The document is also contradictory in its approach to minorities. On the one hand it is clear that it considers all citizens as equals and will not discriminate against non-Muslims. (Al-Bayanouni has been particularly keen to push this last point and at the meeting held in London in 2007 to discuss the Egyptian Ikhwan’s reformist programme, the Syrian leader was highly critical of its stipulation that the President could not be a woman or a Copt. He also censured the Egyptian proposal for an elected council of clerics who would determine whether or not legal rulings conform to Sharia.) Yet at the same time it states unequivocally that Islam should be the basis of the state and of Syrian identity. Furthermore, it views Syria as a specifically Arab state, ignoring not only the country’s Kurdish population but also other non-Arab minorities such as the Assyrians. Ironically, their talk of the umma notwithstanding, the Syrian Ikhwani have been unable it seems to free themselves from the Arab nationalism that was one of the driving ideologies behind the Ba’athist state. In addition, although it promotes freedom, the document displays the traditional Ikhwani concern with public morality and makes clear its desire to legislate for the private lives of its citizens. It bemoans the moral decline in Syrian society and determines to fight alcohol, drugs, gambling and prostitution. It also aspires to ensure that the media supports and publishes ‘innocent entertainment’.74
Given the Brotherhood’s role as a fundamentalist Islamist movement these principles can hardly be compromised on. But these issues aside, the document marks a major shift in the Syrian Ikhwan’s ideology and is a complete departure from the ideas that held currency in the 1970s and early 1980s. Demonstrating just how far the Syrian Ikhwan shifted in its thinking, the document specifies a willingness to initiate a dialogue with European governments and with the government of the United States, as well as with the people of both regions. Even the arch reformers within the Egyptian Ikhwan were not willing to go this far. Undoubtedly, some of these proposals were written with a specifically Western audience in mind. Given the changed international climate since September 2001, the Syrian Ikhwan became more anxious than most to demonstrate to the outside world that there was no justification for labelling it as a terrorist organisation and that it could stand as a credible alternative to the Ba’athist regime.
Part of the reason that the Syrians were able to make such bold statements and play to a Western audience is that unlike the Egyptians, they did not have to think about their grass roots support base in the same way. Because the movement was more or less eliminated inside Syria following the events in Hamah, the Syrians had a much greater flexibility in their approach. Indeed, until the events of the Arab Spring, the Syrians did not have to trouble themselves too much about the need to play to a populist base that was counting on them to act as the defenders of Islam as was the case in Egypt. That is not to say that they weren’t trying to reach out to the Syrian population, but they were well aware that as ‘outsiders’, exiled for so many years, their relevance inside the country was limited.
It is for this reason that the Syrian Ikhwan’s main preoccupation since the late 1990s was how to negotiate a way to return home. Its whole attempt to reinvent itself as a moderate progressive organisation that had turned its back on the more questionable elements of its past, should be viewed within this context. The Ikhwan’s hopes in this respect were heightened in 2000 when Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father as President. The young Bashar had been hailed as a reformer and the Brotherhood believed that he might consider opening up to the Brotherhood and other opposition currents. However, these hopes were soon dashed; in spite of an optimistic start, it was not long before Bashar proved himself to be almost as inflexible as his father. As al-Bayanouni himself noted, the Bashar regime ‘cannot be reformed. We waited more than five years after this regime was established and said that if the President wished to carry out reform or has a reform programme, he would have started it. But after five years we have found that the state of affairs remained as it is and the situation was even deteriorating.’75
In the face of this disappointment, the Ikhwan continued to make desperate attempts to reach out to the regime. In the run-up to the war in Iraq, when the Ba’athist regime was coming under increasing international pressure, the brothers declared that they would defend the regime in the face of external aggression. This was clearly a tactical move aimed both at playing the populist card and at convincing the regime that it should allow them space inside the country because they were true nationalists at heart. Then in 2004 senior Syrian officials, including the President himself, met with leaders who had ties to the Brotherhood, which prompted Syrian parliamentarian Mohamed Habash to comment, ‘The commonalities between the Islamic movements and [the] national movement are stronger than at any time before.’76 Therefore despite its call for freedom and justice, the Brotherhood displayed a willingness to negotiate with the very authoritarian regime that had slaughtered thousands of its own supporters in order to get closer to achieving its objectives. The promotion of democracy clearly came second to securing a place at the table.
