On June 21, Krueger’s belief that Adachi was planning to attack at Aitape was confirmed when captured Japanese documents revealed much of Adachi’s plans. American patrols throughout the perimeter area regularly engaged in action against enemy soldiers. These were considered to be mostly stragglers from various units, until a prisoner taken on July 10 revealed under interrogation that an attack from two directions was planned that very night. He told his questioners that one force would cross the Driniumor halfway between the village of Afua and the river’s mouth into the sea.25 Patrols along the western bank of the river, especially in the area assigned to 3rd Battalion of the 127th Infantry, had been regularly reporting sightings of Japanese soldiers on the east side of the river. Some of these involved large groups of well-armed troops. An attack was coming, and everyone knew it.
The action commenced at 11:45 p.m. on July 10, just as the prisoner had said. Samuel Eliot Morison would later describe the fighting along the Driniumor River as “the biggest and bitterest jungle battle in New Guinea since the Buna-Gona campaign of November–December 1942.”26 It began with a surprising artillery barrage on American positions across the river. Earlier, to maximize the effectiveness of their artillery fire, Japanese scouting units had mapped out where the Americans were located.
As many as ten thousand Japanese soldiers made the initial assault along the river. Many engaged in direct frontal attacks across the shallow water, resulting in considerable loss of lives from well-positioned American machine guns and artillery. Despite the appalling cost in lives, the Japanese continued attacking. In several places they were able to break through American lines and push the defenders back. On July 13, the American troops managed to reorganize themselves and counterattack. After daylight, American and Australian fighter-bombers supported the defending forces. In addition, Allied ships offshore bombarded enemy positions.
The fighting continued day and night as troops on each side fell from exhaustion. By the end of the month, the Japanese were running out of ammunition, which had been dangerously low when the attack began, and started falling back. On July 28, General Adachi considered the condition of his troops to be near total exhaustion. His staff estimated they would run completely out of food by August 3, even though the men were already on greatly reduced rations. On July 31, he sent word to the frontline units to begin preparations for withdrawal. Over the next two days, several desperate attacks were launched in an effort to drive the American defenders back and secure their food supplies, yet all failed. Early on August 4, Adachi ordered the 20th Division to begin withdrawing at noon. The 41st Division was to begin pulling back the following day.
Over the next few days and weeks the intensity of the fighting grew worse as Japanese troops attempted to drive American units away from their food supplies and at the same time withdraw under withering artillery, aircraft, and naval gunfire. Adachi tried to get badly needed food to his men using barges. Each time, the barges were destroyed or forced to return to Wewak by American PT boats and patrolling Allied aircraft. The fighting along the Driniumor River finally ended on August 25, 1944.
General Adachi’s attempt to drive the Americans out of Aitape cost the lives of nearly half the twenty thousand men he committed to the effort. For the Americans, the price of defending Aitape was 440 killed and 2,560 wounded.
At Hollandia, American units had spread out and been engaged in mopping-up operations against groups of Japanese stragglers. By early June, when active patrolling ceased, it was determined that nearly 4,500 Japanese had died around Hollandia. Another 611 had surrendered to the invaders. One hundred twenty-four Americans perished in Operation Reckless, and 1,100 were wounded. General Hugh Casey’s construction crews wasted little time in repairing and extending the airfields on the Sentani Plain.
General MacArthur, ever planning the next phase of his relentless march back to the Philippines, informed his commanders that he intended to launch an invasion of Wakde Island on May 15, followed twelve days later by an assault farther up the coast on Biak Island. He would require air operations from the Sentani Plain airfields to support both assaults. General Eichelberger was given the job of overseeing the construction of badly needed roads from the coast to the three airfields, as well as the much-needed improvements to the three formerly Japanese airfields. Eichelberger had pointed out that Japanese airfields were not suitable for the larger and heavier American aircraft that would have to be stationed there to cover MacArthur’s planned invasions. A fully loaded Mitsubishi Zero weighed 2,410 pounds, while a loaded American Lockheed P-38 twin-engine fighter weighed 17,500 pounds, and a B-25 Mitchell weighed nearly 20,000 pounds before its bombs were loaded.
