structured entity (see 4.2.1 above); or

  • an investor is more incentivised to obtain power over a structured entity the

  greater its obligation to absorb losses or its right to receive benefits from the

  structured entity (see 4.2.3 above).

  5

  EXPOSURE TO VARIABLE RETURNS

  The second criterion for assessing whether an investor has control of an investee is

  determining whether the investor has an exposure, or has rights, to variable returns from

  its involvement with the investee. [IFRS 10.B55]. An investor is exposed, or has rights, to

  variable returns from its involvement with the investee when the investor’s returns from

  its involvement have the potential to vary as a result of the investee’s performance.

  Returns can be positive, negative or both. [IFRS 10.15].

  Although only one invest
or can control an investee, more than one party can share in

  the returns of an investee. For example, holders of non-controlling interests can share

  in the profits or distributions of an investee. [IFRS 10.16].

  Variable returns are returns that are not fixed and have the potential to vary as a result

  of the performance of an investee. As discussed at 5.2 below, returns that appear fixed

  can be variable. [IFRS 10.B56].

  Examples of exposures to variable returns include:

  Consolidated financial statements 411

  • dividends, fixed interest on debt securities that expose the investor to the credit risk

  of the issuer (see 5.2 below), variable interest on debt securities, other distributions

  of economic benefits and changes in the value of an investment in an investee;

  • remuneration for servicing an investee’s assets or liabilities, fees and exposure to

  loss from providing credit or liquidity support, residual interests in the investee’s

  assets and liabilities on liquidation of that investee, tax benefits and access to future

  liquidity that an investor has from its involvement with the investee; and

  • economies of scale, cost savings, scarce products, proprietary knowledge,

  synergies, or other exposures to variable returns that are not available to other

  investors. [IFRS 10.B57].

  Simply having an exposure to variable returns from its involvement with an investee

  does not mean that the investor has control. To control the investee, the investor would

  also need to have power over the investee, and the ability to use its power over the

  investee to affect the amount of the investor’s returns. [IFRS 10.7]. For example, it is

  common for a lender to have an exposure to variable returns from a borrower through

  interest payments that it receives from the borrower, that are subject to credit risk.

  However, the lender would not control the borrower if it does not have the ability to

  affect those interest payments (which is frequently the case).

  It should be emphasised that with respect to this criterion, the focus is on the existence

  of an exposure to variable returns, not the amount of the exposure to variable returns.

  5.1

  Exposure to variable returns can be an indicator of power

  Exposure to variable returns can be an indicator of power by the investor. This is

  because the greater an investor’s exposure to the variability of returns from its

  involvement with an investee, the greater the incentive for the investor to obtain rights

  that give the investor power. However, the magnitude of the exposure to variable

  returns is not determinative of whether the investor holds power. [IFRS 10.B20].

  When an investor’s exposure, or rights, to variable returns from its involvement with

  the investee are disproportionately greater than its voting or other similar rights, this

  might be an indicator that the investor has power over the investee when considered

  with other rights. [IFRS 10.B19, B20].

  5.2

  Returns that appear fixed can be variable

  An investor assesses whether exposures to returns from an investee are variable, based

  on the substance of the arrangement (regardless of the legal form of the returns). Even

  a return that appears fixed may actually be variable.

  IFRS 10 gives the example of an investor that holds a bond with fixed interest payments.

  The fixed interest payments are considered an exposure to variable returns, because they

  are subject to default risk and they expose the investor to the credit risk of the issuer of the

  bond. How variable those returns are depends on the credit risk of the bond. The same

  logic would extend to the investor’s ability to recover the principal of the bond. [IFRS 10.B56].

  Similarly, IFRS 10 also explains that fixed performance fees earned for managing an

  investee’s assets are considered an exposure to variable returns, because they expose

  the investor to the performance risk of the investee. That is, the amount of variability

  412 Chapter

  6

  depends on the investee’s ability to generate sufficient income to pay the fee.

  [IFRS 10.B56]. Performance fees that vary based on the value of an investee’s assets are

  also an exposure to variable returns using the same reasoning.

  In contrast, a non-refundable fee received up-front (wherein the investor does not have

  exposure to credit risk or performance risk) would likely be considered a fixed return.

