Though hard pressed, Barrell’s regiment fought courageously, as did Munro’s, but despite this some of the Highlanders managed to hack their way through the front line only to be killed by the men of Sempill’s and Bligh’s regiments of the second line. One of those who fell was MacGillivray of Dunmaglas. Other clansmen, who outflanked Barrell’s regiment, were likewise dealt with by the same regiments.
The regiments in the centre of Cumberland’s front line were not subjected to such a ferocious onslaught. Few of the clansmen and members of John Roy Stewart’s regiment who charged towards the government soldiers in question managed to reach their adversaries owing to the grape-shot and musket fire which tore into their ranks. For instance, none of the MacLeans and MacLachlans closed with the enemy. Old Lachlan MacLachlan of MacLachlan, the father of Charles’ late ADC, was among those who perished.
And what of the regiments on the left of the Jacobite front line? They likewise failed to come to blows. Cumberland relates what happened: ‘I had placed myself [on the right] imagining the greatest push would be there, they came down there several times within a hundred yards of our men, firing their pistols and brandishing their swords, but the Royals [i.e., St Clair’s] and Pulteney’s hardly took their fire-locks from their shoulders, so that after those feint attempts they made off: and the little squadrons on our right were sent to pursue them.’
Although some of the ground between them and the enemy was waterlogged, the performance of the MacDonalds was nonetheless a bitter blow to Keppoch, whom the Chevalier de Johnstone—who was present— describes as ‘a gentleman of uncommon merit.’ Hence Keppoch despairingly cried: ‘My God, have the clansmen of my name deserted me?’ He then courageously charged with other determined individuals, most of whom soon fell under a hail of bullets, Keppoch among them. The rest, including Clanranald, who was wounded, joined their fellows in flight.
The MacDonalds, and those with them such as the Chevalier de Johnstone, were not the only members of the Jacobite army falling back for it was obvious that the day was lost. Even on the right, where as noted fairly significant losses had been inflicted on the government troops, the men were retreating under enemy fire, including grape-shot from Belford’s guns. Reinforcements from the second line brought forward by Murray, who had returned from the charge to bring them up, failed to turn the tide. As Kirkconnel recalled, ‘nothing could stop the Highlanders after they had begun to run,’ while Johnstone later wrote: ‘What a spectacle of horror! The same Highlanders, who had advanced to the charge like lions, with bold, determined countenances, were in an instant seen flying like trembling cowards in the greatest disorder.’
Nevertheless, pursuing government troops did encounter some resistance. The cavalry on the right, for example, after chasing after the collapsed left of the Jacobite front line, found themselves opposed by the Irish picquets and the Royal Scots of the second who stood firm, and were checked as a result until their doughty opponents also commenced retreating.
The Argyll Militia also sustained casualties during this stage of the proceedings for upon seeing the Jacobites falling back in confusion, many of the Campbells who had entered the enclosures referred to above, climbed over the wall between them and the enemy—Ogilvy’s regiment had been unwisely withdrawn to form a reserve—and moved in for the kill with the result that several of their own number were cut down.
Meanwhile, the dragoons in the westernmost of the enclosures had made their way out onto the moor through gaps made for them in the west wall. Seeing this, FitzJames’ Horse and Elcho’s Lifeguard were ordered by Murray to counter the threat. The dragoons were about 500 strong: their opponents no more than 160 men, if that. For a while a standoff occurred in the vicinity of Culchunaig, partly owing to the nature of the ground for a sunken road lay between them. Then, emboldened by the sight of the Jacobite army in flight, the dragoons moved forward. Saddles were emptied on both sides as shots were exchanged, and though the dragoons drove back their opponents, the delay which had occurred enabled many of the fleeing Jacobite right to escape the field.
The Young Pretender seems to have been dazed by the rout of his army. Early in the campaign he had promised his followers that he would conquer or die, but in the event he allowed himself to be led from the field. According to Johnstone, following the battle the prince ‘was in total prostration, lost to all hope of being able to retrieve his affairs . . . and giving up every design but that of saving himself in France as soon as he possibly could.’
On the other hand Cumberland was elated. He rode around the field congratulating his men and was in turn applauded by them. Though cheerful, he was not in a magnanimous mood. Wounded Highlanders were thus systematically butchered. Most were bayoneted or shot but some who had sheltered in barns and huts were burnt alive when the buildings were set alight. In his dispatch, Cumberland reported that he had ‘made a great slaughter and gave quarter to none but about fifty French officers and soldiers.’
