A few days before the expedition departed Frontenac had received orders from France not to undertake the restoration of Fort Frontenac this year, given that the expense incurred and the supplies used would be of more service in a general campaign against the Iroquois homelands. In the end the governor ignored the order and sent Crisasy on with his mission. This latter move brought the governor in direct conflict with the intendant Champigny, who reminded him of the court’s wishes to no avail. “I believed that he would change his design, as he might easily have done,” Champigny wrote the minister of the marine Count Pontchartrain on August 11, 1695. “For this purpose I suggested endless reasons, but all in vain, except in that he sent orders to reduce the garrison by twenty men.” The intendant was not alone in questioning why a large-scale expedition had not been launched against the Onondaga if for no other reason than to secure the allegiance of the French high country nations allied against them.7
Although the governor’s past dealings with the fort had raised an eyebrow when he sought to restore it, in a letter to Pontchartrain he explained his actions. First, the governor agreed that a show of force was necessary to keep the French allies true to the cause. Had he cancelled the planned operation, which was only days away from departing Montreal, he would have sent quite the opposite message. Second, although many about him wanted to assemble a grand army and descend upon the Onondaga, such talk was foolish. He had neither the troops to accomplish this task, nor was it likely to amount to anything, as the Iroquois had shown time and again that when faced with a superior threat they would simply abandon their villages and disappear into the forest. Thus, the money and time invested in such a venture would be wasted for little in return. Third, the reestablishment of Fort Frontenac would provide the least expensive and most probable path toward convincing the Five Nations to seek peace by acting as a supply depot for the high country tribes and a launching pad for raids into Iroquois territory. Locked in a war of attrition that they could not possibly win the Iroquois would return to Montreal sincere in their desire to end the conflict.8
At least there were no criticisms when it came to the task of repairing the old fort. Crisasy took only twenty-six days to accomplish his task. At first it was thought that simple wooden palisades would be erected to cover the holes blown in the fort’s walls when the garrison abandoned the fort several years before, but Crisasy’s men were able to use a nearby mixture of fine clay to fill in and repair the breaches in the stone. Firewood for the winter was cut and barracks built within the stronghold’s interior for the forty-eight men who would garrison the post. By mid-August Crisasy and the detachment were back at Montreal having accomplished their goals without the loss of a single man.9
The onset of summer also brought a rise in Iroquois raids, not only in the French settlements but in their allies’ villages as well. None of the raids were what one might deem large scale, but the general tone of the summer drifted from peace back toward war. The raids escalated into rumors and sightings of a large—seven-to eight-hundred-man—Iroquois war party descending the St. Lawrence. By mid-August the information had become concerning enough that Frontenac deployed several hundred troops to Isle Perrot in Lake St. Louis to intercept the invaders, but nothing came of the incident.
To the west Marine captain Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac, in command of the French post at Michilimackinac, had convinced a number of Ottawa to launch an attack on the Iroquois. The venture proved successful and elicited an unexpected response from the Iroquois to the Miami to either declare war against the French or be driven off their land by the Five Nations. To enact the plan a large Iroquois war party moved against a major Miami village on the St. Joseph River, but in the process they were ambushed and defeated by a French-Miami force under Marine lieutenant Augustin de Courtemanche. This is not to say that the Iroquois had not made inroads into the French alliance in the region. There were enough near defections and secret negotiations between the Iroquois and the Huron alone to keep Cadillac busy all summer trying to undo the damage.10
With the onset of harvest season there was no lack of targets for Iroquois war parties and a number succeeded in carrying away a handful of captives in scattered attacks. One of the larger Iroquois expeditions, however, was not so fortunate. In late September news reached the governor that a large Iroquois war party had been sighted on Lake Champlain. Fearing an attack on Longueuil, Boucherville, or another settlement in the area Frontenac dispatched a force of thirty or so Canadians, soldiers, and mission Indians under Sieur de La Durantaye to intercept this force. The detachment immediately set out by canoe from Quebec and, upon reaching the Richelieu River, ascended the waterway to within sight of Fort Chambly. Here Durantaye pulled his canoes ashore and set off to the west. French scouts soon found signs that a large Iroquois war party had recently passed by. Armed with this information and their movements masked by rain and dark weather Durantaye’s force moved toward Boucherville where they found the Iroquois war party encamped at the edge of a woods before the town. Never surrendering the element of surprise the French and Indian detachment burst upon the Iroquois encampment, setting the majority of the raiders to flight without their arms or supplies. A brief firefight broke out in the woods that felled two of Durantaye’s men, but the Iroquois were completely shattered by the attack. A second war party of Sault mission Indians attacked the fleeing remains of the Iroquois a few days later on the Richelieu River, further scattering what was left of the attackers.11
With the harvest brought in and the season advancing Frontenac’s fears regarding an English attack on Quebec slowly subsided. Reports of a New England frigate and a brigantine cruising the mouth of the St. Lawrence caused some concern for the relief fleet daily expected from France, but on the last day of September even this apprehension vanished as the news quickly spread of the arrival of eight vessels from France loaded with supplies and munitions. “What pleasure, what joy, what consolation for people in want of everything!” one chronicler wrote of the occasion, perhaps capturing not only the feelings surrounding the appearance of the flotilla but the general relief of having survived another summer under a constant threat of invasion.
