The early nucleus of command for Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5 in September 1943 was as follows:
Kommandeur: Hauptmann Hermann Fischer
Gruppenstab
Adjutant: Oberleutnant Herbert Abel (prev. Staffelführer and Offz.z.b.V. 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.10)
Gruppe Technical Officer: Oberleutnant Hans Müller, DKG (prev. 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.22)
Meteorologist: Unknown at this stage
Navigation Instructor: Oberleutnant Herbert Daubenspeck
Signals Officer: Oberleutnant Siegfried Frank (prev. 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.Ob.d.L.)
Senior Staff Administration Officer: Stabs. Int. Heinrich
Senior Medical Officer: Oberarzt Dr. Rückstahl (prev. 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.10, but replaced by Stabsarzt Dr. Willi Spiesmann after only a short time)
Gruppe Operations Officer: Various appointments, unclear for this time
Stab pilots: Hauptmann Jochen Wahnfried
Oberleutnant Ludwig Herlein (prev. 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.22 and RLM (L.In.1))
Stabskompanie
CO and Photographic Officer: Hauptmann Karl Nather (prev. 2.Schüler-Kp./Fliegerbildschule Hildesheim)
Signals Officer: Leutnant Hans Wessel
Oberleutnant Oskar H.Schmidt
1.Staffel
Kapitän: Hauptmann Josef Augustin (prev. Staffelkapitän 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.10)
Offz.z.b.V.: Oberleutnant Beuthel
Technical Officer: Oberleutnant Günther Korn (prev. 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.10)
2.Staffel
Kapitän: Hauptmann Karl-Friedrich Bergen (prev. St.Ka. 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.100)
Offz.z.b.V.: Oberleutnant Ernst Treskatis
Technical Officer: Oberleutnant Konrad (Kornelius?) Mildenberger, DKG (prev. 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.Ob.d.L.)
Any notion of relaxation that may have existed as a result of the relatively casual progress of training and preparation for operations, ended abruptly on 14 September when the pace shifted up a gear. That day, the Kommandeur, Hauptmann Fischer, ordered the Gruppe to assemble on parade. He informed his men of orders issued by OKL to the effect that discipline on the part of aircrews was of paramount importance and that carelessness displayed on flying operations would not be tolerated under any circumstances. The fact, Fischer told them, was that in this fifth year of war, aircraft and trained airmen were too precious to lose because of inattention or negligence.
Duly dismissed, the flying crews were despatched in small groups to the Ergänzungs-Fernaufklärungsgruppe (or Long-Range Reconnaissance Operational Training Group) under Oberstleutnant Hans-Günther von Obernitz at Posen in western Poland, from where, using Ju 88s, it was intended that they would carry out the first excercises in cooperation with the U-boat arm’s tactical training flotilla, the 27.Unterseebootsflottille under the command of the U-boat ace, Korvettenkapitän Erich Topp, using the Baltic Sea as their training area.12 A small number of officers from FAGr 5, including Oberleutnant Siegfried Frank, of the Gruppenstab and a former signals officer with 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.Ob.d.L., observer Leutnant Heinrich Morf, and pilot Leutnant Hellmut Nagel, both of 1./FAGr 5, also spent some time on board U-boats in the Baltic in order to familiarize themselves on how the submariners depended on, and communicated with, aircraft.
Simultaneously, Fischer also asked all members of FAGr 5 for their suggestions for an appropriate emblem for use by the Gruppe. An emblem ‘committee’ reviewed all the proposals and decided in favour of ‘Der fliegende Holländer’ (Flying Dutchman), which took the form of a black cog on the high seas under full sail, after the ghost ship of legend that was doomed to sail the oceans for ever. The emblem, with slight variations in colour, would be used on some of FAGr 5’s aircraft.
Fischer also began to consider suitable bases in the West from which FAGr 5 could undertake its military operations. In this regard, he sent a small Vorkommando (advance unit), headed by Oberleutnant Ernst Treskatis, an observer from 2.Staffel, and Hauptfeldwebel Heinrich Meyer, the Spiess of the Stabskompanie, to conduct a preliminary assessment of the pre-war civil airport at the town of Mont de Marsan, located some 100 km south of Bordeaux, and around 80 km from the Atlantic coast in western France. Following a positive initial opinion from the Vorkommando, Oberleutnant Schmidt, together with other officers from the Stabskompanie, flew to Mont de Marsan on 24 September to inspect potential accommodation should the Gruppe transfer there. It was decided that a local junior girls’ school could provide acceptable quarters for the Stab, while a building on the Rue de Manon could accommodate 1.Staffel and the girls’ High School could take 2.Staffel. Following further discussions between Fischer and von Barsewisch, it was decided that Mont de Marsan would become FAGr 5’s operational base. Subsequently, Fischer instructed Schmidt to begin preparations for a transfer of the whole Gruppe to France.
