by John France
12 Roger of Hovenden, Chronica Magistri Rogeris de Hovenden, ed. W. Stubbs, 4 vols. (London, Rolls Series, 1871) (hereafter cited as RH), 4. 59. I must thank my colleague in the Swansea History department, I. W. Rowlands, for this reference: on Richard as a general see Gillingham, ‘Richard I’, pp. 78–91.
13 There is a vast literature on Hastings amongst which the classic accounts of Delbrück, History of the Art of War, 3. 146–61 and Oman, Art of War, 1. 151–66 have had enormous influence. For more recent accounts see Douglas, William the Conqueror, pp. 194–204; C. N. Barclay, Battle 1066 (London, 1966); C. H. Lemmon, ‘The Campaign of 1066’, in eds. D. Whitelock et al. The Norman Conquest, its Setting and Impact, (London, 1966); J. Beeler, Warfare in England 1066–1189 (Cornell, 1966), pp. 11–33; France, ‘La guerre dans la France féodale,’ 23–6; R. A. Brown, The Normans and the Norman Conquest (London, 1969), pp. 158–76, ‘The Battle of Hastings’, 1–21, The Battle of Hastings and the Norman Conquest (London, 1982). This is not a definitive list.
14 WP, pp. 148–9, 156–7, 160–1.
15 I follow here the conclusions of E. M. C. van Houts, ‘The ship list of William the Conqueror’, Battle, 10 (1987), 159–84, which contains an edition of the ship-list; Wace 2. 112–14 quoted and tr. by van Houts, p. 162.
16 J. Martindale, ‘Aimeri of Thouars and the Poitevin connection’, Battle, 7 (1984), 224–5; G. Beech, ‘Participation of Aquitainians in the conquest of England 1066–1100’, Battle 9 (1986), 1–24.
17 Wace 3, 6, 411–16, quoted by M. Bennett, ‘Wace and Warfare’, Battle, 11 (1988), 37–58.
18 B. S. Bachrach, ‘Some observations on the military administration of the Norman Conquest’, Battle, 8 (1985), 12 suggests that there is a ‘scholarly consensus’ on these numbers; Douglas, William the Conqueror, p. 188.
19 WP, pp. 152–3.
20 Bachrach, ‘Observations on the Norman Conquest’, 12–15; these are only estimates, but they effectively indicate the scale of the problem as Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard’, p. 56, points out; BT, Pl. 38.
21 R. H. C. Davies, The Medieval Warhorse: Origins, Development and Redevelopment (London, 1989); ‘Warhorses of the Normans’, 67–82.
22 R. P. Lindner, ‘Nomadism, Horses and Huns’, Past and Present, 92 (1981), 3–19 points to the problems of supporting large numbers of horses beyond the great plains without substantial infrastructure.
23 Terraine, The White Heat, p. 97.
24 van Houts, ‘Ship-list’, pp. 179, 163.
25 BT, pl. 40–44. On the nature of the fleet and its gathering see the very learned article by C. M. Gillmor, ‘Naval logistics of the cross-channel operation 1066’, Battle, 7 (1984), 105–31. D. Waley, ‘Combined operations in Sicily 1060–78’, Proceedings of the British School at Rome, 22 (1954), 124–35 suggested that William could have gained knowledge of the specialised Byzantine horse-transports from South Italy, but this is not usually accepted and the evidence of the BT is against; J. H. Pryor, ‘Transportation of horses by sea during the era of the crusades’, Mariners Mirror, 68.1 (1982), 9–27, 68.2 (1982), 103–25; B. S. Bachrach, ‘On the origins of William the Conqueror’s horse transports’, Technology and Culture, 26 (1985), 505–31. On the navigational and related problems see; J. Neumann, ‘Hydrographic and ship-hydrodynamic aspects of the Norman invasion, AD 1066’, Battle, 11 (1988), 221–243.
26 And very gentle it must have been. Neumann, p. 234, suggests about 3.5 knots over a very flat sea, rare conditions in the Channel as the allies discovered in 1944. More severe conditions would surely have led to losses such as occurred in the passage from Dives to St Valéry according to William of Poitiers, p. 161.
27 WP, pp. 154–7.
28 On the Anglo-Saxon army see C. W. Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions on the Eve of the Norman Conquest (Oxford, 1962). The notion that a special corps of housecarls formed an élite amongst the retainers is rejected convincingly by N. Hooper, ‘Housecarls in England in the eleventh century’, Battle, 7 (1984), 161–76. The poorly armed troops in the Tapestry are evidence that peasants continued to serve in the host.
