U.S. cavalrymen searching the area around Momote airfield discovered signs that a large force of enemy troops had occupied the area but had withdrawn under the bombing and withering ship bombardment. They found what appeared to be a headquarters for a battalion-size unit, including a warehouse full of supplies and three large kitchens.17
Colonel Ezaki had pulled his men back to allow the Americans to be drawn into what he hoped would be a trap to annihilate them. He had prepared well for the invasion, having received advanced warning when his radio operators intercepted and translated several messages discussing the coming event between American submarines patrolling the area around Los Negros.18
Sometime during that first day, Ezaki received orders from General Imamura at Rabaul. Perhaps incensed by the fact he had not been able to get additional troops to the Admiralties, partially the result of the navy’s reluctance to provide transports for the dangerous voyage, the general instructed Ezaki to launch a full-scale counterattack against the Americans. Instead, Ezaki did what Japanese Army commanders often did; he attacked the enemy in a piecemeal fashion instead of a massive assault. Had he done as ordered he might have succeeded, since he had nearly four thousand men at his disposal against the one thousand Americans who had landed. Instead of sending them all against the invaders, Ezaki ordered Captain Baba, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment, whose troops were closest to Hyane Harbor, to “annihilate the enemy.” He told Baba his attack was not a delaying action waiting for reinforcements. Ezaki said he was “highly indignant about the enemy’s arrogant attitude,” and Baba should kill himself if captured.19
After dark, the troops of the 1st Battalion moved against the defense perimeter that General Chase had positioned around the eastern end of the airfield. Attacking with machine guns and rifles, the Japanese were able to infiltrate the American line in several places, but were ultimately thrown back at terrible cost in lives. At one point, at least two Imperial soldiers reached Chase’s command post and nearly killed or captured him. They themselves were killed by one of Chase’s staff officers armed with a submachine gun.
The following morning the bulk of the infiltrators had withdrawn, leaving behind sixty-seven dead and a few stragglers who attempted to hide in the overgrown jungle. Most were hunted down and killed. The night’s action had cost the Americans fifteen wounded and seven killed.20
During that day, March 1, badly needed supplies arrived, courtesy of the Fifth Air Force. B-25s and B-17s made several runs over the Allied controlled area, dropping ammunition, food, blood plasma, mines, and grenades via parachutes. Chase knew his reinforcements would not arrive until the following day, so he wanted to understand the size of enemy forces in the area and learn what he could of their plans. When his intelligence officer said he suspected at least three thousand Japanese were on Los Negros, Chase was concerned that a concentrated attack would overwhelm his defenses. The enemy outnumbered him three to one, and with his back to the sea, he had no place to retreat. Reconnaissance patrols found numerous bunkers and other fixed positions that had only recently been vacated. There were also clear indications that large groups of Japanese soldiers were nearby, some as close as four hundred yards from the American lines. More important was the discovery of Japanese documents that revealed the locations of concentrations of enemy soldiers. Chase passed this information on to the Navy and Air Force. Allied planes bombed several of these locations, and two destroyers that had been left behind by Admiral Fechteler’s invasion fleet bombarded those they could reach.
Late in the afternoon, a group of seventeen Japanese officers and sergeants somehow managed to get within fifty yards of Chase’s command post before being discovered. This was truly a suicide mission. After the Americans gunned down several of the men, the remainder, including Captain Baba, killed themselves using swords and hand grenades.21
The surviving members of Baba’s battalion launched another, better-coordinated attack at five p.m., but faltered and broke up against the determined defense of the American cavalrymen. Small groups of Japanese soldiers attempted to infiltrate the American lines throughout the night. By daybreak, March 2, they had all withdrawn, leaving behind several hundred dead. One group of about fifty men actually swam out into the harbor wearing life belts in an attempt to get behind the American line. Their discovery cost virtually all of them their lives as the 75mm pack howitzers the cavalry regiment had wrestled ashore swept the swimmers with three hundred rounds.22
With reinforcements on the way, General Chase decided to push out his defensive perimeter to include the entire airfield. About five hundred of the men on the approaching ships were members of the Seabees and other construction groups who would immediately go to work repairing and expanding the landing zone. The Americans took control of the airfield without serious opposition. Chase was concerned that his weary men, most of whom had not slept since landing, would soon face a large concentrated enemy assault aimed at driving them into the sea. He was correct.
Colonel Ezaki was gathering his forces for an attack on the invaders on two fronts. He had centered his original defense on Seeadler Harbor because it seemed the obvious place for a large invasion force. As a result, many of his units had to struggle across Manus and Los Negros before they were in place. Although he wanted to attack quickly before Allied reinforcements could arrive, the colonel had little choice but to delay his all-out assault until the night of March 3.23
Early on the morning of March 2, Allied relief arrived aboard six LSTs carrying the reinforcement troops. There were also six LCMs loaded with a wide array of heavy equipment, including bulldozers and graders for the Seabees. Two U.S. Navy destroyers, one Australian destroyer, and two American minesweepers escorted them. Aboard the landing craft were the remainder of the 5th Cavalry, the 99th Battalion Field Artillery, and the 40th Seabees. Expecting a quiet landing, the soldiers and sailors were surprised to see American bombers and fighters bombing and strafing close to the beachhead. They came under fire themselves from Japanese mortars and machine guns, and the landing craft had to fight their way to the beach using their 40mm and three-inch guns. Several arriving troops also uncovered .50-caliber machine guns they were to bring ashore and opened fire on the enemy.