Meanwhile, Oberst von Barsewisch arranged for a delegation of technical and engineering personnel from Junkers, headed by Professor Diplom-Ingenieur Heinrich Hertel, the firm’s very capable Technical Director and head of development, based at the Dessau plant, to visit FAGr 5 at Achmer on 23 September. It was hoped that both sides would gain benefit from such a visit, and, after inspecting the unit’s aircraft, workshops and other facilities, as well as watching some flight demonstrations, on the request of the Luftwaffe personnel, Hertel and his team rejoined to the mess hall where they took part in discussions with the crews on how the Ju 290 could be further developed for the purposes of long-range, over-water reconnaissance missions.13
By the end of September, Stab/FAGr 5 was still operating its Ju 88 but had also taken delivery of a Do 17P, while 2.Staffel reported one Ju 290A-2 and three A-3s. On paper at least, 1.Staffel had been assigned one Ju 290A-2 and one A-3.14 As September gave way to October, 2./FAGr 5 sent its Ju 290s and crews to Rerik, a coastal airfield and seaplane station, 37 km west of Rostock on the Baltic coast, where they undertook air-gunnery practice flights over the sea.
On 13 October 1943, the Gruppe suffered its first aircraft damage when Oberleutnant Kohmann took off on a long-distance flight in the newly assigned, but heavily laden, Ju 290A-3 Wk-Nr 0163 (PI+PQ) 9V+AK. As the aircraft attempted to leave the ground, one of its engines failed, but Kohmann was able to belly-land it, avoiding a collision with workshops close to the runway. The aircraft sustained 30 per cent damage in the process, but was repaired and assigned at the end of October to 1.Staffel as 9V+CH.15 According to Oskar Schmidt: ‘The training of flying personnel on the Ju 290 was delayed because of the failure of Kohmann’s machine.’16
On 20 October, Ju 290A-4 Wk-Nr 0166 (PI+PT) 9V+BK flew from Achmer to Mont de Marsan carrying some of the unit’s advance personnel and equipment along with Oberleutnant Schmidt, who went there once again in order to carry out final arrangements with regard to accommodation for Hauptmann Fischer and the Gruppenstab. However, the return flight was delayed as a result of the Junkers sustaining a flat tyre. No spares were available at the French airfield, so the FAGr 5 team had to wait until a new tyre was flown out in a Ju 88 from Achmer.17
By the end of the month, FAGr 5 was reporting an official strength of ten aircraft – one Ju 88 with the Stab, three Ju 290s with 1.Staffel and six with 2.Staffel.18
Once safely back at Achmer, Schmidt made final arrangements for advance elements of the Gruppe to transfer by train to France. So it was that, beginning on 3 November 1943, the men of the Stabskompanie, together with a section from the Gruppenstab and ground personnel of 2.Staffel, began to pack up their belongings and equipment, and to prepare their light vehicles for transport.
Early the next day, the newly promoted Generalmajor von Barsewisch once more visited Achmer to wish the unit all success in its coming operations over the Atlantic. He further announced that from now on, FAGr 5 would, appropriately, carry the unit title of ‘Atlantik’.
After von Barsewisch’s address, 11 goods wagons and a single coach were shunted by the Reichsbahn onto the airfield rail spur. Throughout the course of the day, signals and other technical equipment, along with bedding, clothing, kitchen equipment, de
sks and typewriters, were loaded onto the wagons. The process took until 2100 hrs that evening, primarily because the technical section of 2./FAGr 5 had miscalculated its load-plan timing. Thus it was not until 0700 hrs on the 5th, that the motorized column containing the personnel departed for the rail station at nearby Bramsche. An hour later, the unit, comprising three officers, 81 NCOs, 158 men and 21 Russian Hiwis, together with their light equipment and personal belongings, began boarding. Once again, however, there were delays in bringing together the individual wagons and coaches of the train from the marshalling yard into the station. The process took until early afternoon to complete, but at 1450 hrs, the hauling locomotive finally steamed out of Bramsche in the direction of Osnabrück on the first stage of the train’s journey to western France.19
CHAPTER FIVE
‘NOW IT’S SERIOUS’
Atlantic Operations, November–December 1943
There can be no talk of a let-up in submarine warfare. The Atlantic is my first line of defence in the West...
