During the second half of June, Kenney’s B-25s and P-38s pounded Noemfoor, as well as the airfields at Sorong and Manokwari, destroying as many as sixty enemy aircraft, many while still on the ground. They also sank ten thousand tons of shipping by attacking small craft trying to sneak supplies and reinforcements to New Guinea from the Philippines.9
On June 21, two teams of Alamo Scouts landed on Noemfoor with orders to estimate the number of Japanese combat troops, as well as both their physical condition and their morale—the latter based on their appearance, since an unkempt look might reveal low morale and poor discipline. Scouts were also to determine the caliber of the troops staffing the coastal defense guns. Finally, and perhaps most important, they were to report on the condition of the eight-hundred-foot beach fronting the Kamiri Airfield where the Americans planned to land.
The two teams, each totaling six men, arrived aboard a PT boat in the dark of night. Their first mission was to identify the exact location and size of the break in the coral reef offshore of the landing beach. They did so, and then found that the beach—now called Yellow Beach—was ideal for a landing, since it had only a gradual slope up from the water’s edge. Searching the area around the airfield, they discovered that the enemy appeared rather shabby, and many walked around unarmed. They reported seeing three Japanese tanks, each sporting a 47mm gun and two 7.7mm machine guns. The PT boat picked the teams up during the night of June 23. Their estimate of the number of enemy troops on the island was five thousand, which turned out to be too high.10
Unknown to the scouts, they had been spotted by Japanese soldiers, who reported their presence to the island’s commander, Colonel Suesada Shimizu. The colonel was the commanding officer of the 219th Infantry Regiment of the 35th Division, who on arriving at Noemfoor on June 8, had assumed command of the newly created Noemfoor Defense Detachment. Expecting an enemy assault in the near future, Shimizu established fourteen strongpoints to defend. The Kamiri Airfield was the primary defensive position, and the others were strung out along the coast in both directions toward the other airfields.11
The reports of enemy reconnaissance confirmed Shimizu in his conviction that the Kamiri Airfield would be the Allies’ primary target and the beach just to its west would be their entry point. Meanwhile, radio intercepts warned General Krueger that the enemy commander on Noemfoor was anticipating an attack and moving troops from other sections of the island to the Kamiri Airfield area. Having already suspected that the enemy might be trying to reinforce the Noemfoor Defense Detachment, Krueger now sped up preparations to conduct the landing on June 30, the date MacArthur had recommended.12
The commander in chief had originally suggested to Krueger that he use units from the 6th Infantry Division for the Noemfoor invasion, but Krueger decided against that because the division was still heavily engaged in fighting in the Wakde area around Lone Tree Hill. Instead, he selected the 158th Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Brigadier General Edwin D. Patrick, the “Green Hornet.” Unsure of the number of enemy combat troops his men would face, Krueger also prepared the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment as a reserve. If the eight thousand combat troops of the 158th RCT and the five thousand service personnel—mostly Australian engineers assigned to work on the airfields—became bogged down, the two thousand paratroopers would drop in to help. While they waited in the Hollandia area, the paratroopers studied maps and photos of Noemfoor and attended orientation lectures on the terrain and known enemy positions on the island.13
Both Admiral Barbey, whose ships would deliver the assault team, and General Kenney, whose aircraft were assigned to soften up the island’s defenses prior to the invasion, pressured Krueger to delay the invasion by at least two days. Barbey insisted the infantrymen needed more practice at amphibious landings, and said several of the ships assigned to escort the invasion fleet were still at the Admiralties, refueling and rearming. Kenney wanted to be able to bring additional aircraft to the fight and needed the time to get them into the area. Reluctantly, knowing the delay would annoy MacArthur, Krueger agreed to postpone the invasion to Sunday, July 2. MacArthur gave the change his approval.14
In addition to the normal preinvasion bombardment by the Air Force’s B-24s, B-25s, and A-20s around the entire landing zone at dawn on July 2, Noemfoor was treated to something special. Ten minutes before the troops hit the beach, three hundred thousand-pound bombs fused to detonate simultaneously “crunched along the line of beach defenses,” as Kenney described the scene.15
Meanwhile, a mixed American-Australian fleet consisting of one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, and several rocket ships had fired eighteen thousand shells and eight hundred rockets at the landing zone and surrounding area, beginning at four thirty a.m. The naval bombardment was heavier than any that had ever taken place in the SWPA previously, and especially so for an invasion that many suspected might be only lightly resisted.16
Fifteen minutes before the scheduled eight a.m. landing, thirty-three Army Air Force B-24s attacked a coral ridge and hill line behind the airfield, from which enemy resistance was expected. They dropped five-hundred-pound bombs that shattered the coral. At eight, the landing craft passed through the opening in the reef, or in the case of tracked LVTs, climbed over it, and brought the first wave of troopers from the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 158th RCT onto the sandy beach near the Kamiri Airfield.