It took most of the day to unload all the landing craft. With their bulldozers and graders ashore, the Seabees and Army engineers cleared a road from the beach toward the airfield. Meanwhile, several destroyers and the minesweepers sailed around the island and attempted to force their way into Seeadler Harbor. Shore batteries there proved too well hidden for the destroyers to take them out, and the ships withdrew.
There was sporadic fighting around the airfield during the day and that night. Small groups of Japanese soldiers attempted to pierce the defense perimeter, but all failed. The following day most of the landing craft and several destroyers returned to New Guinea, leaving several destroyers to provide bombardment support when needed.
At seven p.m. on March 3, Ezaki’s coordinated attack began with troops from an independent regiment sweeping in from north. It quickly broke under intense fire from the destroyers, which received their direction from cavalry soldiers with eyes on the approaching enemy. Well-placed machine-gun nests and rifle fire from men in trenches devastated attacks by two other Japanese columns from different directions. What had started as a stealthy assault soon became a rush with screaming Japanese troops dropping from enemy shells and mines planted during the day. One report of the battle claims Japanese soldiers were able to cut radio communication cables to field artillery and mortar units and redirected their fire.24
After dark, several Japanese bombers attacked the destroyers and some shore positions but did little damage. By morning, the Japanese had pulled back, leaving some seven hundred dead for the Americans to count and dispose of. The action cost the Americans sixty-one dead, including nine Seabees who left their equipment to fight alongside the cavalrymen. A disheartened and a
ngry Ezaki ordered a complete withdrawal in an attempt to reorganize his forces.
Over the next few days additional men arrived from the 5th and 7th Cavalry, along with more Seabees and engineers. The Japanese had lost so many men that they were reduced to fighting a defensive war, initiating an attack only occasionally. By March 5, the situation for the defenders had become so grave that Colonel Ezaki signaled Rabaul that he was discontinuing night attacks. He described the Allied artillery shelling as “severe” and admitted his situation was “desperate.”25 On that same day, Allied radio operators picked up a message from someone on the islands to the Eighth Area Army headquarters proclaiming, “The time of our last hour is drawing near. We are striving for our fatherland.”26
Allied ship bombardment soon silenced Japanese shore batteries around Seeadler Harbor, and more Americans from several different divisions landed there. Localized combat was sometimes furious as the defenders were determined to fight to the death. Such fighting continued over both Los Negros and Manus Islands as the Americans hunted down and killed straggling Japanese. As for the original prime objective, Momote airfield, Australian spotter planes began using it on March 10. Except for a few small areas where minor concentrations of Japanese soldiers, now running low on food and ammunition, continued to hold out, MacArthur’s forces controlled the Admiralty Islands by April 3. Of the original Japanese garrison of nearly four thousand men, only seventy-five surrendered. The rest perished.
On May 1, General Krueger declared victory. Cavalry Division commander General Swift gave full credit to the Navy, saying, “They saved our necks.” Momote airfield was expanding to over seven thousand feet long as Krueger issued his declaration, and was soon joined by several more airfields, including two on nearby islands. Seeadler Harbor developed into one of the largest naval bases in the Pacific, with facilities to repair all types of warships. With control of the Admiralties, the Allies could isolate both Rabaul and Kavieng, preventing substantial aid from reaching both Japanese bases.
For MacArthur, the victory was a major step toward achieving his goal of securing the entire coast of New Guinea and ultimately driving the Japanese out of the Philippines. The U.S. Army’s official historian proclaimed that MacArthur’s decision to move quickly against Los Negros with a “reconnaissance in force” had “the very great virtue of hastening victory while reducing the number of dead and wounded.” The Navy’s historian claimed “the Admiralties’ gambit was a brilliant success; MacArthur’s decision was justified.”27
CHAPTER 16
Reckless and Persecution
The speed with which the Admiralties fell surprised just about everyone, except possibly General MacArthur. As the fighting wound down, he was busy altering Allied plans and changing his next objective.
