by John France
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1 OV, 2. 359; C. W. David, Robert Curthose, Duke of Normany (Cambridge Mass., 1920), pp. 17–22; F. Barlow, William Rufus (London, 1983), pp. 33–34; J. C. Andressohn, The Ancestry and Life of Godfrey de Bouillon (Bloomington, 1947), p. 38; H. E. Mayer, Mélanges, pp. 24–5.
2 Suger of St-Denis, Vita Ludovici grossi Regis, ed. H. Waquet (Paris, 1929), pp. 8–11.
3 Glaber, pp. 56–61; H. Delbrück, History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages in the Framework of Political History, tr. J. Renfroe (Berlin, 1923, London, 1982), 3. 140–1; H. Glaesener, ‘Godefroi de Bouillon et la bataille de l’Elster’, Revue des Études Historiques, 105 (1938), 253–64.
4 The phrase is that of J. Terraine, The White Heat: the Mew Warfare 1914–18 (London, 1982) PP. 44, 91, 279.
5 Flavius Vegetius Renatus, De Re Militari ed. C. Lang (Leipzig, 1885). His was the most popular treatise on war in the Middle Ages and it remains in use to this day. There is an English translation by T. R. Phillips, Roots of Strategy (London, 1943), pp. 35–94 based on Clarke’s of 1767. On indications of its popularity in the Middle Ages see C. R. Schrader, ‘A handlist of extant manuscripts containing the De Re Militari of Flavius Vegetius Renatus’, Scriptorium, 33 (1979), 280–305 and B. S. Bachrach, ‘The practical use of Vegetius’s De Re Militari during the early Middle Ages’, The Historian, 21–7 (1985), 239–55.
6 K. P. G. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Berlin, 1832–4), vols 1–3 of his collected writings. English tr. J. J. Graham, 3 vols (London, 1873), revised F. N. Maude, 3 vols (London, 1908).
7 See above n. 3.
8 C. Oman, History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2 vols (London, 1924), 252, 1. 149–68, 165, 167.
9 Delbrück, History of the Art of War 3. 13–92; L. White, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford, 1962), but see the review by R. H. Hilton and P. H. Sawyer, ‘Technical determinism: the stirrup and the plough’, Past and Present 24 (1963), 90–100.
10 B. S. Bachrach, ‘Charles Martel, shock combat, the stirrup and feudalism’, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 7 (1970), 45–75 and ‘Was the Marchfield part of the Frankish constitution?’ Medieval Studies, 36 (1974), 178–86.
11 J. France, ‘La guerre dans la France féodale à la fin du IX et au X siècles’, Revue Belge d’Histoire Militaire, 23 (1979), 177–98 and see the discussion below p. 73–4.
12 E. Lourie, ‘A society organised for war medieval Spain’, Past and Present, 35 (1966), 55–6, 60; J. Power, ‘Origins and development of municipal military service in the Genoese and Castillian reconquest’, Traditio, 26 (1970), 91–112.
13 For the controversy on the status of the Norman knight compare S. Harvey, ‘The knight and the knight’s fee in England’, Past and Present, 49 (1970), 3–43, with R. A. Brown, ‘The status of the Norman knight’, in Gillingham and Holt, eds., War and Government, pp. 18–32. See also J. Gillingham, ‘The introduction of knight service into England’, Battle, 4 (1981), 53–64 and the survey of literature by T. Hunt, ‘Emergence of the knight in England’, in W. H. Jackson, Knighthood in Medieval Literature (Woodbridge, 1981).
14 Duby, Mâconnaise, pp. 411–26; for a survey of recent work on the status of the knight in eleventh century Europe see J. P. Poly and P. Bournazel, The Feudal Transformation, 800–1200, tr. G. Higgitt (New York, 1991), pp. 98–102, and pp. 102–107 for a tentative explanation of the precocity of the Mâconnaise. From a rather different point of view Murray, Reason and Society, pp. 90–4, points to the division at this time between noble and knight.
15 William of Jumièges, Gesta Normannorum Ducum, ed. J. Marx (Paris, 1914), pp. 106–8, quoted by R. H. G. Davis, ‘The Warhorses of the Normans’, Battle, 10 (1987), 67; Fiori, L’essor de la chevalerie, p. 119–41.
16 On weaponry in general see C. Blair, European Arms and Armour (London, 1958); Duby, Mâconnaise, p. 239.
17 Lambert of Hersfeld, ed. E. Holder-Egger (Hamburg, 1981), MGH SS 3. 136.
18 OV, 2. 23–31.
19 In the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem the Franciscans hold the ‘Sword of Godfrey de Bouillon’; its blade is approximately eighty-eight centimetres long and about four centimetres wide at the hilt which is very fine. There is no channel down the middle, only a markedly raised ridge. I was unable to handle it so the measurements taken through glass are approximate.
