In spite of Azzam’s Brotherhood roots, it wasn’t long before he began to fall out with the Ikhwan. According to his son Hudaifa, the reason for the split was that whereas Azzam was keen to accept anyone who was prepared to volunteer into the mujahideen’s ranks, the Ikhwan wanted to restrict entry to those who were from the Brotherhood.33 Hudaifa Azzam has also said that by the mid-1980s the Ikhwan had built up its own organisation in Peshawar, aimed specifically at taking control of the jihad.34 This assertion is borne out by other veterans of the Afghan war. According to one Libyan Afghan veteran, in 1988 Mustafa Mashour and Mohamed Abu Nasser travelled to Afghanistan to ask Abdullah Azzam to close the Khalden camp because some of the Ikhwani recruits were returning to Egypt with a more militant ideology.35 When Azzam refused, Mashour, reportedly under pressure from the Gulf states, which were becoming concerned at the ideas now doing the rounds in the camps, told Azzam that no one should be permitted to enter the camp without a reference from the Ikhwan.36 Azzam of course refused, asserting that the camp was open to all Muslims and not just those from the Ikhwan, but this incident reflects the extent to which Mashour sought to bring the Afghan jihad under his control.
Dr Helbawy, meanwhile, sees the disagreement somewhat differently; he thinks that the real problem was that Azzam wanted the brothers to be more involved in the fighting. Azzam was ‘going with a quicker step, a quicker pace than the Ikhwan’.37 It is true that the Ikhwani were generally reticent to get involved in the fighting in Afghanistan, doing everything they could to facilitate the struggle, but preferring to engage in humanitarian work instead. It was almost as if they supported the ideological cause but considered themselves to be above the messy business of fighting. This reluctance to take up arms may have been because the Ikhwan has tended to be an elitist, middle-class organisation and therefore less inclined to fight than those of tougher stock. Whatever the reason, the Brotherhood has been strongly criticised within Islamic circles for its limited action on the battlefield. The Egyptian militant group al-Jama’at al-Islamiya, who were publishing their Al-Murabitoun magazine out of Afghanistan at that time, roundly condemned the Ikhwani for their unwillingness to engage in the fighting.38 They were also criticised by those who went on to form al-Qa‘ida for opting for the easy life, enjoying the luxuries of living in villas whilst their fellow volunteers were giving up their lives. The Ikhwani attitude towards the Afghan jihad exemplifies why they are so despised by those of a more militant bent, who consider them to be opportunists, ultimately more concerned with their own comforts and interests than with the greater cause.
The brothers defend their unwillingness to fight by asserting that they believed themselves to be more useful in performing other sorts of humanitarian duties. Kamal Helbawy, who was in charge of the Ikhwan’s activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1988 to 1994 and who was based in the Institute of Policy Studies in Pakistan during the conflict, asserts that he tried to convince Ikhwanis not to go and fight but rather to put their skills to better use. He explained:
My own advice was not to go to fight jihad because … many people can learn within three months how to fight and can go and fight, but a doctor who has been educated for twenty years, how can we train another doctor in his place? Or a nurse, or an engineer, or a teacher? … The atmosphere of war is attractive but I was asking, what does Afghanistan need from us, not what would we like to do. One day a medical doctor came to me and said, ‘I would like to go to fight.’ I asked him why. He said ‘because I want to fight jihad to go to paradise’. I said what you are doing can take you to paradise and all the work that we do is jihad … Someone who is not a doctor can go … Take others who are not needed here.39
However, some Ikhwani did get directly involved in the fighting. Helbawy has admitted, ‘If any Muslim brother decided to fight on his own, then no one would stop him.’40 Yet the idea that those Ikhwani fought as individuals rather than under the Muslim Brotherhood’s banner is not entirely confirmed; others have suggested that the Brotherhood did organise some military activities for its members. Hudaifa Azzam has stated that the Ikhwan had two camps for training its fighters, one at Khost and the other at Ghazni.41 According to him, these camps were top secret and only Ikhwani were allowed to enter, although they only held fifty volunteers each at maximum. Other sources have indicated that the Ikhwan did fight in Afghanistan. One website has posted what it claims is a question and answer session with the Ikhwan. This has the Ikhwan declaring: ‘I don’t know why the Ikhwan is always accused of NOT participating in the jihad there [Afghanistan]! Where is the Ikhwan who went there from all over the world? … hundreds of the Ikhwan youth who participated as fighters, doctors, teachers …’42 It is impossible to verify this statement, given that it is not sourced and is not on any official Ikhwani website, yet it would appear that some members of the Brotherhood were more involved in the fighting than the movement often admits.
