by Duncan James
***
Two things that happened later that afternoon caused a flurry of excitement. First of all, Sir Robin Algar had a meeting in his office with Air Commodore Paul Bridges and a cipher expert, and, much later, Tony Weaver had word that the President would want to talk to him on the hot line tomorrow afternoon, at about nine o’clock Washington time.
Isabelle brought in Paul Bridges, and introduced a tall, rather bent man, with a shock of grey, unruly hair.
“This is Mr Ernie Stevens, from GCHQ,” said Isabelle.
The two men shook hands. Stevens somehow looked like a scientist, rather than a civil servant, although he was that, too, of course. He wore a check jacket with leather patches at the elbows, and a shirt that was obviously not used to having a tie tied at the neck. Although he had no papers with him, Stevens had a pair of half glasses perched on the end of his nose.
The three sat at the coffee table, as Isabelle brought in a tray.
“I thought it might be a good idea, Robin,” said Bridges, “to bring you up to speed first with a slice of modern technology that you probably won’t often come across in your job. Otherwise, you won’t have a clue what Ernie’s talking about. As you know, experts tend to forget that not everyone shares their knowledge, and Mr Stevens is one of our top cryptanalysts.”
“Thoughtful of you,” replied the Cabinet Secretary. “And although I am, I suppose, responsible for all of them as Head of the Civil Service, I never seem to have the time to meet as many of the scientific members of it as I should. So it’s particularly nice to meet you today, Mr Stevens. Are you based in Cheltenham?”
“No,” he replied. “One of the outstations - Eastcote, in fact. It’s easier to get to other places from there, including Heathrow. I travel quite a bit.”
“I see,” smiled Algar, looking towards Paul Bridges.
“Well,” began Bridges, “there’s so much going on these days in this field that I hope you will find a quick ‘tour de force’ useful, because one of the most important and rapidly developing aspects of modern conflict is information warfare. In that respect, you are absolutely right to demand the highest possible level of security for whatever operation it is you are now planning, because modern computers and the people who use them can pose a huge threat, as well as being an enormously powerful tool in the right hands. For some time now, the Americans have been conducting special training in the use and protection of computer network operations, and we have sent people to some of those courses.”
“I’ve been on one myself,” said Stevens, “and since then I have been developing our own training programme for the military and others in crucial civil and commercial organisations. You will see the importance of this cyber warfare training and increased awareness when I tell you that the annual level of reported hacking attempts on the US Defence Department computer networks more than doubled last year, to over fifty thousand.”
“Most of the attempts were unsuccessful, and probably carried out by youngsters, but some were undoubtedly hostile,” continued the Head of COBR, “so protection of our information systems is vital.”
“Once someone gets into a network, he can do untold damage,” Stevens went on, “A determined hacker can take control of your system by secretly installing his own operating programme into it - what we call a Trojan Horse - and there are hundreds of these systems available on the internet if you know where to look for them. Once in, the attacker can steal passwords and gain full access to all the file systems.”
“I had no idea,” frowned Algar.
“It gets worse,” said Bridges. “Hackers can devise automated tools which will extract encrypted passwords, they can alter the security and system logs to hide their presence, so ensuring that they can always gain access, or they can simply deny access to legitimate users by flooding the system with so much traffic that it can’t handle it all.”
“There are counter-measures, of course,” said Stevens, “and we are constantly devising new methods of encryption and layered defences to combat increasingly sophisticated threats. But unless we can protect our information systems and control cyber-space, future conventional warfare becomes almost impossible.”
“It certainly seems now”, continued the Air Commodore, “that the days of massive armies facing massive armies are fast coming to an end. In future, victory will go to the force which has best harnessed the information revolution, and gained control of cyberspace.”
“Has fiction really turned into fact so swiftly?” queried Sir Robin.
“Let me give you an example from the first Gulf war,” said Ernie Stevens, adjusting his glasses. “My own organisation mounted a joint operation with the American National Security Agency, and inserted a virus into Saddam Hussein’s command and control system, which caused widespread disruption. His military commanders were forced to keep in touch over far less secure networks, which our intelligence agencies were able to bug. So we knew what they were doing, and gained a huge tactical advantage.”
“Well I’ll be damned,” said an amazed Cabinet Secretary.
“So the old days of Type X codes and first echelon ciphers are over for ever,” continued Ernie Stevens. “We’re into an age of two level super enciphered codes, now. Put simply, this means that the message is coded into five figure groups, taken from a code book, and that is then enciphered by adding random numbers from a one-time pad. The recipient does the same thing in reverse, and the pads and books are frequently destroyed and replaced.”
“I’m very glad that was the simple explanation,” said Sir Robin.
“The point is,” said Ernie Stevens, “that all this can be done by computer these days. We don’t actually use books and pads now, although we still call them that because computer cryptology uses much the same principles. The drawback is that instead of needing to operate a physical security system to protect the code books and so on, we now need to control cyberspace to prevent the computers and their contents being compromised. And there is one further major development that we have been working on, with the Americans at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and that is quantum cryptography, using satellites for transmission over long distances.
