The Kennans spent the summer of 1968, as usual, in Norway. Unusually—but as an expression of confidence—George allowed Christopher and three of his buddies to sail Nagawicka from Denmark to Sweden in early August, without adult supervision. On leaving them at the dock,
I was suddenly seized with a great pang of love and concern for these young creatures: so helpless, so vulnerable, so endangered despite their changed voices, their incipient whiskers, and their great protective show of callous amusement over life—vulnerable and endangered not so much by the sea to which I was now entrusting them in my little boat, and not so much by the built-in tragic nature of the individual human predicament which men had always had to face, but rather by the enormity of what the human community was now doing to itself, with its overpopulation, its precipitate urbanization, its feverish hyperintensity of communication, its destruction of the natural environment, and its cultivation of weapons too terrible for the wisdom and strength of any that might command their custody and use.
To George’s relief, they arrived safely and flew home, a few days later, with Wendy and Annelise. He stayed behind to secure the Kristiansand house for the winter and spent his last evening there going through family photographs. “I think of the way that Fate has tied our lives together,” he wrote Joan, “and how we struggle along, half knowing what we are doing, but with our destinies also largely formed by the accidents of birth and circumstance.”
All depended, he could see, “on God’s grace and on each other; and with this, the whole monstrous fragility and tragedy of our lives, and yet also their poetry and their occasional heroism, become visible and real to me. I wish I could capture this moment of awareness and make it a part of my view of the world, instead of being absorbed and carried away, as I shall be tomorrow morning, by a thousand trivialities and vanities.”67
TWENTY-THREE
Prophet of the Apocalypse: 1968–1980
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER DIED IN PRINCETON, OF THROAT CANCER, on February 18, 1967, at the age of sixty-two. A week later six hundred people crowded into Alexander Hall for the memorial service, at which Kennan delivered the final eulogy. He praised his friend’s scientific mind, “rigorous but humane, fastidious but generous and powerful, uncompromisingly responsible in its relationship to ascertainable truth but never neglectful of the need for elegance and beauty in the statement of it.” He deplored the official injustice inflicted upon Oppenheimer: the government had used his talents to exploit the destructive capabilities of nuclear physics, but denied him the opportunity to explore “the great positive ones he believed that science to possess.” His life cruelly illustrated “the dilemmas evoked by the recent conquest by human beings of a power over nature out of all proportion to their moral strength.”
Shakespeare’s image of a “universal wolf” as a “universal prey” eating itself up had haunted Kennan ever since he incorporated it into his long but mostly unread January 1950 paper on the “super” bomb. The idea, however, was Oppenheimer’s: it was he who first alerted Kennan to the ecological consequences of the nuclear revolution. “[N]o one paid any attention to us,” Kennan recalled, “but that brought us together.” Oppenheimer gave Kennan an institutional home after he left government. Kennan, in turn, spoke for Oppenheimer after allegations about the beleaguered physicist’s loyalty effectively silenced him. A war fought with modern weapons, Kennan warned in his 1957 Reith lectures, would risk everything: “the kindliness of our natural environment to the human experience, the genetic composition of the race, the possibilities of health and life for future generations.” In bidding Oppenheimer farewell a decade later, Kennan acknowledged that without his help “some of us—most of us, I suppose—would never have been quite where we are today.... [A]ny further progress we now make is in part his achievement.”1
There were, at the time of Oppenheimer’s death, about forty thousand nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union—three-fourths of them American. Most were thermonuclear warheads, designed for near-instantaneous delivery by land-based and submarine-launched missiles. The least powerful, intended for battlefield use, each approximated the strength of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Kennan lacked access to these numbers, but he didn’t need it to conclude that seeking security by these means was an absurdity.
Since the Cuban missile crisis, there had been fewer explicit threats to use nuclear weapons. Satellite reconnaissance was reducing the risk of surprise attack. Diplomacy had produced a Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, and a Soviet-American agreement, that same year, to begin negotiations on limiting nuclear weapons delivery systems while restricting the deployment of defenses against them. The goal, it appeared, was no longer to win a nuclear arms race but rather to stabilize it by ensuring equal opportunities for destruction. Both superpowers seemed to have embraced Bernard Brodie’s 1946 argument that the best way to avoid war was to make its prospect as horrible as possible.
Kennan did not doubt the proposition but wondered—with Oppenheimer—why it required retaining the capacity to end civilization so many times over. That was why he distrusted détente, which most people understood to mean something he should have favored: the use of diplomacy to secure peace by balancing power. Kennan saw it as applying outdated techniques to a world in which the relationship between war and politics had changed. The nineteenth-century view had been that “you really could win a war and gain something from it.” Now, though, the destructiveness of weaponry had made such calculations meaningless. War and politics, in Kennan’s mind at least, were becoming equally dangerous.
Where, then, did the strategy of “containment,” which was to have bridged the gap between war and politics, fit into all of this? When Kennan described its objective, in 1947, as bringing about peacefully either the breakup or “gradual mellowing” of the Soviet Union, that country had no nuclear capability. By the beginning of the 1960s, its warhead and missile technology was qualitatively approaching that of the United States. By the end of the decade, it was doing so quantitatively. By 1986, when the number of nuclear weapons peaked at around seventy thousand, just under two-thirds belonged to the U.S.S.R.2
So did the risks of attempting to change that state now exceed the benefits? Was the danger to be contained no longer its behavior but nuclear war itself? If so, did that suggest accepting the Soviet Union and its satellites as permanent features of the international landscape? What would that mean for the future of Germany, and of Europe itself? None of these were new questions for Kennan: he had wrestled with all of them prior to Oppenheimer’s death. In the years that followed, though, they took on a renewed urgency. It was as if Kennan felt an obligation to keep Oppenheimer’s prophetic vision alive, whatever that might imply for the original concept of “containment.”
