Rendezvous with Destiny: Ronald Reagan and the Campaign that Changed America

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Rendezvous with Destiny: Ronald Reagan and the Campaign that Changed America Page 72

by Shirley, Craig


  Reagan, like Carter, had evolved coming out of the inkwell. For years, most cartoonists had emphasized the wrinkles under the Gipper's jaw line, but as he began winning—and maybe fearful of a backlash with seniors—cartoonists began making Reagan appear younger, emphasizing his pompadour instead. Cartoonists fretted that Reagan was hard to characterize because, complained Paul Szep of the Boston Globe, “he is still a very good-looking man.”37

  NOW ON THE DEFENSIVE, Reagan jetted off for a couple of days of campaigning in South Dakota and Idaho—two more states that he should have locked up already. Meanwhile Carter took wing on Air Force One through New York, Missouri, and Illinois. In the Land of Lincoln, he spoke to sooty-faced coal miners and told them how their coal would one day replace oil from the Middle East.38

  In many of his appearances, Carter held town hall meetings with American citizens. He excelled in these forums, asking for the questioners' first names and then using the names and answering their questions with great flourish and detail. Sometimes too much. At Hofstra University on Long Island, a thirteen-year-old girl stood up to ask Carter a question and when he was finished, he said, “Thank you, sweetheart. I love you.” Later, a young man said to the president, “I voted for you and it's the biggest mistake I ever made.”39

  Carter continued to have difficulty with New York City's mayor, the colorful Ed Koch, who often complained about the president's stance toward Israel. At one point, Koch had refused to appear on the same dais with Carter in the Big Apple. To tweak Carter, Koch invited Reagan to Gracie Mansion for a meeting and then held a widely covered photo op.40 Reagan was only too happy to take advantage of Koch's gesture, but the Carter campaign made sure New Yorkers didn't forget what Reagan had once said about federal aid to their city. Carter was running billboard ads quoting Reagan as having said, “I have included in my morning and evening prayers every day the prayer that the federal government not bail out New York.”41

  “RONALD REAGAN'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN may be running out of steam.” So wrote two of the Wall Street Journal's top political reporters, Al Hunt and James Perry, in a lead story published on October 16. The story detailed gloomy assessments of the Reagan campaign, including those offered by Democrat Peter Hart and Republican Bob Teeter. Confidence in the Carter campaign was “surging,” according to the journalists.42

  Polling confirmed that Reagan's campaign had ground to a halt. Bob Strauss crowed to journalists that Pat Caddell's surveys showed Carter “pulling ahead, or at least even, in all of the key industrial states.”43 More telling, an ABC News poll released a few days later showed that Reagan had slid backwards in the Electoral College tally, and that the growing mass of toss-up states now accounted for 182 electoral votes.44 Then a New York Times–CBS poll revealed that Carter had pulled out to a nine-point lead over Reagan in the state of New York, 38–29 percent. Anderson was at 10 percent and 23 percent were undecided.45

  Anderson concluded that he was nearing the end of the road. Though his bank account was heavily in the red, reporters noted a devil-may-care attitude in the candidate aboard his plane, Rocinante, named for Don Quixote's horse. He was telling jokes on the stump, mostly at Carter's expense, referring to Reagan as “Ronnie,” and generally having a good time. He confided to a reporter, “I'm loosening up. It's almost over.”46 After months, Anderson was finally relaxing.

  Reagan was anything but relaxed. Desperate to turn things around, he flew to Flint, Michigan, where he was greeted warmly by 1,200 out-of-work autoworkers. The city's unemployment rate was over 20 percent and the state's jobless rate was over 12 percent. Reagan hit Carter hard on importation of foreign automobiles, as the U.S. government levied certain taxes on American-made cars—in the range of $200 to over $500 per vehicle—but not on Japanese-manufactured cars sold in America. Reagan issued one of his better lines: “You remember when they promised us two cars in every garage? We've got them now—both Japanese and out of gas.”47

