One pilot recalled:
The targeting instructions were outstanding. Every detail was thought of and by using detailed maps, photo-reconnaissance pictures and large dioramas, the targets were introduced to us. Each group spent hours working out the most efficient course of attack against the power stations. The turbine installations, as the heart of the power station, were the main target, and were to be totally destroyed. Course, headings, impact points (which were to be marked by the pathfinders) and target illumination was mentioned repeatedly and the proper documentation was handed out.
Another remembered:
Steinmann showed us that the most important part of the power stations were the turbine houses, for the simple reason that if the turbines were damaged, to repair them would take six months. The Russians were not in a position to build their own turbines. They were only capable of making temporary repairs and therefore were unable to replace them. Steinmann had the original photographs of the power-house installations. Siemens had, in fact, delivered the turbines and had supplied the photos. These photos had been taken throughout the year and thus showed all the different climatic conditions, so that the targets would be recognizable under any circumstances.
For the crews of FAGr 5, however, things were not so clear, as Oskar Schmidt recorded:
During the planning for the ‘big operation’, a part of FAGr 5 was based in Rechlin where its aircraft were equipped for long-range operations and the crews were instructed accordingly. Even there though, FAGr 5 had no definite direction. Although the commander of FAGr 5, and most of the crews, was assigned to the new FAGr 1 in Grove, Major Fischer remained in Rechlin where he worked with the leadership of KG 200. It all went back and forth. Although Major Fischer became the new commander of FAGr 1, he was still unable to decide (until about 20 April 1945) whether to fly to Denmark. He was very anxious to get hold of a Ju 290 with his crew for the ‘big operation’. In March 1945 his crew transferred a Ju 290 from Neubiberg to Jüterbog.
Logbooks collated by the German historians Karl Kössler and Günther Ott indicate that at least five Ju 290s of 1./FAGr 5 – 9V+AH, CH, DH, IH and KH – and four from 2.Staffel – 9V+AK, BK, EK and FK – were in situ at Rechlin, Lärz and Roggentin airfields, and assigned for Eisenhammer.35
However, even as the Eisenhammer briefings were taking place, events were rapidly overtaking German aspirations. By mid-March, the Red Army was consolidating its position along the Oderbruch. The vital nodal point of the Küstrin ‘Fortress’, spanning both the Oder and the Warthe rivers, was still in German hands, but the Soviets were about to advance on Golzow and were poised to take Kietz. On 18 March, just one day after the selected Luftwaffe crews arrived in Berlin, Koller advised Baumbach that even though the ‘enemy offensive in the East may demand operations against the Oder bridges by units set aside for Eisenhammer,’ the operation was still regarded as of ‘decisive importance even under present circumstances. Preparations for Operation Eisenhammer to be pressed on with determination to enable operations to be carried out during the March moon period.’ On the 25th, OKL was informed that orders to disband FAGr 5 were postponed until the ‘special task’ was completed.36
By 29 March, the garrison at Küstrin had surrendered under Soviet pressure. Marshal Georgy Zhukov’s forces had now punched a bridgehead some 50 km wide and 10 km deep into the crumbling German defensive line. Berlin lay in reach. For the Luftwaffe, weather conditions were now also hampering plans. On the 30th, the OKL was forced to advise Steinmann and Baumbach that Eisenhammer was ‘postponed for the time being.’ Aircraft and crews earmarked for the operation were to be released for operations against the enemy bridges over the Vistula, though they were to be ‘pledged to secrecy, particularly in case of being taken prisoner. Operation Eisenhammer to be kept secret at all costs.’
Perhaps the final nail in Eisenhammer’s coffin came on 10 April, when 103 US Eighth Air Force B-24 Liberators bombed Rechlin and its satellite fields. Six Ju 290s of FAGr 5 were destroyed at Roggentin, including: Wk-Nrs 0170 (9V+DH), 0196 (9V+IH), 0180 (9V+KH), 0160 (9V+AK), 0193 (9V+FK).37 At least four FAGr 5 personnel were killed in the raid, including Feldwebel Wolfgang Schneiders, a radio operator, together with an armourer, Unteroffizier Georg Walter, and two electricians, Obergefreiter Karl Dömsch and Gefreiter Karl Bader.38 The bombs also destroyed 18 Mistel, a significant part of the Eisenhammer attack force. Another five were destroyed at Oranienburg. The same day, in his operational orders, Generaloberst Robert von Greim, the commander of Luftflotte 6, issued orders to the tactical command, Gefechtsverband Helbig: ‘The execution of Operation Eisenhammer still takes priority, weather permitting, over all other missions.’
