According to Sir Richard Bulstrode, Goring was ‘without dispute as good an officer as any who served the King and the most dexterous in any emergency that I have ever seen.’ This was no doubt the case now. Though outnumbered, Goring and the Cavaliers with him evidently fought resolutely and many of them paid with their lives. Among those who were killed or mortally wounded were Colonel Sir Richard Dacre, Colonel William Eure and Major Francis Salvin. Eventually, the Royalists who were able to do so, abandoned the struggle they could not win and made good their escape.
Meanwhile, the regiment under Lambton had been destroyed. Of the gallant soldiers in question, William Lilly (whose informant Captain Camby fought against them) wrote, ‘by mere valour, for one whole hour, [they] kept the troops of horse from entering among them....When the horse did enter, they would have no quarter, but fought it out till there was not thirty of them living.’ Camby, who was one of the first to enter among them ‘protested he never in all the fights he was in, met with such resolute brave fellows.’ Others too were impressed by what they saw or heard of this action. The Duchess of Newcastle wrote that her husband’s ‘White Coats showed such an extraordinary valour and courage...that they were killed in rank and file.’ The performance of the doughty foot under Lambton, who was among the slain, was undoubtedly remarkable and has evoked admiration to this day.
By the time Lambton’s regiment was destroyed the battle was almost over. Some of Leslie’s horse and Fraser’s dragoons may now have gone to the assistance of the allied foot engaged against what remained of the Royalist centre—if indeed any resistance were still being offered—while at least some of Leslie’s troopers assisted Cromwell by carrying out a flank attack on Goring.
According to Watson, the battle was over and the field cleared of the enemy by about 9.00pm. However, it is likely that the fighting continued for some time after this. Moreover a motley body of Royalist cavalry, said to have been 2,000 strong and apparently primarily composed of troopers of Goring’s wing who had returned too late from pursuing fleeing allied soldiers to fight against Cromwell, or had refrained from doing so, remained on the ridge until about midnight. The troopers then rode off towards York, leaving the exhausted allies in possession of the field. Manchester was among the latter, and Ashe tells us that he rode around thanking the soldiers ‘for the exceeding good service which they had done for the kingdom.’
During the course of 3 and 4 July the dead were buried. Ashe relates that the countrymen commanded to perform the task calculated that they buried 4,150 bodies. But more persons who fought at Marston Moor lost their lives than this, for many were slain in flight. Watson, for instance, states that fugitives were cut down to within a mile of York. Furthermore many individuals must have perished in the days and weeks to come from wounds they had sustained. It has been estimated that at least 6,000 men, all told, died as a result of Marston Moor and this figure seems reasonable.
The majority of the fatalities were Royalist, and included a significant number of officers. In addition, at least 1,500 of the vanquished were captured. The Royalists also lost their entire artillery train, a great quantity of arms (10,000 according to the allied generals’ dispatch), powder, ammunition, baggage, and about 100 colours.
And what of the allies? The Despatch states: ‘Our loss is not very great, being only one lieut-colonel, a few captains, and 200 or 300 common soldiers.’ It is reasonable, however, to conclude that allied losses were greater than this. After all, they had encountered stiff resistance from much of the Royalist army. Fairfax, for example, recalled of his charge which routed part of Goring’s wing that ‘few of us came off without dangerous wounds; and many were mortal.’ In short, probably about one-third of the total number of those who perished at, or as a result of, Marston Moor were allied soldiers.
It is recorded that Prince Rupert (whose actions during the battle following the rout of the Royalist right wing are, to say the least, uncertain), arrived at York at about 11.00pm on the 2nd. There he met, or was joined by, Eythin. They were later joined by Newcastle who had remained on the field longer than either. According to Cholmeley, the following morning Rupert wished to attempt ‘something upon the enemy’ but was persuaded against doing so by Eythin.