Fighting aside, the Ikhwan remains proud of the instrumental role it played in facilitating recruits from across the Middle East, for which it used its contacts with Saudi Arabia and the Pakistani Jama’at-e-Islami. The Ikhwan was one of the main linchpins in the jihad; as Olivier Roy describes it, the Afghan resistance was a ‘joint venture between the Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama’at-e-Islami, put together by the ISI’.43 The Brotherhood’s role was multifaceted, and according to Helbawy, ‘One of the major responsibilities of the Ikhwan was to co-ordinate the efforts of the mujahideen leaders, encourage them to consult among themselves and train new individuals who were not exclusively affiliated to their tribes or political parties.’44 The Ikhwan used its skills and worldwide network of contacts to create a strong logistical support network for those doing the fighting. The importance of the conflict to the Brotherhood was such that key figures within the leadership regularly visited Afghanistan to give their backing to the mujahideen. Mustafa Mashour made many trips to Afghanistan to advise the fighters and to urge unity in their ranks.45
The Brotherhood in the Arab world also gave money to support the cause. The Ikhwani-dominated Egyptian Medical Syndicate organised and funded 95 per cent of the doctors working in Afghanistan, whether in relief agencies controlled by the Brotherhood or those independent of them.46 In addition, the Ikhwani used the freedom they had in Pakistan to publish tracts and literature to promote both the cause of the Afghan jihad and their own ideology. Helbawy was in charge of producing a range of publications issued by the Institute of Policy Studies that was distributed across the Arab world. In Morocco, there was a system in place to reprint copies and to distribute them across the region.
In spite of the Ikhwan’s desire to distance itself from the fighting in Afghanistan and the differences that developed between it and Azzam, as with Sayyid Qutb the Brotherhood is still keen to claim the father of the Afghan Arabs as its own. Just as with Qutb, some brothers have asserted that just before he died, Azzam suddenly realised his mistakes, acknowledging that the Brotherhood had been correct in its more measured outlook. According to Helbawy, a few days before Azzam was assassinated he came to Helbawy’s house in Islamabad for breakfast with a number of other Islamist figures including the Yemeni Sheikh Abdulmajid Zidanai.47 Azzam allegedly told Helbawy that he wanted the Ikhwan to participate more in the jihad. When Helbawy asked him whether he had been able to reach any agreement with the other factions who had participated with him, Azzam acknowledged that he hadn’t, prompting him to declare, ‘I wish I had done like you.’48 Symbolically, Azzam then allegedly renewed his baya to the Brotherhood.
Such wistful stories read almost like the tales of the martyrs of the battlefield. Yet the Brotherhood’s desire to reclaim Azzam is part of its bid to maintain credibility with its constituencies, which view figures like him as the real heroes of the Islamist movement.
At the same time, in the interests of demonstrating that they are a moderate and peaceful organisation, the Ikhwan prefers to direct the spotlight on to its humanitarian rather than military efforts
in the Afghan jihad. As such the whole Afghanistan experience demonstrates yet another of the fundamental contradictions within the movement.