“Basically, we transmit a digital key for deciphering coded information. Those keys are long random strings of numbers, which again receiver and sender must possess, but they are not anymore sent electronically. As we’ve said, electronic signals can be intercepted and decoded. So we are exploiting the unusual properties of quantum mechanics, and encoding the keys as minute particles of laser light, which we send along optical fibres, or through the air via satellites.
“So,” concluded Stevens, adjusting his spectacles again, “this all means that we can offer you an almost impenetrable code, specific for your operation. But I need to know more about the operation before I can start work on it.”
“I see,” said Algar, for the second time that afternoon, although he really didn’t see at all. “What more do you need to know?”
“I need to know the operation’s code word, for a start,” replied Stevens.
“It doesn’t have one,” replied Sir Robin.
“Then you’ll have to give it one,” demanded the man from GCHQ. “Otherwise, how will the people at our communications centres recognise your traffic when you start sending messages?”
“I see what you mean. I’ll let you know, through the Air Commodore if that’s all right?”
“That'll do,” came the reply. “I assume that all your traffic will be Top Secret, which means we only need one cipher. But how far afield will the traffic be sent?”
“Your assumption is correct, but why do you need to know where we shall be sending messages? I’m not sure I know myself.”
“Then you need to give it some thought,” said Ernie Stevens. “Remember what I said - both senders and recipients need access to the same codes and ciphers, and I don’t want to disseminate them worldwide if that’s not necessary, for obvious security reasons.”
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br /> “I see,” replied the Cabinet Secretary, who meant it this time. “Obviously, we need to keep the list of destinations as short as possible, so off hand I’d say the White House and the Pentagon in the States, one or two people in the Irish Republic’s Government, our own Foreign and Home Offices, and MOD as well as Downing Street. If there are any more after I’ve spoken to the Prime Minister, I’ll let you know.”
“Thanks. The fewer the better, really. Consider too, if you would, whether the normal means of sending secure communications might serve your purpose some of the time, rather than always use the special system, if that would restrict its use.”
“I’ll certainly do that, Mr Stevens, and thanks for your time and patience,” said Sir Robin Algar, drawing the meeting to a close. “Could you spare another minute please, Air Commodore, before you leave?”
Stevens shook hands, and left, adjusting his glasses.
“I take it,” said Sir Robin when he had closed the door, “that Ernie Stevens is a mathematician by specialisation.”
“Yes he is,” replied the Air Commodore. “But he also has a PhD in particle physics, and speaks six languages, although he would be the first to tell you, only four fluently. You can image how valuable he is to us, although there are plenty more around like him in that field of work.”
“I was fascinated by what you had to say about cyber warfare. Much of that was new to me,” confessed the Cabinet Secretary.
“Well it’s a new field, and so far has been subject to very little public debate,” said the Air Commodore. “But it means that the most powerful nations are the most vulnerable, of course, which is why America is so keen to get ahead of the game. Viruses and computer programmes have already been developed that can turn off a nation’s electricity, steal its foreign currency, open the sluice gates of dams and so on, all from thousands of miles away.”
“Foreign currency, eh,” said Algar. “That's interesting, because I had lunch only today with Alistair Vaughan from the Bank of England. He’s Head of Security there. I wonder if he’s heard about that?”
“I know Alistair,” replied Bridges, “and I can tell you he probably knows more about it than anyone in the country.”
“Fancy you knowing him,” commented Algar.
“It’s a fairly close community I work in. I first met him when he was a Commander at Scotland Yard in charge of the serious fraud squad among other things, and I was Provost Marshal. We still keep in touch.”
“Really,” said the Cabinet Secretary.
“In fact, I knew you had lunched together today, and I know what you talked about. He rang me to see if I was in the picture, but of course I didn’t have a clue. It sounds an interesting and useful idea you put to him, though. I’m sure he’ll help, if he can, that is, without stepping too far outside the law. And of course if I can help in any way, you only have to ask.”
“Well, since you now know about it,” said Algar, “what do you think about using this convicted felon to tackle the job we have in mind?”
“I don’t really see any alternative,” replied Bridges. “Someone like Ernie Stevens would easily be able to do it for you, but that would be a bit too close to home for comfort if it went wrong.”
“I must talk to the Prime Minister before reaching a decision, but that’s a useful view to have with me.”
Sir Robin Algar felt decidedly uncomfortable. Too many people knew too many other people, and already word was getting about.
“You look worried, Robin.” said the Air Commodore. “You mustn’t be. The people you are talking to are totally trustworthy, you know, and won’t gossip to anyone who is likely to be a security risk.”
“But Alistair rang you on an open line, and that’s a security risk,” complained the Cabinet Secretary.
“As a matter of fact, he used a perfectly secure line,” responded Bridges. “There was no risk.”
“Well, that’s a relief anyway. I suppose you know Major Bill Clayton, too?” probed Sir Robin.
Air Commodore Paul Bridges grinned, and stood to leave.
“Everyone in this business knows Bill Clayton.”
