Since the Foreign Office knew that Elliot was unhappy in Texas, it will not have been greatly surprised to hear from him in mid-December, not from Galveston but from New Orleans. He had gone there, he said, for health reasons, ‘chiefly for better advice and convenience than I can find in Texas for an instant [having] fallen into a very weak state of health’, but he was hugely relieved to be away from Galveston, as was Clara.48 He had written to Emma in the summer with condolences on the death of her husband, Sir Thomas Hislop, adding that ‘Clara is satisfying herself as well as is possible in this desperate hole, but I will not consent to keep her in such a place beyond the expiration of the summer months’.49 The Elliots did not leave for a new posting, as Charles had hoped and requested, but an extended temporary relocation was a welcome change.
In New Orleans Elliot met Henry Clay, the influential former US Secretary of State. He was glad to receive Clay’s reassuring opinion, expressed several times, that ‘no scheme of that kind [the annexation of Texas] either by treaty, or in any other form, could be carried through the Senate of the United States’.50
Chapter Fourteen
‘Knavish Tricks’
One diplomatic benefit of being in New Orleans was that Charles Elliot could gauge for himself the popular mood in the United States towards possible Texan annexation. It was not Washington DC, but it nevertheless allowed him a realistic perspective on the exaggerated reports and rumours circulating in Texas. He explained to Aberdeen that, though recovering, his health had hitherto prevented a return to Galveston. In mid-February 1844 he wrote again:
It has been so generally reported in Texas that a scheme of Annexation to the United States by treaty, is in an advanced state, that I consider it right to notice these reports to Your Lordship; remarking that nothing of the kind has transpired here, and that the statement is not believed by persons of great knowledge and weight in this Country.1
Aberdeen had reacted strongly to Tyler’s Message to Congress of December 1843 in which, in a passage about the need to end the war with Mexico, the President had implied British interference in Texan affairs. In a letter of 26 December to Pakenham, now British Minister to the United States, the Foreign Secretary instructed him to ‘take the opportunity of observing to the Secretary of State [Upshur], that the language of the President, when speaking of the measures which the U.States may hereafter have occasion to adopt, ill accords with this condemnation of the supposed designs of other powers...’2 Probably sensing the damage it might do to diplomatic relations between Britain and the United States, Pakenham ensured that at this stage the contents of the letter went no further than himself.
Whatever advantage Elliot may have had by being closer to American opinion in New Orleans, political scheming in Texas in his absence ensured that the annexation issue remained active. How much of this Elliot would have been able to influence, or even known about, had he been there is an open question. Without at this stage any firm guarantees from the United States about the terms of annexation, Houston and his government remained unsure what would be the best deal for Texas. Though attitudes in the US towards annexation were keenly divided between the abolitionist north and the expansionist south, the ardently annexationist President and Secretary of State were moving things forward. In mid-January 1844 Secretary Upshur told William S.Murphy, the US Chargé d’Affaires in Texas, that the point had now been reached at which the US Senate would approve an annexation treaty, a view also held by Van Zandt. Houston continued to keep his options open, conducting armistice negotiations with the Mexicans while seeking a guarantee of US protection in the event of a commitment to annexation. The Americans increased the pressure, warning Texas unequivocally about alleged British intentions. Murphy gave Anson Jones an assurance, without authorisation, that ‘neither Mexico nor any other power, will be permitted to invade Texas, on account of any negotiation which may take place, in relation to any subject upon which Texas, is, or may be invited by the United States to negociate’.3
Murphy was subsequently reprimanded for making this commitment but, crucially, it gave Houston added encouragement to pursue discussions with the United States. As Texas was allowing Mexico and the United States to form differing impressions of her intentions, Mexico was behaving with similar guile towards the United States and Texas. Upshur sought to persuade the Mexicans both of the reasons for the US wishing to annex Texas (chiefly to stem British influence and interference) and of future US support for Mexico as a neutral state. Like Texas, Mexico hedged its bets, aware of the weakness of the American position inherent in the divide between the northern and southern states, especially on slavery. Away from Texas, Elliot was unaware of these intrigues. In the wake of Tyler’s Message Aberdeen had not only written to Pakenham, but had drawn into the Texas affair the French government, whose support for Britain in its concerns over American designs on Texas was readily forthcoming.
