Minoru Ota, Imperial Japanese Navy rikusentai. The rikusentai were naval infantrymen, sailors with “advanced degrees” in infantry tactics and weapons. Initially organized to spearhead amphibious landings, these special naval landing forces fought prominently at Wake, Guam, the Bismarcks, and Solomons. When the tide turned, the rikusentai came to resemble defense battalions of the Fleet Marine Force, adapting heavy antiaircraft and coast-defense guns. These sailors became known for their discipline, esprit, and combat skills, but few survived the war. Their greatest commander, Adm. Keiji Shibasaki, died at Tarawa. Minoru Ota lived longer and fought the Americans at more places but met the same fate. Ota, fifty-four at the battle of Okinawa, was a native of Chiba Prefecture and a 1913 graduate of the Japanese Naval Academy. He was an exceptional naval gunner and served as executive officer of the battleship Yamashiro, but by mid-career he was commanding rikusentai units in China. As a captain in May 1942, Ota headed the 2d Combined Special Landing Force earmarked to seize Midway after Yamamoto’s expected naval victory. Later, as a rear admiral, he commanded the 8th Combined Special Landing Forces in New Georgia. Here he fought against the 1st Raider Battalion in the jungles of Bairoko. At Okinawa, Ota commanded ten thousand men, but half were civilian laborers and the others were more gunners than naval infantry. Ota nonetheless galvanized them into a ferocious defense of the Oroku Peninsula against the attacking 6th Marine Division. In the end, he radioed Tokyo: “The troops under my command have fought gallantly, in the finest tradition of the Japanese Navy. Fierce bombing may deform Okinawa’s mountains but cannot alter their spirit.”
Eugene B. Sledge, Marine Rifleman, 1st Marine Division. Fittingly, the lowest-ranking man in this sample achieved the greatest postwar fame. Eugene Sledge attained renown by writing frankly of his wartime experiences. For all of amphibious warfare’s great operational and doctrinal breakthroughs, the final executors were men like Sledge who had to storm ashore under fire. His book With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa became the classic rifleman’s account of the Pacific War, favorably compared with World War I’s All Quiet on the Western Front and the Civil War’s Red Badge of Courage. Of these, Sledge’s work, manifestly nonfiction, is the most believable. Sledge was a twenty-year-old Alabaman, dutiful and observant, when he joined the 1st Marine Division (the Old Breed) in 1944 as a 60-mm mortarman in King Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. Of his first combat landing at Peleliu, Sledge wrote, “Everything my life had been before and has been after pales in the light of that awesome moment when my amtrac started ... toward that flaming, smoke-shrouded beach.” Getting ashore was traumatic enough, then Sledge noted: “A number of amtracs and DUKWs were burning. Japanese machine-gun bursts made long splashes on the water as though flaying it with some giant whip. . . . I caught a fleeting glimpse of a group of Marines leaving a smoking amtrac on the reef. Some fell.” Sledge’s officers warned him Okinawa would be even rougher (“expect 85 percent casualties”). When no resistance materialized, Sledge’s team sped ashore singing “Little Brown Jug.” Then came Awacha Pocket, Half Moon Hill, Kunishi Ridge. Only a handful of the Peleliu vets in his company survived. When news of the A-bombs reached the men in the ranks, “we sat hollow-eyed and silent, trying to comprehend a world without war.”
Larry E. Klatt, Carpenter’s Mate 1/c, USN, 18th Naval Construction Battalion. (Larry E. Klatt)
Lewis J. Michelony Jr. 1st Sergeant, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. (Lewis J. Michelony Jr.)
Eugene B. Sledge, rifleman, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. (Eugene B. Sledge)
Donald M. Weller, naval gunfire support pioneer. (U.S. Marine Corps)
Donald M. Weller, Naval Gunfire Pioneer. Many prewar ground officers viewed naval gunfire as the fatal flaw of amphibious doctrine: the unnatural reliance on ships to suppress a defended beach until proper field artillery could land, register, and open fire. Fleet landing exercises in 1935–41 did little to dispel this bias. But naval gunfire support to amphibious war came of age in the Central Pacific. This feat had many fathers, none more farsighted than Marine artillery officer Don Weller. A Connecticut native, Weller graduated from the Naval Academy in 1930. He served on battleships and cruisers, attended the Army Field Artillery School, and in 1940 became Gen. Holland Smith’s naval gunfire officer in what emerged as the Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet. Smith chose Weller—as he had chosen Captain Jones of amphibious reconn—for his vision and work ethic. Like Jones, Weller followed Smith to the Pacific and helped him prepare for the Aleutians. Weller then took a “leave of absence” to command a 75-mm howitzer battalion in the 3d Marine Division during Bougainville and Guam. He rejoined Smith’s staff to help plan Iwo Jima. “Iwo was the toughest nut to crack,” said Weller. While he and Smith failed to sway the Navy to extend the preliminary bombardment, they did devise a unique “rolling barrage” by a destroyer squadron to precede the assault troops ashore and across the first terraces. Weller also convinced Admiral Blandy to focus all D-minus-1 fires against Suribachi and the Rock Quarry, dominating the beaches. But it was Tarawa, to Weller, that proved the watershed in this difficult art: “The Japanese shore battery could be attacked at short range with reasonable impunity; ships could ‘fight forts,’ at least Japanese forts.” And smart naval gunfire could save American lives.
