With the much-delayed arrival of sponsons in mid-July, gunnery training began from moving tanks. The buildings of North Stow Farm – ‘The Citadel’ – in the centre of the enemy’s trenches were taken over as stop butts for live firing with MG and blind shell. It had barely started when the War Office ordered cessation because many shells had ricocheted up towards the north boundary with risk of injury to the public. The embargo was lifted when Swinton pointed out that he would be sending a new weapon and crews to war having never fired a shot on the move.
The training tanks took a pounding which revealed their weak points. When they ‘bounced’ heavily, the structure flexed so much that the secondary gears could disengage. Belly plates were too thin and could be pressed inwards to foul the flywheel and seize the engine, or even distort the engine bearers if the tank straddled a tree stump or grounded (‘bellied’) over a firm ridge. Tracks constantly broke from sheared links. Pinions and track drive sprockets failed to mesh fully, causing severe wear of pinion teeth and numerous failures. The heavy spring-loaded tail suffered endless problems with Hornsby’s hydraulics, a weak iron frame and poor general design. The machines devoured fuel and lubricants, getting through 2 gallons of petrol and half a gallon of heavy track oil per mile. A day’s training consumed 4 gallons of engine oil, half a gallon of gear oil and 20lb of grease per tank. But crude as the vehicles undoubtedly were, they held the promise of a battlefield revolution and the Heavy Section knew it.
The Somme offensive opened on 1 July 1916 after a week of numbing bombardment. It was the British Army’s blackest day. By sunset with little ground gained, nearly 60,000 men had fallen. A third of them were killed. Some 1.7 million shells had left much of the German wire uncut. Five days later Lloyd George was appointed War Minister following Kitchener’s death in June aboard Hampshire. He was succeeded at the Ministry of Munitions by Edwin Montagu MP, Financial Secretary to the Treasury.
As losses continued to mount and the campaign stalled, Haig spoke of a renewed push in September. He believed the enemy was weakening and he was determined to throw in the handful of completed tanks come what may. The Cabinet was alarmed. Stern and d’Eyncourt made their own representations, emphasizing that crews were not ready and most of the tanks would be the mechanically worn training machines. The DNC pointed out that when the enemy first saw tanks he would quickly produce a counterweapon. The most dangerous antidote would be fire from light QF guns concealed in dugouts ready to be hauled up on sighting the advancing machines – he was proved absolutely right. Montagu went over to plead with Haig against the premature disclosure of the only half-decent prospect of a future breakthrough.
Robertson put all the arguments to Haig at Lloyd George’s request, writing on 25 July that if orders were placed now the BEF could expect 500 tanks in the new year instead of perhaps 150 in September. He ended: ‘In the meantime every possible step is being taken to expedite the preparation of the tanks so that a small number may be available at the earliest possible date should you decide to employ them in that way.’20 It was not Robertson’s intention that the C-in-C should feel undue pressure from the War Office. Haig replied that it was now or never before the following spring, and he would not hesitate to use tanks if necessary.
Swinton cautioned Bird that the huge casualty rate would soon bring a call for more tanks. He warned that the order should be placed immediately, before current production ended and the skilled labour and plant were committed to other work. GHQ would also have to decide whether to stay with the Mk I or introduce a type which was proof against field guns, for which a design had been prepared by Stern’s committee. Brig Gen Burnett-Stuart replied: ‘Before any judgement can be formed it will be necessary to see at least 20 tanks fully equipped and manned, functioning in accordance with some definite tactical scheme. It will also be necessary to view the French experiments … with their tanks.’21 He asked how long a decision could be delayed without breaking continuity of production, to which Swinton replied ‘immediate’. Continuity had already been broken as regards guns, gun mountings, gun ammunition, engines and accessories, but so far the skilled workforce had not been broken up.