20 William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum Anglorum, ed. T. D. Hardy, 2 vols. (London, 1840) (hereafter cited as GR) 2. 479; OV, 6. 238–9.
21 On arms and armour in the late eleventh century see I. Pierce, ‘Arms, armour and warfare’ 237–58; ‘The knight, his arms and armour’ pp. 152–64. On the special significance of the sword R. E. Oakeshott, The Sword in the Age of Chivalry (London, 1981). For a revealing discussion of the wounds inflicted by medieval weapons B. Thordeman, Armour from the Battle of Wisby 1361 (Uppsala, 1939).
22 Delbrück, History of the Art of War 3. 136–9.
23 Gerald of Wales, Opera, ed. J. S. Brewer and J. Dimock, 8 vols. (London, 1867–91), 6. 395–7.
24 France, ‘La guerre dans la France féodale’, 195–8.
25 J. Bradbury, The Medieval Archer, (Woodbridge, 1985), pp. 17–38.
26 ibid, pp. 36–7.
27 GR, 2. 335; OV, 2. 357.
28 Bradbury, Medieval Archer, p. 25; AA, 475, 602.
29 Wace’s Roman de Rou et des Ducs de Normandie, ed. H. Andresen, 2 vols. (Bonn, 1877–79), 3. 5, 206–208, 3. 7, 685–96, 3. 488–98 (hereafter cited as Wace).
30 GR, 2. 477.
31 The Bayeux Tapestry, ed. D. M. Wilson (London, 1985) [hereafter cited as BT], Pls. 62, 63, 70, 71.
32 For the crossbow at Hastings see WP, p. 184, Carmen de Haslingae proelio, ed. C. Morton and H. Munz (Oxford, 1972), Appendix C, pp. 112–15; Bradbury, Medieval Archer, pp. 26–7, 8–11. For its history R. Payne-Gallwey, The Crossbow, (London, 1903).
33 Alexiad, pp. 316–17; J. France, ‘Anna Comnena’; ‘Loud, ‘Anna Komnena’ and her sources for the Normans of South Italy’, in G. Loud and I. N. Wood, eds., Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages: Essays presented to J. Taylor (London, 1991), pp. 41–57.
34 AA, pp. 324, 411; OV 6. 76; Bradbury, Medieval Archer, pp. 45, 3; GR, 2. 475.
35 Strickland, Conduct and Perception of War, pp. 95–7, 140.
36 The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, ed. D. Whitelock (London, 1961) [hereafter cited as ASC], p. 892.
37 M. Fixot, Les Fortifications de Terre el les Origines Féodales dans le Cinglais (Caen, 1968), cited in P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, tr. M. Jones (London, 1984), p. 46; J. F. Verbruggen, ‘Note sur le sens des mots Castrum, castellum et quelques autres expressions qui désignent des fortifications’, Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire, 27 (1950), 147–55.
38 The estimates of the weight of eleventh-century armour are by Pierce, Battle, 240, 253–7. My information about the modern infantry comes from the army depot in Pembroke, for which I offer thanks.
39 On Alfred’s establishment of a network of burhs see H. R. Loyn, Anglo-Saxon England and the Norman Conquest (Oxford, 1962), pp. 132–6; K. Leyser, ‘Henry I and the beginnings of the Saxon Empire’, English Historical Review, 83 (1968), 1–32, but see the caveats of T. Reuter, Germany in the Early Middle Ages 800–1056 (London, 1991), pp. 142–4.
40 F. Barlow, William Rufus, pp. 286–7. BT, PI. 51; M. W. Thompson, The Rise of the Castle (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 48–62, emphasises the care needed to build a good motte but many were only used for a short time and they could be erected quickly.
41 C. H. Haskins, Norman Institutions (Cambridge Mass., 1925), p. 282 cited and tr. Contamine, War, p. 46.
42 On castles and their evolution see J. F. Fino, Forlesses de la France médiévale (Paris, 1977); G. Fournier, Le Château dans la France médiévale (Paris, 1978); BT, Pl. 23.
43 OV, 3. 294–5; M. Chibnall, ‘Castles in Ordericus Vitalis’, in C. Harper-Bill, C. J. Holdsworth and J. Nelson, eds., Studies in Medieval History Presented to R. Allen-Brown (Woodbridge, 1989), 43–56.
44 Suger, pp. 36–9.
45 Duby, Mâconnaise, pp. 161–71; OV, 3. 255.
46 OV, 4. 272.
47 OV, 4. 287–96.
48 Vegetius, Roots of Strategy, p. 67.
49 Quoted and tr. by J. Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, in C. Harper-Bill, C. J. Holdsworth and J. Nelson, eds., Studies in Medieval History Presented to R. Allen-Brown (Woodbridge, 1989), p. 148.