Textual Notes
The following abbreviations are used in the notes:
MCHC: Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
MCOHC: Marine Corps Oral History Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.
NHC: Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
SS No.: Senshi Sosho No. (Japanese war history series)
USMC Operations 1-5: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, volumes 1-5
USNIP: U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
USN Operations: Samuel E. Morison, The History of U.S. Naval Operations during the Second World War
Prologue
Epigraph cited in Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer, 330. “Enemy troop strength is overwhelming” from USMC Operations, 1:264. Details on Baker Company’s landing from Frank, Guadalcanal, 72, and USMC Operations, 1:263. Paramarines and others landing on Gavutu-Tanambogo from Frank, Guadalcanal, 74-79, and USMC Operations, 1:266-73. “The most far-reaching tactical innovation” by Gen. J.F.C. Fuller, quoted by Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 6. “A soldier’s battle” by Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, quoted in Frank, Guadalcanal, 79.
Chapter 1
Epigraph from Isely and Crowl, Amphibious War, 27. For Aboukir Bay, see Brendan P. Ryan, “Aboukir Bay, 1801,” in Bartlett, Assault from the Sea, 69–73. For Caesar in Britain, see Brenda Ralph Lewis, “Caesar’s Battle for Britannia,” Military History 12 (February 1996), 46-53. Gallipoli summary from Isely and Crowl, Amphibious War, 17-23. Liddell Hart “one of the most difficult operations of war” cited in Dyer, Amphibians, 318. (Kelly Turner had this quote in his sea cabin as he sailed for Guadalcanal.) General Eisenhower’s “an amphibious landing is not a particularly difficult thing” is cited in full in Isely and Crowl, Amphibious War, 6. Gen. Eli Cole and Adm. Montgomery Taylor’s reports of the 1924 landing exercises are cited in Isely and Crowl, Amphibious War, 30-31. Two works by Kenneth J. Clifford provide the background of amphibious doctrinal development, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the U.S. Marine Corps (1973) and Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920-1940 (1983). “Pioneer work of the most daring and imaginative sort” from Isely and Crowl, Amphibious War, 36. Japanese amphibious developments in the prewar years from Millett, “Assault from the Sea.” See also chapter 2 of Alexander, Utmost Savagery. Nimitz’s comment “only skill in keeping their plans disguised” from Frank, Guadalcanal, 597. Vandegrift comment “Landings should not be attempted in the face of organized resistance” from Dyer, Amphibians, 541.
Chapter 2
Epigraph from Gen. David M. Shoup Collection, Personal Journal, 2 July 1943, Hoover Institute Archives. Shoup served as observer to the 43d
Infantry Division landing at Rendova, New Georgia. Experiences of first waves ashore at Tulagi from USMC Operations, 1:263-64. Maj. Gerald C. Thomas’s Congressional testimony concerning defenses of Guam from Millett, In Many a Strife, 129-30, 138. Testing the reef-crossing abilities of Higgins boats from USMC Operations, 1:81. Details on development and employment of Higgins’s LCVPs and LCMs from Strahan, Andrew Jackson Higgins, and Baker, Allied Landing Craft. Captain Ota’s amphibious plans for Midway from Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan. Details on the Makin and Dieppe raids and Operation Torch from Lorelli, To Foreign Shores, 57-58, 58-60, and 70-84, respectively. Lt. Col. Jack Colley’s intelligence plan for Tarawa from collection maintained by his son, Cdr. Douglas J. Colley, USNR (Ret.), graciously shared with the author. Naval gunfire at Gavutu-Tanambogo from Dyer, Amphibians, 843-44.
