As darkness fell, no peace came for the Japanese in lifeboats, on rafts, or clinging to wreckage in the sea. Late that night, eight PT boats arrived to sink whatever was still afloat and pick up a few prisoners for interrogation. They fired torpedoes at two burning ships, attacked a submarine that had surfaced to take on survivors, and machine-gunned enemy soldiers on rafts and lifeboats.42
Over the next few days, Allied aircraft and PT boats continued to search for survivors of the convoy. Hundreds of enemy soldiers were killed as Americans and Australians took revenge for the murder of the Double Trouble’s crew. Some Japanese were picked up by their own destroyers and submarines, while others managed to drift to shore. The lucky ones landed on Japanese beaches, while the unlucky ones had the misfortune to come ashore in Allied territory, where they faced death or prison. The rationale for the bloodbath that took place following the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was that any of the Japanese who survived would be returned to duty and have to be killed by American or Australian soldiers in combat.
Of the 6,900 soldiers sent to Lae on the convoy, fewer than 1,200 made it to their destination. For the most part, they arrived ill equipped for combat duty as they had lost everything on the sunken ships. Japanese records indicate about 2,700 troops were rescued. The rest, about 3,000 soldiers and sailors, died. Among those rescued were General Adachi and Admiral Kimura, who both returned to Rabaul. In the future, troop transfers from Rabaul to New Guinea would be made using submarines and barges. There would be no more convoys. All the transports in the Lae convoy were lost, as were four of the escorting destroyers, as well as twenty of the fighters sent to cover the convoy.
Allied losses were infinitesimal by comparison. Thirteen aircrew members died, ten in combat and three in accidents. One B-17 was lost in combat, as were three P-38 Lightnings. Two additional planes were lost in accidents.43
Controversy erupted in the aftermath of the battle. General Kenney, perhaps due to his excitement over such a great victory, accepted the reports of his aircrews that as many as twenty-two ships had been sunk. He gave this figure to MacArthur, who used it in a press release. MacArthur later amended the number when he received more accurate reports that put the size of the original convoy at eighteen ships.
On hearing the news of the great victory from Kenney, MacArthur sent his air chief a message to be shared with his airmen: “Please extend to all ranks my gratitude and felicitations on the magnificent victory which has been achieved. It cannot fail to go down in history as one of the most complete and annihilating combats of all time. My pride and satisfaction in you all is boundless.”44
CHAPTER 11
Assault on Salamaua
As commander in chief of the South West Pacific Area, General MacArthur was, by directive of the Joint Chiefs, “not eligible to command directly any national force.”1 Therefore, the troops of each Allied country—American, Australian, Dutch, Papuan—required a commanding officer or officers who reported directly to the commander in chief.
MacArthur’s leadership style allowed his commanders to plan and execute assigned missions as they saw fit. He rarely interfered in an ongoing operation.2 As such, he needed officers in whom he had complete confidence, trusting their ability to carry out missions with both speed and limited loss of life.
One officer that MacArthur trusted implicitly was Admiral Barbey. In Australia since January, assembling MacArthur’s naval landing force, Barbey soon had his efforts officially designated as the Seventh Amphibious Force of the U.S. Navy. It was later strengthened by the addition of the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade of the U.S. Army. Originally organized by the Army Corps of Engineers, members of the ESB were combination soldier-seamen who specialized in amphibious invasion landings.3
To school his men in how to land on hostile shores under fire, Barbey instituted a four-week-long training program for all combat teams. By mid-March, his Amphibious Force collected four old destroyers that were converted to troop transports, six LSTs, and a little over two dozen assorted landing crafts. The admiral was going to need every vessel he could get his hands on if he was going to be able to deliver MacArthur’s troops to the beaches of New Guinea.4
Following Barbey’s example, the peculiarities of tropical and jungle warfare were taught to naval, ground, and air units throughout MacArthur’s command. Troops were instructed in steps to avoid jungle diseases such as malaria, in dealing with mud and lack of mobility in New Guinea’s terrain, and in how to cope with the inability to see an enemy who may be lurking nearby. The Imperial Japanese Army had been training and fighting in jungle terrain for several years, while the U.S. Army’s training was based on a 1941 field manual that devoted less than three pages to jungle combat. America had been preparing for another war in Europe, not for combat in the rain forests of New Guinea.5
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The Japanese General Staff, in response to lost battles along the Buna-Gona beachheads and on Guadalcanal, redrew their line of defense, which would now run from the northern Solomons, through New Britain, and across the northern part of New Guinea. Key frontier posts were Lae and Salamaua. “New Guinea especially,” their report read, “was the strategic point on the right flank of the defensive line, and if it should fall into the hands of the enemy . . . it would be a case of giving the enemy the best possible route to penetrate into the Philippines and any part of the South Co-Prosperity Sphere. This would be a great menace to the foundation of our general defense system. The strategic value of the Lae and Salamaua areas in the present stage of the operation was of immense importance.”6
It was as if the authors of this report were reading General MacArthur’s mind: he too saw the northern coast of New Guinea as his direct route to the Philippines.