On the 3rd Newcastle made for Scarborough—where the governor of the castle was Cholmeley—intent on going into exile, likely in the belief that he would be made a scapegoat for the defeat. He sailed to Hamburg. At Marston Moor much of his army had been destroyed and the bulk of his general staff, including Eythin, likewise sailed from Scarborough rather than continue the fight against the king’s enemies.
On the other hand, Rupert left York on the 3rd at the head of about 3,500 men, mostly horse, and proceeded to recross the Pennines, no doubt with a heavy heart considering the outcome of Marston Moor; the loss of several personal friends in the battle, including his dog, Boy, a companion since his days of incarceration at Linz; and Newcastle’s decision to give up the struggle for the marquis had expended a fortune in the king’s service and was the man to whom the Royalists in the North naturally looked for leadership. On 5 August Rupert arrived back at Shrewsbury.
Meanwhile, after Marston Moor the allies had soon resumed besieging York. Within days of them doing so, its governor, Sir Thomas Glemham, had come to terms with the allied generals. Thus on 16 July he marched out of the city at the head of those members of its garrison who did not wish to lay down arms, and headed towards Knaresborough. Slingsby records that some of the soldiers then headed for Carlisle with Glemham whereas members of Rupert’s army who had been left at York after Marston Moor ‘took the nearest way to go to the Prince.’
Shortly after the capitulation of York the allied army split up. Manchester moved south; Lord Fairfax commenced reducing the remaining Royalists garrisons in Yorkshire (Skipton was the last to fall, some 18 months later); while Leven moved north and captured Newcastle upon Tyne on 22 October.
It only remains to assess the performance of the senior figures at Marston Moor and the battle’s importance. As has been noted, apart from his decision to commence the battle at an opportune time, Leven did not distinguish himself, and Somerville tells us that when the general received news of the ‘most glorious victory’ he ‘knocked upon his breast’ and stated: ‘I would to God that I had died upon the place.’ Lord Fairfax likewise rejoined the allied army under a cloud.
On the other hand Manchester, Crawford, Baillie, Lumsden and Sir Thomas Fairfax, conducted themselves creditably. The same can be said of Cromwell, who was ably seconded by Leslie. Indeed, he was the chief architect of the allied victory. As Peter Newman has commented: ‘Cromwell’s initial triumph was crucial to the outcome of the battle, for he was able, with his strong cavalry well in hand, to move across the battlefield taking the enemy in flank and rear, undermining their resolve...much of the honour won by the Allies on July 2nd 1644 is rightfully Cromwell’s.’
Rupert’s conduct of the campaign and battle is worthy of both commendation and censure. His actions in the North West in May and June before making for York were sensible, for instead of acting precipitously he built up the strength of his army and took steps to reduce the likelihood of Parliamentary raids during his absence from the region. Moreover, his subsequent march from Knaresborough to York via Boroughbridge and Thornton Bridge was a classic manoeuvre. Furthermore, his deployment of the Royalist forces at Marston Moor showed some sound tactical thinking. For instance, good use was made of the natural obstacles of the battlefield; Napier’s men were well placed to support Byron; and Blakiston’s brigade was unusually placed to support the weak centre.
On the other hand, Rupert has been criticised for a number of reasons. The principal complaint is that he committed his numerically weaker forces to battle with the allies—yes, he had to save York if possible, but he did not have to follow up his success by confronting the enemy, especially in view of the likelihood that the latter a
rmy would have soon fragmented. It will perhaps be remembered that Newcastle thought such a development likely. That ‘irreconcilable differences and jealousies,’ to quote Clarendon, existed ‘between the officers and the nations’ may have been the case, but the prince believed that he could not afford to wait and see whether this would prove true. Unaware of a recent victory by his uncle at Cropredy Bridge on 29 June, he wished to conclude the northern campaign as soon as possible so that he could go to the king’s assistance. Moreover, if he had not decided to resolve matters by battle the allies could simply have turned their attention to York once again after he had marched off. Furthermore, it has to be borne in mind that on the evening of 1 July Rupert did not know that the allies would decide against fighting. Hence one can understand why, after carrying out a brilliant outflanking manoeuvre and throwing the enemy off balance, he was eager to press home his advantage. True, the decision was a daring one and asked much of his men who had just undergone a strenuous march, and of Newcastle’s army, which had experienced the rigours of a lengthy siege, but whether it was a wrong one is less clear cut.
