On his return he alerted Capt Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the CID. Swinton was also present. Tulloch was referred to the War Office where his information was noted with scepticism. He was eventually told that it could not be true because the British Military Attaché in Berlin had no knowledge of it. Undeterred, he sketched out his ideas for a wildly ambitious machine-gun destroyer based on twin coupled Hornsby caterpillars, each set mounting six 12-pdr guns and 12 machine guns, and carrying 100 men. Tulloch tried to convince Vickers of the need for such a huge attack platform which he wanted armoured and powered with locomotive steam engines. He sounded out other military and civil contacts but there were no takers.5
The next stage in Swinton’s formative journey came days before the war. He had been Assistant Secretary of the CID under Hankey for a year when, in July 1914, he received a letter from an old mining friend from his South Africa days. Hugh Marriott had been searching for a heavy prime mover and had just attended a demonstration near Antwerp of a 60bhp Holt semi-track tractor. He had seen the big machine climb out of a waterhole, surmount a near-vertical 4ft embankment and draw a six-furrow plough, sunk to its platform, across mud flats. ‘Unbelief was pardonable,’ he said.6 Its military possibilities as a gun tractor so impressed Marriott that he alerted Swinton, who passed the letter to Hankey and the directors of artillery and transport. This sporadic accumulation of information crystallized in Swinton’s mind 11 weeks into the war. In September he was appointed the sole official war correspondent for the British Expeditionary Force. Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, had kept the press out of the operational zone in France but soon came to realize that without authoritative news the papers could only report rumour. Swinton found himself with an open brief; he was free to move and gather information wherever he pleased, from GHQ to field dressing stations. By late September he was likening the battle along the Aisne to semi-siege warfare:
I gathered … from wounded men and officers who had been through the fighting, what was happening to them… It was known that the Germans had many machine guns, and I think it was a revelation to us when we moved forward on the Aisne and on every other occasion to find what a machine gun was capable of… I was also impressed with the heavy casualties caused to our infantry when they went forward.7
Swinton returned briefly to London on 19 October. What he had seen and heard at the front worried him deeply. The rationale of the High Command appeared to be circular. New measures against wire and well-concealed machine-gun positions did not exist. Therefore, these obstacles should be overcome with shellfire. If shellfire was ineffective, intensify it. Therefore, new measures were uncalled for. He was convinced the cycle could only be broken by a tracked fighting vehicle. It was no good designing one ‘off the board’ – it was needed now. Could a production machine be adapted? He remembered Marriott’s Holt.
Next day, the 20th, in Hankey’s office at 2 Whitehall Gardens, Swinton described the near deadlock, the growing strength of enemy defences and firepower and the need for a new remedy. The war was only weeks old. News at first hand rather than from staff reports was scarce and Swinton was exceptionally well informed. He urged the conversion of a number of Holt tractors to make them armoured fighting machines. Hankey was well placed to promote the idea and promised to do so. The following day the two met for lunch at the United Services Club where they were joined by Tom Tulloch. Notes were compared. Swinton and Tulloch (fellow cadets at the RM Academy 25 years before) were of like mind. The three agreed, in Hankey’s words, a kind of pact. If Swinton was summoned by Lord Kitchener, he would make his case to him. Swinton would also tackle the General Staff and technical people in France in the hope of generating demand for the machines. Tulloch would explore the engineering aspects and identify specialist designers and builders. Hankey would sound out ministers and the War Office.
When Prime Minister Herbert Asquith summoned Swinton that afternoon for a private meeting at 10 Downing Street to hear his news of the front, the Colonel kept his ideas for motor machine-gun destroyers to himself. Though he stressed the weakness in British artillery and machine guns and its consequences, he left the 20-minute interview feeling that Asquith had not appreciated the implications and urgency of the situation. Swinton had lost his nerve. He was conscious that he was simply the official war correspondent, the scribe in the sandwich between army and press, with no authority to raise wider issues with anyone; and Hankey had agreed to tackle the politicians. Nevertheless, it was a lost opportunity. Swinton had the PM’s undivided attention and was a consummate communicator. His first-hand knowledge would have reinforced Hankey’s more distanced pleading.
Kitchener gave Swinton an appointment for 22 October but was unable to keep it. Swinton had no permission to delay his return to GHQ. Though he left London the next day he later considered it a mistake. On arrival at St Omer he reported his actions in London and explained his ideas to the engineer-in-chief, Lt Gen George H. Fowke, who heard him out but was unpersuaded. Probably the only surviving contemporary document which records any of these discussions is a letter from Swinton to Hankey marked ‘GHQ 11.11.14’:
Re Caterpillar. I put your idea before Gen. Fowke the Chief Engineer on 22.10. He wrote to the W.O. (D.F.W.) [Director of Fortifications and Works, Maj Gen Sir George Scott-Moncrieff]. Whether it is the result of this or of the original information given by me (from Marriott) before the war, Marriott tells me that several have been ordered. This may be for purely tractive purposes, or for bursting in against positions as suggested by you.8
It is curious that Swinton should have credited Hankey with his idea of a fighting Holt. Hankey said later that the solution had evolved jointly and that he did not believe his part in the discussion could justify a claim that the tank idea was his. Swinton denied that he deliberately attributed the idea to Hankey to improve the chances of acceptance of his scheme, pointing out that ‘Hankey and I were pals and such Machiavellian cunning was unnecessary’. He added rather lamely that he may have been referring specifically to mention by Hankey of rollers, or else it was a slip.9 For his part Hankey raised the subject with Kitchener on two occasions, finding the Secretary of State ‘not receptive of the idea and very preoccupied’.10 He recalled:
Swinton did not have much luck at GHQ. Nor did I at first. Balfour bit at once, but he was not yet a member of the Government. He practically offered to find £2,000 to build a tank. Asquith was most appreciative and promised full support – if I could get WO to play. But that was the rub.