A directive from Tokyo instructed Eighth Area Army commander Imamura to increase his efforts to strengthen the bases at Lae and Salamaua. He needed to extend Japanese control over New Guinea beyond Papua, which the Allies now controlled. He was also to increase construction of roads and airfields, reinforce troops throughout occupied New Guinea, and stockpile supplies for the expected Allied offensive. Among these defensive measures, the Imperial Navy air arm received orders to “wage aerial annihilation operations in concert with the Army.”7
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Unfortunately for MacArthur, Allied military leaders took a view of the war in New Guinea different from that of their Japanese counterparts. On January 19, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff developed six recommendations for the remainder of the year. The first was concerned with defeating the U-boats; the second was assistance to Russia; the third was operations in the European theater; the fourth focused on offensive action in the Mediterranean. The fifth stated, “In order to insure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters.” The final recommendation dealt with the Pacific and Far East. It said, “Operations in these theaters shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated. These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favorable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.”8
The Combined Chiefs made it clear that SWPA, and the Pacific in general, remained a backwater of the war to which only limited resources would be provided. It remained a Germany-first war as far as Washington and London were concerned.
Yet despite the Combined Chiefs’ policy regarding the Pacific, American forces in SWPA continued to increase, although at a pace that tested MacArthur’s patience. Under him was I Corps, consisting of the 32nd Infantry Division, the 41st Infantry Division, the 1st M
arine Division, the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 158th Infantry Regiment, the 98th Field Artillery (Pack) Battalion, the 40th and 41st Antiaircraft Brigades, and the 2nd Engineers Special Brigade. Due to arrive were the 24th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division.9
All of these U.S. Army units reported to Australian general Thomas Blamey, as did fifteen Australian divisions. Yet MacArthur, who felt that American soldiers should serve under American commanders, decided to divide the land forces into two distinct armies based on their nationalities. Blamey would remain as commander of all land forces in title, but MacArthur would create an entirely separate force under an American commander. All U.S. Army ground forces would report to this new officer, who would report to MacArthur, not Blamey. Such a structure would give MacArthur the overarching organization he needed to ensure a unified effort in his drive up the New Guinea coast toward his ultimate goal of the Philippines.
MacArthur’s opinion had quite possibly moved closer to that of Hap Arnold, who, following his visit to Papua in September 1942, wrote in his diary, “General Blamey has no idea of attacking unless he is forced into it.”10 MacArthur may also have been reacting to protests from American officers, who complained that the Australians were attempting to control command arrangements by promoting Australian officers one grade higher than the Americans with whom they dealt.11
MacArthur did not reveal to the Australian government his plans to remove American forces from under Blamey’s control, yet he laid the groundwork for doing so in a conversation with Defense Secretary Frederick Shedden. Asked about Blamey’s performance during the Buna-Gona campaign, MacArthur described him “as a good, courageous commander in the field, but not a very sound tactician.” He added that Blamey did “not command the fullest support of all in the Australian Army and that he had political ambitions.” He recommended that Blamey be made commander of the Home Defence Forces in Australia, and be replaced by the commander of the 9th Division, Lieutenant General Sir Leslie Morshead, just returning from North Africa.12
Under the terms of his directive, MacArthur should have consulted both the American and Australian governments about this change in command structure. Although he did not, the Australians took a benign view of this reduction of their general’s authority. As described by Australian historian David Dexter, “the new arrangement was probably the only one that, in the circumstances that had developed, would have been politically acceptable in Washington. . . . There were practical and psychological obstacles in the way of leaving an Australian commander in control of the Allied land forces in the field now that they included a substantial American contingent; and the Americans evidently considered that, if separate roles could be found for the Australian and the American Armies, difficulties inseparable from the coordination of forces possessing differing organization and doctrines could be avoided.”13
Once again, MacArthur knew exactly the man he wanted for a job. On January 11 he sent a message to General Marshall explaining his need and identifying the officer he sought: “Experience indicates the necessity for a tactical organization of an American Army. In the absence of such an echelon, the burden has been carried by GHQ. I recommend the U.S. Third Army under [Lieutenant] General Krueger, which would provide an able commander and an efficient operating organization. I am especially anxious to have Krueger because of my long and intimate association with him.”14
Two days later, Walter Krueger received a surprising radiogram while inspecting troops at Camp Carson, Colorado. “I have just recommended to Chief of Staff that you and the Third Army Headquarters be transferred to this area,” wrote MacArthur. “I am particularly anxious to have you with me at this critical time.”15
MacArthur’s request for the sixty-two-year-old general surprised many people, including Marshall. Born in West Prussia in 1881, Krueger immigrated to the United States with his mother after his father died. He never completed high school, and unlike so many of his contemporaries, did not attend West Point or earn a college degree. Enlisting as a private during the Spanish-American War, he served in Cuba and the Philippines, then journeyed to France as a staff officer during World War I. Following the war, he earned a reputation for his skill in planning and especially training, which led to several posts as a training officer of increasingly larger forces until May 1941, when he was promoted to lieutenant general and commanding officer of the Third Army, then in training for the expected war in Europe. His reputation grew when he twice defeated the Second Army in combat maneuvers, proving the value of various doctrines he had been teaching.