The leadership of New York viewed the fall of 1695 in a similar light. For Governor Fletcher in particular, the last two years had been something of a confirmation of his previous warnings to Whitehall. The population of the colony had dropped by 40 percent, to the point that one out of every ten men in the colony was on military duty at any given time. It was not surprising. With too small of a population to defend itself, and a crushing tax burden to support the troop levels needed to defend the province, many people had simply left. The colony’s fortifications were badly in need of repairs, and cannon, powder, and muskets were in short supply. Added to this was the strain from the frequent militia call-ups, and frontier garrison duty was starting to be reflected in the colony’s declining agricultural output.
To make matters worse, the Iroquois, who to a large degree the colony depended upon to guard the frontier, were stretched to the breaking point and had entered into peace negotiations with the French. “Though always our friends,” the governor confided to a colleague, “they are much wasted by the war and too sensible of the weakness of this province when they find the neighbouring Colonies give us no assistance. Without losing their affection for the English they have struck up a treaty with the French for themselves, wherein I am obliged to acquiesce for want of force.” On several occasions Fletcher had done his best to discourage these negotiations, or at least direct their intentions, but he had little to show for the effort in the way of results.12
At least there appeared to be some relief for the colony. Orders arrived in late 1694 laying out Fletcher’s powers to call upon 120 of the Connecticut militia in time of war. In late fall even better news arrived concerning the colonial quotas. Since the colonies could not agree upon such numbers themselves the king specified the following troop commitments: Connecticut, 120; Rhode Island, 48; Massachuse
tts, 350; Maryland, 160; Virginia, 240; New York, 200; and Pennsylvania, 80. Governor Fletcher was appointed commander-in-chief of this colonial force and, as he already occupied the governorship of New York, no quota was specified for Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. It was hardly an end to the inter-colonial problems. Several colonies chose to send money or supplies in lieu of men. There were questions as to who paid for and equipped the troops and fears that constant false alarms would tax the militia and lead to escalating costs. Together these points and a number of others undermined the effort to raise a colonial army for the defense of the frontier. In October 1695, an exasperated Fletcher informed Whitehall that he could not “procure one man of the 1,198 appointed.” The crown’s attempt to put some form of unified colonial command in place had failed miserably. Fletcher was a commander in name only.13
Like his adversary to the north Fletcher dealt with constant rumors of French intentions toward the Iroquois and New York. Rumors of a planned attack on Albany, Kingston, or the Mohawk villages in the fall of 1694 occupied much of the governor’s time, but nothing came of the alarm. Spring brought new whispers concerning an impending attack on the Onondaga. The reports appeared substantial enough that Fletcher immediately dispatched powder and shot to his allies as well as called out three hundred New York militia to march to their aid. The matter proved to be yet another false alarm, and although Fletcher was concerned that he did not have enough troops to guard the frontier, he need not have been. Albany was an enclosed town supported by some three hundred troops and the town’s militia. It would take a sizable French and Indian force to truly threaten the town, and without cannon, which would prove incredibly difficult for a French and Indian force to transport to the town, there was really little chance of Albany falling. Many of the smaller posts north of the town were garrisoned as well, but they protected little these days. The perils of war on the frontier had chased away most of the settlers and left their villages a fraction of their prewar numbers. Small-scale raids still dotted the landscape throughout the summer and fall of 1695, but it was impossible to stop these even if the governor had three times as many troops under his command. In some sense the citizens of New York were fortunate in that little else would occur on the frontier during the war to upset the status quo. There would be scares and rumors in the coming years, but the Hudson and Champlain valleys were soon to take a back seat while King William’s War reignited to the north, east, and west during its final full year.14
CHAPTER TWENTY
Frontenac and the Onondaga
BY THE FALL OF 1695 any English threat to Quebec had passed, but for Frontenac matters concerning the Iroquois and his native allies had already become a priority. Dealings with both had deteriorated into a crisis. What the French court had warned the governor about had become a reality; the Five Nations were not serious about a peace treaty and had only sought time to regain their strength. Renewed attacks on the colony made this clear. What was far worse was that the truce in place over the last year had allowed the Iroquois to open direct negotiations with the Ottawa, Huron, and several other high country tribes. The Iroquois aim was a commercial arrangement that would break the ring of French trade and political alliances in the west, and the timing of the Five Nations’ proposals could not have been better. The high country tribes had seen little in the way of effort on the part of the French to strike at the Iroquois, and lingering on-again, off-again peace negotiations had left them open to the arrangement. There was also the matter of several French traders who had begun bypassing the Ottawa and trading with the Sioux at the southwestern edge of Lake Superior. Arming the traditional and powerful enemies of the high country tribes had led to conversations concerning a military alliance with the Five Nations in exchange for commercial considerations.