Ultimately, these attempts at negotiation failed, leaving the Ikhwan as isolated and as far away from the country as ever. So much so that in 2006 the leadership made an even more desperate and expedient move in its attempt to manoeuvre its way back into having some sort of relevance in the Syrian political context. In March 2006 the Brotherhood officially teamed up with former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, who had defected from the regime in 2005, and the two formed a joint opposition platform called the National Salvation Front. The front was a collection of different opposition groups, including Kurdish and liberal groups, but it was driven by Khaddam and al-Bayanouni. This curious union provoked widespread surprise, given that Khaddam was considered to have been one of Hafez al-Assad’s right-hand men throughout the period in which the Ikhwani suffered their most brutal oppression at the hands of the Syrian state. Questions were asked as to how the Ikhwan could stomach working alongside such a notorious figure, but Khaddam’s offer proved an opportunity that was too good to miss.
Contact between these two unlikely partners was initiated by Khaddam after his defection. Al-Bayanouni was apparently unsure in the beginning as to how to respond to Khaddam’s overtures. He told the Financial Times in January 2006 that the Ikhwan was willing to work for political transition in Syria with former regime officials who were prepared to commit themselves to democratic change.77 However, two days later, during an interview with Al-Jazeera, he is alleged to have referred to Khaddam as ‘a partner to the four-decade regime of corruption and despotism in Syria’.78 There were also reports that al-Bayanouni had demanded that Khaddam apologise for the crimes committed by the Syrian regime against the Syrian people. Khaddam denies that any such request for an apology was made by the Brotherhood and asserts that in any case he has nothing at all to apologise for.79 However, Obeida Nahas has confirmed that the Ikhwan did ask the former official to clarify some issues in relation to his past and that Khaddam explained that he was never involved in any torture or killing but accepted responsibility for being part of the Ba’athist regime.80
Such obstacles were clearly overcome and al-Bayanouni even seemed to be making excuses on behalf of Khaddam, declaring, ‘Today his stance is one of regret, and he is very serious about democracy in Syria … There is a death sentence against him. He is being chased now like they chased us. He does have some responsibility for what has happened in the past, but it is clear he has changed.’81 Al-Bayanouni also stated: ‘Mr Khaddam himself has relatives from among the Muslim Brotherhood whom he couldn’t rescue from the grip of the Syrian regime.’82 Other members of the Ikhwan were less forgiving. Mohamed Farouq Tayfour, for example, who in spite of being al-Bayanouni’s Deputy at the time was a strong opponent of the 2004 reform initiative, declared that Khaddam was ‘the last to talk about reform in Syria’.83 Nonetheless, his name appeared on the list of the founding members of the National Salvation Front, as did Adnan Saad Eddine�
�s.84
Predictably, the alliance was to prove relatively short lived: in April 2009 the Ikhwan pulled out of the front. The Ikhwan asserted that its withdrawal was due to a difference of opinion within the front over the offensive that Israel launched on the Gaza Strip in December 2008. The Syrian brothers had made a controversial declaration on 7 January 2009 in which they announced their decision ‘to suspend activities against the Syrian regime to devote all efforts to the main battle’ in Gaza.85 This announcement taps into what was one of the Syrian Ikhwan’s core problems prior to the Arab Spring, not only in its relations with the rest of the Brotherhood but also with its public image more widely – the very regime it was fighting against was hailed as heroic across the Islamic world for its unfailing support of Hamas. This means that the Syrian Ikhwan was never able to compete with the Ba’athist regime in Damascus over the issue of Palestine, an issue that has been the bread and butter of many other Ikhwani groups. The Syrians came under enormous pressure from other parts of the Ikhwan over this issue, which is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Three, because of the fact that they opposed the al-Assad regime when others considered it to be the only true defender of the Palestinians and of Hamas throughout the region.86 Their comments about supporting the efforts in Gaza were therefore a desperate attempt to try to demonstrate that they, too, were forthright defenders of the Palestinian cause.
