This called for some American deception. On May 21, Pearl Harbor wired the Midway garrison commander, via a secure undersea cable linking Hawaii and Midway, instructions to send an emergency radio signal to Pearl complaining of a severe water shortage. The commander immediately radioed a statement that “at the present time we have only enough water for two weeks. Please supply us immediately.” The commander of the 14th Naval District at Pearl, Admiral Claude Bloch, kept up the deception when he responded that he was sending a water barge with emergency supplies right away.
The following day, the American intelligence unit at Melbourne listened in as the Japanese radio station on Wake Island reported the plea for water and identified the location making the request as Affirm Fox (AF). An order went out to the attacking fleet to take on additional water supplies. Allied code breakers quickly picked up both signals. They now knew the target for Yamamoto’s “decisive battle” was definitely Midway.6
Meanwhile, Admiral Yamamoto was doing all he could to determine how many American aircraft carriers in the Pacific were close enough to take part in the defense of Midway. A planned flying boat reconnaissance of Pearl was hampered by three U.S. Navy ships stationed at French Frigate Shoals, some 560 miles northwest of Honolulu. This picket line of two destroyers and a tanker prevented enemy aircraft from approaching Pearl Harbor and effectively blinded the Japanese admiral as to what was happening at the great naval base.7
A key question for Yamamoto was what had become of the Yorktown after the Battle of the Coral Sea. Her apparent disappearance left many Japanese convinced she had been so seriously damaged that she later sank. In fact, the immense carrier had made it back to Pearl Harbor on May 27 for repairs that were expected to take ninety days. In an incredible display of hard labor and teamwork, some fourteen hundred men worked day and night to repair her so that she sailed from Pearl Harbor ready for combat at nine a.m. on the morning of May 30.8
Although thousands of miles away from the scene of the planned action, General MacArthur provided what one naval historian called a “brilliant bit of deception.” Both MacArthur and Nimitz were aware that Japanese radio interceptors were eavesdropping on radio communications in SWPA. Deciding to take advantage of this, he recommended to Admiral Nimitz that several shore stations and two or three ships exchange transmissions that indicated a carrier task force was operating in the Coral Sea, far from Midway. Nimitz gave the idea his full approval, and as a result, the seaplane tender Tangier and the heavy cruiser Salt Lake City steamed across the Coral Sea, exchanging intelligence traffic with each other and shore stations, appearing to eavesdroppers to be part of a carrier-based task force. As expected, Japanese analysts listening in quickly informed Admiral Yamamoto that at least one carrier task force, possibly the vanished Yorktown, was still in the Coral Sea, too far to take part in the coming battle at Midway.9
According to one Japanese officer, the Naval General Staff believed the reports “constituted powerful evidence that the enemy did not yet suspect our intention, for if he did, he would obviously have called all his scarce remaining carriers back from the Southwest Pacific.”10
A massive Japanese fleet sailed toward Midway, unsure of what to expect. They had no idea how many American ships would challenge them, and if any were aircraft carriers.
The Imperial force consisted of four fleet aircraft carriers: Akagi, Soryu, Kaga, and Hiryu, carrying a total of 248 aircraft. Seven battleships, fifty-eight cruisers and destroyers, four floatplane tenders, and one light carrier joined the fleet, as well as tankers, cargo ships, and fifteen transports loaded with five thousand troops. Missing were the two aircraft carriers unable to participate due to damage and losses suffered during the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Admiral Nimitz was fully prepared. Meeting the enemy were three fleet carriers: Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet. Together they were armed with 233 aircraft, but were backed by 127 land-based planes that Nimitz had squeezed onto Midway, including Army B-17 Fortresses and B-26 Marauders. Supporting the carrier forces were twenty-seven cruisers and destroyers, sixteen submarines, and a mix of tankers, tenders, and other auxiliary craft.
