… Well, we started off with just enough time to do it if all went well. We got … to a huge crater, and then the trouble began. I was walking in front of the leading tank and each Section Commander was leading his own lot. We had quite a short interval between tanks, I think too short really but they were all in such a funk of losing touch, with the possibilities of a tow from the tank ahead in case of a sideslip, that they came hurrying on behind me. My feet were as cold as ice and the thing I was really afraid of, for myself, was that I should cop one and the leading tank would drive over me without seeing me in the dark.
We could only crawl along and … the Bosch kept putting over small shells but all burst in the ditches each side of the tanks except two or three which burst actually on the road between the tanks. When we got about level with Rat Farm which was to be my advanced HQ and report centre, I turned round to speak to Dad Hill in the leading tank, and just as I did so there was a violent explosion and sheet of flame right under his offside track by my legs. It blew me away off the road but I got up and came back to Dad. I told him to come very slowly ahead as there was the horrible probability that his track was broken, and if we could catch up the ends of the track on top of the tank we might still be able to mend it and save the situation. With my heart in my mouth I watched his track coming gently and steadily along and thank God it had suffered no damage… I saw that we had run over a box of rifle grenades and they had all gone up with a bang.
Finally we got as far as the Steenbeek which was supposed to have a bridge over it. We drove over the powdered remains of this, which was simply a harder place in the surrounding sea of swamp. Beyond this there was an immense crater stinking to heaven and full of, and surrounded by, dead of all sorts. I got my tanks all ready to deploy before zero and moved them up towards Spree Farm… It is a never to be forgotten miracle that we ever got them to the jumping off place at all. The slightest slip, or failure in guts or skill of one of those drivers and we were all done in without a chance.33
The campaign was a near disaster for the tanks. Many were lost, half-sunk in the morass and then blown to pieces at the enemy’s leisure. There were local successes – on 25 September one tank followed by two companies of infantry had cleared 1,500yd of trench in one hour, taking 362 prisoners for five casualties among the attackers – but to continue to commit the tanks to such conditions was a fearful waste of machines and brave men. Their potential was thought by many to be negligible. Lt Gen Gough’s Fifth Army HQ reported that they were slow, vulnerable and susceptible to the ‘bad going’ which, they said, would exist on any battlefield. This last was a disreputable statement – the tanks were never built for artillery-induced swamp.
The Heavy Branch gained its independence as a Corps on 27 July 1917 by Royal Warrant. It became the Tank Corps, but if it was to have a future it needed a chance to fight on the firmer ground for which the machines were designed.
11.
CRISIS
‘Stern … is, or was, the most superb organiser and team leader I have ever met, and it is no exaggeration to say that but for his leadership we should never have had any tanks in the last war.’1
Sir Harry Ricardo to Lord Hankey, 13 February 1942
‘Get rid of Stern.’2
Brig Gen Hugh Elles to War Office, 7 October 1917
In a surprise move by Lloyd George, Churchill replaced Addison as Minister of Munitions in July 1917. Winston had returned from France in March the previous year to rejoin the House of Commons and prepare for the Dardanelles Commission of Enquiry. Its verdict fell more heavily on Kitchener and Asquith than on Churchill, but he remained politically isolated with few influential friends. He desperately wanted to return to high office with an opportunity to invigorate the direction of the war. Lloyd George was not unsympathetic but time was needed for Tory knives to be sheathed. He asked Addison in March 1917 if the Ministry could discreetly offer Churchill a post without ‘special executive responsibilities’. Addison consulted d’Eyncourt who suggested Churchill should lead a small mission to the USA to secure steel and other strategic material for Britain’s tank programme and to encourage the Americans to build their own tank army.3 The proposal was well timed – America entered the war against Germany next day, 5 April, but Addison was not persuaded. The Ministry already had a resident munitions purchasing group over there, and Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour’s politically sensitive mission to the US was about to sail. Winston’s roving presence as a wild card would have invited trouble. Addison twice spoke to Churchill, inviting him to consider ‘a small ad hoc committee under his chairmanship which should consider and discuss the general question of the tank programme … and to consider the use of such weapons in warfare and to advise generally on the subject’ [Addison’s emphasis].4 It was a lamentably inadequate role which Churchill instantly dismissed.
Addison then spoke of his willingness to let Winston take his place at the Ministry. Despite strong Conservative opposition the Prime Minister acted on the offer and invited Churchill to join his government as Minister of Munitions. Winston’s acceptance precipitated an immediate threat of resignation from Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War. He withdrew it, providing Churchill refrained from interfering in the conduct of the war and in the business of departments other than his own. Addison chose a regular meeting of his heads of department on 24 July to introduce his successor. He ended his valedictory address with a caution for Churchill that in time of materials shortages and restrictions, the role of the Minister of Munitions was inevitably unpopular. To a coolly unresponsive audience Churchill replied, ‘Well, at any rate, I start from scratch in that respect.’5 He went on to set out his plans for the Ministry and for accelerated munitions production. By the end of a brave and sincere address he had completely won over hearts and minds.