Hollandia was to become an invaluable base for future air and naval operations. Eichelberger called the order to invade Hollandia “one of the great strategic decisions of the Pacific War.” As Army engineers worked around the clock improving the airfields, it became apparent that their use would be limited to fighters and medium bombers such as the B-25. The ground was just too spongy and the drainage too poor to allow the heavy B-24s to land safely, even if steel matting was used on the runways. Despite this shortcoming, Hollandia grew into a major Allied base housing 140,000 soldiers. By the end of June, it had seven hospitals operating with 3,650 beds. Hollandia harbor, with dozens of docks constructed by American engineers, could anchor an entire battle fleet.27
Later in the year, Hollandia would serve as the jumping-off place for a fleet of hundreds of transports and warships that sailed thirteen hundred miles, taking tens of thousands of American soldiers to the landings at Leyte in the Philippines. Hollandia allowed MacArthur to achieve his goal of returning to the Philippines two months earlier than he had originally planned.28
CHAPTER 17
Next Stop: Wakde
General Kenney once described MacArthur as a leader who “believed in moving fast when he was winning.”1
Even before the landings at Hollandia and Aitape on April 22, 1944, MacArthur’s planners were working on the next step up the New Guinea ladder toward the Philippines: Wakde Island. Located 140 miles from Hollandia along the New Guinea coast near where it bends to the west, Wakde is actually two islands so close together that the Allies simply referred to them as one. A narrow waterway separates the islands, usable only by shallow-draft vessels. The larger island, Insoemoar, was the more important of the two because the Japanese had an airfield there. Its one drawback was that it was surrounded with thick coral, hindering an amphibious assault, except for a five-hundred-foot stretch of beach. That was where the landing would take place. The smaller, Insoemanai Island, was closer to the coast and not occupied by the enemy. Until the fall of Hollandia, the Japanese Second Army considered Wakde an important forward base for the defense of the Geelvink Bay, farther west. The bay served as protection for the southern flank of the large Japanese naval base at the Palau Islands located between New Guinea and the Philippines at the western edge of the Caroline Islands. This Japanese stronghold sat astride the southern route to the Philippines, and perhaps most important, guarded the oil and resource-rich Dutch East Indies.2
Less than three miles off the New Guinea coast, Wakde stood sentinel at the eastern end of Maffin Bay, a ten-mile-wide indentation in the mainland. On the western end of the bay was the village of Sarmi, which had become a refuge for Japanese troops who had fled from Hollandia. MacArthur’s original plan was to conduct two landings in the area, one at Sarmi to capture the two Japanese airfields in the vicinity, and the other at Wakde Island. He changed his mind when he learned from General Willoughby, his intelligence chief, that as many as six thousand Japanese combat troops of the experienced 36th Division defended the Sarmi area. The fact that aerial photoreconnaissance revealed that the ground around the two airfields, Sawar and Maffin Airdromes, could not handle the weight of heavy American bombers, confirmed the decision. Fighters and medium bombers might use these fields, but the commander in chief wanted forwa
rd fields for his long-range heavies to enable them to attack the numerous enemy airfields then under construction in western New Guinea. This decision was supported when pilots engaged in Fifth Air Force bombing raids in the Sarmi area on April 28 and 29 reported strong antiaircraft fire that indicated the territory was well defended. Rather than risk an invasion, two days of raids effectively destroyed the two airfields and the tiny village of Sarmi itself.3
MacArthur turned his attention to Wakde, primarily the larger island of Insoemoar. Only 9,000 feet long and 3,000 feet wide, the island sported a 5,400-foot-by-390-foot runway built on coral. Photos revealed a series of barracks south of the runway where the Imperial troops occupying the island were housed. Several dispersal areas for parking aircraft were on the opposite side, some of which contained Japanese aircraft that had been destroyed on the ground by American raids. The island was home to a company of the 224th Infantry Regiment of the Japanese 36th Division, a mountain artillery platoon, several antiaircraft units, the 91st Naval Garrison Unit—the airfield was used principally, but not solely, by the Japanese Navy—and a construction detachment to maintain the runway. Allied air officers convinced MacArthur that the Wakde field could be made to accommodate heavy bombers.4