  While in Michigan, Reagan received unexpected endorsements from two legendary civil-rights leaders, Ralph Abernathy and Hosea Williams. Both men were important lieutenants of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and both were high officials in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Abernathy spoke to the congregation of the St. John's Christian Methodist and Episcopal Church in Birmingham, outside of Detroit. Referring to Carter, he said, “We don't need this doctor anymore, because we as the patients are getting sicker. We need to change doctors.” Reagan was deeply touched by the decision of Abernathy and Williams: “I just didn't realize such a thing could happen. I was overwhelmed.” Black leaders including Coretta Scott King, widow of the slain civil-rights icon, roundly denounced the two men.48 African Americans, who had provided the margin of victory for Carter in seven states in 1976, were expected to heavily support the Democrat again.

  Stepping up the pressure, Carter yet again called on Reagan to meet him in a one-on-one debate. Just as in the Reagan camp, a hotly argued debate had been going on among Carter's men over a debate. Pat Caddell, in particular, argued vociferously against any debates now. The pollster knew that undecided voters had broken for the incumbent in the closing days of every presidential election since World War II, with the exception “the big landslides in '64 and '72, which were locked in very early.” More important, Carter was surging and Reagan was faltering. A debate at this point was an unnecessary wild card, with Carter in danger of losing more than he would gain. “I kept saying no, no, no,” Caddell later remembered. But Bob Strauss and Hamilton Jordan were “unwilling to shut the door” on the debate negotiations after the Reagan-Anderson debate, Caddell said.

  There was another, even more important factor: the president himself wanted to debate. Carter was contemptuous of Reagan and wanted the chance to make mince meat of his conservative opponent. Caddell later said, “I don't think the president … felt Ronald Reagan was well informed. I think that's a nice way to put it.”49

  Caddell was overruled by Carter and the hierarchy.

  The Reagan campaign was unsurprisingly uncoordinated in its response to Carter's challenge. Bill Casey agreed in principle that the voters would find a debate between the two men useful, and Ed Meese said such a meeting was “highly possible,” but Reagan told ABC News that he was still opposed to excluding Anderson.50 Inside the campaign, the hawks and doves were going at it over whether to debate. Speaking for the doves, Stu Spencer said, “We don't need a debate.”51 Others were dubious. One Reagan aide said on background, “If the guy can't debate Jimmy Carter for one hour, maybe we're all making a mistake.”52 The Democrats, meanwhile, pressed the advantage. Strauss told reporters, “Carter does not need the debate. Reagan needs the debate.”53

  The editorialists who had praised Reagan only a short time earlier for bravely wanting to include Anderson in the fall debates now hotly denounced him for “ducking” a two-man confrontation, especially since the wind was going out of Anderson's sails.

  Surprisingly, however, these editorial pages were supporting Reagan by a healthy margin over Carter. Editor & Publisher magazine surveyed hundreds of newspapers and as of the third week of October, 221 newspapers had endorsed the Gipper while only 59 supported Carter. The survey did not take into account the size or circulation of the publications or that 303 papers had yet to announce their decision, but it did defy the notion that the editorial pages were overwhelmingly liberal or biased against Reagan.54

  Reagan got some more welcomed news when he received the endorsements of the National Association of Police Organizations, the largest police union in the country, and of the New York Patrolmen's Benevolent Association.55 Beat cops had always liked Reagan.

  But even with those small advances, Reagan wasn't slowing Carter down. The president got still another boost in the form of new government reports showing that the dead economy might slowly be coming to life. In September, production increased 1 percent, the first increase since May 1979, and personal income likewise moved up nearly 1 percent.56 Detroit and the hous
ing industry, too, were slowly getting off the mat. Inflation, interest rates, and unemployment remained terribly high, but Carter welcomed any good economic news.