The MoM had grown to over 50 munitions departments by now. They were controlled by captains of industry in line with Lloyd George’s founding policy. These men instinctively operated in fierce competition with each other for labour, priorities and materials, routinely pleading their case to the Minister who, as the organization grew, became overburdened with the task of mediating in turf wars. Churchill slashed and burned. The departments were merged into ten large groups whose controllers were directly answerable to him. Each was a member of a Munitions Council which worked across group boundaries. The Mechanical Warfare Supply Department fell into Group W (Warfare) under Sir Arthur Duckham, its other constituents being Mechanical Transport, Inventions, Trench Warfare, Agricultural Machinery and Electric Power Supply.
There followed a lightning ministerial interrogation of each department. Churchill reached Mechanical Warfare on 3 August, asking Walter Layton, his Director of Statistics, for a situation report ‘on a single sheet of paper’:
How many tanks, and of what patterns, are to be ready month by month for the next twelve months?
By whom, and to what extent, have these programmes been approved?
How much steel do they require?
How much do they cost?
How much labour, skilled and unskilled, do they require in these twelve months?
What are the principal limiting factors in material and class of labour?
Apart from the number of tanks, what quantity of spares, and what maintenance plant are required?
Give the money value or weights of materials or proportion of labour required or whichever of the three is most convenient and representative.
Let me know the number of people in the tank department, the principal salaries paid, and the aggregate of salaries paid per annum.
Show particularly any part of tank production which overlaps aeroplane production, i.e. any transferable margin, whether of skilled mechanics or of ball bearings etc. in which these two branches of production are clashing competitors.
Show also the proportion of steel, of money and of skilled and unskilled labour proposed to be absorbed in tank production in these twelve months compared with the general budget o
f the Ministry.6
Stern replied that he needed 8,000 tons of steel each month (1 per cent of national steel output). Monthly production costs based on 200 heavy and 100 medium tanks with spares totalled £1.4m. Tank factories were short of 950 skilled or semi-skilled men. Ball bearings, small castings and nickel for armour plate were the principal factors limiting output. As to quantity of spares required, Stern answered ‘impossible to estimate’. MWSD was preparing to supply 300 tanks per month, based on 160 heavies, 100 medium and 40 supply tanks. That was the limit. There was no spare capacity.
The War Office and Stern were now completely at odds. Churchill came under pressure to replace his controller of tank supply. A Munitions Council Subcommittee on Tanks was formed and chaired by Churchill himself. It met on 5 September to question Stern and d’Eyncourt. Stern had circulated a secret memorandum the previous day in which he summarized the 1917/18 programme and argued that the estimated 1,000 Mk IV machines available in the coming year should fight alongside the emerging new types. He continued, ‘The military authorities suggest schemes such as altering the engine and transmission. The Army should devote themselves to training and fighting.’7 Stern was under great pressure, but his flat rejection of any collaborative role for the army in developing its new weapon was ill-considered. Churchill subjected the operations of MWSD to a forensic examination. He was well prepared. Ominously, a secretary was instructed to make a verbatim record. The meeting began badly for Stern, and soon worsened:
Churchill: What tanks are now in existence?
Stern: You can take 700 of Mk IV. I do not know what they have lost at the Front. There are about 600.
Churchill: Surely you know from day to day or from week to week?
Stern: They will not let me know what are destroyed. I suppose they think it is not my business.
Churchill: Surely we ought to know exactly the number of tanks that are in action?
Gen Headlam: I cannot give you them out of my head but I am going back [to France] tomorrow and I will get them at once.
Churchill: We ought to know what are the tanks at the Front in action and under repair. How many are there? You do not know?
Stern: I know exactly what I have delivered. I have delivered of the first mark 250 … and now we have delivered roughly 600, but where they are and what they are doing I do not know.
Stern: They have about 600 in France and in their training camps here.
Churchill: I do not want to know that. I want to know how many there are there and how many there are here.
Stern: They do not let me know that. I deliver them to the Army. If I ask anything I am told to mind my own business.
Churchill: Mr Hutchins, telephone over to the WO and ask them if they would give us their estimate of the number of tanks at the Front in action and under repair and training at home.
Churchill: What have you in your 1918 programme?
Stern: 1,600 heavy tanks.
Churchill: Additional?
Stern: Apparently.
Churchill: What do you mean by that?
Stern: It is very difficult to see from the WO minutes what they want. They wanted us to alter the last 500 of our 1,400 [Mk IV] into Mk V, which we cannot do.
Churchill: Are these 1,600 heavy tanks in addition to the 700 you still have to deliver?
Stern: It is a little doubtful.
