Apparently, Fairfax subsequently rode forward from his commanding position, just to the northeast of Naseby, at the head of an escort to reconnoitre the undulating ground between his army and that of the king some four miles or so to the north. Evidently, as he approached Clipston he came across a position with boggy ground beyond it, which he seems to have deemed suitable for the deployment of his army. According to a certain W.G., Cromwell persuaded him against adopting such a course, believing that the waterlogged nature of the ground in front of the position would lead Rupert to decline battle or turn the flank. He thus exclaimed: ‘Let us, I beseech you, draw back to yonder hill, which will encourage the enemy to charge us, which they cannot do in that place without absolute ruin.’ Fairfax agreed, and began riding back to the Naseby ridge where the bulk of the New Model was assembled. It will be remembered that Sprigge states that the New Model had rendezvoused near Naseby by 5.00am. There can be no doubt, however, that the march from Guilsborough took longer than he believed and stragglers were probably still arriving as Fairfax returned from his reconnaissance.
Fairfax was not the only one who undertook a reconnaissance mission. According to Walker, the Royalist scoutmaster, Francis Ruce, rode forward at about 8.00am, and he evidently did so before Fairfax. Visibility seems to have worsened and the Royalists were uncertain about the New Model’s movements. Walker relates that Ruce returned ‘with a Lye in his Mouth’, stating ‘that he had been two or three miles forward, and could neither discover or hear of the Rebels.’ At this, states Clarendon, ‘a report was raised in the army that the enemy was retired.’ Rupert now rode forward at the head of a strong body of horse to determine the state of affairs himself.
In so doing, apparently in the neighbourhood of Clipston, he caught sight of Fairfax and his escort riding back towards the high ground about Naseby. Rupert may, as one or two of his contemporaries state, have concluded that Fairfax was intent on withdrawing, or perhaps he believed that he had a chance of falling upon the Roundheads before they were ready to receive him. What is certain is that he sent for the rest of the Royalist army to advance as fast as possible. As the ground before him was largely waterlogged, Rupert turned to his right to find more suitable terrain.
The Royalists’ movements were seen by their adversaries. Sprigge continues:
The Enemies Army...we saw plainly advancing in order towards us: and the winde blowing somewhat Westwardly, by the Enemies advance so much on their right hand, it was evident, that he designed to get the winde of us: which occasioned the General to draw down into a large fallow field on the Northwest side of Naseby, flanked on the left hand with a hedge, which was a convenient place for us to fight the Enemy in.
Thus if Rupert believed that Fairfax was intent on withdrawal, he was soon disabused of the notion. As the Roundheads took up a position on the north slope of high ground a short distance from Naseby, the Royalists therefore prepared for battle on the south slope of Dust Hill. Between the armies was a shallow valley comprising a large open tract of land known as Broad Moor.
The Parliamentarians, however, soon drew back somewhat so that most of them were concealed from the enemy by the brow of the ridge. Just why Fairfax ordered this retrograde movement is uncertain. Perhaps, as Sprigge comments, he did so in order to prevent the Royalists seeing ‘in what form’ the New Model was deployed ‘nor see any confusion therein.’ It has, moreover, been suggested that Fairfax wished to ease the pre-battle tension of his new recruits.
Before discussing events further, it will be profitable to say something about the principal protagonists and the opposing armies.
Charles and the Royalist army
Charles was born in Scotland in 1600 and succeeded his father James VI of Scotland and I of England in 1625. When the Civil War commenced in 1642 he had no taste of battle and at Edgehill appointed an experienced Scottish soldier, Lord Forth, commander-in-chief of his army. As has been noted earlier, Forth held this post until the autumn of 1644 (by which date he had been created Earl of Brentford), when he was replaced by the younger and healthier Prince Rupert. (For a discussion of Rupert, see page 132) It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that in military matters Charles was merely a figurehead. He attended the vast majority of councils of war and played an important, indeed, decisive part in determining strategy. For instance, it will be recalled that more than once during the Naseby campaign he overruled Rupert over what course to take.
His intervention was not always beneficial. Clarendon, who knew him well, observed of him in connection with military affairs that he was
very fearless...and...had an excellent understanding, but was not confident enough of it which made him oftentimes change his own opinion for a worse and follow the advice of men that did not judge as well as himself....If he had been of a rougher and more imperious nature he would have found more respect and duty; and his not applying some severe cures to approaching evils proceeded from the lenity of his nature and the tenderness of his conscience, which in all cases of blood made him choose the softer way, and not hearken to severe counsels, how reasonably soever urged.
On the whole, Charles was undoubtedly compassionate and could be magnanimous. At Lostwithiel, for example, he displayed both when dealing with trapped enemy infantry. Upon their surrender, the wounded were shipped to Plymouth rather than taken prisoner, whilst their able-bodied colleagues were likewise allowed their freedom and marched off towards Portsmouth with officers above the rank of corporal still in possession of their weapons. Furthermore as noted, during the Naseby campaign, Charles was distressed by the sack of Leicester.