The possibility of attacking Soviet power installations also lingered on in the minds of those at the OKL. On 8 April 1945, Major im Generalstab Sandmann of the Führungsstab telephoned Major von Harnier, KG 200’s operations officer, instructing him that Major Fischer and the Ju 290s of 2./FAGr 5 were to be removed from Baumbach’s personal jurisdiction as the Fliegerführer 200, and placed under the direct control of the OKL in readiness for a revised plan to be codenamed Operation Gertraud. A total of 200 m3 of fuel allocated for Eisenhammer was to be reserved for Gertraud.39
Operation Gertraud foresaw an attack by up to 12 Ju 290s from 2./FAGr 5 based at Rechlin-Lärz (quoted as having a range of 2,300 km) against three target groups of hydro-electric power plants most probably at Stalinogorsk, Kashira, Shatura, Komsomolsk, Yaroslavl (two plants), Aleksin, Tula, Tolon, Gorki and Dzerzhinsk. The operation was to be prepared in closest cooperation between Major Fischer and Professor Steinmann, and was to be carried out no later than 18–20 April. OKL also stressed the secrecy surrounding the operation, with informed personnel being kept to the minimum and those crews assigned to fly the operation being briefed thoroughly at the latest possible stage.40 The Ju 290s would be fitted with external ETC carrier racks and carry BM 1000F/H Sommerballon and BM 1000G Winterballon mine bombs. These were air-dropped, Treibminen (drifting mines) intended to hinder the use of rivers as supply routes, but they were seen as an ideal weapon for destroying the power stations, by dropping them close to the waterway entrances which were protected by torpedo nets.
The Sommerballon was detonated by a passive, short-wave transmission fuze and was filled with 750 kg of Trialen. It was divided lengthways into halves, only one half being filled with explosive. When dropped, because of the location of the centre of gravity, which was low down and on one side, and because of a ballast of 1–3 kg, the bomb stood on its nose, inclined from the perpendicular and with little pressure on the ground. Entering the water up-stream of a hydro-electric power station, the bomb would be carried by a current flowing at over 0.5 m/sec to the grate of the operating turbine. It was designed to pass easily over small obstacles on the bed. If the bomb exploded at the grate of the turbine, the resulting pressure wave would have been transmitted through the induction channel and would have destroyed the cover of the turbine.41
The Winterballon was an SC-1000L bomb with a Prallscheibe, or anti-ricochet disc, angled at 30° and filled with 400–500 kg of Trialen explosive. It was intended to be used in icy conditions. Once dropped, the ‘bomb’ would penetrate the surface ice layer and then be raised by a balloon to drift with the current beneath the ice layer towards the target. The Prallscheibe was used to turn the nose of the bomb in shallow water. The mines could be fitted with parachute brakes and could penetrate ice up to 50 cm thick. They could be safely dropped from high altitudes into as little as seven metres of water and were intended to explode in the same manner as the Sommerballon.42
Shortly after the orders for Operation Gertraud had been issued, six of the twelve Ju 290s allocated for the mission were destroyed in Allied strafing attacks on north German airfields. Accordingly, on 14 April, Koller ordered that all preparations for the planned operation be abandoned, and this finally marked the end of German hopes of destroying Soviet hydro-electric power stations. However, even if Gertraud had taken
place as scheduled, it is extremely doubtful whether, at this late stage, it would have had any effect on the final outcome of the war. The Soviet offensive against Berlin, which effectively sealed the fate of the Third Reich, commenced on 16 April 1945 and by 24 April the city was virtually surrounded and the defending German armies in disarray. The truth was that the Red Army possessed sufficient reserves of equipment and munitions to offset the possible effects of a successful Operation Gertraud, and could have completed the occupation of eastern Germany before any material shortages manifested themselves.
____________
At the beginning of April, the bulk of the Stab/FAGr 5 and 2.Staffel were still at Neubiberg, although elements of the latter were also at Rechlin-Lärz.43 At Hofolding, Hauptmann Schmidt was given, briefly, the responsibility of the local Volkssturm unit which was led by the head forester of the Hofoldinger Forst. While this may have been a source of useful additional manpower, by this stage it was accepted that if the enemy did arrive in the vicinity, as was anticipated, deployment of this last-ditch unit would serve no purpose to the people of the village.