A demonstration was staged on 21 July at Elveden in response to Burnett-Stuart’s comment. Swinton was reluctant to release machines from an already tight training programme but reassurance for a doubting staff in France overrode all other priorities. He threw in every tank that was in serviceable condition. Twenty-five advanced across the mock battlefield firing at or overrunning MG positions and creating much noise and smoke. The large gathering included Robertson and Lloyd George, though unfortunately the party from GHQ arrived moments before the end of the demonstration. It was adjudged a success. Robertson instructed Swinton to order a further 50 tanks.22 To his credit Robertson won approval to double this to 100 at the next meeting of the War Committee on the 27th. The two batches of 50 were designated Mks II and III respectively, each type divided equally into male and female versions. Foster’s was to build 25 Mk II males, the rest went to Metro.
Butler, Haig’s DCGS, and Swinton had agreed on 22 July that the first section of six tanks and a workshop should be on the sea within two weeks, the remainder to follow in lots of two sections at weekly intervals. The hard-worked machines at Elveden were in rough shape and Knothe thought it might take two months to get them all battle-ready. His mechanics lacked experience and special tools for such jobs as track removal. Key accessories were also missing, but Stern guaranteed to complete the work in ten days. His appeal to Metro for volunteers brought an immediate response from 40 men who were billeted by the police at Thetford. They were fed courtesy of the Great Eastern Railway which installed a restaurant car on the tank siding until the work was finished.
Stern’s Tank Supply Department had driven Mk I production forward and was already developing new machines and equipment. His small team of fourteen specialists at Armament Buildings was working flat out on such diverse activities as design of a tracked self-propelled heavy gun and the development of a supertank resistant to field-gun fire. Final design of Mk I details had included loopholes, gun mountings, shields and recoil systems to fit the sponsons, means of escape, reinforcement of belly plating, extra roof protection and production of double-skin armour. They also examined camouflage measures, additional ammunition stowage, improved engine cooling, and overcoming the repeated failure of hydraulic systems. In addition they sourced and monitored the production of a vast inventory of material ranging from ammunition, armoured telephone cable, armour plate, communications equipment, compasses, first-aid packs, gun sights, machine guns, periscopes, pistols, prismatic binoculars, telescopes and tarpaulin tank covers, to items in particularly short supply such as cooling fans, exhaust systems, magnetos and radiator tubes. They were competing for priority allocation of skilled labour, especially fitters, gear-cutter operators and turners. There were the essential routines covering negotiation and award of contracts, organizing factory by factory inspection of components and assemblies before acceptance, staff recruitment, accommodation and training. Logistical planning was centred on tank transport by rail, the transhipment of the machines to sea ferries and onward movement in France. Scarce flatcars had to be found in England and France, loading and offloading procedures devised, and special equipment including sponson transport trollies and lifting gear obtained. Provisioning for the 6-pdrs called for a specially reduced charge to suit the modified gun, and consideration of the relative values and quantities of black powder and other propellants, pointed shells, fused shells, high explosive and case shot for 75,000 rounds of gun ammunition. Proofing of the guns and production of range tables followed.
Lt Norman Holden joined the department in July as Stern’s deputy. The two would work closely together for the rest of the war. Holden had been invalided out of the RNAS after being severely wounded in an armoured car attack at Gallipoli, where he was twice mentioned in despatches. His arrival coincided with Stern’s decision to dispense with the Tank Supply Com
mittee through which he was having to run the Supply Department. He viewed the committee as a brake on his powers of decision and he was unused to, and disliked, the consultative process. Matters came to a head at the end of the month.
Bertie Stern and Walter Wilson were assertive characters, highly competent in their totally different fields and frequently at odds with each other. Wilson reported a steering tail at Lincoln which was fouling the track frame. Having previously alerted Stern to what he considered to be consistently poor work by Foster’s on these assemblies, he gave notice that he would take no further responsibility for them. Stern refused to accept the disclaimer, reminding Wilson that the tanks were rush orders for warfare, to be assessed as agricultural machines rather than precision motor cars. Continuing tail failures led Wilson to decide to replace the lot with a sturdier version, to be built by Metropolitan without reference to Stern. When Stern got wind of the order it was cancelled from his office by phone next day, 26 July. Stern rightly anticipated that Wilson would appeal to the Tank Supply Committee to reinstate the order, so he called a meeting on 1 August and wound up the committee. Its members were reformed as an advisory body lacking all executive authority.