50 Suger, pp. 16–17.
51 The story is told by William of Poitiers and derived here from Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, in Harper-Bill, Holdsworth and Nelson, Allen Brown p. 151.
52 On this theme see T. Reuter, ‘Plunder and tribute’, 75–94.
53 J. Gillingham, ‘Richard I and the science of war’, in Gillingham and Holt, War and Government, pp. 84–5. See the comments of Strickland, Conduct and Perception of War, pp. 238, 344–5 on even the ecclesiastical acceptance of ravaging.
54 Odo of Cluny, Life of St Gerald of Aurillac, tr. G. Sitwell (New York, 1958), pp. 115–123; OV, 3. 243.
55 ASC ‘D’ p. 159; Florence of Worcester, Chronicon, ed. B. Thorpe, 2 vols. (London, 1848–49) [hereafter cited as Florence], 2. 13. Ordericus does not mention the king’s defeat, simply saying the siege lasted for three weeks.
56 Andressohn, Godfrey de Bouillon, pp. 39–41 and see above p. 26; Mayer, Mélanges, pp. 25–30.
57 J. H. Hill and L. L. Hill, Raymond IV of St Gilles 1041 (or 1042)–1105 (Syracuse, 1962), pp. 8–9.
58 Chronicon monasterii sancti Petri Aniciensis ed. G. V. I. Chevalier in Cartulaire de l’abbaye de Saint-Chaffre du Monastier (Paris, 1884), pp. 161–2; Adhémar-Laubaume, Adhémar de Monteil, pp. 13–17; Bréhier, Adhémar de Monteil, p. 13. Heraclius viscount of Polignac was Adhémar’s standard bearer at the battle against Kerbogah; one of his nephews was killed and another wounded during the passage across the Balkans: RA, pp. 38, 82.
59 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, ed. M. Matthieu (Palermo, 1961), p. 109; Geoffrey Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae comitis, ed. E. Pontieri in L. A. Muratori, Rerum italicarum scriptores, 5 (1) (Bologna, 1928), 25.
60 F. Chalandon, Domination normande, 1. 118–121; Amato di Monte Cassino, ed. Bartholomaeis, p. 14. On the origins of the Norman incursion into this area see J. France, ‘The occasion of the coming of the Normans to Southern Italy’, Journal of Medieval History, 17 (1991), 185–205.
61 R. B. Yewdale, Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch (Princeton, 1924, Amsterdam, 1970), pp. 26–31.
62 OV, 4. 288–89.
63 Abbo, Siège de Paris par les Normands, ed. and tr. H. Waquet (Paris, 1942), pp. 33, 42; Richer de Rheims, Histoire de France, ed. and tr. R. Latouche, 2 vols. (Paris, 1930), 1. 142; 2. 178.
64 H. E. J. Cowdrey, ‘The Mahdia Campaign of 1087’, English Historical Review, 92 (1977), 1–29 gives the full text of the Carmen de victoria Pisanorum. This expedition is also discussed by R. Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century, unpublished D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1984, pp. 347–72. On the Norman expeditions see D. Abulafia, ‘The Norman kingdom of Africa and the Norman expeditions to Majorca and the Moslem Mediterranean’, Battle, 7 (1984), 26–49.
65 See below, pp. 163–5; it is also possible that the machines used by Louis IV against Laon in 938 was of this type.
66 AA. 324. For an illustration of the Roman weapon see O. F. G. Hogg, Clubs to Canon (London, 1968) p. 81.
67 Abbo, 32–33, 22–25. It is, however, a sign of the confusion on this subject that J. F. Niermeyer, Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus (Leiden, 1976), p. 637, equates Manganellus with ballista.
68 I have relied heavily on Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, for his enlightening discussion of this subject, pp. 5–49. However, I have gone further in dismissing torsion instruments by the time of the First Crusade. this is simply a matter of judgment, but it seems to me that given their relative complexity they would have vanished generations before the sources (in the thirteenth century) make this clear; see also E. W. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1969–71); R. Schneider, Die Artillerie des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1910); K. Huuri, ‘Zur Geschichte des Mittelalterichen Geschutzwesens aus Orientalischen Quellen’, Studia Orientalia, 9 (1941); J. F. Fino, ‘Machines de jet médiévales’, Gladius, 11 (1972), 25–43. For the later period D. Hill, ‘Trebuchets’, Viator, 4 (1973), 106–16. C. Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East 1198–1291, (London, 1992), p. 113 briefly asserts the conventional view in a crusader context.