The action commenced on June 3, when a scout plane out of Midway reported the appearance of enemy ships. The Battle of Midway was a devastating loss for the Imperial Navy. All four fleet carriers were sunk, as was one cruiser. Just as vital, 228 aircraft were lost, including 121 of Japan’s most experienced and virtually irreplaceable pilots. In all, 3,057 men died. The cost to the Americans was the loss of Yorktown and one destroyer, as well as fewer than 150 aircraft. Three hundred forty Americans perished in Yamamoto’s “decisive battle.” America’s losses, however, were replaceable; the Japanese would struggle until the end of the war, attempting to replace the carriers, aircraft, and pilots lost at Midway.
As a diversion that he hoped would draw U.S. ships away from the Midway area, Yamamoto had sent a small force to Alaskan waters to capture two mostly uninhabited Aleutian Islands, Kiska and Attu. The total force invading both islands consisted of two light carriers, three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, twelve destroyers, one seaplane tender, and eight transport ships carrying 1,550 troops. Unfortunately for the admiral, American code breakers had determined by late May that the attack in the north was little more than a feint, so other than sending five cruisers, thirteen destroyers, six submarines, and assorted auxiliary craft, Admiral Nimitz all but ignored the Alaskan invasion for the time being.11
In an incredible spin, the Imperial Navy’s chief spokesman, Captain Hideo Hiraide, issued a statement for public consumption describing the attacks on Midway and the Aleutian Islands as “effective blows dealt against the American continent, and at one stroke extending Japan’s defensive waters 2,500 nautical miles eastward.” He then boasted of sinking two U.S. aircraft carriers, and said American claims of sinking two Imperial carriers and badly damaging two others was “propagandizing.”12
In a follow-up statement, Hiraide told the Japanese people, who would remain in the dark concerning Imperial defeats throughout the war, “The enormous success in the Aleutians had been possible by the diversion at Midway.”13
Japan’s leading commentator on military matters, Masanori Ito, described the “victory” at Midway in this way: “The brilliant war results obtained are beyond all imagination.”14 Writing about the battle after the war, however, Ito remarked, “So great was Japan’s defeat in this one battle that the resourceful and skillful enemy must have been supported by the wrath of an avenging god.”15
There was a bit more honesty among high-ranking officers, especially in the army. Lieutenant General Shinichi Tanaka, chief of the Operations Bureau, reacted to the defeat by exclaiming, “We have lost supremacy in the Pacific through this unforeseen great defeat.” The army chief of staff, General Hajime Sugiyama, agreed. The answer, he declared, was to “choose a method outside of the Pacific region to lay low the enemy.”16
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Stunned by the defeat at Midway, the Imperial Navy was at first worried that the American fleet might plan a counterattack in home waters. On June 11 the planned invasions of New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, as part of Operation FS, originally set for July, were postponed. Cancellation came two months later. The troops earmarked for these invasions received orders to stand down and await further orders.
On June 7, a meeting of the operations staffs of both the army and navy agreed that “research will be immediately undertaken to find out if Port Moresby can be invaded by the overland route.”17 Five days later, army headquarters instructed Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake, commanding general of the recently formed 17th Army at Rabaul, to cooperate with the navy in devising a plan for the capture of Port Moresby by means of an overland route from the east coast of New Guinea. Recognizing the limitations of the facilities at Lae and Salamaua as jumping-off points for such an advance, headquarters ordered Hyakutake to send elements of his army to occupy another location fart
her down the coast near where the Mambare River empties into the Solomon Sea. He was also instructed to look for additional places to locate air bases. Earlier reconnaissance surveys had already identified the airfield near Buna, some sixty miles south of the Mambare River, as being capable of expansion into a major base.
With the loss of four carriers and many of their aircraft at Midway, the importance of Port Moresby to the Japanese for gaining air supremacy over the Coral Sea increased. The two airfields located there could be expanded for use by Japanese land-based planes over a large portion of the sea. Controlling the airspace over the Coral Sea would allow Japanese forces to sever the communications and supply connections between Australia and the United States and permit reinstatement of Operation FS. The seizure of Lae and Salamaua, already accomplished in March 1942, were initial steps in reaching the objective of occupying Port Moresby.