Wilson put in a written request for a decision from the new body on a full tail redesign or a simpler reinforcement. Summoned to Stern’s office, he refused an order to redirect the request to Stern as Chairman. Christopher Addison, the Ministry’s Parliamentary Secretary, was called in and Wilson was ordered to leave the room. The incident typified Wilson’s resentment at finding himself subordinate to Stern’s decisions on matters of design and engineering. Stern for his part insisted with good reason on his right to exercise final control if targets were to be met. He then decreed that design and policy issues would be decided by a sub-committee comprising himself, d’Eyncourt and Bussell. Wilson was confirmed as Design Engineer and promptly sidelined. D’Eyncourt was not the man to adjudicate on the detail of tank design. Dale Bussell was a level-headed organizer and Admiralty contracts man, but no engineer. Stern freely admitted his modest mechanical knowledge in an interview in 1942:
I was very interested in all mechanical motors. I was one of the early motorists in this country. I had many different types of motors and I perfected the auto-wheel, a third wheel to a bicycle. I had it manufactured by Percy Martin of BSA, in Germany by the Deutsche-Waffenfabrik, in Belgium, in France and in America.
q. How did you acquire your mechanical knowledge?
a. I have been a banker and always employed experts. I was the entrepreneur. I have no mechanical training except I have been deeply interested in the development of the internal combustion engine from the start.23
A.W. Wall designed and produced the original Auto-Wheel, a motorized aid for cyclists, in 1909. Stern and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle were associated with a company which took over Wall’s machine and improved it in 1912 with considerable success.
Wilson was given a summary of his duties and responsibilities under the new arrangements. He was answerable to Stern who told him: ‘As regards your being kept informed of the results and behaviour of the tanks, I will arrange for all useful information on this subject to be passed to you.’24 The Chief Design Engineer was to be denied direct access to data on the very machines he had introduced. Stern would decide what constituted ‘useful information’. Wilson wrote at the foot of the memorandum, ‘4th Sept. 4 p.m. I saw Major Stern with reference to this and explained that the paragraph re information was not satisfactory. I wished facilities to see things myself and he promised me all facilities both as to seeing machines in this country and abroad.’25 Stern’s formal confirmation of their discussion left him with sole discretion as to which visits Wilson would be permitted to make.
Among other departmental changes, Tritton was engaged as Consulting Engineer on a monthly retainer of 40 guineas (£42.00). Tulloch’s association with tank development came to an end. He continued to serve the Ministry on numerous technical committees and was promoted to major.
Stern dropped a bombshell on 3 August. He told Montagu that there were effectively no spares to accompany the tanks to France. Production was geared to continuous assembly in the belief that no machines would take the field until all 150 had been built. No spares were scheduled for supply until the last Mk I tank was completed. He continued:
… the machines cannot be equipped to my satisfaction before 1st September. I have therefore made arrangements that 100 machines shall be completed in every detail, together with the necessary spares, by 1st September. This is from the designer’s and manufacturer’s point of view, which I represent. I may add that in my opinion the sending out of partially equipped machines, as now suggested, is courting disaster.26
The supply of spares had been given little consideration in the race to produce finished tanks. Only the Daimler engines came with spare parts. Swinton used his considerable powers of persuasion to try to get Stern to produce parts for two companies of tanks, withholding the news that he had failed for five days before telling Bird. The spares shortage persisted in varying degrees for many months. The tank was viewed by most as a means of crossing a few hundred yards of disputed ground after which it had no purpose. Stern considered it a missile, valueless after first use.