“From daylight to noon this little island was bombarded” from Rear Adm. Herbert B. Knowles, USN (Ret.), letter 1 September 1962 to Headquarters, Marine Corps, p. 1, retained in “Comments on Vol. III” file, Archives Section, MCHC. Casualties from “friendly” aviation strikes on Gavutu from Frank, Guadalcanal, 76, 78. “Tinker toy level” from Wyckoff, “Let There Be Built Great Ships,” 51-57. “Unloading French 75s” from del Valle, oral memoir, 1966, MCOHC, 243. Sir Roger Keyes’s “folly to storm a defended beach in daylight” cited in Dyer, Amphibians, 590. Russian Black Sea Fleet landings in 1943 from Paul Carell, Scorched Earth, 2:154-69. Details on amphibious transports and cargo ships from Silverstone, U.S. Warships of World War II, 260-61, 281, 335. Losses of troop transports from Silverstone, U.S. Warships of World War II, 266, 335, 404, and Morison, The Two-Ocean War, 233, 408. For the Japanese Ketsu-Go plan for attacking American troop transports with suicide forces, see chapter 9 this volume. Details on LSTs from Baker, Allied Landing Craft. The tattletale leaker from Barbey, MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy, 39, 43. Turner’s “You are the first to land!”—one of the all-time classic quotes of amphibious warfare—cited in Dyer, Amphibians, 545.
Chapter 3
Epigraph from Tadao Onuki, one of the eight rikusentai to survive Tarawa, in Ito, Tomiaka, and Inada, eds., Jitsuroku Taiheyo sense (Real accounts of the Pacific War), 3:31. Details on Admiral Shibasaki and the action on Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll, extracted from Alexander, Utmost Savagery. Details on the naval revolution in the Central Pacific engendered by the advent of the Essex-class carriers from Reynolds, The Fast Carriers.
Gen. Holland Smith’s early recommendations for use of LVTs in amphibious assaults are found in CG, Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet to CG, Army Ground Forces of 13 March 1942, p. 3, and CG, Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet of 31 March 1942, Annex G, p. 2, both copies provided courtesy Maj. Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR, in his research as the leading biographer of Merritt A. Edson. Lieutenant Colonel Krulak’s 1943 “Crash Test” of LVTs is contained in his official report, “Tests of amphibian tractor under surf and coral conditions,” 3 May 1943. Gen. Clayton B. Vogel forwarded the report to the commandant on 5 May. The assistant commandant (Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rockey) endorsed the report “for information” to the CG, Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet (Gen. H. Smith) on 9 June 43, five months before Tarawa. Document held in Archives Section, Marine Corps University, and provided the author courtesy of fellow historian Maj. James R. Davis, USMC (Ret.). Joint Planning Staff Report No. 205, “Operations against the Marshall Islands,” 10 June 1943 is found in Record Group 165, ABC 384, National Archives.
Tank losses and problems at Tarawa from 2d Tank Battalion Special Action Report, 14 December 1943, Archives Section, MCHC. Development of the dock landing ship from Wyckoff, “Let There Be Built Great Ships,” 56-57. The complaint about Spruance wanting “a sledgehammer to drive a tack” is attributed by Potter to Adm. John H. Towers in Nimitz, 255. Spruance’s observation about the principal lesson learned at Tarawa came from Buell, The Quiet Warrior, 214-15. “Get the hell in and get the hell out” from Potter, Nimitz, 257. An excellent account of the Bougainville landing is contained in USMC Operations, 2:207-35. Details of close air support to the landing from Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation, 131, 181, 190-92. Admiral Koga’s belief that his aviators had so severely damaged Halsey’s fleet that the Americans would be incapable of launching a new counteroffensive in the Central Pacific is reported in SS No. 62, 442.
Prof. Donald W. Olson identified the rare “apogean neap tide” in “Tide at Tarawa,” 526-29. Admiral Shibasaki’s death, now determined to have occurred the afternoon of D-Day vice D+3, is based on translations of survivors’ accounts in SS Nos. 6 and 62, action reports of the two destroyers in Fire Support Area Four, and radio logs of the Shore Fire Control Party and the 2d Marine Division, as presented in Alexander, Utmost Savagery, 147-52. Turner “a goddamned painful lesson” cited in Dyer, Amphibians, 651. Shoup’s dissatisfaction with support provided by VAC at Tarawa is scattered throughout his 1943-44 journals in the Shoup Collection, Hoover Institute Archives, and the “Volume 3 Comments” file in the Archives Section, MCHC. See also Merritt Edson to Gerald Thomas, 13 December 1943, Box 5, Edson Papers. The mystery of the missing two-thousand-pound daisy-cutters is discussed in Alexander, Utmost Savagery, 88, 108. See also Shoup’s field notebook for Tarawa, Personal Papers Collection, MCHC.