Opposition was minimal, with only a few Japanese firing their weapons. Most had been so stunned by the massive bombardment that there was no fight left in them. At one point, about three dozen Japanese soldiers spilled out of a cave in the coral terrace just beyond the landing strip, which had quickly fallen to the Americans without resistance. The dazed enemy troops at first just milled around as if they were unsure what had happened and how they should respond. They had little chance for that, as the advancing Americans poured rifle and machine-gun fire into their midst, killing them all.17
The 1st Battalion of the 158th headed toward the western end of the airfield while members of the 2nd Battalion headed east. Everyone had to move as quickly as possible to make room for troops and tanks landing behind them. Both battalions were soon joined by the 3rd, and all troops engaged in clearing caves and other prepared defensive positions that had been mostly abandoned or were occupied by Japanese who put up little or no resistance. By nightfall, with thousands of combat and support troops ashore or soon to be, the beachhead extended beyond the airfield. Despite rumors, which later proved to be substantially false, of numerous enemy snipers in the area, the Americans began moving some of the partially destroyed thirty Japanese aircraft from the field as they waited for the Australian engineers of the RAAF’s 62 Works Wing to arrive and begin repairing the landing strip.
The only serious opposition the invading forces encountered were some 70mm artillery and mortar shells fired onto the beach landing zone and the coral reef beyond from distant enemy positions. They succeeded in killing one American and injuring several others. In addition, several vehicles, including a truck filled with ammunition, were destroyed. The enemy shelling continued intermittently for about two hours until gunners aboard the naval escort ships found their targets and silenced them.18
The original plan for the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment called for a battalion to drop onto the Kornasoren Airfield once the Americans seized it, a milestone expected to be achieved on July 3. Yet when General Patrick was informed that a captured Japanese soldier had mentioned that between 3,500 and 4,000 enemy troops had been recently brought to the island to support its defense, he became concerned. He questioned if he might be facing a situation similar to that on Biak, where the enemy laid low during the actual landings, then later launched surprise attacks from well-fortified positions. Now he was unsure how many enemy combat troops he faced, especially when he recalled how Allied intelligence had greatly underestimated the number of Japanese at Sarmi.19
Patrick decided he did not want
to wait for the reinforcements; instead, he radioed Krueger asking that the entire parachute regiment be sent right away, and changed its landing zone to the Kamiri Airfield, which was under his control. These troopers’ presence at the airfield would relieve his infantrymen of defense duties so that they could prepare to fight whatever enemy was waiting for them in the nearby jungles and hills. General Krueger responded quickly that the 1st Battalion of the 503rd PIR would drop in at eleven the next morning, July 3. It would be followed over the next two days by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. By midday on July 5, the entire regiment was scheduled to be at Kamiri Airfield to support the 158th RCT. This would give Patrick an additional two thousand combat troops to accomplish his mission.20
Meanwhile at Biak, another 2,700 men of the 34th Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division were preparing for the possibility that they might have to lend their support to the troops on Noemfoor. Having assembled on the Biak beach on June 30, they were prepared to load into LCIs in less than twenty-four hours for the nine-hour trip if they were needed. On Noemfoor, the Americans and Australians settled in for a relatively quiet night, although everyone remained on alert for a possible enemy attack.
