Likewise, some paranormal experiences include bizarre, category-defying imagery. It becomes very easy for others to dismiss them by saying that experiencers saw them in movies. Fiction often reflects cultural trends, anxieties, and semi-conscious ideas. Fiction is not separate from them. When a culture feels stress and is in a period of transition, so are individuals. Peoples’ dream imagery can reflect not only their personal problems but also those of their culture, often in a veiled manner. Commercially successful fiction, and its associated imagery, can become part of the larger culture. They may be adopted as icons, as vehicles for expression of a variety of ideas.
The essence of fiction raises important theoretical issues, supernatural horror especially so. How is it that the untrue can scare us? Noel Carroll, a philosopher at the University of Wisconsin, presents a useful analysis in his book The Philosophy of Horror (1990). Carroll began by asking why we become scared when watching a horror movie or reading a horror novel. Why should fiction cause such a reaction when we know perfectly well that it is not real? This seems like a rather inconsequential question, but his exploration is enlightening.
A number of rationales have been offered for this seeming paradox, and Carroll addressed several of them. A commonly invoked explanatory phrase is “the willing suspension of disbelief.” Carroll laid out a devastating attack against this notion. He commented that the idea of “will” is specified, but few people, if any, can remember any such act of will when they sit down to watch a movie or read a novel. Suggesting that it is an “unconscious will” at work simply avoids the problem. Further, when we read a horror story, we know that it is fiction; we do not willingly decide to believe it to be real.
Some have argued that we only pretend to be scared, but this too is not the case. As Carroll pointed out, many in an audience don’t have to pretend. Speaking of himself regarding The Exorcist, Carroll stated “But I, at least, recall being genuinely horrified by the film.” The proposed explanation thus fails. (Carroll’s choice of The Exorcist is not the most compelling, because in the minds of many people, the line between fact and fiction is especially blurred in this case. Being a respectable academic, Carroll did not consider the reality basis of The Exorcist.)
Carroll finally suggests that “thought contents, as well as beliefs, can produce emotional states,” and he is right. Images and ideas are not separate from emotion. Even pondering some of them is enough to evoke fear or anxiety. We cannot easily detach our cognitions from our emotions.
The innate ambiguity between emotions and thoughts is a problem of blurred boundaries, and several techniques help separate the fictional from the real and so assure our peace of mind. The context and setting in which a story is told provide a structure to frame it. When we go to a movie theatre or read a work of fiction, we set aside a time and place for the fictional encounter. We are informed by the book cover, word of mouth, or clear implication, that the story is unreal. The labels are explicit. When such markers and context are insufficient, problems can erupt. For instance, Orson Welles’ 1938 radio broadcast of the War of the Worlds caused a panic even though it was announced several times that it was only a story.
Popular fiction can sometimes promote belief in the paranormal, and this has been of grave concern to CSICOP. In the mid-1990s the TV series the X-Files became extremely popular; it included psychics, UFOs, and sinister government conspiracies. CSICOP’s magazine, Skeptical Inquirer, criticized the program for promoting erroneous beliefs, and the Committee capitalized on the situation by sending out a fundraising letter denouncing the show.33
Their concerns seem largely misplaced. The first half of the 1990s saw a rising membership in UFO organizations (which indicated a growing level of relatively committed belief), but the second half saw a marked decline. The immense popularity of the X-Files did not translate into more serious, long-term belief in UFO conspiracies. On the other hand, CSICOP’s concerns are not entirely off the mark. During periods of liminality in a culture, fiction can work to blur boundaries.
Typically though, horror and supernatural fiction reinforce the separation of imagination and reality. Audiences can witness the events, and then in a somewhat detached manner come to recognize that they have not seen anything quite like what was portrayed. They can discuss matters with others and receive reassurances.
Pretense
Pretending overtly mixes imagination and reality; it blurs that binary opposition. Children’s games, theater, deception, and fantasy role playing all involve pretense. Unlike fictional books, pretending involves more than text—the physical world is engaged. It is a more active blurring, and the theoretical work on pretending provides added insight into the imagination-reality binary opposition.
Children pretend. A child may imagine that a stick is a doll, or a doll a baby. Children often simulate activities while imagining they are doing them. But pretending is not limited to humans; it has been reported occasionally among rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees. For instance, one monkey was seen mimicking her mother by carrying a coconut shell as though it were a baby. Such examples are rare among
those raised with conspecifics but more common by those raised with humans.34
Pretending and deception (like the trickster) are found in all cultures, and we must suspect, if not a direct biological basis, at least some foreshadowing of them in our early evolution. Deception, of course, appears widely; even plants and simple animals use it, e.g., camouflage and mimicry. But conscious deceit is our interest here.