Then, on the 6th, OKL issued the following directive: ‘As part of the disbanding of units no longer fully utilized, the Gruppenstab of FAGr 5 is to be disbanded. With immediate effect the Gruppenstab of FAGr 1 will assume the immediate cooperation with B.d.U. in all matters associated with maritime reconnaissance for U-boat operations.’44 Just what measures were actually put in place to effect this, if any, is not known.
Meanwhile, with the eventual disbandment of Sonderkommando Nebel at Offingen some time in the spring of 1945, those personnel of FAGr 5 under Hauptmann Georg Eckl who had been assigned to it prepared to return to their Gruppe’s base at Neubiberg, but for Eckl, and his A-5 Wk-Nr 0171 9V+CH, on 21 April there was a last-minute, unexpected demand that he fly a mission on behalf of the Fliegerstaffel des Führers (FdF) together with Leutnant Wagner in A-2 Wk-Nr 0157 9V+BK. As Eckl recorded:
Having spent the winter of 1944/45 in Offingen, the crews went back to Neubiberg. It was April 1945. There were preparations being undertaken for a large-scale attack under the jurisdiction of KG 200. But on the day of deployment, the operation was called off. It was all last-moment. After that, the last four Ju 290s were ordered to Berlin-Tempelhof. We landed there around 0230 hrs [on the 22nd] and had with us Hauptmann Eckl (Staffelkapitän, 2./FAGr 5), Leutnant Günther Dittrich, Oberleutnant Günther Korn and Oberleutnant Herbert Wagner, all pilots from 1.Staffel, and Oberleutnant Horst Degenring (observer), Oberleutnant Hans Münsterer and Oberleutnant Reinhard Sigel, both pilots, all from 2./FAGr 5, as well as Leutnant Lohberg, another officer assigned to the Gruppe.
Eckl described the general chaos facing the aircrews at this time as Germany declined into collapse:
At Tempelhof, some SS officers with armoured filing cabinets boarded the aircraft, along with their secretaries, and ordered us to fly to Ainring near Salzburg. On the second flight, which was the first flight to have an intermediate landing in Prague, about 100 German women and children were taken on board (later Frau Degenring and her mother were also there). Then came orders to fly from Salzburg via Vienna, from where we were to collect new landing gear for a Focke-Wulf Fw 200, on to Prague. Prague airfield was already under attack when our Ju 290 landed there. Because of the artillery fire, the spare parts for the Fw 200 were quickly unloaded in the centre of the airfield and we immediately took off again. Without loss or damage, the aircraft was able to take off.
Once in the air, we were instructed to fly to Lübeck. At Lübeck and at Rechlin, there had been strong enemy air raids … By the end of April, there was only my Ju 290 at Lübeck. Meanwhile, on a flight on 22 April 1945, the Ju 290 flown by Leutnant Dittrich, with Oberleutnant Hans Rehne as observer, had been shot down by German Flak [see below]. Who expected a German four-engined aircraft to be in the sky at that time?45
On 10 April, the day after the city of Königsberg had surrendered to the Soviets, a signal reached Oberleutnant Abel, the adjutant of FAGr 5, who was still at Neubiberg, instructing all military personnel in the area to leave their units with immediate effect and to serve as ground troops to fight the advancing Allies or Soviets. At this, a further instruction came quickly from an apparently worried Major Fischer in Rechlin, where some of his pilots were training up on the Ar 234, to transfer there as soon as possible. Two columns were formed up: one under Hauptmann Schmidt, to move by road, the other, under Leutnant Robert Stein, an observer from 2./FAGr 5, together with Hauptfeldwebel Proch, Oberfeldwebel Limmer and Feldwebel Schartner, to move by rail. As Schmidt recalled:
We received movement orders from the Luftgau, giving permission to transfer the senior technical personnel by road (in wood-gas-powered vehicles) via Rechlin to Denmark. We were issued with correct travel papers and special passes, without which we wouldn’t have got anywhere at all – so stringent were the checks. Everything that was not riveted or nailed down was then taken away by local commanders.46
Movement of the rail column got off to a bad start when the wagons assigned for it were destroyed in an enemy air attack between Zwiesel and Bayerisch Eisenstein, but the road column, to which a few petrol vehicles had been added as well, departed Neubiberg on the 12th, routing to the east of Munich, to halt at Straubing for the first night. Progress was slow as a result of having to negotiate bomb craters and the shot-up wrecks of many vehicles on the Autobahn. The column then continued north, edging the Böhmerwald, via Eger, to Plauen. The Luftwaffe men noted the considerable damage done to the town from Allied bombing, but despite this, local Volkssturm units had erected makeshift defensive barriers in the streets in an attempt to hold back the enemy, whether they came from the east or the west. The next major town would be Magdeburg, but the place had already fallen to the enemy, so the decision was taken to veer east towards Brandenburg, before heading north to Ludwigslust. However, between Halle and Merseburg, the FAGr 5 men had their first encounter with Allied advance units. Although given Panzerfäuste, for which they had received no prior instruction, the column became involved only in a brief nocturnal ‘skirmish’ and during the night, the enemy moved away.
