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CONTENTS
Author’s Note
List of Maps
Cast of Principal Characters
PART ONE • Inflection Point
1. The Plan
2. The Subversive
PART TWO • The Road to War: Pakistan, the Taliban, and al-Qa’ida
3. The Best of Times
4. Warnings and Forebodings
5. Romancing the Taliban
6. The War That Never Was
7. The Outlier
8. Countdown
PART THREE • The First American-Afghan War
9. Non-Negotiable Demands
10. Charting the Course
11. Perfidious Albion
12. A Dip in the Shark Tank
13. Vox Clamantis
14. A Fall from Grace
15. The Wages of Sin
16. Son of Kings
17. No Return
18. Son of the Lion
19. “As Flies to Wanton Boys . . .”
20. The Ambush
21. Dress Rehearsal
22. Nuclear Nightmares
23. The Prodigal
24. Enemies Without, Enemies Within
25. Salvation
26. Entering the Rapids
27. Cataract
28. A Wilderness of Mirrors
29. Redemption and Vindication
30. Serendipity to Inevitability
31. Earthly Rewards
32. Badlands
33. Twin Reprieves
34. The Convergence
35. The Escape
PART FOUR • Pakistan, Al-Qa’ida, and the Wider War
36. The Czar
37. Distraction in the East
38. Days of Hope and Promise
39. The Poet
40. The Public and the Personal
41. The Reckoning
42. The Sage
43. Flirting with Armageddon
PART FIVE • Postscript: Once and Future Wars
44. Premonitions
45. The Unraveling
46. Acceptance
Photographs
Acknowledgments
Photo Credits
About the Author
Index
For Paula and Doug, who shared the adventure
AUTHOR’S NOTE
On December 7, 2001, eighty-eight days after 9/11, Gul Agha Shirzai seized the Governor’s Palace in Kandahar from the fleeing Taliban, as Hamid Karzai, fresh from negotiating the Taliban’s surrender, prepared to travel to Kabul to assume his duties as head of Afghanistan’s interim government. Just weeks earlier, both events had seemed highly improbable, if not impossible. On that extraordinary day, I knew I would write this book, and what its title would be. I began making preparations.
After my return to Langley in 2002, I was able to review official cables I had sent and received from 1999 onward, and to make cryptic notations to aid my memory. These notes provided the backbone for much of the book. During my subsequent time in Washington, from 2002 to 2006, I was able to document events more easily. My calendar diaries, though very brief, included lists of participants in interagency meetings and the general topics discussed.
When at last I sat down in the middle of 2012 to write, over ten years had passed since 9/11. Many of my recollections from my time in Pakistan were still utterly clear, involving scenes I had mentally stored up and reviewed in the intervening years. I found that my earlier notations brought back a wealth of vividly detailed memories. My habit of saving almost everything I laid hands on while in Islamabad also proved a blessing: official visitor schedules, clippings from the Pakistani press, invitations to official events, even dinner menus, helped me, along with extensive open-source research, to tie the details of recalled events to specific dates.
The book contains reconstructed dialogue. Many of my recollections of key conversations in which I was directly engaged, or which were recounted to me soon after the fact by one of the participants, are available to me upon consulting my notes. My recognition at the time of how extraordinary some of them were served to imprint them in my mind. Conversations where I remember the burden of what was said, but not the specific words, I have related without quotation.
As one might expect in a book written by a former spy, the names of some characters appear as aliases, or as partial true names. In some cases, I have done this in deference to the wishes of the individual concerned; in others, I have done so on my own account; and in some cases I have acted in deference to requests from CIA. Any time I do not identify an individual by his or her full true name, I place quotations around the name in the initial instance of its use. The need to maintain anonymity leads me to withhold some identifying details from my accounts of certain individuals, but in no case do I falsify either their positions or their descriptions.
There were a number of books that greatly helped me to put my recollections into proper context. Particularly useful here was Prisoners of Hope, by Heather Mercer and Dayna Curry, the two young American women who were among the eight Taliban captives from Shelter Now International. Eric Blehm’s The Only Thing Worth Dying For provided an account of Hamid Karzai’s campaign from Uruzgan to Kandahar, told from the perspective of the Special Forces A-Team accompanying Team Echo. It helped me to understand strictly military aspects of the operation. Company Man, former CIA acting general counsel John Rizzo’s account of his thirty-four years at CIA, served me with an optic different from my own on the tumultuous events affecting CIA’s detention and interrogation program during my time as director of the Counter-Terrorism Center.