Adolf Hitler at a conference with Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz at the Berghof, 31 May 1943
The arrival of the Luftwaffe’s new long-range reconnaissance Gruppe in western France could not have been more timely.
In the late summer/early autumn of 1943, with his slender resources, the Fliegerführer Atlantik had little option but to assign increasing responsibility for convoy reconnaissance, and the attempts to shadow convoys, to KG 40, whose Fw 200s were expected, additionally, to undertake offensive, anti-shipping operations. The Fliegerführer could also count on the flying boats of 1./SAGr.129, but usually there were between just two and four of such aircraft serviceable at any one time. Furthermore, it was recognized at the end of October that the monthly production of six Fw 200s meant that ‘the supply of this type of aircraft to the Fliegerführer Atlantik is inadequate.’1
Another example of the failure of cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the U-boats took place on 8 October 1943 when a Bv 222 of 1./SAGr.129 out of Biscarosse appeared over convoy SC.143, comprising 39 merchantmen outbound from Halifax on course to Liverpool with an escort of nine mixed warships from the Canadian Escort Group C-2, four destroyers of the British Support Group 10 and the Merchant Aircraft Carrier (MAC) ship Rapana.
The Blohm & Voss had taken off at 0415 hrs and was scheduled to arrive in the convoy area at 1500 hrs with the objective of homing the U-boats onto their prey.2 On making contact with the convoy, the Bv 222 was expected to make beacon signals on one of the six aircraft/U-boat cooperation D/F frequencies to the large but fuel-depleted Rossbach wolfpack of 14 U-boats. Individual U-boats would then report the bearings of the shadower with their own grid positions, making possible a more reliable convoy position from the resulting D/F fix than could be counted on from the aircraft’s sighting report.
At around 1340 hrs at 35° West 6785, the Bv 222 spotted the convoy moving east at eight knots. Between 1425 and 1530 hrs, U-boat Control transmitted a series of five warnings to U-boats in the area that an aircraft was in contact with a homeward-bound convoy (SC.143), instructing the boats to stand by for D/F bearings. However, it seems the D/F fix procedure failed.3 Nevertheless, during the night of 8/9 October, the U-boats did succeed in sinking a Polish destroyer and an American freighter, but they would pay a heavy cost,when three of their number were sunk by Allied aircraft.4
Another such effort occurred on 27 October, when at 0945 hrs an Fw 200 shadower from III./KG 40 sighted and reported the 60 vessels of the SL.13/MKS.26 combined homebound convoy from West Africa and Gibraltar.5 This time, over the course of the next four days, the U-boats of the Schill 1 wolfpack were directed to the convoy. On the 31st, U-306 found itself close enough to gain visual observation of the enemy grouping; the U-boat radioed the rest of the pack, but its signals were picked up and the vessel was destroyed by action from a corvette and a destroyer. The Fw 200s continued their dogged, but inconsistent and insufficient efforts into November whenever serviceability and the demands of offensive operations allowed them. The SKL war diary clung to the hope that, ‘From 10 November the reconnaissance situation of the Fliegerführer Atlantik will be considerably alleviated by the projected allocation of ten Ju 290s which have the same range as the Bv 222s and are faster.’6
Indeed, in October 1943, BdU had formed a new wolfpack of ten U-boats off the coast of Portugal which, as previously noted, was known as Schill. The Schill pack was to intercept convoys sailing to and from Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic. Commencing operations on 29 October, by 9 November the sum total of its success was one freighter sunk, at a cost of two U-boats, one as a victim to convoy escort and the other to a B-17 air escort. That day the SKL Operations Section noted: ‘The operational failure of Group “Schill” is to be attributed exclusively to insufficient air reconnaissance. An improvement may be expected from employment of the Ju 290.’7 Indeed, this belief was echoed by Dönitz on 13 November when he wrote that ‘Long-range reconnaissance by Ju 290s’ would make a resumption of attacks against Mediterranean convoys worthwhile, ‘facilitating the speedy concentration of U-boats on a convoy and hence the possibility of carrying out an attack in a single night.’8