The gap in Charles Elliot’s preoccupations occasioned by his distance from current diplomacy was filled, predictably, by China and by his health. In January he sent a long letter to Emma discoursing again on his role in China and giving his current perspective on its aftermath, saying that there was nothing pleasant in his present situation to write home about. By mid-March his health showed some improvement, but he was not inclined to be too positive. He wrote to his sister: ‘I have just time for one line to tell you that I am better, but still desperately weak. I am off to Texas today, for only a very few days, however, for my doctor tells me that I must go away immediately to the northward’.4 In the same letter he mentioned also the illness, of great concern to Clara and to himself, of their baby daughter Emma Clara, who remained in a ‘very, very precarious condition’. A little earlier he had asked the Foreign Secretary for permission to go north for the sake of his health, as advised by his doctor, from whom a medical certificate was enclosed. Dr Rushton’s note emphasised that it was essential, if Elliot was to become fully well again, that he should move to a more temperate climate to the north as soon as possible. He continued:
I conceive that your attack of severe Dysentery has proceeded from a debilitated state of the Digestive Organs, brought on by long residence in tropical Climates, and am satisfied that your continued residence either here, or in a latitude as low as Texas, would be attended by a great risk of a return to your present Complaint, and from the consequences of such a return you have everything to dread.
Under these circumstances, I conceive it your duty, at whatever sacrifice, to leave our hot and humid Climate, for one more dry and bracing.5
In his covering letter to Aberdeen, Elliot took advantage of the opportunity by expressing a wish to return to Europe, but dented his credibility by saying that Rushton’s certificate advised this, which it clearly did not. He probably thought, in any case, that such a move would not be sanctioned, and implied as much by indicating that
if Your Lordship shall be of the opinion that it would be more convenient for the public interest that I should not go so far from my post at present I would endeavour to find suitable change on the Northern parts of this Continent, and return to my duties as soon as my health enabled me.6
The following week he wrote to Aberdeen informing him that he would indeed be going north. His first task however was to return to Texas, to find out closer to hand what was going on, and in particular what had prompted the government to dispatch a special emissary to Washington DC.
Texas had sent General J. Pinckney Henderson, a firm supporter of annexation, to join Van Zandt in negotiations with the Americans. It was probably the clearest indication yet that annexation was being taken seriously and that its implementation was a real possibility. In an exchange of correspondence between Elliot and Anson Jones, the Secretary of State informed Elliot that it was in the Texas Congress that policy had changed. The mood there had turned more strongly against Mexico; it had become
very apparent the Government of Mexico were indisposed to any settlement upon reasonable and admissible terms
… intelligence from our Commissioners beyond the Rio Grande engaged in conducting the terms of the Armistice was of a very unfavorable character, and the people of this country tired of uncertainty and delay naturally turned their attention to annexation, the door to which had just been unexpectedly opened, as the most certain remedy for existing evils.7
Nevertheless, Elliot told Aberdeen, Houston himself remained committed to Texan independence. Unless and until provided with hard evidence to the contrary, Elliot wanted to see the best in people; he certainly did not want to think now that Houston might be being less than straight with him. The President had only authorised the Henderson mission to Washington, Elliot said, to pre-empt a resolution of Congress which would have removed his control of the annexation issue.