I also have benefited from a number of authors whose experience, research, or analysis have generally informed the thinking reflected here. In My Life in the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, one of the founding members of the Taliban and its former ambassador to Pakistan, has provided useful insights into the reasons for Taliban actions and attitudes. I have also had the opportunity to meet and speak with Zaeef at some length. These discussions between former adversaries have helped to shape my thoughts about possible future outcomes in Afghanistan and the potential post-conflict role of the Taliban. In War Comes to Garmser, Carter Malkasian, who impressively fills the roles of both scholar and practitioner, provides a very useful “micro” view of how Coalition missteps and local Afghan politics have led to the Taliban’s return in a representative part of Afghanistan. Peter Bergen and Katharine Tiedemann of the New America Foundation have edited Talibanistan, a collection of analytic research pieces that, among other things, provide useful insight into the reasons for the Taliban’s abdication of power and subsequent return, as well as the increased post-9/11 radicalization of the Tribal Areas in Pakistan. And Duty, Robert Gates’s memoir of his time as defense secretary, offered helpful insights into the attitudes, assumptions, and reasoning behind the formulation of Obama administration policy on Afghanistan.
Finally, the accounts contained in this book benefited greatly from the recollections and insights offered by former colleagues. Barry McManus, lead interrogator of the Pakistani scientist Dr. Bashir, the head of UTN, provided a richness of detail concerning those tension-filled days. During that time, Barry was the embodiment of grace under pressure. Similarly, “Marco,” the senior JSOC representative in Islamabad, who would prefer to maintain in retirement the selfless anonymity
he chose while on duty, was most helpful in supplementing my recollections of the rescue of the Shelter Now detainees. “Jimmy Flanagan”—who risked his life on many occasions, along with the other members of Team Echo and their uniformed brothers-in-arms, to guide and protect Hamid Karzai—shared his first-person accounts of Karzai’s exfiltration from Afghanistan; Team Echo’s return; and the decisive battles of Tarin Kowt and Shawali Kowt. “Dave,” my redoubtable deputy, was characteristically generous in providing his reminiscences, particularly about the capture of Abu Zubayda. He is an unsung hero of that time.
Any errors or omissions that remain despite the assistance catalogued above reflect my failings alone.
LIST OF MAPS
1. Route of Hamid Karzai
2. Route of Gul Agha Shirzai
3. Pakistani Tribal Areas
CAST OF PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS
NB: Names entirely in quotations are either aliases or partially true names, employed to protect the identities of the individuals concerned.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Charlie Allen, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection
Gary Berntsen, chief of Team Juliet
Cofer Black, Director of the Counterterrorist Center (CTC)
John Brennan, acting Director, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
David Cohen, Deputy Director for Operations (1995–97)
“Dan,” senior military targeting officer, CTC
“Dave,” Deputy Chief of Station, Islamabad
“Detroit,” CIA team leader in Faisalabad
“Duane,” member of Team Foxtrot
John Ferguson, senior CIA officer in New Delhi
“Jimmy Flanagan,” member of Team Echo
Kyle “Dusty” Foggo, Executive Director of Central Intelligence
Porter Goss, Director of Central Intelligence (2004–06)
“Greg,” leader of Team Echo
Pat Hailey, CIA representative to U.S. Central Command
“Hank,” chief of CTC/SO
“James,” junior reports officer, Islamabad
“Jeff,” senior reports officer, Islamabad
“Jim,” CIA case officer, Islamabad
Steve Kappes, Deputy Director for Operations (2004)
“Kate,” senior communicator
“Jim M,” senior paramilitary officer
“Mark,” leader of Team Foxtrot
John Massie, deputy chief of CTC/SO
John McLaughlin, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Barry McManus, senior polygrapher and interrogator
Pat Murray, chief of staff to DCI Porter Goss
James “Jim” Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations (1999–2004)
“Colonel Pete,” senior CIA representative to JSOTF-N, “Task Force Dagger”
Jose Rodriguez, Deputy Director for Operations (2004–07)
Gary Schroen, chief of the “Jawbreaker” team in northern Afghanistan
Gary Spitzel, chief of the South Asia Task Force
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence (1997–2004)
“Tom,” Farsi-Dari translator
Dan Webster, former Deputy Chief, Near East Division; senior annuitant, Islamabad
AFGHANS
Tayyib Agha, office director for Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban
Mullah Abdul Jalil Akhund, “Mullah Jalil,” Taliban deputy foreign minister
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Taliban deputy chief of Army Staff
General Abdur-Rashid Dostum, militia leader, Northern Alliance
Abdul Haq, opposition leader
Hamid Karzai, Afghan tribal opposition leader; president of Afghanistan
Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, Taliban minister of aviation
Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, Taliban foreign minister
Mullah Naqib, Afghan tribal leader
Mullah Mohammed Omar, “Commander of the Faithful,” founder and leader of the Taliban
Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Osmani, “Mullah Osmani,” Taliban commander, Southern Zone
Mohammed Yousaf Pashtun, “Engineer Pashtun,” advisor to Gul Agha Shirzai