The original plan, approved by the Joint Chiefs, called for MacArthur’s forces to move next against the powerful Japanese base at Hansa Bay, located between Madang and Wewak. The Imperial Japanese Army, anticipating MacArthur’s strategy, quickly began shipping troops there, resulting in the deployment of more than forty thousand Japanese soldiers in and around Hansa Bay by March 1944. Most were combat troops experienced at preparing well-fortified defenses. The Allies became aware of this buildup when code breakers in Brisbane intercepted a message from General Imamura in Rabaul to Tokyo that described the reinforcements then en route to the Hansa Bay area, including Madang and Wewak. The message also suggested that defenses at Hollandia, much farther up the coast, would also need strengthening.1
Meanwhile, Australian forces continued battling their way through the jungle toward Madang. General Adachi, Eighteenth Army commander, decided that the approaching Australians and the American forces now in the Admiralties could easily outflank and trap his troops at Madang. He ordered the war-weary men there to march along the coast to Wewak, 150 miles away. Short of food and harassed by Australian patrols and Allied aircraft, many of these men never reached their destination.2
Assaulting Hansa Bay worried at least one member of MacArthur’s planning staff, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers. Fellers feared that attempting to capture Hansa Bay, and engaging in combat with the still-powerful 18th Imperial Army, would bog down the SWPA forces and delay MacArthur’s timetable for his return to the Philippines. Instead, he suggested that if Admiral Nimitz’s Pacific Fleet could provide carrier-based fighter cover, the Allies should bypass Hansa Bay and strike nearly 550 miles farther up the coast, at Hollandia. Despite opposition to the idea from more senior members of GHQ, Fellers took his suggestion directly to MacArthur, who immediately liked it.
Fellers quickly found himself in hot water with his own boss, Brigadier General Stephen J. Chamberlin. Committed to invading Hansa Bay, Chamberlin had rejected Fellers’s suggestion to invade Hollandia. When Chamberlin discovered that Fellers had gone around him to MacArthur, he removed Fellers as chief of the planning section. MacArthur then demonstrated his gratitude to a man with a good idea by making Fellers his military secretary, thus rescuing Fellers’s military carrier.3
Based at least in part on Fellers’s suggestion and evaluation of the Hollandia defenses, MacArthur decided to bypass the more powerful and obvious targets at Wewak and Hansa Bay and instead reach all the way up to Hollandia. MacArthur sent his chief of staff, General Sutherland, to Washington to argue for approval of the change in plans. With the Joint Chiefs’ approval, MacArthur then ordered his staff and commanders to begin planning for a dual invasion at Hollandia and nearby Aitape.
The order was accomplished in classic MacArthur fashion. The first thing he did was send what were called “warning instructions” to his air, naval, and ground commanders outlining in broad terms what their goals were. He then called them together to discuss each man’s part in the planned operation, and appointed a coordinator. Although never a “control freak,” he remained aware of what everyone was doing and rarely if ever interfered with the tactical execution of their plans once he had approved them. Samuel Eliot Morison described MacArthur’s leadership in this way: “Here is the job to be done, these are the tools to do it with, and this is the time in which I wish it to be accomplished. You work out the details.”4
Admirals Barbey and Kincaid and Generals Eichelberger, Kenney, and Krueger assembled their staffs to begin planning the invasions. MacArthur appointed Krueger to coordinate the plans developed by this group. With little knowledge of the terrain, they had to come up with how many troops were needed and how many ships were required. One of their first conclusions was that General Kenney’s land-based fighter escort aircraft would be of little help since Hollandia was at the outer edge of their current range.5
Meanwhile, the successful isolation of Rabaul forced Imperial Headquarters to transfer control over General Adachi’s Eighteenth Army, on New Guinea, to the Second Area Army. Commanded by General Korechika Anami, the Second Area Army, which had transferred from Manchuria, now assumed responsibility for the defense of Dutch New Guinea. Hollandia was the first Japanese base across the border in the Dutch section of New Guinea, while Aitape, 150 miles southeast, was the closest Japanese stronghold in Australian Papua New Guinea to the border.
As Adachi consolidated his forces at Hansa Bay and Wewak, where Japanese troops had built numerous bunkers and fortified tunnels into the rising coral, he did not lose sight of Hollandia—in January 1944, he had said the port was his army’s “final base and last strategic point” in New Guinea. He also complained about the lax attitude of the Hollandia garrison, which for too long had been beyond the active combat zone. In March, General Anami, likely fearing envelopment of Madang by the American and Australian forces, ordered Adachi to begin withdrawing westward from Madang and other coastal strongpoints and consolidate his Eighteenth Army at Hollandia. These plans were placed on hold until July or August, however, since both Japanese generals believed that MacArthur would strike along the coast of Australian-governed New Guinea before crossing the border into the former Dutch territory
. Adachi, especially, was convinced the next attacks would come at Hansa Bay and/or Wewak.6
The plan developed by MacArthur’s GHQ called for three simultaneous landings. Two were in the Hollandia area: one at Humboldt Bay, the second about twenty-five miles west at Tanahmerah Bay. The third landing would be at Aitape.
Since occupying the Hollandia area in April 1942, the Japanese had constructed three airfields on the Lake Sentani plain between the two bays and behind the seven-thousand-foot-high Cyclops Mountains along the coast. Humboldt Bay was developed to serve as an anchorage for large ships that unloaded their cargoes there for transshipment by barge to the southeast as far as Wewak, 215 miles away. The town of Hollandia, which once served as the governmental seat of the region, was located on the western edge of Humboldt Bay. While the anchorage was important, MacArthur’s main objectives were the three airfields. Capturing and improving them would extend the range of General Kenney’s land-based bombers for future operations along the coast.
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