MGO [Master General of Ordnance, Maj Gen Sir Stanley von Donop] was too overwhelmed with his own job to take it on. Wolfe Murray [member of Army Council] was not much use and Callwell [Director of Military Operations] had not yet enough grip to push a new idea unless egged on by GHQ. Lord Kitchener, always a good friend to me, heard me out but said the armoured caterpillars would be shot up by guns. I was stymied.11
Hankey’s abortive discussions with Kitchener effectively closed the subject as far as the Secretary of State was concerned. Kitchener was submerged beneath an almost unendurable burden of responsibility, not only for the day-to-day conduct of the land war but also for the raising, equipping and training of the vast New Armies which were his own creation. A bad situation was made worse by the absence of the cream of his General Staff whom he had assigned to GHQ in France. To cap it all, Gen Sir Charles Douglas, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, died on 25 October just at the time when Hankey was trying to press the harassed ‘K’.
Swinton concluded that those in control at GHQ had failed to appreciate the nature and implications of the German defence. It followed that Kitchener too was dangerously unaware. Hankey spent the whole of Christmas Day 1914 at home drafting an appreciation of the war situation. On 28 December he sent copies to Winston Churchill at the Admiralty and to Kitchener, and a few days later to the newly created War Council which had assumed Supreme Command and to which he was promoted lieutenant-colonel and Secretary. His so-called ‘Boxing Day memorandum’ w
as an impressive assessment of the current stalemate. It detailed historical precedents for breaking such deadlocks, suggested new weapons and identified strategic options. Reflecting the Swinton/Tulloch proposals he said:
Is it possible by the provision of special material to overcome the present impasse? Can modern science do nothing more? Some of the following devices might possibly be useful:
Numbers of large heavy rollers, themselves bullet proof, propelled from behind by motor engines, geared very low, the driving wheels fitted with caterpillar driving gear to grip the ground, the driver’s seat armoured, and with a Maxim gun fitted. The object of this device would be to roll down the barbed wire by sheer weight, to give some cover to men creeping up behind, and to support the advance with machine gun fire.12
Hankey later told Swinton:
My description of [the armoured caterpillar] was rather unfortunate and departed from the original machine that you had propounded. At the moment I had got the idea, which I afterwards dropped, that heavy rollers were necessary to work with the Caterpillars in order to break down the barbed wire. I got this idea from a mechanically propelled roller I had seen on the Horse Guards Parade, and I then thought that the addition of a roller might be an improvement.13
Hankey had placed the caterpillar concept first in a list of tactical ideas which included bullet-proof shields or armour for those leading the first wave of attacking troops, massed smoke balls to screen assaults, rocket-thrown grapnels with ropes attached to grip enemy wire before winching back the whole tangle, and spring catapults or pumping apparatus to throw oil or petrol into enemy trenches. He proposed the formation of a small expert committee to design such devices, stressing that it should include officers of the Royal Engineers with personal experience of trench warfare. No such organization or means of coordinating the development of new weapons then existed. He had Swinton in mind for the job:
Thereafter my policy was to back Swinton, to get him on to the development committee, and eventually into the command. I was also ‘selling’ Tanks all the time to the small circle of influential people ‘in the know’ – Asquith and his entourage, Balfour, Lord K. (who remained sceptical) and especially McKenna who, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, held the purse strings.14
Hankey’s memorandum was timely. No comparable appreciation was to hand from the military or naval staffs. His references to a caterpillar machine and other devices prompted Churchill to write to Asquith at length on 2 January:
I entirely agree with Colonel Hankey’s remarks on the subject of special mechanical devices for taking trenches. It is extraordinary that the Army in the field and the War Office should have allowed nearly three months of trench warfare to progress without addressing their minds to its special problems… The question to be solved is not therefore the long attack over a carefully prepared glacis of former times, but the actual getting across of 100 or 200 yards of open space and wire entanglements. All this was apparent more than two months ago, but no steps have been taken and no preparation made.