What surprised Marshall about MacArthur’s request was that Krueger had no real combat experience. Marshall did not think of Krueger as a combat commander, but rather as a highly valuable trainer of soldiers who would go into combat. Yet Marshall knew he could not deny MacArthur’s request—and, besides, he did not know what else to do with Krueger.16
The appeal from the SWPA commander also amazed Krueger, who had resigned himself to the likelihood that there would be no combat role for him in this war. He wondered about MacArthur’s comment concerning their “long and intimate association.” True, Krueger had once worked in the War Plans Division of the Army Chief of Staff’s office when MacArthur was the chief, but that was a decade ago. He told a friend that MacArthur having “remembered me well and favorably enough to ask for my services in SWPA was as remarkable as it was flattering.”17
The War Department approved MacArthur’s request for Krueger, but not for the Third Army Headquarters staff. It seemed there were not enough American troops in the theater to qualify as an army. As a result, Krueger could take only a limited number of staff with him.
Krueger arrived in Brisbane on February 8, 1943, to a warm welcome from MacArthur. He was surprised that his command of the Sixth Army, to which the War Department had assigned him, was changed by MacArthur to command of something called the Alamo Force. He soon learned that all units in the Sixth Army had been transferred to this Alamo Force. The reason for this bit of deception by MacArthur became clear when Krueger realized that, as a regular army, the Sixth would have to report to the Australian general in charge of Allied Land Forces, but as a task force, Alamo Force could report directly to MacArthur. General Blamey might not have been fooled by this ruse, but he never said anything to MacArthur about it.
MacArthur, who now had the men he wanted commanding his land, air, and amphibious forces, could not be more pleased with his decision concerning Krueger. He later wrote that Krueger “became to the Sixth Army what George Kenney was to the Fifth Air Force. History has not given him due credit for his greatness.”18
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If the destruction of a Japanese convoy in the Bismarck Sea brought one message home to the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo, it was that the Allies were clearly dominating the skies over New Guinea. This was an unacceptable situation for a military that relied heavily on airpower. Japanese warships rarely engaged in combat unless they could be sure of the protective cover offered not only by the aircraft from their own carriers but also by land-based bombers and fighters. On land, Japanese army advances always included engineers to build forward airfields as quickly as possible.
One consequence of the Bismarck Sea fiasco was the development of Operation I-GO—sustained concentrated air attacks on Allied air forces in the Solomons and New Guinea. The goal was to drive enemy planes from the skies over those islands.19
Admiral Yamamoto, who made the fateful decision to take personal command of the navy’s part of I-GO, divided the operation into two phases. The first focused on the Solomons, especially Guadalcanal. The second phase targeted sites on New Guinea. Yamamoto flew to Rabaul to be near the action, and he transferred 150 aircraft from the 3rd Fleet carriers Zuikaku, Junyo, Hiyo, and Zuiho, at Truk to Rabaul, where they joined the planes of the 11th Air Fleet commanded by Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka. Yamamoto had over 350 carrier- and land-based aircraft for his operation, including 72
twin-engine bombers.20
When the first phase of attacks on Guadalcanal were complete on April 7, Yamamoto’s pilots claimed a great victory in the Solomons, including the sinking of ten transports, a cruiser, and a destroyer, and the shooting down of thirty-six enemy planes at the cost of twelve Japanese planes. In truth, they had sent only one American destroyer—the Aaron Ward—one New Zealand corvette, and an American tanker to the bottom of the sea. Seven American fighters were downed at a cost to the Japanese of thirty-nine aircraft.21
The second phase of attacks against targets on New Guinea began on April 11. First hit was the small port at Oro Bay, fifteen miles southeast of Buna, where several small ships were unloading supplies for the airfield at Dobodura. Twenty-two “Val” dive-bombers and seventy-two Zero fighters swept in a few minutes before twelve thirty p.m. One merchant ship sank, a second was so seriously damaged that its crew drove her up on the beach to prevent her from sinking, and an Australian minesweeper received light damage. Fifty fighters that scrambled from Dobodura assaulted the Japanese, downing six of the attackers at no cost to them.22
The following day it was Port Moresby’s turn. In what was the largest Japanese air raid so far in the entire theater, forty-three Mitsubishi medium bombers flew over the Owen Stanley Range, escorted by 131 Zeros. Several aircraft were damaged while still on the ground, and at least five attackers were shot down.23
Two days later, the formations attacked Milne Bay. Advance warning allowed several ships in the harbor to escape out of the bay, resulting in only one Dutch cargo ship lost, and several other small vessels damaged. Seven enemy and three Allied planes were shot down.24 Once again Japanese pilots greatly exaggerated their success, reporting 175 Allied planes downed, and the sinking of one cruiser, two destroyers and twenty-five transports.
War at the End of the World Page 23