29 Only R. Glover, ‘English warfare in 1066’, English Historical Review, 67 (1952), 1–18 has maintained that the English had cavalry and this has been decisively rebutted by Brown, Normans and the Norman Conquest, p. 94. However, it is interesting that J. Kiff, ‘Images of war – illuminations of warfare in early eleventh century England’, Battle, 7 (1984), 177–94, finds that the designers of the BT drew on an earlier tradition of representations of fighting horses. The scorn of the Normans for this style of war is well known: ‘A race ignorant of war, the English scorn the solace of horses and, trusting in their strength they stand fast on foot’, Carmen, 369–70, pp. 24–5.
30 ASC, C. D 141–2, 140 E.
31 Brown, Normans and the Norman Conquest, pp. 143–4 contrasts the failure of Harold and the success of William in this respect. ASC, C, p. 143 says that the coming of the Norwegians surprised Harold but this perhaps refers to the timing. Both invasion armies were very late in the season.
32 For the claims of Harald Hardrada and the disloyalty of Harold’s brother Tosti see Brown, Normans and the Norman Conquest, upon whose chronology I have relied in this account.
33 D. Waley, ‘Combined operations in Sicily 1060–78’, 118–25; Chalandon, 1. 191–3.
34 Chalandon 1. 186–90; Amatus of Monte-Cassino, Amato di Monte Cassino, ed. V. Bartholomaeis (Rome, 1935) 5, xxviii p. 164, [hereafter cited as Amatus].
35 Chalandon 1. 205–208.
36 K. J. Leyser, Medieval Germany and its Neighbours (London, 1982) pp. 76, 89–90.
37 AA, 440; Vita Heinrici IV Imperatoris, ed. W. Eberhard (Hanover, 1899), p. 23. La Chronique de Zimmern, ed. H. Hagenmyer, Archives de l’Orient Latin, 2 (1884) p. 24 suggests that Godfrey played a major role in the siege of Rome in 1081 and was later ill, but this work has been criticised, on which see below p. 92, no. 36.
38 B. H. Hill, Medieval Monarchy in Action (New York, 1972), pp. 73–5; for Godfrey’s participation see above pp. 63; B. Arnold, German Knighthood 1050–1300 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 50, 81, 86, 97; R. P. Grossman, The Financing of the Crusades, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1965, pp. 6–7.
39 On the German Indiculus see the comments above p. 63; J. H. Round, ‘Introduction of knight service into England’, Feudal England (London, 1895) was the great proponent of the notion of a veritable revolution in which William imported feudalism: modern thinking has tended to suggest that it came into existence over a period of time becuase there was no such coherent body of feudal ideas as Round supposed – on which see M. Chibnall, ‘Military service in Normandy before 1066’, Battle, 5 (1982), 65–77; ON THE likelihood of a continuation of a preconquest form of quotas and obligation based on negotiations between the English king and his followers see Gillingham, ‘Introduction of knight service’, 53–64; D. R. Cook, ‘The Norman military revolution in England’, Battle, 1 (1978), 94–102.
40 On mercenaries and the king see the seminal article of J. O. Prestwich, ‘War and finance in the Anglo-Norman state’, TRHS 4 (1954), 19–43; J. Schlight, Monarchs and Mercenaries (Bridgeport, 1968); S. D. B. Brown, ‘The mercenary and his master: military service and monetary reward in the eleventh and twelfth century’, History, 74 (1989), 20–38.
41 M. Prestwich, ‘Military household of the Norman kings’, English Historical Review, 96 (1981), 1–37; M. Chibnall, ‘Mercenaries and the “Familia Regis” under Henry I’, History, 62 (1977), 15–23.
42 For the text of the treaty of 1101 Diplomatic Documents preserved in the Public Record Office 1. (1101–1272) ed. P. Chaplais (London, 1964) no. 1; on Rufus’s treaty Barlow, William Rufus, p. 325.
43 Suger, pp. 8–9.
44 Dunbabin, Francein the Making, pp. 188–90; Fulk le Réchin, Fragmentum Historiae Andegavensis, ed. L. Halphen and R. Poupardin in Chroniques des comtes d’Anjou et des seigneurs d’Amboise (Paris, 1913) p. 237 quoted and tr. J. Gillingham, ‘William the
Bastard’, p. 147.
45 I very much doubt that William had purposely delayed his crossing waiting for the enemy army to break up as suggested by M. Chibnall in Brown, ‘Battle of Hastings’, n. 20. One has only to think of the deep preoccupation of the allies with weather in the uncertain conditions of the Channel even in 1944 to grasp that William must have awaited the weather, not hoped that it would await his greater convenience.
46 For the suggestion that William had such ships see above p. 60, n. 25; J. Neumann, ‘Hydrographic and ship-hydrodynamic aspects of the Norman invasion’, 232–4.