It would be quite easy in a short time to fit up a number of steam tractors with small armoured shelters, in which men and machine guns could be placed, which would be bullet-proof. Used at night they would not be affected by artillery fire to any extent. The caterpillar system would enable trenches to be crossed quite easily, and the weight of the machine would destroy all wire entanglements. Forty or fifty of these engines prepared secretly and brought into position at nightfall could advance quite certainly into the enemy’s trenches, smashing away all the obstructions and sweeping the trenches with their machine gun fire and with grenades thrown out of the top. They would then make so many points d’appui for the British supporting infantry to rush forward and rally on them. They can then move forward to attack the second line of trenches. The cost would be small. If the experiment did not answer, what harm would be done? An obvious measure of prudence would have been to have started something like this two months ago. It should certainly be done now.15
Churchill went on to criticize the absence of protective shields of all types, saying that a month earlier he had ordered 20 shields mounted on wheels for experiment. He also advocated the large-scale use of smoke. All these devices had been listed in Hankey’s memorandum. Churchill expanded them before echoing Hankey in urging that ‘a committee of engineer officers and other experts ought to be sitting continually at the War Office to formulate schemes and examine suggestions’. Asquith moved quickly. He later told Churchill that on 7 or 8 January ‘I sent for K. and made him read your letter, at the same time expressing my strong personal concurrence. He promised to set the experiments in train without delay, and I know that he did so. I was myself a very early victim of “Crocodilitis” … having caught the virus originally from Hankey.’16
Just before this surge of prime ministerial interest in a mechanical solution could take effect, however, Swinton at last got the War Office moving. On 4 January 1915 during a brief period of leave he visited Maj Gen Sir George Scott-Moncrieff, Director of Fortifications and Works (DFW) and Commander of the Royal Engineers. Scott-Moncrieff was responsible for mechanical devices for trench warfare, but with the proviso that he could initiate nothing unless GHQ requested it or gave prior approval. He reminded Swinton that since neither condition had been met his hands were tied by the Army Council, and Swinton had no formal authority to raise the matter with him. Swinton made a stand, putting forward his case for a mechanical weapon with more conviction and in greater detail than he had to Hankey ten weeks before. The DFW relented and agreed to set up a committee of experts to investigate the conversion of a Holt Caterpillar or other suitable machine to fighting use. Swinton nominated Tulloch for membership because he was an armaments and motor expert. Scott-Moncrieff invited them both to see him the next day. The two met in Swinton’s club before the appointment, where they ran into Col Louis Jackson, Assistant DFW. On hearing of the impending meeting Jackson said the subject fell within his area of responsibility. He enthusiastically supported their ideas and it was agreed that the matter be left with him. As Swinton had to return to France, Tulloch would submit the technical aspects of their case. Scott-Moncrieff minuted von Donop that same day:
Yesterday two officers back from the seat of war pointed out to me the necessity for some means of holding on to the front trenches of the enemy, which now are difficult to hold after an assault owing to their being enfiladed by machine gun fire. One of them suggested to me an armoured motor car with caterpillar traction, manned by a small crew sufficient to work two machine guns. I spoke to D. of A. [Director of Artillery, Gen H. Guthrie-Smith] and Col Holden [recalled as Ass’t Dir. of Transport] about it today, after mentioning the subject to you. The former agreed that the experiment was worth trying, though practical details might be difficult. The latter said there were two of the caterpillar tractors now at Aldershot which he thought might be fitted up with machine guns and armoured. I asked permission to form an informal committee for the purpose.17
Von Donop approved. Scott-Moncrieff’s minute confirms that he was responding solely to Swinton’s initiative. Kitchener’s instructions to begin mechanical trench-taking experiments were issued a week later. The committee comprised Scott-Moncrieff and Guthrie-Smith, with Holden as technical adviser. It inspected the Holt semi-tracks at Aldershot on 13 January and decided to put one over a prepared course on the ranges at the Proof Establishment and Gunnery School, Shoeburyness.
Tulloch submitted proposals for a heavily armoured ‘caterpillar land cruiser’ and a lighter ‘land destroyer’. Each version comprised a pair of coupled chassis on Hornsby-type chaintracks, both chassis being independently steam driven. Fleets of these articulated push-me/pull-you sets would, he claimed, overcome barbed-wire defences and trenches. The cruiser was to mount four 2-pdr automatic guns and carry a double skin of 7mm armour to withstand field-gun fire. Two machine guns and an encircling high-tension electrified rail would protect it from close infantry attack. The lightly armoured
smaller machine would mount two or three machine guns only. Amphibious versions were suggested. He concluded:
The quickest way to tackle the problem is to enlist the interest of a thoroughly sound professional automobile engineer and designer, who has at his back the facilities for designing offered by a well equipped drawing office and a factory where the vessels could eventually be built if the design is approved. An Artillery and Explosives expert [i.e. Tulloch], in Committee with the Engineer, should not take long in getting out a general design of the whole at small expense for ultimate approval for the building of a series of vessels… The cost of design and drawings would probably be covered by £200 or so… The suggestion to form a Committee … is an essential, as experience shows that every design involving several sciences is bound to be a compromise.18
The thrust of Tulloch’s submission was directed as much at overcoming prejudice as at proposing solutions. His custom-build approach was at odds with Swinton’s scheme for a modified production machine, which Tulloch dismissed as impracticable. Instead, he had dusted off his sketch of 1911 and changed little. Swinton was familiar with Tulloch’s ideas but was unaware of his rejection of his own concept. Jackson strongly supported Tulloch:
The Devil's Chariots Page 4