On April 10 MacArthur ordered General Krueger to prepare for the invasion of Wakde, which he tentatively set for May 15. General Kenney instructed General Whitehead to throw everything he could against Wakde and the Maffin Bay area prior to the planned landing. During the first two weeks of May, the Fifth Air Force dropped fifteen hundred tons of bombs on the island and the Maffin Bay shoreline, as well as firing a half million rounds of machine-gun ammunition. In addition, Allied destroyers and PT boats cruised the bay, attacking targets of opportunity. Since the Japanese Army had pulled every available aircraft west to keep them safe from Allied attack, these vessels had little to fear from enemy air action.5
The Japanese were not blind to what was happening. The heavy bombardment, coupled with the successful amphibious landings at Hollandia and Aitape, convinced Lieutenant General Hachiro Tagami, commanding officer of the 36th Division, that the Allies planned an amphibious attack in his area. In fact, on May 16, one day before the landings took place, Tagami warned his unit commanders that it was “highly probable” that Wakde Island and Sarmi would soon be assaulted.6
To bolster the defenses of the Wakde airfield, Tagami had the service and air force troops on Wakde evacuated and replaced by eight hundred marines who could be expected to put up a stronger defense. This was done two days before the assault and remained unknown to the Allies until a prisoner revealed it following the successful invasion.7
In preparation for the Wakde assault, twenty thousand Americans boarded vessels of varying sizes at Hollandia and Aitape. Most were from the 41st Infantry Division, although members of the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment were included. In overall command of the landings was Brigadier General Jens A. Doe, assistant division commander. Rear Admiral William Fechteler, Admiral Kenney’s deputy, commanded the convoy taking the troops up the coast. At first glance, a twenty-thousand-man invasion force for such a small island might seem like overkill, but the actual operation was to take place in two steps. General Krueger recognized that Wakde was too small to house all the troops he wanted to send to the area, as well as the tons of supplies they would require. Therefore, the first landing was scheduled two miles up the coast of the mainland from Wakde near the village of Arara. Intelligence sources reported that nearly eleven thousand Japanese troops were stationed along the coast from Arare west to Sarmi, and could be activated in days to defend against an amphibious landing. Most of the American troops were to be assigned to protect the landing zone on the mainland while a battalion of the 163rd Regimental Combat Team would conduct the invasion of Wakde from the village of Toem, directly opposite Wakde.
Meanwhile, the troops on Wakde made preparations for a last-stand defense of the island and airfield. They had constructed one hundred pillboxes and bunkers made bombproof by layers of thick coconut logs and coral overhead. Others took up positions in many of the caves that dotted the island, while still others removed machine-gun turrets from some of the many destroyed aircraft on the island and buried them up to their muzzles. It was an impressive display of ingenuity by combat-experienced men who realized they had nowhere to withdraw once the enemy arrived. They waited patiently, hidden from spying enemy aircraft whose pilots regularly reported seeing no human activity on the island.
In the rainy predawn hours of May 17, American and Australian cruisers began pouring six-inch shells into Sarmi, Wakde, and all points in between where Japanese troop concentrations were known or suspected. Ten American destroyers pulled in closer to shore to add to the pounding. The firing stopped after one hour to allow several floatplanes to mark the mainland beach with smoke bombs to pinpoint the locations for landing craft commanders to put their men and cargo ashore. First ashore were the soldiers of the 3rd Battalion of the 163rd Regimental Combat Team, landing, to their surprise, without opposition. They quickly established a defense perimeter. The 2nd and 1st Battalions followed, along with a battalion of combat engineers. By nine thirty a.m. the entire assault force was on the shore and had yet to encounter any enemy resistance.8
The 1st Battalion moved through the perimeter and headed east toward Toem. The plan was to transport the battalion to Wakde the following day. In preparation, one company was quickly taken to Insoemanai Island after the tiny islet was determined to be undefended. Once there, men set up machine guns and mortars and began shelling Wakde.