Upshur, with whom Van Zandt had been formulating the detail of a treaty of annexation, met with a fatal accident at the end of February. Van Zandt was immediately concerned that the constructive progress of the negotiations would stall, but he need not have worried. The new Secretary of State was John C. Calhoun; not only did the process continue apace, but the unauthorised assurance given earlier by Murphy was in large measure legitimised. Calhoun wrote to the Texan negotiators: ‘I am directed by the President to say that the Secretary of the Navy has been instructed to order a strong naval force to concentrate in the Gulf of Mexico, to meet any emergency; and that similar orders have been issued by the Secretary of War, to move the disposable military forces on our southwestern frontier for the same purpose.’8 The treaty between the United States and Texas was finalised, signed, and laid before the US Senate on 22 April. It had with it related correspondence, including the letter from Aberdeen to Pakenham of 26 December 1843, which had found its way to the US Government in February. Aberdeen’s intention had been to rebut any suggestion that Britain’s main purpose was abolition, but his mentioning Britain’s stance towards slavery in general had prompted Calhoun to represent Britain as intent on imposing abolition everywhere, including Texas. In the light of this, said Calhoun, the United States could ‘no longer refuse, consistently with their own peace and security’ to respond positively to Texas’s request for annexation; but Calhoun had misjudged the American people’s reaction to his enthusiasm for annexation.9 Charles Elliot wrote to Aberdeen in May from New Orleans reporting on these developments. In line with public opinion the Senate had not ratified the treaty, and Elliot clung to his belief that if only Mexico could be persuaded to recognise Texan independence then there would be no appetite in Texas for annexation. He wrote:
It may, I think, be depended upon… that if Mexico can be induced to acknowledge the Independence of Texas, the Government and people would reject any renewed overtures for annexation to the North American Union. Their recent consent has been less the result of a desire to form part of that Union, than of a belief that the agitation of such a project would dispose the Government of Mexico to acknowledge their Independence.10
Elliot may or may not have been right in his assessment of how Texas would react to Mexican acceptance of independence, but he had no evidence for his assertion about the reason for Texas’s acceptance of annexation. It was another example of the wishful thinking to which he was prone. He also had other things on his mind, not least plans for the improvement of his health. With a reference to the presidential aspirations of Henry Clay, and no doubt agreeably surprised by the response to his leave request, he wrote to his sister:
My dearest Emy,
The last mail has brought me leave of absence to return either to Europe or to proceed to any northern part of the United States. I was very much tempted to go at once to Europe, but upon the whole I have thought it better to remain in the neighborhood of my post, at all events till the annexation affair is fairly set to sleep. So far as I can judge there is no chance of carrying it during the present administration’s time, and if Mr Clay should succeed, still less. We are going to the Springs in the Mountains of Virginia, which are said to be of great virtue for complaints of the kind that I have been afflicted with.11
The Elliots left for Virginia leaving Consul Kennedy as the senior British representative in Texas. Before he departed, Charles Elliot suggested to Aberdeen that the most efficient route for contact between the Foreign Office and himself would be via the British Consul in Boston, and said he had made it clear to Kennedy that he was not to get involved in diplomacy; he was to ‘confine himself strictly to an unobtrusive and prudent discharge of his Consular duties.’12 Elliot’s relationship with Kennedy was not close. There had been little contact since their first meeting. That had been cordial enough, but Kennedy clearly found it irksome, with his greater knowledge and experience of Texas and its people, to be excluded from the diplomacy now shaping the country’s constitutional future. His dissatisfaction was compounded by the absences of the superior officer entrusted with this role, who was now about to be away again, for an unspecified but almost certainly longer period than hitherto.
Elliot had also asked Kennedy to forward to London any ‘informations … during my absence, which he may judge to be of interest.’13 Kennedy lost no opportunity to do so, writing to Aberdeen frequently while Elliot was in the United States. His first letters were mostly on matters of disagreement between himself and the Chargé d’Affaires in which he was implicitly critical of Elliot. Subsequently he supplied information in his consular brief on such things as port charges, and people and ship movements. He also reported on what he had been able to glean of diplomatic and political developments.
