Alison Pargeter
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
From Opposition To Power
SAQI
Alison Pargeter is a writer and analyst specialising in the Middle East and North Africa. She has held academic positions at the University of Cambridge and Kings College, London, and is a senior associate at Menas Associates, an international consultancy firm. Her other publications include Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi and The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe.
‘Alison Pargeter has established a reputation as one of the best current analysts of Islamic radicalism. This book – detailed, authoritative, sober, perceptive and meticulously researched – shows why. It is an important contribution to our understanding both of the Muslim Brotherhood itself, to the controversies that surround the movement and to the broader phenomenon of political Islam. A must read for scholars, students and anyone interested in the Middle East.’
Jason Burke, author of Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam
‘A tour de force … This well-written and much-needed book admirably traces the origins and development, internal debates and frictions, geographical spread – and abiding contradictions – of a movement that, despite its ambiguities and shortcomings, remains very much a force to be reckoned with.’
Alan George, University of Oxford
‘This highly lucid and approachable analysis of the Brotherhood offers a welcome degree of clarity. Alison Pargeter offers a global picture of the trajectories the movement has taken in the Arab world and in Europe. Based on important internal documents, and, crucially, a remarkable array of on-the-record interviews with senior Brotherhood personnel, Pargeter allows the Brothers to do much of the talking.’
Richard Phelps, Perspectives on Terrorism
‘Highly recommended, especially to those who see radical Islam, Jihadism, Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism as one huge monolith and all equally to be feared.’ New Statesman
Contents
Introduction
1. Conflicting Currents: The Egyptian Ikhwan in Opposition
2. From Diplomacy to Arms and Back to Diplomacy:The Evolution of the Syrian Ikhwan
3. The International Tanzeem: Myth or Reality?
4. A School of Thought: The Ikhwan in Europe
5. The Ikhwan and Violence
6. The Arab Spring: From Opposition to Power
Conclusion: The Challenges Ahead
Acknowledgements
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Introduction
One of the unforeseen consequences of the Arab Spring has been the catapulting of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) – one of the longest surviving and most controversial of all political Islamist movements – from the underground to the forefront of the Middle Eastern political arena. Despite the fact that the popular uprisings that gripped parts of the Arab world in 2011 were largely non-ideological in nature, driven largely by youth who came together with no political agenda other than to oust the authoritarian regimes that had gripped the region more or less since independence, it was the Brotherhood that was to reap the advantages of the revolutions. In Egypt, the Brotherhood through its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, emerged triumphant in both parliamentary and presidential elections; in Tunisia, An-Nahda, which although not officially part of the Brotherhood follows its broad ideological orientation, won the largest majority in the elections to the constituent assembly and went on to lead the government; in Libya, the Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party may not have triumphed in the elections to the General National Congress but it still became part of the government as well as a key political player; in Syria, meanwhile, the Brotherhood is playing a major role in the opposition platforms that have sprung up and looks set to have a stake in the country’s future. The Arab Spring, therefore, turned out to be a triumph for the forces of reformist political Islam.
This turn of events is all the more paradoxical given that the Brotherhood has always been a movement that has shunned revolutions and that repeatedly declared itself not to be interested in taking power. It preferred to work from the bottom up, or so it proclaimed, educating society Islamically in order to prepare it for the eventual establishment of an Islamic state. Yet when it came to it, the Brotherhood rushed at the opportunity to get to power. The movement mobilised its resources on an unprecedented level to manoeuvre its way through the transition and to dominate the emergent political arena.
To those familiar with the Brotherhood, the movement’s behaviour during the Arab Spring was not all that surprising. The Brotherhood has always been a movement of controversy and contradiction that has proved near impossible to pin down. Indeed, it has always represented a conundrum to those trying to fathom it. It is a social movement that also functions as a political entity; it is a transnational organisation that emphasises the independence of its national branches; it projects itself as pacific yet some of its branches have been directly involved in violent action; it broadly rejects the West and Western values yet is increasingly anxious to be seen in Western eyes as a moderate organisation that upholds progressive inclusive values. It is also a movement that has been cloaked in ambiguity and that has comprised so many different strands and currents that it has struggled to articulate a single stance on many key issues including violence, the role of women and the role of non-Muslim minorities. It is easy to understand, therefore, why observers and policymakers have found it difficult to develop a coherent policy towards the movement. It is also easy to understand why the Brotherhood’s shift into the political mainstream following the Arab Spring has created such a challenge for policymakers, particularly those in the West.
Yet now, it seems, is the Brotherhood’s time. It has certainly been a long wait. The movement was first established in Egypt in 1928 where it emerged partly as a response to the colonialist presence in the country, but also to the end of the last caliphate, the Ottoman Empire. The Brotherhood came within the tradition of the reformist school that emerged in Egypt in the late nineteenth century through scholars such as Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abdu who believed that the only way the Islamic world could meet the challenges posed by Westernisation and modernisation was to return to the ‘uncorrupted’ values of the Islamic past. The movement soon gathered momentum and by the 1950s had also developed into a reaction against the modernising secular forces of Arab nationalism that threatened to unseat traditional conservative religious values. As a result, the Brotherhood drew much of its support from the classes that feared change, namely the petty bourgeoisie and the trading and artisan classes. Indeed, since its beginnings, it has been a largely reactionary movement, preoccupied by issues of public morality and the preservation of traditional values.