The general consensus is that it was a mistake: the impetuous prince got carried away and threw commonsense out of the window, thereby squandering many lives in a disastrous battle. In contrast, General Sir Frank Kitson has commented, ‘it is surprising that historians have been so slow to recognise the tactical imperatives that drove Rupert on’, and that ‘Rupert was correct in...engaging the enemy as soon as possible.’ On balance, it seems Kitson is right. It is certainly worth bearing in mind how close Rupert came to success at Marston Moor—the allied victory was certainly not easily won.
Rupert has also been censured for allowing his men to relax on the evening of the 2nd when several hours of daylight remained. The criticism is sound. Although it was unusual for an army to attack at such a time, it was nonetheless unwise of the prince to let his men rest when such a large enemy force was overlooking his position. Perhaps his decision resulted from tiredness and despondency caused by the attitudes and actions of subordinates, most notably Eythin.
And what of Newcastle and Eythin? Though the former believed that Rupert was acting precipitously in bringing the allies to battle on the 2nd, he fought bravely, exhorted others to do likewise, and was the last of the Royalist generals to quit the field. Eythin’s behaviour, though, deserves censure. He had a longstanding grudge against Rupert (whom he blamed for losing the battle of Vlotho, and for whose capture there he had been blamed), and his late arrival at Marston Moor was more probably due to tardiness and lack of confidence in the prince than anything else.
Furthermore, upon his arrival he rudely stated upon being shown a plan of battle by Rupert: ‘By God, sir, it is very fine in the paper, but there is no such thing in the field.’ It seems fair to conclude that Eythin was more of a hindrance than an asset.
Lord Byron has likewise been censured by historians. At the very least, he moved against Cromwell prematurely, and at worst, in so doing disobeyed orders. What is undoubted is that the failure of Byron’s wing enabled Cromwell to support Crawford in turning the right flank of the Royalist centre, and then carry out the manoeuvre which made it wellnigh impossible for the Royalists to win the battle.
In the centre, Major-General Henry Tillier, who was considered a resolute fellow, seems to have performed creditably. The same can be said of Goring. Indeed, his performance is praiseworthy. He led his wing in a well-timed counterattack against Sir Thomas Fairfax, and then gallantly confronted Cromwell in a stubborn contest in which the latter held the advantages and thus not surprisingly was victorious.
Marston Moor was the greatest battle of the Civil War. It was also one of the most important. It destroyed Prince Rupert’s legend of invincibility, brought Cromwell more into the limelight, and to all intents and purposes lost the North for the king. The psychological impact of the defeat on the Royalist party was such that in the months which followed the engagement it failed to respond positively to the challenge which faced it in the region, and thus allowed the enemy to gain control of a part of England which, in the main, had been a valuable recruiting ground and source of contributions to the Royalist war effort.
Oliver Cromwell attributed the allied victory at Marston Moor to divine intervention. Immediately after the battle he wrote to his brother-in-law, Valentine Walton, stating: ‘Truely England and the Church of God hath had a great favour from the Lord, in this great victory given to us, such as the like never was since this war began.’ A ‘great victory’ it certainly was, but it did not end the Civil War, and in similar circumstances in the future Cromwell was to have reason to praise the Almighty again.
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AULDEARN 9 May 1645
In 1638 a committee of Scottish nobles and divines drew up the National Covenant, which called for the defence of Presbyterianism against the ‘papist’ policies pursued by Charles I and his supporters. Opposition to the king was such that a large Scottish army subsequently crossed the border (January 1644) to fight on behalf of parliament during the Civil War.
However, some Scots were Royalists. The most notable was James Graham, first Marquis of Montrose. He had signed the Covenant but had become disenchanted by the extremism of fellow influential Covenanters. In August 1644 he crossed into his homeland, having received the king’s commission at Oxford to secure Scotland for the Royalist cause. He entered the country with only two companions, but soon received a degree of support, and on the 28th raised the royal standard in Atholl.