Meanwhile, Port Moresby was the target of a steady bombing campaign by the Navy’s 24th and 25th Air Flotillas. In May alone, 403 planes took part in twenty individual raids. Yet MacArthur and Australian general Blamey kept up a steady flow of supplies and men to replace losses quickly. Enhanced antiaircraft defenses soon forced the Japanese planes to stop low-level bombing and attack from twenty thousand feet, reducing effectiveness.
Based on previous aerial photography, the Japanese were convinced there was a direct route from Buna across the mountains to Port Moresby. General Horii was ordered on July 1 to send a small force from his South Seas Detachment, now part of the 17th Army, to Buna with instructions to investigate roads in the area for the needed overland route to the opposite coast. The troops Horii selected for this assignment had not yet left when revised orders from Imperial General Headquarters arrived on July 11. The new orders stated, “The 17th Army, in cooperation with the Navy, shall at the opportune time capture and secure Port Moresby, and mop up eastern New Guinea.”18
By coincidence, four days later, on July 15, General MacArthur issued his plan for developing Buna into an Allied base from which his aircraft could attack Lae, Salamaua, and Rabaul. He planned to send one Australian infantry division and a unit of American Army engineers overland from Port Moresby to “seize an area suitable for operations of all types of aircraft and secure a disembarkation point pending arrival of sea parties.”19
MacArthur began moving everything he needed in Australia closer to New Guinea, including his own headquarters, which he transferred from Melbourne to Brisbane. The American 32nd Division moved from Adelaide to Brisbane and the 41st Division from Melbourne to Rockhampton, near the Coral Sea coast. Engineers were building airfield facilities along the northeast coast of Australia, closer to New Guinea. Since MacArthur considered Port Moresby too vulnerable to enemy attack to expand Air Force facilities there, he moved existing ones up to Australia’s York Peninsula, which juts out like a finger pointing at New Guinea.
During June, MacArthur also sent American engineers to work on a new airfield at Milne Bay, on the southern end of New Guinea. A machine-gun platoon, several antiaircraft batteries, and a platoon from the 101st U.S. Coast Artillery Battalion joined them. Their primary job was to construct and protect an airfield capable of handling heavy bombers at a place called Gili Gili at the northern end of Milne Bay. This base was to secure the southern end of the Owen Stanley Range and reduce the possibility of Japanese forces enveloping Port Moresby. Anxious to protect this site, MacArthur and Blamey sent Australian brigadier John Field to Milne Bay with elements of his 7th Brigade, which included combat infantrymen, engineers, antiaircraft batteries, and a battery from an antitank regiment. All forces located at Milne Bay, named “Milne Force,” American and Australian, were commanded by Brigadier Field, who reported directly to General Blamey. As soon as the airfield was ready for them on July 20, a squadron of Australian fighters arrived to take up air reconnaissance and combat patrols in the area.20
MacArthur’s plan was to have a force of 3,200 men at Buna by early August to build airfields to accommodate fighters and bombers as a complement to the airfield at Milne Bay.
Meanwhile, MacArthur and Blamey had not forgotten about Lae and Salamaua. The enemy was flying an increasing number of sorties from these two airfields against Port Moresby, and even occasionally against targets on the Australian mainland. Unable to send a substantial force against the two Japanese bases, the Allied generals had decided early on to instead use what the Australians called Independent Companies to harass the Japanese and prevent them from enlarging the area they controlled. An Independent Company was a type of special forces unit whose members were trained in irregular warfare tactics.
The remnants of the small Australian forces that had abandoned Lae and Salamaua had regrouped at several locations in the nearby mountains and valleys from which they kept watch on Japanese activities. Over the weeks, occasional clashes had arisen between Japanese soldiers patrolling the perimeters of their bases and these men, who were mostly members of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles. In many cases, members of local tribes acted as scouts and spies to aid the NGVR.