Schmidt was able to use the ‘authority’ of the Reichsmarschall Aktion to convey the column speedily and without delay through SS roadblocks and as far as Hagenow, where he allowed a halt. From Hagenow, he telephoned Major Fischer at Rechlin. ‘The Kommandeur gave orders that the column was to go to Rechlin,’ Schmidt recalled. ‘He wanted to go with Oberst Baumbach and the SS to help stop the Russians on the Oder. The planned major operation with KG 200 was no longer possible and “blown out” at least in the short-term. Irrespective of whether we agreed with the Kommandeur’s intention, we had no choice but to make for Rechlin.’47
The FAGr 5 column reached Rechlin on the 18th to find the airfield badly damaged by recent American bombing raids and attacks by USAAF fighters. The following day, several ground personnel of the Gruppe were killed or wounded during further low-level attacks by enemy fighters and more Mistel composites, intended for Eisenhammer, were also destroyed.
On 16 April, not that far away to the east, the Red Army commenced its main attacks around Küstrin, assisted by large numbers of close-support aircraft which hindered German response and artillery operations. They also used the massive SU-152 assault gun bearing a formidable 152 mm gun. The German 9.Armee had to cover a 130-km front with just 235,000 men, 833 tanks and assault guns and some 4,000 artillery pieces and mortars. Schmidt recalled:
Why Major Fischer did not go with his new unit to Grove was a mystery to us. With some of the ‘faithful’, he wanted to be a hero alongside the Fallschirmjäger … He still believed in victory, despite the fact that on the Western Front, there was already fighting in our homeland. Abel and I demanded orders to move to the West. But none were forthcoming. After several unsuccessful requests from the Kommandierende General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Dänemark [Commanding General of the Luftwaffe in Denmark], the General called Fischer and gave him a rea
l dressing-down. He was to take immediate action and assume command at Grove, otherwise he would be put before a court martial. At that, the Utopia of heroic operations vanished. The crews – at least those with aircraft – flew to Grove the next day, while the rest joined my motor column which departed Rechlin immediately.48
On 20 April, Schmidt’s column found itself driving through the night, past Kiel, towards the Danish border. During the journey, an address was broadcast over the radio to mark the Führer’s 56th birthday. The men in the column wondered briefly whether this day would see the deployment of the long-promised ‘wonder weapons’.
At Grove, conditions were considerably better, with decent quarters and decent food, including fare that had not been seen in Germany for a long time. The men from Schmidt’s column had the opportunity to inspect the new Ar 234, although for most of the time the aircraft remained on the ground because of a lack of fuel and the inability to supply parts. But there was one intriguing development when Major Fischer suggested to the Kommandierende General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Dänemark, Generalleutnant Alexander Holle, who had been General Kessler’s successor as Fliegerführer Atlantik, that all personnel at Grove either not immediately needed for flying operations or of no immediate use should be used to create a Panzerjagdabteilung (Tank Destroyer Unit), armed with Panzerfäuste and equipped with bicycles, to be ‘thrown against’ enemy tanks. Hauptmann Schmidt was duly selected to set up this ad hoc unit, but little, if anything came of it.49
At 0300 hrs on the morning of Sunday, 22 April 1945, Leutnant Günther Dittrich of 1./FAGr 5 took off from Rechlin in Ju 290A-2 Wk-Nr 0158 9V+AH, bound for Neubiberg. At his side in the cockpit as second pilot was Oberfeldwebel Martin Kistler, with Oberleutnant Hans Rehne as flight commander and observer. The crew was completed by Oberfeldwebel Günther Rudolph and Feldwebel Erich Frohn (radio-operators), Feldwebel Rolf Werner (flight engineer), together with Oberfeldwebel Walter Kroll and Oberfeldwebel Drescher (both gunners).50 Also on board 9V+AH as ‘passengers’ were Leutnant Gustav Thomas of 1.Staffel and Oberleutnant Rolf Rotenburg, a pilot of 2./FAGr 5, two or three female signals personnel, as well as three or four NCOs from FAGr 5 who acted as additional gunners. Walter Kroll remembered:
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