Although the Brotherhood originated in Egypt as a result of a specific set of social and political conditions, its ideology soon spread and branches began to spring up in other countries. Syria and Jordan were perhaps the most important branches in the early days but it was not long before most of the countries of the Middle East had their own branch or equivalent of the Brotherhood. It was able to spread in this way because it offered a simple ideology that corresponded with the mood of the time and that seemed to represent a reassuring beacon of constancy during a period of immense upheaval in the region. Indeed, its slogan said it all: ‘Islam is the solution.’
Whilst it had started out primarily as a social and cultural movement, the Brotherhood came to take on more of a direct political role and by the 1950s had evolved into one of the most powerful opposition currents in the region. Like many other groups operating at the time, its politics became increasingly radical in the 1960s and 1970s, largely as a response
to repression by the regimes in the region, which viewed it as a potential challenge to their own hegemony. In the 1970s, caught up in the current of Islamic revivalism that swept the Islamic world, the Ikhwan came to articulate its demands ever more forcefully. Perhaps the most extreme example is that of the Syrian branch, which got involved in a bloody conflict with the Ba’athist regime culminating in the deaths of thousands of its members and supporters. As a result of this increasingly antagonistic relationship to the state, a number of Ikhwani were pushed out of their home countries. Some sought refuge in Saudi Arabia whilst others went to Europe.
The push into Europe broadened the scope of the Brotherhood setting in motion the beginnings of its transnational ambitions through its international organisation. However, as it became clearer that returning home would be impossible, Europe-based Ikhwani began to establish their own organisations in the continent. As a result, the Brotherhood succeeded in crafting a network of branches and organisations across Europe, the Middle East and beyond, becoming perhaps the most influential Islamist opposition movement in the world.1 From its various centres, it worked to further the cause of Islam in the hope that it would one day come to power and realise its dream of creating an Islamic state.
The events of 9/11 were to alter the Brotherhood’s situation dramatically. As the world woke up to the bombings in the United States, political Islamist groups suddenly came under the harsh glare of a new spotlight. Attention inevitably focused on the Ikhwan. In some quarters the movement was simply considered part and parcel of the al-Qa‘ida phenomenon, whilst others accused it of acting as an incubator for militancy on the grounds that some of those who formed part of the global jihadist network had spent their formative years with the movement. In the end, the Brotherhood escaped being branded as an international terrorist organisation. Nonetheless, the threat of being made a proscribed group continued to hang over the Ikhwan and its members found themselves in the position of having to prove their ‘moderate credentials’ to the world. However, the Brotherhood remained a potent force both in the Middle East and beyond, able to capture and articulate the forces of conservative Islam and to posit itself as a ‘pure’ and authentic alternative to the regimes in power.
Yet for all its strength, after almost eight decades in opposition, by the 2000s the Brotherhood was coming to resemble somewhat of a spent force. Bogged down in stasis and in-fighting, exhausted by the years of oppression and seemingly resigned to the unchanging nature of the political landscape of the Middle East, the Brotherhood looked to be resigned to its fate. In addition, it was finding itself increasingly challenged by the growing power of the Salafist currents that were expanding into its own constituencies and attracting the youth in particular. As such the Brotherhood was coming to look as much part of the creaking furniture of the Middle East as the very regimes it sought to challenge.
The Arab Spring was to change all that. The uprisings breathed new life into the Brotherhood that finally saw its chance to realise the ambitions that had eluded it for so long. Drawing on its years of experience and its organisational skills, as well as its trademark pragmatism, the Brotherhood (and its counterpart, An-Nahda) moved skilfully to outmanoeuvre the other players on the political scene. However, the Brotherhood’s coming to power was not solely down to the way in which it played the transition period. It was also because the movement succeeded in reaching out to the masses and offering them a credible alternative.
This book analyses the evolution of the Ikhwan from its inception in Egypt in 1928 to its emergence into the political mainstream. It examines the aims and strategies of the movement and assesses why, prior to the Arab Spring, the Brotherhood seemed to be stuck in a rut, unable to move beyond its own traditions and history or to engage in reform in any meaningful way. It also analyses how the movement responded to the uprisings of the Arab Spring and how, in the Egyptian case in particular, it manoeuvred itself into power. It looks, too, at the complex dynamics between national and international concerns as expressed through the relationship between the mother branch in Cairo and the rest of this transnational movement.
First published in 2010, much of the material in this book is based upon research conducted in 2007 and 2008 thanks to the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation. It includes material drawn from interviews with key members of the Brotherhood, past and present, and with those in the wider Islamist movement, as well as from literature produced by the Ikhwan itself. This updated edition includes a new chapter that deals with the Brotherhood and the Arab Spring, focusing in particular on the Egyptian Ikhwan. This edition also addresses some of the key challenges that the Brotherhood and its Tunisian counterpart, An-Nahda, are grappling with now that they are in power.