  IT REMAINED UNCLEAR WHETHER Reagan and Carter would ever participate in a one-on-one debate, but they engaged in a showdown of sorts at the annual Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation dinner in New York City. The white-tie charity event had become practically a command performance for presidential candidates, who were expected to entertain the dinner guests with irreverent and self-deprecating humor. The foundation had been created back in the 1940s to honor the memory of Al Smith, the New York governor who in 1928 became both the first Catholic and the first Irish American to win the presidential nomination of a major party. The Democrat was pummeled by Republican Herbert Hoover, but in that election Smith began to pull together the seemingly disparate groups of ethnic voters, city workers, blacks, rural folks, Roman Catholics, and southerners who, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, would become the foundations of the modern Democratic Party. Carter had skillfully rebuilt this coalition in 1976, and now he needed to do so again.

  But Carter stumbled badly as he addressed the crowd at the Al Smith event. The president did not help himself by blowing off the dinner and only arriving afterward to make his comments. Reagan, as was his custom, was there for the entire event, meeting people and taking the temperature of his audience before speaking. Carter goofed again when he told several jokes at Reagan's expense; at best they fell flat and at worst were booed—and this by an overwhelmingly Democratic crowd. Nancy Reagan fixed an icy cold gaze on Carter. The president's speech went downhill from there, as he then lectured the audience about religious tolerance in America. “I've studied the Bible all my life. But nowhere in the Bible, Old or New Testament, are there instructions on how to balance the budget or how to choose between the B1 bomber and the air-launched cruise missile.”57 The audience groaned loudly at Carter's sanctimonious remarks.

  Reagan clearly understood the mood of the event much better than his opponent did. His speech was lighter, his jokes self-deprecating. Reagan led off with a yarn about a recent phone conversation he had supposedly had with Carter. In Reagan's tale, Carter said with amazement (here Reagan put on a mock southern accent), “Ronnie, how come you look younger every time I see a picture of you riding a horse?” To which Reagan said he responded, “It's easy, Jimmy. I just keep riding older horses.”58 Reagan played off the age issue again when he quipped that there was no truth to the “rumor that I was present at the original Al Smith dinner.”59 Then Reagan took note of Al Smith's first career: “What a president he would have made! He started out as an actor.”60 The audience roared.

  Reagan turned serious for a moment when he brought up the issue of the hostages in Iran. Rising above all the rumors that the hostages would be freed before the election—including his own previous reference to a possible “October Surprise”—he said, “No one in America will rejoice more than I when America's long wait for a resolution of this crisis is over.” He concluded by making moving remarks about Al Smith, “a man of peace, good will and profound faith.” Reagan told of how Smith did not descend into bitterness the night he suffered his crushing defeat to Hoover, but instead said, in reference to his wife, “This is Katie's birthday, let's go upstairs and cut the cake.” Reagan added, “That's what I call real class.” The Gipper was rewarded with a standing ovation.61

  Reagan had clearly won this round with Carter. Now his campaign faced a decision on a bigger fight—the one-on-one debate.

  The Reagan camp was still divided on this issue. Stu Spencer and Bill Tim-mons remembered Gerald Ford's disastrous performance in his second debate with Carter in 1976 and didn't want to see a repeat of it. But even some of the doves recognized that Carter was scoring political points by repeatedly challenging Reagan on this subject. Carter continued to rise in the polls and Reagan continued to decline. Finally, the night Reagan addressed the Al Smith dinner, Spencer convened an emergency meeting of the campaign's high command to decide the issue once and for all. The Reaganites commandeered a suite on the top floor of the Waldorf Astoria to hash things out.

  After a couple of hours spent arguing in the deep of night, the high command reached a virtually unanimous decision: Reagan would have to debate Carter to stop the hemorrhaging of his campaign. The following morning, over a 6 A.M. breakfast, Reagan met with his men, who told him of their view that the confrontation was now necessary. The strongest advocate was the newest member of the team, Jim Baker.62 Baker's show of confidence in his candidate meant a lot to Mrs. Reagan.