An advance party led by Lt Col John Brough of the Royal Marine Artillery, a very able Staff College graduate, was despatched to France to prepare for the reception and onward movement of the tanks. Operation Alpaca began on the night of 13/14 August when the first half of Maj A. Holford-Walker’s C Company entrained 13 male tanks at Elveden for the journey to Avonmouth docks, Southampton. They embarked for Havre on the 20th. The rest of C Company with 12 female tanks sailed on the 24th.27
Swinton was summoned to Haig’s advanced headquarters to review shipments with the C-in-C and Butler. Haig pointed out on the map the sector where the tanks were to be committed, emphasizing the supreme importance of getting as many machines as possible across to France by 10 September latest. Swinton said he could deliver 50 and, providing the Channel remained free of enemy submarines which had been disrupting sailings, he thought the last half company might be got to Havre as early as the 4th.28
No sooner had Swinton reported the meeting to Bird on his return, quoting Haig’s deadline of 10 September, than a telegram arrived from GHQ which put it at 1 September. Faced with a ten-day discrepancy the DSD sought explanation. Butler confirmed that they had taken Swinton’s ‘best case’ forecast of the 4th and had further advanced it in hope of its fulfilment. The fact that Swinton had attached conditions was not mentioned. Although blameless, he was instructed that in future he must bring back a written note of important decisions agreed with him, initialled by Butler or Kiggell. A hint of unreliability now attached to Swinton.
He returned to GHQ at the end of August to find the atmosphere unhelpful. Reaction to the tanks was a mix of amused tolerance and scepticism. A few were relying overmuch on the handful of machines to bring success to the offensive. The tanks were seen by many as a bit of comic relief. Crews near to exhaustion from unremitting preparation and maintenance were constantly badgered to make the machines perform ‘stunts’. The Staff were critical of Swinton’s management of tank supply and of the organization of the Heavy Section in general. Brig Gen Burnett-Stuart had remarked in a scribbled note to Butler earlier in August: ‘The whole organisation of this show at home has been on fancy rather than on practical lines.’29 Swinton was told that Brough was persona non grata and his replacement was requested only three weeks after his arrival at GHQ. He was considered ‘difficult’, probably with good reason. He had warned against committing tanks in penny packets, had objected to interruptions in training to stage party tricks, and cautioned that the powers of the tanks were still largely unknown. Swinton replaced Brough with Lt Col Bradley, his commander at Elveden, who lasted a further three weeks before his departure was demanded.30
Sixteen Zeppelins raided England on the night of 2/3 September. The last of D Company’s tanks had ent
rained and left Elveden the previous night. ASC personnel were now loading sponsons, spare guns, ammunition and stores. Just before midnight the shouts and engine noise on the brightly lit siding were silenced by alarm whistles and sudden darkness as the acetylene flares were extinguished. Zeppelin L32 had dropped incendiaries near Thetford and was blindly searching for an aerodrome near Barnham. It overflew the siding, its commander, Oberleutnant Werner Petersen, and his crew quite unaware of the prize below. L16 followed at a distance, dropping a bomb on the edge of the Elveden estate. Thereafter, Swinton loaded tanks by day and had the site screened from public view. Of the 150 Mk I ordered, 110 had reached Elveden by the end of August. A three-week production interval followed during which a supply of spare parts was accumulated.
Maj Frank Summers’ D Company with 25 tanks and two spares arrived at the assembly area on 6 September, bringing to 52 the number of machines reaching France in time for the coming offensive. The 25 tanks of Maj C.M. Tippetts’ A Company plus eight spares and a mobile workshop followed mid-month. All tanks were sent on to Yvrench near Abbeville for tuning up and training with the infantry. Haig expected much of them.
9.
FIRST BLOOD
‘The tail in France is trying to wag a very distant and headless dog in England.’1
Col Hugh Elles, Commander of the Tanks, to GHQ, 31 December 1916
C and D Companies moved up by rail to Lt Gen Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army area between 7 and 10 September. The 48 ‘Alpacas’ plus four spares detrained at Méricourt, north of Arras. Knothe and a team of fitters worked continuously on them for the next five days and nights, snatching the odd hour’s sleep while awaiting a part or completion of a test. Sir Douglas Haig’s Somme offensive had advanced the 30-mile front by up to 4 miles at unimaginable cost in lives, mutilation and suffering. The enemy regularly and determinedly counter-attacked. The terrain had become a naked waste of pulverized farms and villages marked only by the stain of their brick dust. The wrack of recent fighting lay everywhere: smashed supply wagons and horse teams, abandoned equipment and the unburied dead. For the tankmen it was a horrifying foretaste of what lay ahead.
The Devil's Chariots Page 20