Chapter One deals with the Egyptian Ikhwan, the mother branch of the entire Muslim Brotherhood movement. Tracing its evolution from the days of its founder, the chapter explores how the Egyptian brothers became so hampered by their own traditions that they struggled to resolve their own internal contradictions. Chapter Two looks at what was in its heyday the other major Middle Eastern branch, the Syrian Ikhwan. This chapter examines the Syrian Brotherhood’s shift into violence in the 1980s and its subsequent return to diplomacy, something that makes it arguably one of the most progressive Ikhwani branches today. Chapter Three deals with the highly controversial subject of the Brotherhood’s international organisation. Whilst many Ikhwani deny it even exists, this mysterious body has played a major role in the Brotherhood’s evolution, especially during the 1980s. Its importance may have declined in recent years, but it still has a role to play within the Ikhwan’s international structures. Chapter Four examines the Brotherhood in Europe, looking specifically at the UK, French and German branches and at the various Ikhwani-oriented organisations and institutions that have been established there. It assesses the challenges facing these organisations given the fact that they are minority communities with limited influence living in a secular society. Chapter Five offers an assessment of the Ikhwan’s relationship to violence. It explores the attitudes within the movement towards the ideology of violence through key scholars such as Sayyid Qutb and to jihad, including examining the role that the Ikhwan played in the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Chapter Six offers an examination of the Brotherhood’s shift from opposition movement to mainstream political actor during the Arab Spring. Focusing primarily on Egypt, it looks at how the Brotherhood responded to the revolution and worked its way into power. Finally the conclusion addresses some of the key challenges facing the Brotherhood now that power has finally become a reality.
1
Conflicting Currents
The Egyptian Ikhwan in Opposition
The Egyptian Ikhwan has always been considered to be the heart and the soul of the entire Muslim Brotherhood. Not only is it the founding branch of the transnational movement – something that gives it a particular historical legitimacy – its Murshid (Supreme Guide) is spiritual guide to the Brotherhood as a whole. Decisions made in Cairo reverberate around the movement’s other branches with special significance and still carry a certain moral authority. Indeed, the Egyptian branch is considered to be the vanguard of the entire Brotherhood movement.
In many ways, the Egyptian brothers have lived up to this role. They weathered the storm of the many decades of sustained and brutal repression at the hands of the Egyptian state and despite being banned for almost a century, succeeded in maintaining a substantive grass roots following across the country. The Egyptian Ikhwan also succeeded in making its presence felt on the political scene, manoeuvring itself into parliament without even having a political party and dominating many of the country’s professional associations. The Brotherhood proved successful on the financial front too, creating its own Islamic financing networks that sustained the movement throughout the years of hardship. As such, the Egyptian Brotherhood had established itself to such an extent that by the time the Arab Spring reached Egypt, the Brotherhood was poised to step out of
the wings and into power.
Yet despite all these achievements, in the years leading up to the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian Ikhwan looked to be a movement in stasis. It was utterly bogged down in introspection and indecision, unable to take a clear stance on many issues, not least the extent to which it should reform. Indeed, the Brotherhood seemed to have got itself caught between an awareness of the need to meet the challenges of a changing world and the need to remain true to its founding principles. Thus, whilst in the years before the revolution, it adopted a more reformist discourse that was fully in keeping with the spirit of the times, at the same time it seemed unwilling to move very far from the core principles established by the movement’s founder Hassan al-Banna in the 1920s.
This basic contradiction manifested itself in an often ambiguous discourse and a basic unwillingness to spell out policies on more controversial issues, something that brought charges from within Egypt and beyond that the movement was playing a political game in order to further its own interests. Indeed, the contradictory signals that have emerged from the Ikhwan’s executive body, the Guidance Office, meant that any gains the movement made were often reversed by its own undoing.
One of the reasons the Ikhwan was so unable to articulate a more cohesive strategy is that it was forced to operate under extremely difficult conditions. Any move they made had to be a careful calculation of risk, weighing up the potential cost not only to the movement as a whole but also to individual members, who have repeatedly found themselves in prison. However, whilst state repression was certainly a factor in the Ikhwan’s inability to reform, it cannot be considered the sole cause of this failing.
Internal wrangling within the movement between those of a conservative bent and those who wished to become more engaged in the political process also played its part. Commentators often portrayed this division as a clash of generations with the conservative old guard pitted against the younger reformist faction, themselves in late middle age. Whilst such a divide certainly existed and continues to exist, it is perhaps misleading to overplay the generational factor. The group known as the reformists, which comprised figures such as Issam al-Ariyan and Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh, was a specific set of individuals who came to the Brotherhood in the 1970s as students and who were more overtly political than their predecessors. Indeed, rather than a reformist current, it is perhaps more accurate to talk about reformist figures or individuals. Their bid to push the movement to take a more progressive stance came up against repeated resistance from the more conservative elements within the leadership. That this wrangling was at times played out in the public domain only served to strengthen the impression that the Ikhwan was lacking in direction.
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