  But Spencer could tell that the Gipper was way ahead of them. A couple of days earlier, during his campaign swing through South Dakota, Reagan had told Nofziger, “Lynwood, I think we're going to have to debate.”63

  Reagan announced on the tarmac at LaGuardia Airport that he would now debate Carter, dropping his stance that Anderson had to be included. In his statement, Reagan said that given the independent's sagging support in the polls, the League of Women Voters was justified in excluding him.64 Anderson squawked, but there was little else he could do.

  The League of Women Voters immediately issued revised invitations to a forum at the Cleveland Convention Center, tentatively scheduled for October 28, only one week before the election. A hurried meeting was arranged for representatives of both camps to haggle over the details. Jim Baker didn't try to spin things, saying bluntly that Reagan was debating only because he had fallen in the polls. The truth was that a lack of enthusiasm for Jimmy Carter was not enough of a reason to vote for Reagan. Reagan had yet to convince the American people that he would be an acceptable alternative to Carter.

  The ferocious campaign between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter in many ways had come down to an all-or-nothing proposition for both men. A Reaganite complained that it would be like “rolling the dice in one big crapshoot that could blow it all.”65 With only a week to go after the debate, the loser would have little time to repair the damage. In all likelihood, the winner would be the next president of the United States.

  ONCE THE DEBATE WAS on the schedule, both campaigns' advertising went negative. The Carter campaign ran five-minute spots featuring the president saying that Reagan wanted to engage in a “shootout at the O.K. Corral” with the Soviets. Reagan's commercials stuck to the economy. The ads showed him standing in a field, looking into the camera, saying, “Everywhere I travel in America I hear this phrase over and over again. ‘Where is it going to end?’ Record inflation has robbed the purchasing power of your dollar.… I'm prepared to do something about it.”66

  Reagan also used television to try to refute Carter's attacks. The campaign purchased a half-hour on CBS for $150,000 for Reagan to talk about foreign policy in an attempt to reassure nervous voters, especially women. The theme of the address was “Strategy of Peace in the '80s.”67 Reagan used the word “peace” so often in the speech that some writers referred to Reagan's “peace offensive.” The GOP nominee made his case that peace would come from strength, and that nothing would force the Soviets to the negotiating table quicker than a militarily strong America. He called for junking SALT II and starting over with SALT III: “The way to avoid an arms race is not to simply let the Soviets race ahead. We need to remove their incentive to race ahead by making it clear to them that we can and will compete if need be.” Reagan cited Senator John Glenn of Ohio, a Democrat who also opposed SALT II.68

  Carter didn't let up, charging that Reagan's position on nuclear armament could lead to war because he sought superiority over the Soviets. The president claimed in a live radio broadcast from the Oval Office that Reagan was pushing America toward the “nuclear precipice,” and called Reagan “extraordinarily naïve.”69 Carter announced that he would once again seek Senate ratification of SALT II, even though the Democratic-controlled body had put the treaty on ice after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

  MORE AND MORE COLUMNS appeared speculating that Reagan was about to blow the election. In state aft
er state, it was too close to call. Confidentially (but lacking in confidence), one of Reagan's key aides told a reporter, “I think Reagan is slipping everywhere … If he doesn't do something dramatic, he's going to lose it by attrition.”70

  Most of the Carterites were almost giddy. They had gotten the debate they wanted with Reagan and the president was on offense. Despite some lingering concerns about several states in the South, they felt, to a person, that the president's home region would not give up on one of its own. One Carter aide confidently told Newsweek, “The pieces are in place for us to win.”71

  To shore up his backyard, Carter headed to Texas, Florida, and Louisiana. On the stump, his touch was noticeably lighter, less abrasive than it had been. Ted Kennedy had finally fallen into line, working crowds in New Jersey and other states, exhorting them to send Carter back to the White House. Kennedy had come around for two good reasons. One, his own political future: his aides were already plotting a 1984 campaign. Second, money: half of the money he raised on the trail for Carter would go toward the $1.7 million debt his own campaign had rung up. At one joint event, the two men finally clasped hands over their heads in the very pose that Carter had coveted at their convention.72

 

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