“Not the nature of amphibious warfare to be bloodless” from Kelly, “The Achilles Heel,” 41-45. “Carry a supply of wooden plugs” from VAC “SOP for Employment of Amphibian Tractors (LVTs),” 14, Navy Archives, Suitland. “SNAFU Leadership” from Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, USMCR, to CG, VAC, “Report of Observations on Galvanic Operation,” 27 November 1943, p. 8, Archives Section, MCHC. “Landing teams should practice landings wherein all units are mixed up” from Lt. Col. Walter I. Jordan, USMC to CG, VAC, “Long-suit Operation, observation of,” 27 November 1943, p. 5, Archives Section, MCHC. Japanese attempts to alert the Marshalls of tactical lessons learned from the loss of Tarawa are contained in radio intercepts reported in CINCPAC messages 212100 November 1943, ULTRA file, and 230127 November 1943, ULTRA file, both in SRMN-OI3, Part 3, Record Group 457, National Archives.
Chapter 4
Epigraph from CINCPAC Monthly Operations Report, July 1944, p. 37, cited in Dyer, Amphibians, 945. J. T. Rutherford account of D-Day landing from interview, April 1995. “On this day the enemy landed” from diary of Tarac Kawachi of the 43d Division Hospital Unit, found on Saipan 19 July 1944, copy provided author courtesy Raymond J. Hagberg, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion at Saipan. Composite U.S. casualties extracted from USMC Operations, 3:636. The concentration of so many significant naval and military landmarks in a mere six weeks vitiates their historical study: 6 June 44: D-Day at Normandy; 15 June: D-Day at Saipan; 18-19 June: Battle of the Philippine Sea; 21 July: W-Day at Guam; 24 July: J-Day at Tinian.
Nimitz’s waffling on the Marianas vs. “the single axis,” MacArthur’s “Give me central direction of the war in the Pacific” letter to Secretary of War Stimson, and King’s rebuke to Nimitz are contained in Potter, Nimitz, 279-83. The composition of Mitscher’s Task Force 58 in the Marshalls from Miller, War at Sea, 435. Nimitz’s plans for the amphibious invasion of Truk from Isely and Crowl, Amphibious War, 308. Quantities of LVTs available for the three landings in the Marianas from Croizat, Across the Reef, 243-44. Shortage of ships for the landing forces for Forager reflected in Turner to Wilkinson, 30 July 1944: “We simply didn’t have enough troops here [Saipan], and the reason we didn’t have enough troops was that we didn’t have enough ships to bring them in,” cited in Dyer, Amphibians, 917. West Loch disaster and shortage of qualified ammo ships from Dyer, Amphibians, 895. Incident of Nimitz endangered by venturing too close to exploding ammo ships at West Loch related to author by Loren F. “Sonny” Paulus, former bodyguard to Nimitz, during interview, February 1996.
The Japanese rigid adherence to defense at the water’s edge in the Marianas is best summarized in Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, 61-63, 67. See also Dyer, Amphibians, 873. Dyer (870-72) al
so substantiates the disruption of IGHQ efforts to reinforce the Marianas created by U.S. submarines. Major Yoshida interrogation from personal papers of Col. Thomas Jack Colley, USMC (Ret.), provided the author courtesy of his son, Cdr. Douglas J. Colley, USNR (Ret.). Holland Smith “We are through with flat atolls now” cited in Sherrod, On to Westward, 57-58. Incident of injury to Lieutenant Dodd on D-Day at Saipan in Sherrod, On to Westward, 77. Spruance’s comments defending his decisions at the Battle of the Philippine Sea from Buell, The Quiet Warrior, 303. Nimitz’s reaction to the civilian bodies at Saipan’s Marpi Point on 17 July 1944 from Potter, Nimitz, 313-14, and Paulus interview, February 1996.
“I was particularly impressed to see Japanese soldiers still alive” attributed to Lt. Col. Calvin W. Kunz, USMC, 9th Marines, Guam, in USMC Operations, 3:458. Gaan Point action from same source, 3:461-62. General Shepherd’s two D-Day quotes from same source, 3:474, 476. One-fifth of IIIAC committed to logistics functions from same source, 3:577-78. “The 77th Marine Division” from O’Brien, Liberation, 44. “Dick Conolly’s and Roy Geiger’s units were superbly schooled” from Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, 383 (vol. 8 in USN Operations).
Tinian details summarized from Alexander, “Amphibious Blitzkrieg at Tinian,” 10-17. The most concise and dispassionate summary of the “Smith vs. Smith Controversy” (more accurately: “Maj. Gen. Holland Smith, USMC, vs. Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, USA”) is contained in USMC Operations, 3:313-20. Excellent details of the J-Day night counterattack battle are found in same source, 3:388-92. “Each man fell in position” from interview, with Brig. Gen. Frederick J. Karch, USMC (Ret.), February 1994. Adm. Kishisaburo Nomura’s “Everywhere you attacked before the defense was ready” appears in the USSBS Interrogation No. 429, 2:387.
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