In mid-March, an NGVR patrol slipped inside Salamaua to assess the enemy’s strength and intentions, then quickly withdrew following a brief firefight. Japanese units pursued the patrol as far as the swollen Francisco River but were unable to find a crossing. They rectified this by forcing local tribesmen to build a bridge that allowed them to continue their pursuit until they found an NGVR munitions and food storage dump, which they blew up before returning across the river.21
In April, General Blamey sent one of the Independent Companies, the 2/5th, to Port Moresby in preparation for the reinforcement of the NGVR in the area of the Markham Valley, some 250 miles north-northeast of Port Moresby. The valley runs west from Lae into the gold-producing areas around Wau.
During the third week of April, a meeting at Port Moresby determined what actions the Allies should take against the two Japanese bases. Time was a factor, as it appeared the enemy was rapidly expanding both bases and improving the runways. In attendance were General George Alan Vasey, deputy chief of the Australian General Staff and close confidant of General Blamey, and American general George Brett, commander of Allied Air Forces for SWPA. One important result of the meeting was the decision to form a large guerrilla outfit called Kanga Force, which would absorb the NGVR units and the other Australians in the area around the Japanese bases. Added to the NGVR were two independent companies, a mortar platoon, and an antitank battery. Kanga Force’s primary jobs were to expand reconnaissance of the Japanese and, whenever feasible, conduct small-scale raids.
On May 1, General MacArthur told Blamey that he hoped the time was near to take “a limited offensive” against Lae and Salamaua and possibly even retake their airfields. When Blamey explained the difficulty of moving men and material into the area, MacArthur requested that General Brett provide aircraft to move the Kanga Force. Throughout May, June, and July, the men of Kanga Force harassed the Japanese and prevented them from expanding the areas under their control.
Meanwhile, in Washington, plans were under discussion to take advantage of the defeat of the Japanese fleet at Midway. MacArthur had made known his view that a powerful thrust should be made through New Guinea and the Solomon Islands with the ultimate target being Rabaul. Since all the objectives discussed fell within the South West Pacific Area, it made sense to MacArthur and most Army officers in Washington that the SWPA commander in chief be in command of the operation. However, the Navy, in the person of Admiral King, the chief of naval operations, objected.
The Joint Chiefs set down three tasks required to meet their ultimate objective of “seizing and occupying the New Britain–New Ireland–New Guinea area”:
a.Task One: Seizure and occupation of the Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent positions (all part of the Solomons).
b.Task Two: Seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomon Islands, and of Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast coast of New Guine
a.
c.Task Three: Seizure and occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Guinea–New Ireland area.22
The Navy’s objection to MacArthur’s being in charge of the entire operation was that the first task, at least, was almost entirely amphibious in nature. Therefore, Task One was assigned to Vice Admiral Ghormley, commander of the South Pacific Area. SWPA was to provide him with whatever naval and air support it could from its skimpy resources. At Admiral King’s urging, the Joint Chiefs excluded MacArthur from command of Task One by moving the border between the South Pacific Area and SWPA slightly to the west. The new border bisected the Solomons, placing the lower half, including Tulagi, in the South Pacific Area.23
MacArthur was to command the two remaining tasks. Both Ghormley and MacArthur urged that the target date of August 1 for Task One be moved back since neither command had the resources considered desirable for success. The Joint Chiefs turned them down. MacArthur biographer D. Clayton James suggests that the general accepted the plan as devised, probably because he “realized that, though the directive was not altogether to his liking, it represented the first significant departure from the basic Anglo-American strategic policy of merely containing the Japanese until the defeat of the Germans was assured.”24
In anticipation of Task Two, on July 15 MacArthur directed Brigadier General Robert H. Van Volkenburgh, the designated commander for what would become “Buna Force,” to begin making preparations for the movement of troops and material to Buna. Van Volkenburgh was the commanding general of the 40th Artillery Brigade at Port Moresby, and tasked with control of the forces while they were moving to Buna. Once there, an Australian brigadier would take command.25
War at the End of the World Page 13