At six thirty the following morning, July 3, a C-47 transport carrying paratroopers from the 1st Battalion took off from Hollandia and headed out over Humboldt Bay. Another followed every thirty seconds until all thirty-eight transports, along with three B-17s loaded with ammunition and other supplies, were airborne. Once all forty-one planes were over the water, they assembled into formation and headed toward Noemfoor. Unknown to the men aboard the transports, General Patrick had radioed Alamo Force headquarters with specific instructions on the approach the C-47s should use at Kamiri. A Canadian paratroop officer attached to Patrick’s headquarters had warned him that the condition of the runway was such that it would be dangerous for the paratroopers to drop on it from their normal two-plane, side-by-side formation. Instead, the C-47s should fly in single file so that the men aboard would have a better chance of landing in the center of the airstrip. Although Kamiri Airfield was 250 feet wide, the Canadian’s inspection of the drop zone revealed that the sides of the strip were covered with wrecked Japanese aircraft, as well as bulldozers, trucks, and other heavy equipment used by the engineers. The presence of all this equipment narrowed the usable airstrip to just one hundred feet. The Canadian was worried the men dropping from the sky faced serious injury and even death if they landed among all the obstacles. For some unknown reason, Patrick’s instructions, and the reason for them, never reached the pilots of the C-47s or the regiment’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel George M. Jones, who was aboard the first aircraft in formation.21
Just about everything that could go wrong with an insertion of paratroopers into a war zone—with the exception of enemy action, of which there was still none—did go wrong at Kamiri Airfield on July 3. First, the C-47s approached the drop zone two abreast instead of single file as General Patrick had requested. This alone guaranteed at least some of the paratroopers would land amid the equipment and debris on the sides of the landing strip. This failure was compounded when the pilot of the lead plane, carrying Colonel Jones, forgot to reset his craft’s altimeter from sea level to ground level, leading to his approaching at an altitude of about 150 feet, far below the minimum 400 feet required for the parachutes to open and the troopers to land safely. When the green jump light signaled the men to go, they leaped out of the plane without realizing how close to the ground they were. The following C-47s had locked onto the first aircraft and approached the same way, but the pilots of a few farther back realized the error and quickly attempted to increase their altitude before the jumpers went out.
Once out of the aircraft, the parachutes had only a few seconds to deploy before the troopers hit the ground harder than they should have. As a result, they smashed onto the crushed and compacted coral surface. Others crashed into various pieces of heavy equipment, and several landed in trees or on tree stumps. Of 739 paratroopers who jumped that morning, 72 officers and men were injured, many with serious bone fractures, including broken ankles and legs. Colonel Jones very nearly suffered a serious head injury, but was saved by his steel helmet. He would complain of a throbbing headache for eight days after. The battalion’s commander, Major Cameron Know, suffered a broken foot. The 1st Battalion of the 503rd PIR suffered a ten percent casualty rate before ever encountering an enemy soldier.22
The injured soldiers received minimal first aid at the strip. Instead, they were taken to aid stations on the beach and eventually boarded ships for Finschhafen, where breaks and fractures were repaired. Some of these men would never be able to jump again. Despite his throbbing head, Jones reported to Patrick and received orders to relieve the infantrymen guarding the airstrip. By midafternoon, the 2nd Battalion of the 158th RCT had turned over defense of Kamiri Airfield to the paratroopers, who quickly established their own defense perimeter.23
On July 4, the 3rd Battalion was dropped onto Kamiri Airfield. By then, General Patrick had the construction equipment used to repair the landing strip moved as far away as possible, and the wrecked Japanese planes dragged off. This time, the C-47s came in at four hundred feet and in single file before the jump light turned green. The lucky jumpers managed to land in the sand along the sides of the runway, now cleared of vehicles. The unlucky ones landed on the crushed coral of the runway, which proved as hard as concrete. This time, 8 percent of the men suffered injuries that removed them from duty. By now, Colonel Jones had had enough of his troopers being injured, and prevailed on General Patrick to bring the 2nd Battalion to Noemfoor by ship. It arrived a few days later with no serious injuries.24
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Once security for the Kamiri Airfield was in the hands of the paratroopers, Patrick resumed his advance across the island, with his focus on capturing the two other airfields. At about five a.m. on July 4, soldiers from the 1st Battalion of the 158th RCT forded the nearby Kamiri River and were attacked while crossing a small hill by three Japanese companies. The fighting lasted for several hours until the enemy withdrew, leaving behind the bodies of 201 comrades. The Americans suffered only two wounded. The Americans would henceforth know the place where the battle occurred as “Hill 201.”