In some respects, then, the refined king (he was a great lover of art), was an admirable character, a decent man, with moreover a high sense of duty towards his family, subjects and God. Nonetheless he had some pronounced faults. He was frequently devious, and though capable of concerted action, was often irresolute, a trait touched upon by Clarendon. Also, on the whole he was prone to bad judgement. More often than not he misread a situation: more often than not he was sanguine in circumstances which would have alarmed others. In the short-term this was good for his health; in the long-term it cost him his head.
The size of the Royalist army at Naseby is disputed. On 4 June, shortly after taking Leicester, Charles declared in a letter to Sir Edward Nicholas, ‘my army is so weak being not 4,000 foot and 3,500 horse.’ The same figures appear on Sir Bernard de Gomme’s sketch-map of the Royalist and Parliamentarian dispositions at Naseby. It is thus not surprising that some historians are of the opinion that the king’s army on 14 June was approximately 7,500 strong.
Interestingly, however, Lord Belasyse (a veteran of the battle and a member of the council of war), recalled that the Royalist army did not exceed 12,000 horse and foot. Moreover, Sprigge (who was Fairfax’s chaplain, though he may not have been at Naseby), relates that the battle ‘was fought much upon equall advantage, whether you respect the numbers on each side, there being in that not 500. odds, or the ground.’ Sprigge may have been mistaken, as of course could Belasyse, or he may have inflated the size of the Royalist army to magnify the achievement of the New Model.
It is nonetheless possible, indeed probable, that the Royalists did exceed 7,500 men. True, Charles had not been joined by Gerard and Goring, but it is noteworthy that in a letter of 4 June Charles stated that he intended to ‘gather up stragglers.’ Some historians have estimated that the Royalist army at Naseby may have been as strong as 11,000 men. The basis for estimates of the army’s strength is the known strength of regiments at the siege of Leicester, and from these and estimates of the strength of units at Naseby whose establishment in late May is unknown, Brigadier Peter Young finally concluded in his work on Naseby that Charles had approximately 5,000 horse and 4,600 foot, and these figures seem the most plausible.
Some of the men belonged to regiments which had done little more than garrison duty. The majority, howe
ver, belonged to tried and tested units. One such was Rupert’s regiment of horse—which was 400 strong at Leicester—a very experienced unit which had fought at Marston Moor and a host of other actions where Rupert was present. At Naseby it was commanded by Sir Thomas Dallison. Among other battle-hardened regiments were those of the Northern Horse—in all amounting to 1,500 troopers at Leicester—under Sir Marmaduke Langdale, a dour and formidable Catholic gentleman from Yorkshire. The Northern Horse had a distinguished record and, not surprisingly, was primarily interested in northern affairs. In fact following the capture of Leicester, the Northern Horse had arbitrarily moved north, angered by the king’s decision to relieve Oxford, but had soon turned back with the result that the disgruntled troopers were again with Charles when he marched into Market Harborough on 5 June.
Many of the regiments of foot at Naseby were likewise no strangers to battle. The most notable was Prince Rupert’s regiment—the Bluecoats— which may have been nearly 500 strong on 14 June.
Fairfax and the New Model Army
Sir Thomas Fairfax was born in 1612, the son of Ferdinando, second Baron Fairfax of Cameron. ‘Black Tom’, as he was nicknamed on account of his complexion, was clever and matriculated from Cambridge in 1626. Three years later he went to the Low Countries to learn the art of war. He served under Sir Horace Vere (who later became his father-in-law), and was present at the siege of Bois-le-Duc in 1629. In 1640, by which date he had returned to England, he received a knighthood.
During the early years of the Civil War Fairfax spent much of his time fighting in Yorkshire under his father. He gained a reputation as a very daring soldier who loved to be in the thick of action, and was moreover an inspirational leader. The Royalist Secretary, Nicholas, writing after Fairfax had been defeated by Goring at Seacroft Moor on 4 April 1643, said that he was ‘the man most beloved and relied upon by the rebels in the north.’ Another contemporary, the Parliamentarian lawyer, Bulstrode Whitelocke, was to write in 1646 that Fairfax was
a person of as meek and humble carriage as ever I saw in great employment, and of but few words in discourse or council....But I have observed him at councils of war, that he...hath ordered things expressly contrary to the judgement of all his council; and in action in the field I have seen him so highly transported, that...he would seem more like a man distracted and furious, than of his ordinary mildness, and so far different temper.
An essentially moderate man, Fairfax did not approve of the subsequent trial and execution of King Charles, and played a part in bringing about the Restoration.
Estimates of the strength of the Parliamentarian army at Naseby vary from approximately 13,000 to about 17,000 men. According to Belasyse, the Royalists believed that Fairfax had about 15,000 men, and it is interesting to note that Sir Samuel Luke, the governor of Newport Pagnell, was of the opinion on the eve of Naseby that the army was not ‘less than 8,000 horse and 7,000 foot.’
There were ten regiments of New Model cavalry at Naseby and these were all at or near full strength, 600 men. In addition, there were Colonel John Fiennes’ regiment and a contingent known as the Associated Horse. In all, 6,700 thus seems a reasonable estimate for the strength of the cavalry.
The army contained one regiment of dragoons. This was commanded by Colonel John Okey and it is generally assumed to have been at, or near, its full establishment of 1,000.