Jihad in Palestine and Iraq
Just as it supported the jihad in Afghanistan, the Ikhwan has supported fighting jihad in Palestine and more recently Iraq. Pronouncements by key Ikhwani leaders in support not only of the jihad but also of suicide operations have prompted much condemnation and accusations that they are supporting terrorism. Mehdi Akef is alleged to have stated in 2004:
The Muslim Brotherhood movement condemns all bombings in the independent Arab and Muslim countries. But the bombings in Palestine and Iraq are a [religious] obligation. This is because these two countries are occupied countries, and the occupier must be expelled in every way possible. Thus, the movement supports martyrdom operations in Palestine and Iraq in order to expel the Zionists and the Americans.49
Whilst the brothers in Europe have tended to be more circumspect about such issues due to the political sensitivities of their environment, some have not shied away from openly declaring their support for jihad. Palestinian and former MAB leader Azzam Tamimi has said of those volunteers who go to fight in Iraq: ‘They are responding to a duty because jihad for the sake of Allah is one of the main principles in our religion. Those who volunteer came from every part of the world and they are some of the goodness that the Prophet preached to us about when he said “the goodness in me and in my umma until the day of judgement”.’50 Similarly, Ahmed al-Rawi, former head of the FIOE, is reported to have stated: ‘My opinion on the occupation [of Iraq] is that it is illegal. I couldn’t call the resistance, even military resistance to the occupation, I couldn’t consider it criminal.’51 Moreover, one imam in the UK who followed the Ikhwan’s ideology admitted that he would not try to dissuade anyone who came to him saying they wanted to go to fight in Iraq.52
Yet given the prevailing political and social climate in the Islamic world and the ideology that has underpinned the movement for so many decades, it would be extremely difficult for the Ikhwan to take any other stance. Firstly, as explained above jihad is considered a core religious duty not just by the Ikhwan but by the entire reformist Islamist trend that has come to dominate political Islam in the contemporary context. As part of this trend the Brotherhood cannot refute such concepts and holds them very close to its heart. It is true that jihad can be interpreted in various ways and can be a means of struggling through peaceful means, yet the Brotherhood has always interpreted jihad in its range of meanings and the concept of violent struggle has always been part of its religious teachings. As the former leader of the Jordanian Ikhwan, Abd al-Majid al-Dhunaybat, has expressed:
Martyrdom operations are legitimate as long as the enemy targets civilians. Our ulema gave their religious opinion: They said these operations are religiously acceptable because they represent a reciprocal treatment. The Zionist enemy consists of people who are either in the military or preparing to join the military. Martyrdom-seekers offer the noblest forms of martyrdom. They sacrifice themselves knowing that they would meet God moments after their operations, and they realize that they wound the enemy in defence of their people and creed. Islamic history provides many examples of things similar to the martyrdom operations.53
Similarly Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh, once at the vanguard of the Egyptian Ikhwan’s more progressive wing, said in April 2004 of jihad in Palestine and Iraq: ‘This is a matter of religion, not politics. When a Muslim land is occupied, jihad becomes an individual duty for every man and woman, boy and girl. A woman goes out to jihad without her husband’s permission and a child without his father’s permission. In this matter there is no place for discussion or games.’54
Aboul Fotouh’s assertion is of course highly questionable, in that the Ikhwan has used the jihad in both Palestine and Iraq as a means of rallying its supporters and bolstering its political standing. These two arenas of conflict have become key elements in its political agenda. In the Egyptian Ikhwan’s reform initiative of March 2004, the section titled ‘Most Important National Causes (Palestine and Iraq)’ notably takes up three and a half pages, whilst the section titled ‘In the Field of Combating Poverty’ is only half a page long! The opening lines of the section on Palestine and Iraq read: ‘Resistance against the Anglo-American and Zionist occupiers of Arab and Muslim lands is a legal right and duty imposed (on people under occupation) by Islam and guaranteed by Islam and guaranteed by international laws and treaties.’55 As such the repeated assertion by the Ikhwan that jihad is simply a religious duty is arguably a means whereby the Brotherhood has sought to hide politics behind the mask of religion.