Khaddam, meanwhile, who referred to the Ikhwan as a ‘burden’ on the front, suggested that the real reason why the Ikhwan left was because it had opened another dialogue with the Syrian regime.87 Although such a dialogue has not been confirmed, al-Bayanouni told the Arab media, ‘The issue is in the Syrian regime’s court. The regime may use this overture to open channels of dialogue.’88
It would appear that, seeing a chance to move closer to the regime, the Ikhwani seized the opportunity to capitalise on the situation and had no qualms about walking away when it suited them. In any case, the alliance with Khaddam was always tactical, more a reflection of the weakness of both parties than any real shared ideological conviction. The front was set up at a time when the Syrian regime was under intense pressure from the Bush government and the Ikhwan was keen to demonstrate to the outside world that it was capable of working with other currents in the promotion of democracy.
More importantly, Khaddam failed to deliver what the Ikhwan was hoping for. Al-Bayanouni observed at the time of the front’s establishment: ‘It is important to form a coalition with Abdul Halim Khaddam because he has got powers inside the regime. These insider powers are ready to work and participate in the process of moving towards democracy in Syria.’89 However, Khaddam’s bid to win over other important parts of the Syrian regime, thus weakening the Ba’athist state, proved completely untenable. He was also unable to bring the support of Saudi Arabia, which would have given the front some real weight. Given all these issues, not to mention the usual in-fighting that goes with being an opposition in exile, the Ikhwan simply dropped its new allies when they were no longer useful.
Such political expediency inevitably raises questions about the Ikhwan’s commitment to democracy. So much of the Syrian Ikhwan’s history has been reactive rather than proactive that one is left wondering whether its reformist platforms are just another opportunistic move born out of the experience of exile rather than a genuine change of heart. Indeed, the Syrian Brotherhood has often appeared to be engaged in a politics of desperation that has seen it seize any opportunity that presents itself and that has caused it to oscillate from armed insurrection to appearing as the most progressive of Ikhwani branches.
These questions are all the more pertinent given the recent unfolding of events in Syria. The popular uprisings that erupted in March 2011 and the subsequent descent into civil war have opened up the possibility of a real future for the Ikhwan inside Syria. The movement has been quick to take advantage of the opportunity. Although, like its Egyptian counterpart, the Syrian Brotherhood was initially hesitant to give its support to the protests, once it became apparent that the demonstrations were going to endure, the Brotherhood gave them backing. Indeed, like the Egyptian Ikhwan, once they saw which way the wind was blowing, the Syrian brothers determined they had to join in if they wanted to secure a place for themselves in the country’s future. Thus at the end of April 2011, the Syrian Brotherhood issued an official statement in support of the uprisings and went to on to play a major role in the Syrian National Council (SNC), an umbrella opposition front. Also in line with the Egyptian Brotherhood, in July 2012, the Syrian Ikhwan announced that it intended to establish a political party.