The Iroquois move had created nothing short of a calamity within the Franco-native alliance. It appeared the high country tribes were on the verge of agreeing to a separate peace with the Iroquois—one which would undoubtedly bring them into contact with the English in a short order of time. Such an event would be nothing short of a disaster. Although the governor had sought to weaken and bring the Iroquois to a sincere peace through a petite de guerre, or a conflict of raids and attrition, the current situation required immediate action. Frontenac had expressed his doubts about whether a major expedition against the Five Nations would accomplish anything, but now such a large-scale operation was needed to secure the commitment of the Ottawa and other allied tribes in the war against the Iroquois. Callières, Champigny, and even the French court were pleased to see the count’s change of heart.1
Fortunately for New France the resourceful Cadillac, who had taken command at Michilimackinac, was able to rally a number of principle chiefs against the Iroquois. One of these, a prominent Potawatomi chieftain named Onaske, soon raised a war party and in October attacked a large Iroquois contingent that had been hunting near the Ottawa River. In a running engagement Onaske and his men managed to pin the Iroquois force against the river and slowly decimate its numbers until many in desperation drowned braving the frigid river. Some forty Iroquois warriors were killed, thirty scalps taken, and another thirty-two Iroquois brought back as prisoners. The war party also captured nearly five hundred beaver skins worth a sizable amount of money and English supplies that had been given to the Iroquois. Iroquois losses aside, the attack accomplished what Cadillac had hoped in derailing the Iroquois peace talks and buying Frontenac the time he needed to organize a response.2
Resolved on a major campaign there were no questions as to where to attack. Frontenac and his council had agreed earlier that the blow should fall upon the Onondaga, who were now leading the Five Nations’ efforts against the French and their allies. The question was more when and with what forces. Serious consideration was given to a winter attack on the Onondaga villages primarily because the season made it more likely that a significant number of the tribe would be present. If the villages and the Onondaga’s supplies harbored within them were destroyed during the winter, it would inflict the maximum amount of damage even if the Onondaga chose to flee and not fight. The approach was sound and borne out by the winter raid on the Mohawk villages in 1693. It was also wholly unrealistic. The logistics were simply too immense. A war party large enough to face the combined might of the Iroquois would have to travel over 450 miles from Montreal over brutal country during the most inhospitable time of year. Even by Canadian standards this seemed a stretch. A record snowfall earlier in the season soon put any thoughts of a winter expedition out of the question.
Frontenac considered another attack on the Mohawk during the winter, but instead he dispatched a handpicked force of three hundred men under Louvigny to fall upon the Iroquois who had wintered near the Ottawa River. Although the detachment was ready to leave Montreal at the end of January a two-week blizzard halted their plans. The war party would eventually make its way toward Fort Frontenac, but exhausted by navigating seven-foot-deep snow drifts their task appeared to be in vain. Luck was on their side, however, and they surprised a party of eleven Iroquois, killing three of their number before the rest were led back to Montreal in chains.3
Preparations for the upcoming campaign continued, and by May 1696 the governor was meeting with Callières and his senior officers in Quebec to discuss the final details. On June 22, Frontenac, along with the detachments of colonial marines assigned to the operation and the militia contingents from Quebec and Three Rivers, arrived at Montreal. The army encamped at La Chine and on July 4 were joined by five hundred Huron, Abenaki, and Iroquois from the various local missions. The native warriors combined with the eight hundred troops of the marine and some 1,200 militia made Frontenac’s army an impressive sight.
On July 6, the army moved to Ilse Perrot. From here the six hundred boats and canoes carrying the expedition departed in stages. Callières, commanding the vanguard of five hundred natives and two battalions of marines, took the lead. This was followed by a contingent of Canadians
and two large bateaux, which carried a pair of small cannon and a number of small mortars that would be used to demolish the Onondaga’s palisade villages. The provision vessels along with Frontenac and his staff came next, followed by the four battalions of militia from Quebec, Three Rivers, and Montreal. A pair of marine battalions and a detachment of natives under the command of Vaudreuil brought up the rear. One witness recorded the slow precession of Canada’s military might as it threaded its way up the St. Lawrence.
As nearly thirty leagues of rapids were to be surmounted, progress was very slow, and it is inconceivable how many difficulties were encountered in making the portages, as the men were frequently obliged to unload the bateaux several times a day of the greater portion of their freight. Those unacquainted with the country cannot understand what we call Cascades and Saults. Falls are often met seven to eight feet high, over which fifty men have plenty to do to drag a bateaux; and in the least difficult places, it is necessary to go into the water up to, and sometimes beyond, the waist, it being impossible to stem the current even with the lightest canoes by the aid of poles and paddles.4
After a journey of 150 miles the lead elements of the army arrived at Fort Frontenac on July 19. As the rest of his troops filtered into Fort Frontenac over the next several days the governor put his forces to work securing the stronghold. Enough firewood for the winter was cut, and Sieur Levasseur, acting as the expedition’s chief engineer, saw to masonry repairs and the construction of a number of wood buildings for the garrison. The surplus in manpower was also turned toward the bay where three small vessels, scuttled when the fort was abandoned in 1689, were raised a few feet out of the water. The best of the three vessels was then hauled ashore to be repaired.
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