Robert W. Mitchell, a psychologist at Eastern Kentucky University, has explored deception in animals. His writings help us understand its implications for a host of activities. Mitchell noted that “pretense is extremely rare in chimpanzee play but may be rather common in chimpanzee deception” and went on to suggest that “the existence of pretend play in humans may derive evolutionarily from the usefulness of pretense in deception.”35 He discussed the account of a series of deceptions by two chimps, Belle a female, and Rock, a greedy dominant male. After Rock stole Belle’s food, she began to hide it. Rock tried to discover her hiding place by watching her, but Belle began to lead him away from her hiding places. The deceits escalated, and Rock learned to watch her surreptitiously. Each tried to deceive the other, in part by being aware of how they appeared to the other and modifying their appearance accordingly. They behaved in ways calculated to mislead. There was intent behind the pretense.
Mitchell analyzed such cases, and he concluded that in many instances, to effectively use pretense for intentional deceit, one must be able to take the other’s point of view, to understand what the other sees and experiences. One must imagine what it is like to be another. He explains: “To pretend to be another, one must recognize that one’s own actions, usually experienced kinesthetically, are the same as those of another, experienced visually. Both planning and pretending to be another indicate an agility at imaginal representation which can be used to manipulate others.” Mitchell commented that: “Once an organism recognizes that the other has a perspective, the organism may come to recognize that that perspective may include the recognition that the organism itself has a perspective. It is at this point that the organism has a self, in the sense that the organism can think about itself from the other’s perspective.” This suggests the beginning of reflexive self-awareness, which requires an understanding of the self from an outside vantage point. The use of conscious deception was probably an important factor in the evolutionary development of awareness.39
Parenthetically, I should add that research on animal deception, intent, and thinking is extremely controversial, and it generates bitter debates. There are pitfalls in inferring mental activities in animals. Individuals of many species can appear to pretend, but it is often difficult to tell if intent is involved. Play fighting has been a source of speculation for decades. When animals fight playfully, do they consciously know that they are pretending or is their behavior genetically programmed? There are arguments on both sides. Per
haps there is a gradation. Even humans do not always realize when they are pretending. Children may play that a monster is chasing them, but they sometimes become truly frightened when doing so. The distinction between imagination and reality is not always clear for them and sometimes not even for adults. Despite the uncertainties and controversies, there is much to learn from the research with animals. Even the disputes and ambiguities might provide clues.
Summary
This chapter has discussed diverse views on the imagination—from primate behavior to religion to fiction. Perhaps some readers will find little cohesion in the mixture. But there has been one central concern—the blurring of imagination and reality, of representation and object, of signifier and signified, and conversely, how each aspect within a pair of opposites is made distinct.
The betwixt and between area is the trickster’s realm. This domain is inherently nebulous, ambiguous, and somewhat chaotic. Those who fail to recognize this essential characteristic are doomed to misunderstand the fundamental issues.
Paranormal experiences often involve the imagination; they are also frequently associated with deception. The paranormal and deception are two constituents of the trickster constellation, and this suggests that the imagination shares some of its properties. There is another component of the trickster constellation—sexuality. I have not addressed the sexual imagination, but it is a powerful force. So here we have the trickster elements of deception, sex, and psi, which are all closely associated with the imagination.
There are deep evolutionary connections among mental representation, imagination, awareness, simulation, pretending, and deceit. These cannot be fully explained by the evolution of primate behavior, but that body of work should not be overlooked when contemplating the matters.
Although the imagination has a marginal status, it is too powerful to be ignored. Massive industries are devoted to fiction, and they serve to stimulate, but also to satisfy, the imagination. Horror fiction and other genres incorporating paranormal themes are exceedingly popular. They frighten us, but ultimately we know them to be untrue.
Their explicit fictionality serves to reinforce the boundary between imagination and reality.
All this has implications for understanding psychic phenomena. Psi blurs the distinction between imagination and reality; the same blurring is found with pretense, the playful, and deception. In most situations, society needs clear distinctions. Pretense and the playful have their place, but they must be limited. So too must psi.
CHAPTER 25
Paranoia
The coyote is the most aware creature there is … because he is completely paranoid.
Charles Manson, circa 1969
Paranoia and the paranormal cluster together. Examples include fear of being watched by ESP, witchcraft accusations, ideas that occult societies control the world, and conspiracy theories of government coverups of UFOs.
Paranoia has several definitions. Webster‘s dictionary gives two: „1: a psychosis characterized by systematized delusions of persecution or grandeur usu. without hallucinations 2 : a tendency on the part of an individual or group toward excessive or irrational suspiciousness and distrustfulness of others.“2 I will typically use the term in the second, more general, sense. There are many degrees of paranoia, and conspiracy theories are collective versions of it.
Paranoia’s association with pathology gives it a strongly negative connotation, and many people think of it only in that way. Even when the more general definition is used, like the term “delusion,” it evokes ideas of mental illness. With all the unfavorable associations, proponents of the paranormal have little incentive to mention the topic. Yet paranoia needs to be studied because it helps explain fear of the paranormal and opposition to psychic research.