Charles Elliot did not return to Galveston until December. During his absence the annexation issue had continued to command the attention of politicians and diplomats in Texas, Britain, Mexico, the United States and now, again, France. Aberdeen had instructed Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, to propose to the French Government a plan for the British and French to act jointly to persuade Mexico to acknowledge Texan independence. The Foreign Secretary had first held explanatory meetings with Mexico’s man in London, Tomas Murphy, and with the Texan Minister in Britain, Ashbel Smith. He informed Charles Bankhead, Doyle’s successor as British Chargé d’Affaires in Mexico, of what he had said to Cowley: if Mexico recognised independence, Britain and France would guarantee protection of both independence and the Mexico–Texas border from interference by any other country. Aberdeen had made it clear to Murphy that if Mexico did not accept Texan independence, Britain would not oppose the annexation of Texas by the United States, nor would it act on border issues. Should France assent to this proposal, Aberdeen advised Bankhead on 3 June,
we propose to send out forthwith a fit person to Texas, in the unavoidable absence of Captain Elliot, who will be instructed to ascertain as accurately as he may be able the state of publick opinion and feeling with respect to the projected annexation of Texas to the United States, under the security of the joint guarantee above described.14
Importantly, Aberdeen was explicit that abolition in Texas should not be a condition of the recognition of independence by Mexico. Since she had herself accepted Texan independence without such a stipulation, Britain was in no position to suggest that it be required by Mexico.
A proposed annexation treaty was again considered by the United States Senate on 8 June. The northern states, motivated by opposition to the acquisition of a state committed to slaveholding and by the risk of war with Mexico, as well as personal antipathy to Tyler and Calhoun, ensured its defeat by thirty-five votes to sixteen. As Pakenham wrote to Aberdeen some three weeks later, this did not mean that the annexation question had gone away, and he warned the Foreign Secretary in blunt terms of his view that if Britain and France tried to implement the proposal for joint action, the United States would annex Texas forthwith.15 In Texas, Houston’s exasperation with the annexation issue reached new levels. His disillusionment caused concern in the United States, now taken up with a forthcoming presidential election in which a committed annexationist, James K. Polk, had emerged as the Democrat candidate against the Whi
g Henry Clay.
By the end of June, Charles Elliot had taken up residence in the mountains of what became West Virginia. He wrote to Aberdeen from Blue Sulphur Springs, a spa resort built ten years earlier which had attracted some notable visitors, including Henry Clay and Presidents Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. He was aware that he was falling far short of what would normally be expected of a Chargé d’Affaires in such a rapidly changing political situation. His tone in places was tentative and pleading:
I have the honor to report that I am ready to proceed to my post whenever my presence there may seem to Your Lordship to be desirable; and I would add that I have written privately to Mr Pakenham some days since, to say that I shall be prepared to return to Texas at any moment that He may see reason to recommend that course.
Through the press of this Country I learnt that the treaty of annexation had been rejected by the Senate of the United States…. But I suppose it may be taken for granted that the subject of annexation will be renewed again in some form, at the next regular Meeting of Congress in the United States, if not at a called Session, and perhaps with more probability of success than has attended the treaty.16
He concluded ‘I take the liberty to repeat to Your Lordship that communications to me, addressed to the care of Her Majesty’s Consul at Boston, will always reach me within a few days arrival at that point’.17
With Elliot to all intents and purposes hors de combat, Bankhead in Mexico new to his post and caught up in the country’s political turbulence, and Kennedy causing irritation through unauthorised attempts to involve himself in diplomacy, it was Pakenham who was Aberdeen’s main source of information and advice from the New World. His warning letter of 27 June quickly persuaded Aberdeen to stall his plans for an Anglo-French initiative; Cowley was instructed to inform the French of the British change of policy; and the French Foreign Minister, Guizot, agreed to the deferment of the project. While Britain and France waited during the summer and autumn of 1844 for the outcome of the US presidential election, changes of leadership were afoot in Mexico and Texas. Santa Anna’s bellicose threat to invade Texas to prevent US annexation faded as his own position became increasingly fragile and he was eventually ousted. In Texas Anson Jones was elected to succeed Houston as President and began to exert influence well before formally taking up office in December.
Captain Elliot and the Founding of Hong Kong Page 23