47 Gillmor, ‘Naval Logistics’, p. 124.
48 Douglas, William the Conqueror, pp. 191–2.
49 WP, pp. 168–9.
50 Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard’, p. 158, follows William of Poitier’s suggestion, p. 180–1, that the devastation caused Harold to hasten his march.
51 WP, p. 158, tr. Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard’, p. 157.
52 In Kent, on the way to London, his army would later run short of supplies: WP, p. 212.
53 WP, pp. 170–1.
54 OV, 2. 172–3.
55 Brown, ‘Battle of Hastings’, 8; on the battle see the accounts of Barclay and Lemmon mentioned above p. 56, n. 13 and the comments of Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard’, 156–8.
56 as Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard’, quite rightly insists.
57 ASC, pp. 141–3; Florence 1. 226.
58 Perhaps the point of the Carmen’s story, p. 25, of the Saxons dashing forth from the forests is that Harold unexpectedly managed to rally his surprised force.
59 WP, p. 195.
60 As noted above p. 35 the BT shows a single English archer, Pl. 61.
61 The source for this division of the Norman army is the Carmen, vv. 413–14 upon whose account much doubt has been cast: R. H. C. Davis, ‘Carmen de Hastingae Proelio’, English Historical Review, 93 (1978), 241–61; ‘The Carmen de Hstingae Proelio: a discussion’, Battle, 2 (1979) 1–20. However, its value as a contemporary, though very literary, source has been effectively restated by E. M. C. van Houts, ‘Latin poetry and the Anglo-Norman court 1066–1135: the Carmen de Hastingae Proelio’, Journal of Medieval History, 15 (1989), 38–62.
62 WP, p. 186 says that the Danes had sent much help.
63 WP, pp. 186–9 testifies to the effectiveness of the English as soldiers. Perhaps the two-handed axe was particularly effective (see BT, Pl. 62): Pierce, ‘Arms and armour’, 245–6.
64 WP, pp. 190–3, 194–5; the use of the feigned retreat at Hastings has often been doubted but it seems to have been a well-established tactic of cavalry in the eleventh century, on which see B. S. Bachrach, ‘The feigned retreat at Hastings’, Medieval Studies, 33 (1971), 344–7.
65 WP, pp. 198–9, 202–5.
66 On the use of the lance see: D. J. A. Ross, ‘L’originalité de ‘Turoldus’: le maniement de lance’, Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale, 6 (1963), 127–38; V. Cirlot, ‘Techniques guerrières en Catalogne féodale; le maniement de la lance’, Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale, 28 (1985), 36–43 who argues for a date later in the twelfth century; J. Fiori, ‘Encore l’usage de la lance: la technique du combat vers l’an 1100’, Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale, 31 (1988), 213–40 who argues for an earlier date; on the development suggested here see below p. 73. On the size of horses see below pp. 372–3.
67 Brown, ‘Battle of Hastings’, 16, suggests that the discipline of the Norman army and its coherence were based on the groupings of five or ten knights called conroi, which are known to have existed in the twelfth century: J. F. Verbruggen, ‘La tactique militaire des armées de chevaliers’, Revue du Nord, 29 (1947), 161–80. I think it is likely that such units emerged on the model of vassal-groupings which formed an important element of armies in the eleventh century, and perhaps largely as a result of the need to order mercenaries being used on an ever greater scale. Men were used to fighting alongside their neighbours. Much of the army of 1066 was, effectively, mercenary and large groups of such men would have needed a parallel organisation, but we do not known precisely how they were used.
68 WP, pp. 194–5.
69 OV, 6. 350–1.
70 Henry of Huntingdon, Historia Anglorum, ed. T. Arnold (London, 1879) [hereafter cited as HH], p. 235 and see below pp. 372–3.
71 J. F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in the Middle Ages, tr. S. Willard and S. C. M. Southern (Amsterdam, 1977), pp. 192–3.
72 Quoted by Lourie, ‘A society organised for war’, 70.
73 R. H. C. Davis, ‘Warhorses of the Normans’, 69, 80–81 and see also his book The Medieval Warhorse. In these two works the difficulties of breeding really good strains of horse in medieval conditions are carefully explored.
74 G. Jackson, Medieval Spain (London, 1972), PL 36; D. Nicolle, Early Medieval Islamic Arms and Armour (Madrid, 1976), Pl. 41; Fiori, ‘Encore l’usage de la lance’, 220–1; V. Cirlot, ‘Techniques guerrières an Catalogne féodale’, 36–43.