69 OV, 4. 288–9; BT, Pl. 49–50.
70 Suger, p. 150–1; Stephen is more properly called Stephen Henry and he succeeded his father Theobald I (1037–1089/90) count of Blois and Champagne in the Blois portion of his inheritance: M. Bur, La Formation du Comté de Champagne v.950–v. 1150 (Nancy, 1977), p. 230.
71 Suger, 219–31. On Louis’s struggle with the robber barons and its importance see R. Fawtier, Capetian Kings of France tr. L. Butler and R. J. Adam (London, 1960), pp. 19–22; Dunbabin, Origins, p. 296.
CHAPTER 3
Campaigns, generals and leadership
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William the Conqueror is probably the best known soldier and general of the eleventh century. The conquest of England in 1066 was not only a major historical event, it was also one which has stuck in the minds of at least the English-speaking world. William was a minor when his father died in 1035, and the struggle to impose himself upon Normandy was long and bitter. It was only with the help of his overlord, Henry I of France (1031–60) that the greatest rebellion against him was defeated at the battle of Val-ès-Dunes in 1047 of which we know almost nothing. However, the rebel leader, Guy of Burgundy, took refuge in the castle of Brionne where he held out for three years.1 Thereafter, although William’s position improved, the propensity for rebellion remained. In the wake of his capture of Tours in 1044 Geoffrey Martel, count of Anjou (1040–60), turned his attention to Maine, where the major city of Le Mans was captured in 1051. After the count of Maine’s widow, her son Herbert and daughter Margaret had fled to the Norman court, Geoffrey seized both Domfront, a fief held of the count of Maine by the Bellême family, and the Norman town of Alençon, offering as an inducement to their soldiers a licence to ravage in the Norman lands.2 William failed to take Domfront by coup de main and built four castles, probably earthwork and wood structures, to blockade it while maintaining an active posture which enabled him to rally his troops against an effort to relieve it by Geoffrey, whose forces retired intact and watchful. William now faced a difficult situation for their presence prevented him from ravaging. However, William had apparently kept a close eye on Alençon in the meantime, and, when he realised that its defences were weak, suddenly seized it, dealing so harshly with its garrison that Domfront decided to come to terms.3 The campaign certainly illustrates William’s generalship, with its tight control over events. It indicates how the castle and its supply dominated war yet not at the expense of mobility which was the key factor in William’s victory. It should also be added that Geoffrey was a good general, but here he was at the very edge of his authority, so his power was attenuated and his ability to bring it to bear without enormous effort limited. William’s own stabs against Maine failed for much the same reasons, until after Geoffrey’s death in 1063 when, taking advantage of the internal conflict then rending the house of Anjou, he advanced against Le Mans with fire and sword as described by William of Poitiers.4
In the years 1051–2 there occurred a major shift in alliances in northern France. The Norman dukes had long been close allies of the Capetian royal house. William’s father, Robert I, had sustained Henry against the revolt of 1031 and in return the king had supported his son as we have seen.5 But the Capetians had also long been friendly with the house of Anjou, who had been their allies against the grave threat posed by the counts of Blois-Champagne, most recently accepting their conquest of Tours in 1044 from the Blésois.6 When these two allies quarrelled over Maine, King Henry supported the Angevins,
posing a grave threat to William whose régime was still far from secure after his recent minority. In 1053 William of Arques, a great lord of upper Normandy with many allies, rebelled and his castle of Arques, newly built and well fortified, was the focus of events. William’s men at Rouen, his principes militiae, tried unsuccessfully to interfere with the preparation of Arques, but when William arrived he built a counter-castle and settled down to a siege. King Henry led an army into Normandy, ravaging as he went, but was ambushed and, although he got supplies into Arques, his force was so weakened that the castle fell soon after his withdrawal. In the following year Henry tried again with two armies, one under Odo, his brother, striking into Eastern Normandy and the other under his own command, supported by the Angevins, advancing via Evreux. The duke adopted the classic tactic of shadowing his enemy, and one of his detachments fell upon French ravagers at Mortemer causing such loss that both French armies withdrew. The same tactics of shadowing the French, preventing them from spreading out to forage, were employed in 1057 and this time William fell upon the French and Angevin army as the tide cut it in two crossing the Dives at Varaville, causing very heavy losses. It was at this battle that, according to Wace, archers played a notable role.7 There is much to admire in William’s generalship in all these campaigns. He was a master of the contemporary techniques of war and succeeded in impressing his vassals and preserving their loyalty. Perhaps even more important is to notice the scale of effort which he managed to sustain despite his internal difficulties. He, and indeed his opponents, mounted major campaigns interspersed with sieges and lesser affairs over a period of very nearly ten years. This obviously says a great deal about the economic efficiency of the manorial economy, but it also says a great deal about the ability to organise, recruit and sustain armies. It is a theme not much discussed by modern historians of the period, but it was of course a vital skill in the circumstances of the crusade.