Only the day before however, Dönitz’s staff lamented in a report: ‘the enemy holds all the trump cards. Far-reaching air cover using location methods against which we have no warning … the [Allied] air menace has curtailed the mobility of the U-boats.’9 The failure of the Luftwaffe to provide the U-boats with the vital information they so badly needed was a significant factor in compelling Dönitz and his staff to review and revise the standard wolfpack tactics. From that point, the U-boats – in the North Atlantic at least – would adopt more varied and experimental formations, which would see them remaining submerged during hours of daylight in order to hide from enemy aircraft. Enemy shipping was to be attacked only at night. This would result in a scattering of U-boats in the North Atlantic from November 1943 onwards, a development that served to stem the tide of losses.10 Nevertheless, as the British historian and broadcaster John Terraine has written, ‘By November the writing was on the wall.’11
But if FAGr 5’s arrival in France was timely and badly needed by Dönitz and his U-boats, the first phase of the land logistics enterprise of getting the unit there had not proved so positive. After a journey lasting four days, staging through Osnabrück, Münster, and Aachen, across the Belgian border to Montzen, then Liège, Namur, Charleroi, and into France towards Compiègne, Paris-Le Bourget, and Juvisy – where an electric locomotive replaced the third successive steam engine – then Tours and Morcenx, the train carrying the first element of the personnel and equipment of the Gruppe finally drew into Mont de Marsan station early on the morning of 8 November 1943. There had been problems all along the line; delays as a result of two air raid alarms during loading at Achmer, then another at Münster, along with changes in locomotives at Aachen, Charleroi and Juvisy, and when the wagons finally rolled to a stop, there were difficulties encountered in the unloading process at Mont de Marsan station.
It was not until evening that the men and equipment finally arrived at Mont de Marsan airport, located 2.5 km north-east of the town centre, within the angle formed by the Mont de Marsan–Brocas railway line and the road from the town to Bergerac.
Set in a sandy and grass-covered area amidst thickly wooded countryside, the pre-war civil airport was bounded to the west by the road to Coudère, while the town racecourse and a small lake lay beyond its north-west boundary. The airfield had undergone some expansion in 1942 and by late 1943 measured 170 m from north to south, while in May 1943 it was extended to the west to around 1830 m, this stretch accommodating a single concrete runway which ran east to west across the old boundary road in that direction. The original, narrow runway of 500 m, running north-north-west/south-south-east served as a taxi track connecting the concrete runway with the southern dispersal area. A concrete perimeter road encircled the entire original landing area and the extension to the west. Adminis
trative and stores buildings were situtated on the western boundary, while accommodation for the aircrews was located in requisitioned houses along the road running south from the airport to the town centre.12 By the time FAGr 5 moved into Mont de Marsan, there were three large, covered dispersal areas (one to the north and two to the south) and 24 large open ones spread around the airfield. In addition, there were another nine smaller dispersal points. In September 1943, British Air Intelligence had noted shrewdly ‘In view of the extensive development which has taken place, it may be intended as a base for long-range aircraft operating over the Bay of Biscay.’13
Indeed the first of FAGr 5’s Ju 290s arrived at Mont de Marsan from Achmer on or around 10 November. That day, Hauptmann Fischer held a major briefing with his unit commanders. The Gruppe was to be placed under the tactical command of the Fliegerführer Atlantik, Generalleutnant Kessler who, despite his lingering misgivings over the effectiveness of the organization, remained in post.
It was also arranged for a small number of aircrew with experience of long-range and long-duration over-water missions to be assigned to FAGr 5 in order to give practical instruction. Over time, in addition to the cadre from the Lufttransportstaffel 290, this would include, from the Fw 200-equipped KG 40 at Bordeaux-Mérignac, Oberleutnant Hubert Schreiner, Oberleutnant Otto-Karl Kremser, Oberfeldwebel Gerhard Hartig and Hauptmann Heinz Braun, only recently appointed as Staffelkapitän of LTS 290, and Leutnant Herbert Wagner, from Transportfliegerstaffel 5, Braun’s old unit, where he had flown both the Ju 90 and Ju 290.14
Shadow over the Atlantic Page 8