Gul Agha Shirzai, Afghan tribal opposition leader; governor of Kandahar
Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, Taliban ambassador to Pakistan
PAKISTANIS
Lieutenant General Ehsan ul-Haq, Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence (2001–04)
Colonel Sultan Amir Tarar, “Colonel Imam,” Afghan expert, Inter-Services Intelligence
“General Imran Zaman,” senior officer, Inter-Services Intelligence
“General Jafar Amin,” senior officer, Inter-Services Intelligence
General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani, Director-General, Military Operations; Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence (2004–07)
Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States
Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed, Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence (1999–2001)
General Pervaiz Musharraf, president of Pakistan
“Brigadier Suhail Majid,” Afghan expert, Inter-Services Intelligence
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Jerry Boykin, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
General Ron Burgess, Director for Intelligence, “J-2,” on the Joint Staff
Steve Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
General Tommy Franks, Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command
“Marco,” senior representative of Joint Special Operations Command in Islamabad
General Stanley McChrystal, Commander, Joint Special Operations Command
Chief Warrant Officer (CW3) Poteet, Special Forces liaison to Islamabad Station
“Greg R,” “Captain Greg,” Special Forces liaison to Islamabad Station
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State
Robert “Bob” Blackwill, U.S. Ambassador to India; deputy national security advisor for Southwest Asia
Chat Blakeman, political counselor, Islamabad (2001–03)
Wendy Chamberlin, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan (2001–02)
David Donohue, U.S. Consul-General, Islamabad
William “Bill” Milam, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan (1998–2001)
Nancy Powell, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan (2002–04)
John Schmidt, political counselor, Islamabad (1998–2001)
Michele Sison, deputy chief of mission, Islamabad
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Dave Falco, FBI special agent
Jenny Keenan, Assistant legal attaché, Islamabad
Christopher Reimann, legal attaché, Islamabad
WHITE HOUSE
J. D. Crouch, deputy national security advisor (2005–07)
Stephen Hadley, deputy national security advisor (2001–05); national security advisor (2005–09)
Zalmay Khalilzad, National Security Council
Dr. Condoleezza Rice, national security advisor (2001–05); Secretary of State
Fran Townsend, Homeland security advisor
OTHERS
“Akbar,” unofficial Afghan-American facilitator between the U.S. government and the Taliban
Dayna Curry, American member of the NGO “Shelter Now International” in Afghanistan
Heather Mercer, American member of “Shelter Now International” in Afghanistan
Georg Taubman, head of “Shelter Now International” in Afghanistan
Part One
* * *
INFLECTION POINT
Chapter 1
* * *
THE PLAN
SEPTEMBER 23, 2001
SUSPENDED IN THE HAZY netherworld between sleep and wakefulness, I gradually became aware of an irritating sound somewhere near my head. It took a few seconds to or
ient myself. I was in my bedroom, safe behind bolted steel doors. The sound was coming from the secure phone on the nightstand. The clock indicated I’d gone to bed just four hours before.
“What in God’s name do they want now?” I thought. I raised the receiver and managed a raspy “Hello.”
“Did I wake you up, son?” It was the unmistakable voice of George Tenet.
I wasn’t much in the habit of being awakened by the director, but what caught my attention was being called “son.” George wasn’t all that much older than me.
“No, Mr. Director,” I lied. “I was just getting up.”
“Listen, Bob,” he began, after our encrypted phones had synched up. “We’re meeting tomorrow morning at Camp David to discuss our war strategy for Afghanistan.
“How should we begin?” he asked. “What targets should we hit? How do we sequence our actions? Defense is telling us that there are almost no military targets available.” We can see from overhead reconnaissance, he added, that the Arab al-Qa’ida fighters, whom we called the “Afghan Arabs,” had evacuated their camps. “Should we bomb empty camps?”
These questions had been troubling me for the twelve days since September 11, while the situation in Afghanistan rapidly evolved. As the CIA station chief in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, for the past two years, I was responsible for all U.S. clandestine intelligence activities in both Pakistan and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan—fully 90 percent of the country. For two years, it was my job to lead the men and women charged with ferreting out the region’s secrets and penetrating its mysteries. I had devoted nearly every waking minute to understanding problems: the rivalry between India and Pakistan over Kashmir; Pakistan’s covert support to terrorist groups; its construction and proliferation of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles; the plans and intentions of Pakistan’s military dictator, General Musharraf; and, most important, the terrorist enterprise of Osama bin Laden and its relations with the Taliban, the Afghan religious student movement that dominated the country and provided him with safehaven and support. Now, after 9/11, I knew that it would no longer be enough to report on problems. As the senior CIA officer on the scene, I would have to try to solve them.
88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary Page 1