On the same day, the 3rd Battalion’s troops moved east along the coastal road toward Kornasoren Airfield. Although they saw numerous signs of enemy activity in the area, including minefields and fixed defensive positions, they found no Japanese soldiers. They occupied the airfield without opposition, set up a perimeter defense, and began patrolling the area the following day, after calling in the engineers to work on the landing strip.25
Next, General Patrick turned his attention to Namber Airfield, along the island’s west coast. Concerned about the location of the still substantial Japanese force on Noemfoor, Patrick decided against sending his 2nd Battalion, having been relieved of perimeter defense duty by the paratroopers, up the coast road to seize the airfield. Instead, he had them board landing craft and—escorted by three destroyers, an LCI rocket vessel, and six B-25s—on July 6, they landed on the coast and took control of the airfield with no enemy opposition. They had the airstrip ready to receive Allied aircraft within hours. One can only assume that Colonel Shimizu, the island’s Japanese commander, had decided that since he did not have any aircraft, and the chances of Imperial Army or Navy airplanes coming to his rescue were nonexistent, he saw no reason to expend his force defending landing strips for which he had no use.26
Throughout the area occupied by the Americans, enemy activity was confined to a few stragglers who wanted to die for their emperor, or conversely, decided they were so hungry they just surrendered. On July 11, Patrick, aware that there remained some enemy force hidden in the jungle, divided Noemfoor into two sectors. The 158th RCT was to patrol and engage in mopping-up operations in the southern half of the island, while the 503rd PIR did the same in the northern half.
With the island being searc
hed by, and mostly under the control of, friendly Americans, the native population emerged from hiding places in the jungle. Some waved Dutch flags to signal the Americans. With the help of Dutch civil authorities, they were resettled into their coastal villages, protected by American troops. In late July, the village chiefs called a meeting at which they declared war on Japan and began actively seeking out Japanese soldiers, who were either killed or captured and turned over to the Americans. By the end of August, they had taken fifty enemy soldiers prisoner and killed a similar number.27
Meanwhile, soldiers from both American regiments continued their search for the remaining Japanese on the island. Following a series of skirmishes, paratroopers discovered an enemy force hidden near a map location called “Hill 670.” On July 16, the 1st Battalion of the PIR attacked the hill, killing 116 Japanese and seizing the high ground. The rest of the enemy, an unknown number, melted away into the jungle. Throughout the next weeks, the diminishing enemy force attempted to find a safe haven, but it was not to be. During the middle of August, patrolling Americans found clear signs that the enemy had turned to cannibalizing their own dead as well as slave laborers and even a few Americans.
Despite the fact that Colonel Shimizu and a handful of his men, probably his personal bodyguard, were never found, General Krueger declared the Noemfoor operation over on August 31, 1944. The American forces had suffered 63 men killed, 343 wounded, and 3 reported missing; Japanese deaths exceeded 1,700, and 180 were taken prisoner.
MacArthur’s decision to invade and capture Noemfoor had two goals. One was to eliminate the small island as a staging area for Japanese troops being transferred from the large enemy base at Manokwari on New Guinea to reinforce the defenders on Biak. The second was to activate the enemy-built airfields for use by General Kenney’s bombers and fighters as the Allies moved west along the Vogelkop Peninsula and even across the sea to the Philippines. Achieving the first was simple. With the Americans in control of Noemfoor, not only did the transfers to Biak halt, but also troops began to move out of this now clearly vulnerable base farther west to Sorong.
War at the End of the World Page 40