There were eight regiments of foot present, all of which belonged to the New Model. If they were each at full strength—1,200—this would mean that there were 9,600 infantry at Fairfax’s disposal. Undoubtedly, however, this was not the case. Desertion, particularly of foot, had always been a problem during the Civil War and it would be unreasonable to suppose that the New Model was immune, especially when it is borne in mind that parliament had had to resort to impressment to fill the ranks of the infantry. The French ambassador, for instance, had seen men set upon in broad daylight in London and carried off to serve in parliament’s new war machine. In light of such action, and the general war weariness which prevailed at this date, it is logical to assume that a significant number of soldiers stole away when able to do so. As Ian Gentles has commented: ‘Conscripting infantry in 1645-6 was like ladling water into a leaky bucket. During the weeks leading up to Naseby, for example, conscripts...did “daily run away.”’ Moreover, it has to be remembered that armies on campaign were weakened by losses owing to illness brought on by a poor diet and bad living conditions. In view of the above, 7,200 seems a reasonable estimate for the strength of the New Model foot at Naseby. In all, then, Fairfax was probably in command of approximately 15,000 officers and men.
Though parliament had conscripted infantry, this had not been the case with the cavalry. The requisite number of troopers for the New Model establishment of eleven regiments was found from the armies of the Eastern Association, the Earl of Essex, and Sir William Waller. Hence the horse contained many battle-hardened veterans. The troopers of Fairfax and Edmund Whalley’s regiments are a case in point. They had belonged to Cromwell’s celebrated double regiment—the ‘Ironsides.’ A New Model cavalry regiment consisted of six troops each 100 strong, and the rate of pay for a trooper was a handsome 2s. a day.
Evidently Okey’s regiment of dragoons, which at least in theory had an establishment of ten 100 strong troops, was primarily made up of recent conscripts: it had been little over 400 strong at the beginning of May. The daily rate of pay for the men was 1s. 6d.
There were ten companies in a regiment of foot. The colonel’s was theoretically 200 strong, the lieutenant-colonel’s 160, and the major’s 140, while those of captains were each 100 strong. The companies were manned by musketeers and pikemen and the former outnumbered the latter by two to one, or more. The daily rate of pay for infantrymen was a mere 8d., no more than could be earned by labourers.
The proposed strength of the New Model foot was 14,400. The army of the Eastern Association had provided 3,578 men, Essex’s 3,048 and Waller’s army, 600. As has been noted, parliament had had to resort to conscription to make up the numbers. London and the county committees of the east and southeast were given quotas to raise, but these had not all been achieved. To illustrate the point, a week before Naseby the Eastern Association had provided less than three-fifths of the men required from it. Hence when Fairfax left Windsor on 30 April his infantry was not quite at full strength, and though he was evidently augmented during the Naseby campaign, the reinforcements will have done little more than offset losses through sickness or desertion, if that.
In the chapter on Marston Moor (which contains a brief account of the tactics, weaponry, etc of the period), it was noted that regiments on both sides wore coats of various colours and consequently that the armies did not have a uniform appearance. The infantry regiments of the New Model, though, all wore coats which were Venice red and were distinguished from each other by the colour of their facings.
It is fairly common to view the soldiers of the New Model as psalm singing Christians who staunchly upheld biblical standards of behaviour. God fearing men of this sort were certainly present, but not all their comrades were as devout. In fact, only four days before Naseby Sir Samuel Luke stated in a letter to his father that drunkenness was prevalent. ‘I think these New Modellers knead all their dough with ale’ he wrote, ‘for I never saw so many drunk in my life in so short a time.’ Perhaps Luke was exaggerating, but it is evident that the New Model was not as disciplined and formidable a war machine as it was to become in the course of time. Fairfax had, however, already demonstrated a desire to make it such. On 5 May, for instance, shortly after taking the field, he had hanged two wayward soldiers near Andover and had marched the army past the tree on which they were hung.
The quality of officers was generally high. At the beginning of the Civil War most officers had come from the upper echelons of society and though often brave, were not necessarily competent. But as the war progressed the view ga
ined ground that men should hold positions of responsibility through merit, and many officers serving in the New Model had worked their way up through the ranks, with the result that Luke commented it was hard to distinguish the officers from ordinary soldiers. It must be emphasized though, that at the senior level the majority of officers were of good birth. This is of course true of Fairfax. It is also true of Cromwell, who is often erroneously referred to as a yeoman. He was a country gentleman—admittedly of small estate—whose father had been a younger son of Sir Henry Cromwell, one of the wealthiest men in Huntingdonshire.
Description
Naseby lies in the heart of England and is situated on a plateau which contains a number of low hills and valleys. The battle which made this Northamptonshire village notable, was fought on Saturday 14 June 1645 a short distance to the northwest of Naseby, for as noted earlier the Royalist and Parliamentarian armies had respectively taken up positions to the north and south of a shallow valley—Broad Moor.
The Royalists were drawn up on Dust Hill, about half a mile from the Roundhead position, and over one and a half miles from Naseby itself. As usual, the foot was in the centre with horse on the wings.
Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746 Page 22