  5.3

  Evaluating whether derivatives provide an exposure to variable

  returns

  Investors need to evaluate whether being party to a derivative gives them an exposure

  to a variable return.

  As indicated at 3.2 above, an investee may be designed so that voting rights are not the

  dominant factor in deciding who controls the investee, such as when any voting rights

  relate to administrative tasks only and the relevant activities are directed by means of

  contractual arrangements. In such cases, an investor’s consideration of the purpose and

  design of the investee shall also include consideration of the risks to which the investee

  was designed to be exposed, the risks that it was designed to pass on to the parties

  involved with the investee and whether the investor is exposed to some or all of these

  risks. Consideration of the risks includes not only the downside risk, but also the

  potential for upside. [IFRS 10.B8].

  When evaluating whether being party to a derivative is an exposure to a variable return,

  it is helpful to follow these steps:

  • analyse the nature of the risks in the investee – for example, assess whether the

  purpose and the design of the investee exposes the investor to the following risks:

  • credit risk;

  • interest rate risk (including prepayment risk);

  • foreign currency exchange risk;

  • commodity price risk;

  • equity price risk; and

  • operational risk;

  • determine the purpose(s) for which the investee was created – for example, obtain

  an understanding of the following:

  • activities of the investee;

  • terms of the contracts the investee has entered into;

  • nature of the investee’s interests issued;

  • how the investee’s interests were negotiated with or marketed to potential

  investors; and

  • which investors participated significantly in the design or redesign of the

  entity; and

  • determine the variability that the investee is designed to create and pass along to

  its interest holders – considering the nature of the risks of the investee and the

  purposes for which the investee was created.

  Consolidated financial statements 413

  Some might argue that any derivative creates an exposure to variable returns, even if

  that exposure is only a positive exposure. However, we do not believe that this was the

  IASB’s intention, given the following comments made by the IASB in both the Basis for

  Conclusions accompanying IFRS 10 and the Application Guidance of IFRS 12.

  ‘Some instruments are designed to transfer risk from a reporting entity to another

  entity. During its deliberations, the Board concluded that such instruments create

  variability of returns for the other entity but do not typically expose the reporting

&
nbsp; entity to variability of returns from the performance of the other entity. For

  example, assume an entity (entity A) is established to provide investment

  opportunities for investors who wish to have exposure to entity Z’s credit risk

  (entity Z is unrelated to any other party involved in the arrangement). Entity A

  obtains funding by issuing to those investors notes that are linked to entity Z’s

  credit risk (credit-linked notes) and uses the proceeds to invest in a portfolio of

  risk-free financial assets. Entity A obtains exposure to entity Z’s credit risk by

  entering into a credit default swap (CDS) with a swap counterparty. The CDS

  passes entity Z’s credit risk to entity A, in return for a fee paid by the swap

  counterparty. The investors in entity A receive a higher return that reflects both

  entity A’s return from its asset portfolio and the CDS fee. The swap counterparty

  does not have involvement with entity A that exposes it to variability of returns

  from the performance of entity A because the CDS transfers variability to entity A,

  rather than absorbing variability of returns of entity A.’ [IFRS 10.BC66, IFRS 12.B9].

  This principle is applied in the following example.

  Example 6.20: Derivatives that create risk for an investee

  A structured entity (Entity A) enters into a CDS whereby a bank passes the credit risk of a reference asset to

  the structured entity and, hence, to the investors of that structured entity. In this example, if the bank has the

  power to amend the referenced credit risk in the CDS, it would have power over a relevant activity. However,

  as the bank, through the CDS, creates rather than absorbs risk, the bank is not exposed to a variable return.

  Consequently, the bank would not be able to use its power to affect its variable returns and so would not

  control the structured entity.

  In our view, a derivative that introduces risk to an investee (e.g. a structured entity)

  would not normally be considered an exposure to variable returns under IFRS 10. Only

  a derivative that exposes a counterparty to risks that the investee was designed to create

  and pass on would be considered an exposure to variable returns under IFRS 10. This

  view is consistent with the IASB’s intentions.

  5.3.1

  Plain vanilla foreign exchange swaps and interest rate swaps

  It is important to consider the purpose and design of the entity when evaluating whether

 

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