Montrose was a friendly, courteous man, and Gordon of Ruthven relates that he ‘quickly made a conquesse of the hearts of all his followers.’ What is more, he soon showed that he was a man of military ability. He won an engagement at Tippermuir (1 September) and proceeded to beat other numerically superior Covenanter forces. For example, on 2 February 1645 he inflicted a crushing defeat at Inverlochy on the Campbell clansmen of the most important Covenanter of them all, the Marquis of Argyll.
Montrose thus greatly angered the Covenanters and caused consternation in their ranks. This was a situation one of them, Colonel John Hurry, was determined to rectify. He decided to lure the marquis into country hostile to the Royalist cause and engage him there in advantageous circumstances at the head of the army under his command.
Consequently, when Montrose advanced towards Elgin from Skene on 2 May, Hurray fell back west to Forres and then to Inverness where he received reinforcements. On the night of Thursday 8 May Montrose encamped at Auldearn, a small village on a low ridge two miles east of Nairn. Hurray moved against him, conducting a rapid night march from Inverness. Thus on the 9th, with his opponent closing in, Montrose prepared for battle. He placed part of his army of nearly 3,000 men just to the north of the village under Alasdair MacDonald. The bulk of his men he stationed to the south of Auldearn, on the reverse slope of the ridge. The royal standard was with MacDonald and Montrose hoped that Hurray would attack Alasdair in the belief that he was engaging the entire army, thereby allowing Montrose himself to fall upon Hurray’s right flank.
As the Covenanter army of 400 horse and 3,500 foot made its way across marshy ground to the west, MacDonald disobeyed orders to remain where he was and charged down to engage the enemy. Fierce fighting ensued and MacDonald’s outnumbered men were pushed back towards their original position. As Montrose prepared to move to their assistance Hurray, who was now aware of the marquis’ position, ordered Captain Drummond to turn his horse to the right to face the threat, but the order was misheard and Drummond turned left instead. Not surprisingly, his troopers were soon routed by cavalry sent against them. Simultaneously, Royalist horse hitherto inactive on Alasdair’s right, attacked Hurray’s left flank. MacDonald was then joined by Montrose and they began pushing back the enemy centre. The battle soon became a rout, and at least 2,000 Covenanters in total perished. Montrose’s reputation was going from strength to strength—a legend was in the making.
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NASEBY 14 June 1645
‘Our victories, the price of blood invaluable, so gallantly gotten and, which is more pity, so graciously bestowed, seem to have been put in a bag with holes; what we won one time, we lost another. The treasure is exhausted; the country is wasted. A summer’s victory has proved but a winter’s story....Men’s hearts have failed them with the observation of these things.’
A Parliamentarian
The above words date from December 1644 and clearly reflect the despondency felt by many of those opposed to King Charles. Despite their great victory at Marston Moor earlier in the year, they had failed to truly capitalise on their success, thereby prolonging the Civil War. Indeed, they had suffered a number of setbacks. At Lostwithiel, on 2 September, for instance, General Skippon had been forced to surrender at the head of over 6,000 men, while on 27 October a large Parliamentarian army had failed to defeat a numerically inferior Royalist force at the Second Battle of Newbury. Furthermore, by this date the Marquis of Montrose had two victories to his credit in Scotland, where he had recently commenced campaigning on behalf of the king.
Thus the closing months of 1644 found the Parliamentarians in an acrimonious mood. Leading figures quarrelled and blamed each other for not bringing the war to a successful conclusion. But some did more. They discussed ways of improving military efficiency and the quality of their forces.
In common with their opponents, the Parliamentarian generals had a number of problems to contend with. One such was the difficulty of maintaining the strength of their armies. For a variety of reasons, including arrears of pay and an unwillingness on the part of many men to serve away from their own locality, especially for long periods, desertion was commonplace.
Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746 Page 20