Given its history, the Syrian Brotherhood has been at particular pains since the start of its involvement in the opposition to demonstrate its moderate credentials. The movement has repeatedly stressed that it is not seeking to dominate the post-Assad political arena and that it is seeking an inclusive solution for Syria. As Mohamed Farouk Tayfour, the Deputy of the movement declared, ‘The Brotherhood will not monopolize power in the political arena and in managing the coming period … They will be a part of the overall Syrian framework of rebuilding our country and healing the wounds of Assad family rule.’90
Such remonstrations are clearly reminiscent of the pledges made by the Egyptian Brotherhood when they entered the fray of the Egyptian revolution. However, once again, the Syrians went further than the Egyptians. In March 2012, the Syrian Brotherhood published a ten-point Pledge and Charter outlining its vision for the future. This document is overtly progressive in its outlook. Not only does it pledge that the movement will aspire to a modern civil state that is democratic and pluralistic and that operates on the principle of transition of power, it also advocates a state based upon, ‘citizenship and equality, in which all citizens are equal regardless of their ethnicity, faith, school of thought, or [political] orientation’.91 It aspires, too, to a state that upholds, ‘freedom of thought and expression, freedom of religion and worship, freedom of the media, political partnership, equal opportunities, social justice, and the provision of basic needs for a dignified life. A citizen shall not be discriminated against due to his faith or [religious] practices, and shall not be restricted in his private or public life.’92
What is particularly notable about this document, however, is that unlike previous reform documents produced by the movement, it does not emphasise Syria’s Islamic identity. Indeed, the references to Islam are limited to the preamble, which simply states that the charter is based upon the tenets of Islam. Even more surprising was that shortly after the charter was published, the Brotherhood’s leader, Mohammed Riad al-Shaqfa, who succeeded Al-Bayanouni as General Guide in 2010, went as far as to declare in an interview with Dubai TV that the movement would have no objections to a Christian or a woman becoming President, so long as they were the people’s choice.93 Although Shaqfa can clearly make such pronouncements safe in the knowledge that neither a woman nor a Christian would have any chance of being voted to the post, his willingness to go that far clearly separates the Syrian Brotherhood from its Egyptian counterpart.
However, the Brotherhood’s declarations of moderation have not convinced everyone, including some members of the SNC. Some elements within the 310 seat council, a quarter of which is dominated by the Brotherhood, criticised the movement for its excessive influence over decision making within the body. This includes the Kurds, who have deep reservations about the Brotherhood, not least because of its resistance to Kurdish demands for federalism or for Kurdish autonomy within Syria. Accusations were levelled at the Brotherhood to the effect that it was trying to control the SNC through its influence over independent Islamist members of the council and that it was channelling funds to favoured groups inside Syria in a bid to build its presence in the country.94 This lingering suspicion of the movement and its real intentions prompted some more secular elements to object to the SNC’s being absorbed into the Syrian National Coalition, a body established in November 2012 to try to unify the opposition. For all its efforts to p
resent a more moderate face to the world, therefore, the Syrian brothers clearly still have a long way to go to convince everyone.
It is still too early to ascertain what will unfold in Syria. What is certain, however, is that when the al-Assad regime finally goes, the Brotherhood will make sure it is there to play a part in whatever comes next. It goes without saying that doing so will not be easy. The movement’s long absence from the country means that it will be competing with a host of other Islamist forces and currents, many of which are likely to have a stronger local following. Whether in the face of such competition the Brotherhood will stick to its more moderate stance or whether it will feel compelled to retract down a more conservative line of thinking has yet to be seen. However, given the mood of the region, all the indications would suggest that the Brotherhood will once again become a force to be reckoned with in the Syrian context.
3
The International Tanzeem
Myth or Reality?
One of the most contentious issues that has haunted the Muslim Brotherhood in recent decades has been its so-called Tanzeem al-Dawli (international organisation). Much of the controversy has arisen on account of the secrecy that has surrounded this organisation since its inception in the 1970s. There even seems to be confusion within the Brotherhood itself as to what exactly the international tanzeem is and what role it plays. Whilst some Ikhwani talk about it as if it were an active component of the Brotherhood, part of its transnational identity that is actively directed from Cairo, others dismiss it as little more than a co-ordinating body, with no significant function. Egyptian brother Dr Kamal Helbawy, for example, has described the international tanzeem as no more than ‘international co-ordination’.1 Similarly, the Syrian brother, the late Dr Hassan al-Huwaidi, who was a Deputy to the Supreme Guide in the international organisation until his death in March 2009, referred to it as ‘an advisory body that has no executive power’.2
The Muslim Brotherhood Page 10