Government casualties were said to be fifty killed, 259 wounded and one missing. According to Cumberland, rebel fatalities amounted to about 2,000 killed on the field or during the pursuit. That they were very high is undoubted. For instance, only three of Clan Chattan’s 21 officers survived the battle, while half of the Atholl brigade perished.
Lord George Murray, who fought with typical courage at Culloden and perforce largely conducted the battle, blamed Charles for the disaster and gave vent to his feelings in a letter to the prince written the day after Culloden. For a start, he declared, it was ‘highly wrong’ of the prince ‘to have set up the royal standard [at Glenfinnan] without having positive assurance’ that France would fully back a rising. Moreover, among other things he lamented the prince’s reliance on the incompetent O’ Sullivan, who had been entrusted ‘with the most essential things’ in regard to operations and whose choice of ground, Drummossie Moor, the prince had accepted to do battle with Cumberland.
Drummossie Moor had undoubtedly been a disastrous choice of battlesite. To make matters worse, the prince had compounded the error by making others. Prior to the battle’s commencement, he overruled a suggestion by Murray that a close inspection of the terrain be undertaken. Consequently, unbeknown to the Jacobites, some of the ground before their position was boggy and thus hindered the clansmen’s subsequent charge. Furthermore, the prince blundered by allowing the enemy to secure the enclosures to the right of his position. Murray had wanted to partly demolish their walls but had been overruled by the prince.
During the battle itself, Charles appears to have displayed chronic indecision. His only chance of victory was launching a ferocious charge, but by the time it commenced his ranks had been seriously weakened by the cannon fire to which they had been subjected for far too long. In fairness to the prince, he later maintained that he had given the order to advance on eight occasions. This seems rather unlikely, but if true, would of course nullify or at least weaken the accusation that he was indecisive, while indicating that the standard of communications in the Jacobite army was abysmal.
Although we have to deplore the savagery Cumberland showed to the defeated Highlanders (savagery which earned him the sobriquet, ‘Butcher’), it must be conceded that his overall performance deserves respect. Though he generally despised Highlanders, he did not underestimate their prowess. Hence, as noted earlier, in the weeks prior to Culloden he drilled and re-drilled his men, training them to withstand a Highland charge and ensured through this and other measures that morale was high. Moreover, he behaved with alacrity upon hearing of the Jacobites’ abortive night march on Nairn, and led his men competently when they came face to face with their adversaries on Drummossie Moor.
George II received the news of his son’s victory on 25 April and was overjoyed. The defeat of the Jacobites was also well received by the majority of his subjects, some of whom now felt compassion for the routed. Shortly after Culloden young Edmund Burke wrote, ‘
how the minds of people are in a few days changed, the very men who but awhile ago, while they were alarmed by [the prince’s] progress so heartily cursed and hated those unfortunate creatures are now all pity and wish it could be terminated without bloodshed.’
Cumberland, however, remained implacable. ‘All the good we have done’, he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, ‘is a little blood-letting, which has only weakened the madness, not cured it. I tremble for fear that this vile spot may still be the ruin of this island and our family.’ He was determined to continue the work of destroying Jacobitism which he had commenced at Culloden.
One objective was of course the apprehension of the Young Pretender. But much to their chagrin, the government forces failed to arrest the fugitive prince, for on 20 September 1746, after many adventures in the Highlands and the Western Isles, he sailed for France on board l’Heureux accompanied by a few companions, one of whom was Cameron of Lochiel. Charles’ high hopes of ousting the House of Hanover had come to nothing and Jacobitism was a spent force: he was a sad and disillusioned man.
In their endeavours to capture him, and cow the Highlanders into permanent submission, the government forces inflicted great suffering; killing people for little or no reason, ransacking and destroying property, and slaughtering livestock. As Kybett comments: ‘Added to the toll of lives taken at Culloden and the reprisals of that summer were many stillbirths and deaths from starvation in the winter of 1746. It was the beginning of the decimation of the Highland population, from which they never recovered.’
The harshness of the government forces, and measures such as an Act of Parliament of 1747 prohibiting the wearing of tartan or any item of Highland dress other than by soldiers serving in regiments of the British Army, had a profound effect on Highland society. Many of those who had dreamt of the restoration of the House of Stuart found that the dream had become a nightmare—they must have bitterly lamented the day Charles Edward Stuart ever had cause to say: ‘I am come home, sir.’
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