Moreover, fighting jihad has been core to the Ikhwan’s political ideology since its very inception. Palestine was one of the first international causes to unite the Ikhwan and many brothers rushed to join the battle. Three battalions of Egyptian brothers went to fight in 1948 including Said Ramadan, who led a group of Ikhwani from Egypt to take part in the struggle. The Jordanian Ikhwan also sent its own battalion, as did the Syrians. Considering the difficulties of travelling at that time and the Ikhwan’s limited membership it was remarkable that according to Hassan al-Banna, the Ikhwan had 1,500 volunteers inside Palestine at one time during the war.56
However, the Ikhwan’s interest in Palestine pre-dates 1948; the Egyptian Ikhwan carried out propaganda activities on behalf of the Palestinians during the Palestinian revolt of 1936 and the Mufti of Jerusalem was in regular contact with al-Banna. The Ikhwan also formed a special committee headed by al-Banna to protest against Britain and defend the Palestinian cause, and a handful of Ikhwani took part in armed attacks against Jewish installations in Palestine during the revolt.57 The cause of Palestine was also taken up by the first Syrian Ikhwani leader, Mustafa al-Sibai, who invested a great deal of effort into raising awareness of the plight of the Palestinians within Syria and beyond. Since that time, the cause has been central to the Ikhwan’s political agenda and the call for Palestine’s liberation is a key tenet of its public discourse. Moreover, the Ikhwan has been forthright in its support for Hamas, which itself grew out of the Brotherhood.
However, the call to liberate Palestine through violence is not unique to the Ikhwan or even to the Islamist camp. Given the deep resonance that the Palestinian issue has among Arab populations, Middle Eastern regimes have also railed against the occupation of Palestine and have sought to act as defenders of the Palestinian cause to bolster their legitimacy both domestically and in the Arab world. Defending Palestine went hand in hand with Arab nationalism. Yet it was also used by the conservative monarchies of the Gulf that sought to amplify the Palestinian issue for their own benefit. As such Palestine has become part of the discourse and rhetoric of the Arab world, with regimes and their opponents alike competing to make themselves appear as the legitimate and authentic defenders not only of Palestinians, but also of Muslims and Islam itself. Therefore in spite of the fact that Palestinians have been notoriously badly treated as individuals within the Arab world, the Palestinian cause has long been a means of tapping into popular sentiment and rallying support by those on all sides of the political spectrum.
As a result, the Ikhwan has sought to appeal to its grass roots support base with emotive calls demonstrating that it is fully behind the fight against Israel and that it is in some way ‘its struggle’. Abd al-Majid al-Dhunaybat proudly declared:
We want the jihad action to escalate and to involve the whole Muslim nation, not only the Palestinians. The enemy is a threat to the nation, not only to Palestine. Resistance against the enemy should not remain confined to the Palestinians; the entire nation must be involved. Resistance and the intifadah need the support of peoples to be able to continue.58
Similarly, during an appearance on Hizbullah’s Al-Manar television channel, the former Deputy of the Egyptian Ikhwan Mohamed Habib announced:
The truth is that the resistance, whether in Iraq or in Palestine, defends not only the holy places, the land, and the honour but a
lso defends the nation’s honour. They represent the first line of defence for the entire Arab and Islamic society and world. Therefore, the issue of martyrdom and of the martyrdom operations carried out by boys and girls, and also the operations carried out by the Iraqi resistance, these redeem self-confidence and hope, because a nation that does not excel at the industry of death does not deserve life.59
Among the Jordanian Ikhwani the cause of Palestine is even more fundamental and the need to be seen to be resisting Israel is perhaps most crucial. This is because of the huge number of Palestinian refugees who reside in Jordan and the fact that the Kingdom has been more directly affected by the fall-out of Israel’s actions than any other state in the region. In addition, the ranks of the Jordanian Ikhwan have been swollen over the years by those of Palestinian origin. Whilst the Jordanian Ikhwan has long been divided into two currents – one that is more moderate, comprising those who are originally Jordanian, and the other the more hawkish Palestinian wing, which tends to be more representative of the grass roots of the organisation – it goes without saying that both currents share a complete aversion to any rapprochement with Israel. Their 1989 election platform stated: ‘The Islamic movement believes that the liberation of all of Palestine is the most important and sacred duty … The soil of Palestine is Islamic and belongs to the Muslims for eternity.’60 When the Madrid peace conference on the Middle East opened in October 1991, the Jordanian Ikhwan termed the opening session as a ‘day of mourning’ and subsequently made clear its objection to all further peace deals with Israel, especially those that involved Jordan’s Hashemite monarchy. The presence of so many Palestinians in the ranks of the Jordanian brotherhood has only increased the imperative for populist rhetoric.
The Muslim Brotherhood Page 20