75 France, ‘La Guerre dans la Fance féodale’, 197–8.
76 Gillingham, ‘Knight service’, 55; he also cites OV, 2. 218: ‘For in the lands of the English there were very few of those fortifications which the French call castles; in consequence the English, for all their martial qualities and valour, were at a disadvantage when it came to resisting their enemies’; however there were fortifications in Anglo-Saxon England: G. Beresford, ‘Goltho Manor Lincolnshire; the building and the surrounding defences c. 850–1150’, Battle, 4 (1981), 13–36, and note also E. Roesdahl, ‘Danish geometrical fortresses and their context’, Battle, 9 (1986), 209–26. On the later stages of the Conquest see OV, 2. 221–37 and for its horrors 231–33; W. E. Kapelle, The Norman Conquest of the North (London, 1979).
77 F. Chalandon, Essai sur le règne d’Alexis I Comnène (1081–1118) (Paris, 1900, New York, 1971), pp. 51–94; Domination Normande 1. 258–84.
78 See above p. 62. for the 1300 see Malaterra, p. 71.
79 Alexiad, pp. 142–3.
80 On the Anglo-Saxon participation in the Varangian guard see Godfrey, ‘The defeated Anglo-Saxons’, 63–74; S. Blondal, The Varangians of Byzantium, tr. and revised B. Benedikz (Cambridge, 1978).
81 Alexiad, pp. 145–53; Oman, Art of war, 1. 166–7; Chalandon, Alexis I Comnène, p. 79.
82 Chalandon, Alexis Comnène, pp. 87–8.
83 Chalandon, Alexis Comnène, pp. 86–7, 90; Alexiad, pp. 163–73; Yewdale, Bohemond, pp. 20–1.
84 Chalandon, Alexis Comnène, pp. 92–3.
85 David, Robert Curthose, pp. 46–51, 53–69; Barlow, William Rufus, pp. 70–98, 273–96.
CHAPTER 4
Preparations and prelude
* * *
Urban II launched his appeal for an expedition to the east at Clermont in November 1095 and in a calculated campaign aimed primarily at the nobility and knighthood undertook a great journey through western and southern France. In other areas he relied on bishops and enthusiastic preachers to spread the word. We know very little about the mechanics of this process, and only rarely do we have insight into the reasons why and how individuals took the cross. Raymond of Toulouse, the first major layman to take the cross, seems to have conferred with Urban before Clermont. Indeed, William of Malmesbury was later to write erroneously, that he persuaded Urban to launch the expedition.1 The general reasons which we have already noted as underlying crusading enthusiasm applied to the leaders as much as to anyone else, but we know enough about them as individuals to be able to speculate intelligently. Robert Curthose faced a difficult political situation in 1095, for his brother William Rufus wanted the whole inheritance of the Conqueror and could bring great resources to bear to this end. Robert was an able soldier – he had once captured Brionne, a castle which occupied the Conqueror for three years, ‘between the ninth hour [3pm] and sunset’, but he lacked self-discipline and liked the pleasures of life – ‘to sleep under a roof’. According to the hostile Ordericus it was because of the weakness of his position
that: Tearing still worse to come since everyone had abandoned him, he resolved on the advice of certain men of religion to hand over the administration of his duchy to his brother and, himself taking the cross, to go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem to make amends to God for his sins’.2 Robert lacked the grasping drive of his father and brothers, but his valour and personal geniality made him the most attractive of the Conqueror’s sons. Stephen of Blois and Robert of Flanders chose to accompany him on the march south from Normandy while his own large army included a number of erstwhile enemies like Stephen, count of Aumale.3 But Robert was seeking refuge from his political troubles and although he would show great valour, would display also his notorious laziness on the crusade.
Godfrey de Bouillon may well have felt that his future lay behind him. His family lands were not vast and his hold on them was challenged by Albert of Namur and Mathilda, countess of Tuscany, the widow of Geoffrey the Hunchback. The duchy of Lorraine which had been conferred on him by Henry IV in 1087 was ‘an empty dignity’. The Investiture Contest placed him in an unenviable position – he was the enemy of the papal ally, Mathilda, but in Lorraine had failed to support Henry IV’s champion Otbert bishop of Liège, for local reasons.4 He may well have felt that the crusade offered him a possible escape from the frustrations of his position in Germany, though it is unlikely that he swore an oath never to return, as later tradition asserts. His decision to support an initiative by Henry IV’s enemy, Pope Urban, was a great triumph for the reform papacy. His near-neighbour, Robert of Flanders, held a truly great and rich fief. His father Robert the Frisian (1071–93) had gone on pilgrimage to the Holy Land in the years 1086–9. It was probably while returning from Jerusalem in 1089 that he arrived at Constantinople and there was asked by Alexius I for military assistance in the form of 500 cavalry, which probably arrived in the spring of 1091. Alexius wrote a letter to Robert, probably in 1090, reminding him of his promise, and this was later transformed into crusading propaganda.5 This family connection goes some way towards explaining his decision to go.