Other than an occasional sniper, no Japanese opposition had yet been encountered. The consensus seemed to be that the Japanese had deserted Wakde. One story has it that the American company commander on Insoemanai claimed he could wade over to the big island and capture it with just his orderly. Luckily for him, he did not attempt it.9
That same day, General Eichelberger’s chief of staff, General Clovis Byers, flew over the islands and reported no activity. He boasted he and his pilot would have landed on the airfield except for the numerous large bomb craters the Air Force had created.10
The Japanese, meanwhile, were waiting inside their bunkers, pillboxes, and caves, unseen by Allied eyes and unharmed by Allied bombs. One man who remained skeptical about the reported lack of defenses on Wakde was General Doe, who resisted attempts to move up the schedule for the invasion. He wanted to give the 218th and 67th Field Artillery Battalions that had come ashore with the 163rd a chance to continue the softening up of Wakde from their positions along the new beachhead at Arara.
At eight thirty the following morning, May 18, two destroyers opened a bombardment of Wakde with their five- and six-inch guns, focusing on the west side facing the smaller island since the assault craft would have to pass between the two islands to arrive at the landing beach. Overhead, several American fighter-bombers strafed the same area. This was followed by the arrival of three rocket-launching LCIs. Two of them led the landing craft in with the first of six waves of 1st Battalion troops. They laid down a barrage of rockets on the landing beach. The third LCI flanked the landing craft between it and the shore of Wakde, firing its rockets onto the shore. It was then that the Japanese machine gunners hidden along the shore opened a deadly fire on the landing craft. The LCIs quickly positioned themselves between the enemy shore and the troop landing craft to draw off the Japanese fire. The three rocket launchers suffered heavy casualties because of this courageous maneuver, with 20 percent of their crews killed or wounded.11
The first wave with Rifle Company B went ashore on the beach at 9:10. Succeeding waves with the remaining three companies, along with two Sherman tanks from the 603rd Tank Company of the 1st Cavalry Division, hit the beach by 9:25. One of the company commanders was killed by intense Japanese fire, and two others were wounded. The four companies fanned out and began clearing the area of enemy resistance. The two tanks proved invaluable in helping drive the Jap
anese from the relative safety of their bunkers. All four companies headed via different routes to the center of the island and the airfield. They found Japanese hiding in caves and coconut plantation homes that had been wrecked by the bombing and shelling. For the most part, the fighting was close in with rifles, grenades, and even bayonets as the enemy fought back desperately.
Shortly after noon, Company A’s advance was halted by a group of Japanese firing from three pillboxes near what passed for the coast road. One tank eliminated the pillboxes and the infantry killed the troops staffing it and several foxholes behind it. The intense fighting continued in this vein for the rest of the day and all the following day. The Japanese were fighting to the death, as they had no means of escape. Near the eastern end of the airfield, the advance of three companies halted under relentless small-arms and machine-gun fire. The Americans were unable to gain control of the airfield as the enemy had positioned himself ideally for its defense. By nightfall, both sides took up defensive positions and waited for the return of daylight. The day’s fighting cost the lives of twenty-one Americans, including seven officers and fourteen noncommissioned officers, as well ninety-four men wounded. The latter were taken back to the landing beach, where an LST serving as a frontline hospital had arrived. Along with it were three more LSTs bringing engineer construction crews and heavy equipment to begin work on the airfield as soon as it was taken. Japanese losses were estimated at two hundred dead and many more wounded. No Japanese surrendered that day.12
War at the End of the World Page 34