Projection and Self-Awareness
The projection hypothesis describes many instances of paranoia. It suggests that one “projects” one’s hostilities onto an outside entity. For instance, toddlers’ nightmares of monsters can be interpreted as projections of his (or her) hostilities toward the parents. The monsters reflect the toddler’s thoughts, and they serve a beneficial function. After the nightmare, the child recognizes (at least partly) that he (or she) needs the parents’ protection, and if he killed them, he would be left vulnerable to the actual dangers of the world. The toddler learns his place in the social order, the need for cooperation, etc. This is a natural and necessary development.
Projection has many implications for topics in this book, and it can be formulated more generally in terms of boundaries and binary oppositions. Toddlers’ projections indicate a confusion between self and other, between dream and reality, and between internal and external.
The development of self-awareness can provoke fear. Barbara Bab-cock noted the pattern in her seminal article on the trickster. In reviewing Paul Radin’s work she commented that: “Episode 3 also provides the first indication of self-awareness in the statement, ‘Trickster got frightened’, for, as Radin points out, ‘being frightened in Winnebago symbolism is generally indicative of an awakening consciousness and sense of reality, indeed, the beginning of a con science’.”
4
French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan made a similar point, though in his typically obscure fashion. Morris Berman succinctly summarized a few of the ideas, noting that: “Lacan has argued that the ego is a paranoid construct, founded on the logic of opposition and identity of self and other. He adds that all such logic, which is peculiar to the West, requires boundaries, whereas the truth is that perception, being analogue in nature, has no intrinsic boundaries.”5 Briefly, Lacan indicates that the emergence of ego (i.e., the development of self as a separate entity) entails some paranoia. Lacan writes: “we call ego that nucleus given to consciousness, but opaque to reflexion,” and he goes on to say that “the analytic maieutic adopts a roundabout approach that amounts in fact to inducing in the subject a controlled paranoia.” Lacan relates paranoia to reflection, mirroring, and development of self-awareness.
Examples
To explain the issues, I will present a variety of paranoiac conditions and situations. This will be something of a hodgepodge collection, but diverse concrete examples are useful when pondering general principles. I hope that the intentionally jarring juxtapositions of cases and theories will force readers to recognize the abstract commonalities.
Ernest Hartmann explained that some paranoia can be understood in terms of mental boundaries. He reported that his thin-boundary measure correlated with high scores on the paranoia scale of the MMPI, commenting that the scale “is often considered a measure of sensitivity, especially interpersonal sensitivity, when tested in non-clinical populations.”7 Hartmann did not give much more discussion to the matter, perhaps wishing to avoid too closely associating thin boundaries with pathology.
Bigfoot can be partly understood in terms of projection and paranoia. Anthropologist Henry Sharp, in his book The Transformation of Bigfoot (1988), tells of a small Chipewyan society in which tensions between two brothers threatened the group’s existence. A hunt for Bigfoot brought them together in a common purpose even though neither had a firm belief in the creature. The hostility within the group was projected outward onto a common enemy, and that strengthened the social bonds. Each brother realized that he needed the other as an ally. The fear of Bigfoot was therapeutic and adaptive. This instance, like others, shows that estrangement can beget fear and the recognition of danger.
In many primitive cultures, illness, death, and bad luck are sometimes ascribed to a witch, who may have some unresolved problem with the victim. The cause of misfortune is attributed to an outside source, again illustrating the concept of projection. The witch may not even be aware of being a witch, but can be accused anyway. In our culture, such suspicions are seen as irrational and paranoid because it is believed that one cannot harm another by thoughts alone. (Anthropological definitions of witchcraft vary. A witch typically has an innate ability to cause harm and may do so unin
tentionally. The term sorcerer generally designates a person who deliberately uses magical practices for negative ends.)
A witchcraft accusation made against a member of one’s own society causes severe tensions. If it is not resolved, some people may leave the group to escape the hostility. Thus paranoia serves a destabilizing, anti-structural function. British anthropologist Mary Douglas suggested that witchcraft is “an aggravator of all hostilities and fears” and that it can also be “a brutal midwife delivering new forms to society.”8 Witchcraft and sorcery can fracture groups, thereby stimulating the formation of new ones. With small tribal societies, this promotes diversity, which can have survival value for the species overall. This atavistic function of the paranormal is not accommodated the same way in our society.
The UFO field is characterized by rampant conspiracy theorizing and paranoia, and examples were presented in earlier chapters. Martin Kottmeyer attempted to explain the connection theoretically in his paper “Ufology Considered as an Evolving System of Paranoia” (1989).9 Carl Jung raised the issue of projection in his book Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies (1958), suggesting that UFOs could be explained, in part, by that concept.
Some cultural conditions are fertile for paranoia. Historian Curtis Peebles in his Watch the Skies! (1994) noted that UFO-related conspiracy theories flourished in times of growing distrust of government. Those are anti-structural periods, and during such times even highly respectable people are freer to voice suspicions of the establishment.
The Trickster and the Paranormal Page 50