Sir A. Duckham: I should read the letter to say they were.
Churchill: What basis are you making on?
Stern: I can only produce 160 tanks a month of this type, the heavies, and therefore I have given a preliminary order for 800 [Mk V] which keep my factories going for 5 months. In the meantime I was going to try and have this elucidated, whether they mean the 500 or not.
Churchill: There is nothing easier in the world than to elucidate it.
Layton: You cannot start on January 1st with 160 a month? Your last minute said you
doubted whether you could do that.
Stern: Well, we can do it.
Layton: Not at the full rate.
Stern: No, we start at from between 100 to 160. It is difficult to get materials, but we ought to carry on our production clean through.
Churchill: I want to know what is your programme for 1918?
Stern: I have taken 1,600 heavy, 1,200 light tanks and 800 supplies, and they want some gun carriers. My manufacturing programme is, I can give them 160 a month heavies, 50 a month lights – working up to 100, and the supplies are not yet designed.
Churchill: What about the supply tanks?
Stern: The supply tank is not designed yet. We are getting on with the design. Churchill: It is an amazing thing you have not got a design by now. It is a most obvious line of development. Anyone could see at least a year ago that it would be needed, and far more useful than that thing lugging a great cannon about. It is extraordinary we have not got on with it.
Stern: The one that lugs the cannon about can be used as a supply tank. That is the point I want to bring up. The real point is this – that we wait for the experience of the fighting season before we start the new design. This is very experimental. We had the greatest difficulty to get any orders at all for this; in fact most of these were made without orders. We only started in September, not a year ago. We waited for the new designs that are required. They want all sorts of changes. We could give them a supply tank with the old design with great ease. It is a question of sprocket wheels. They now want a chain drive [for greater endurance, but entailing a complete redesign of the final drive].
Churchill: But surely you have an experimental establishment, have you not? Which is under the entire control of this department, and you can build any kind of tank you want – one tank?
Stern: Yes.
Churchill: Do you not think it would have been a prudent thing nine months ago to get on with a tender tank?
Stern: We have got a gun carrier which will carry 10 tons of supplies. We have redesigned that. That is ready to be made, and that is what I suggest you should have made.
Churchill: Then you have got a design for the supply tank?
Stern: Absolutely.
Churchill: It is not the kind you are putting up to the War Office?
Stern: No, they want something different again.
Churchill: I think the supply tank is more important than any other class of tank.
D’Eyncourt: There was only a demand from the War Office for a supply tank not more than 6 months ago.
Churchill: You remember it is now nearly a year ago that I talked to you about it. I do think anyone could see there was a development. The one thing is to get the stuff up to the lines after an advance, and here is the only method of getting the stuff over the ground.
D’Eyncourt: The gun carrier type forms an excellent chassis for a supply tank, and even the original heavy tank can be made, though it is not very fast. We have been trying to develop the best design for a supply tank, which we are doing now.
Churchill: With the result that when the fighting begins on the 1st March, there will not be a sufficient number of supply tanks to help the Army. There will be beautiful ones coming on, but they will be too late.
Stern: You do not appreciate the fact that we have never been allowed to do anything; we have never been allowed to have any factories. While I was getting my supply tanks built, five times have the railway people stopped me going on with my order. [Sir Ernest Moir’s Transport Department, MoM, had reluctantly released capacity at loco builders Kitson’s of Leeds for assembly of gun carriers and a supply variant.] Sir Ernest Moir [member of Munitions Council]: This is all nonsense, and nothing to do with the question. You have got possession of Kitson’s absolutely, and have always had it. This is nothing to do with the design of a carrier tank. [In fact, at the urging of Moir’s department the Ministry had given notice on 18 June that Kitson’s were to build the first eighteen gun carriers only, before reverting to loco work. Four weeks later the War Office overruled this instruction.]
Churchill: I am on the experimental point, because if there is any proper experimental department which can make variants of this and have them ready, I consider it is the duty of the Tank Department of the Ministry of Munitions to be ahead of the military in this matter. As to building a great number of tanks to a particular order, that you do not do until the WO ask for it, but none of these ideas originated with the WO at all, and we ought to have specimens of the best eight or nine different variants which are possible, made and worked out and ready and modelled, so that if at any time the military come and say ‘we should like this’ we can reply ‘well here is a pattern; we are perpetually improving it’. It ought to be entirely on an independent footing from supply. Have not you got anything of that?
Stern: Yes. I have had the greatest trouble to get anything, because we have been an experimental department. I have had practically no assistance to carry on my business at all. We can get neither officers nor engineers. I am not getting anyone. I have had the greatest difficulty getting anything… It is not a year ago since we went into battle, but directly after that battle I put every sort of transmission into an experimental machine… We are carrying out all experiments, and our difficulties have been of construction, design, brake and transmission. Now we have solved that.
The Devil's Chariots Page 27