I.
Late in 1967 Kennan was elected president of the American Academy of Arts and Letters. Established in 1898, limited to fifty members, and modeled on the much older Académie française, the organization’s mission was to recognize distinction in literature, music, and the fine arts. Kennan had been invited to join five years earlier because of his accomplishments as a writer, sixty-four years after the first George Kennan was similarly honored. The academy’s parent organization, the National Institute of Arts and Letters, had made the second Kennan its president in 1965, just in time for the ill-fated White House Festival of the Arts. He took all of these institutional responsibilities seriously. Kennan’s sense of having been excluded as a young man, Arthur Schlesinger speculated, had left him with a love of ritual as an older man: “He believes strongly that the ceremonies of life are important. It’s an endearing, interesting characteristic.”3
Kennan addressed the academy for the first time in his new capacity on May 28, 1968, three months after the Tet offensive in Vietnam, two months after Johnson’s announcement that he would seek a negotiated settlement of the war but not reelection, seven weeks after the ass
assination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and one week before that of Robert F. Kennedy. “[W]e are meeting,” Kennan acknowledged, “in a very troubled time.” The artist’s duty was not to get involved in politics, which were always “polluted with the passions and the myopia of the moment.” Nor was it to attempt to correct, in any immediate sense, “the manifold follies and stupidities to which man, in his capacity as a political actor, is prone.”
Perhaps it might be, though, to “lend to the comprehension of the human predicament a deeper dimension of insight,” through which “the tragic illusions of power and anger will lose their force.” Had not Cranach and Grünewald painted during peasant rebellions and religious wars? Had not Goethe, Beethoven, and Schiller flourished alongside the upheavals of the Napoleonic era? Most moving of all was Boris Pasternak, “scratching out his poems through the night in that abandoned country house in the Urals during the Russian civil war, while each night the dark shadows of the wolves against the snow came nearer.” It took forty years for his writings to appear, but they were now “an imperishable component of Russian literature.” Much would have been lost if those artists had sacrificed their creativity “in order to throw themselves into political pursuits for which they were ill-prepared and in which, as Pasternak realized, they could do nothing comparable in importance to what they could achieve by the employment of their real talents.”4
Kennan’s luxury—but also his burden—was not having to be Pasternak. He spoke wistfully of wanting to detach himself from contemporary events, but no one forced him to do so. That left him resisting temptation, mostly unsuccessfully. It had seemed safe enough that summer, for example, to publish his 1938–40 dispatches from Prague, unearthed while preparing his memoirs. But on August 20–21, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia to suppress the growing reform movement there. The new Kremlin leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin had made “a colossal mistake,” Kennan was sure, and The New York Times quickly connected that violation of sovereignty with his reports on another such event three decades earlier. Soon Kennan was calling for an additional hundred thousand American troops to be sent to West Germany as a show of force, to counter what he saw as an increasingly “adventuristic streak” in Soviet behavior.5
He was also still thinking, wistfully, about politics. “I think I could have been successful at it,” he wrote Joan a few days before the 1968 presidential election. “I have never found it hard to communicate with people from a platform, and I rather love all the human and intellectual intricacies.” But he could never have afforded to run for office; his views, moreover, were “light years ahead of the current drift of public opinion.” If the next administration were to offer him a position like under secretary of state or ambassador to the United Nations, though, he might take it.6
Kennan called the office of Richard M. Nixon two days after his victory at the polls to offer whatever advice the president-elect might want. None was sought, but Nixon’s appointment of Henry A. Kissinger as his national security adviser surprised and pleased Kennan. He had been reading Kissinger since the 1950s and now regarded him as “fully recovered from the militaristic preoccupations of earlier years”—his writings, presumably, on the “limited” use of nuclear weapons. Shortly after learning of his new job, Kissinger in turn assured Kennan of Nixon’s regard for him as “a leading example of people whose possibilities were not being used by the last administration,” the implication being that the new one might find a way to do so.7
That conversation took place at a Princeton cocktail party on December 4, 1968. The occasion was the inaugural conference of the International Association for Cultural Freedom, a privately funded reincarnation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, exposed the previous year as having had CIA support. Other attendees included Schlesinger, John Kenneth Galbraith, Stanley Hoffmann, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Norman Podhoretz, Marion Dönhoff, and Kennan’s old Moscow friend Lillian Hellman, but also a clamorous contingent of young black power advocates and white New Leftists. Understandably confused, the local Students for a Democratic Society chapter prepared an all-purpose poster: “Down With Racism, Imperialism, Genocide, Corporation Capitalism, Policy Planners, etc.” (A stronger exhortation had been crossed out, at the last moment, on the advice of a university official.) Kennan, improbably, delivered the dinner address. With his “gray suit, silk tie, elegant gold chain across his vest, [and] dignified bearing,” The New York Times reported, he personified a lifestyle “for which the young could muster little sympathy or understanding. He reciprocated completely.”
The nation had many problems, Kennan told his audience, not the least of which was “the extremely disturbed and excited state of mind of a good portion of our student youth, floundering around as it is in its own terrifying wilderness of drugs, pornography and political hysteria.” This was not Pasternak-like detachment, and a heated discussion followed. “Since when [are] youth not allowed to be asses?” Hellman demanded, prompting one young activist to announce that he had just fallen in love with an older woman. She was not amused. “He did a very brave thing,” she said in defense of Kennan: “He refused to be a swinger.”8
“The new administration must be given a fair opportunity to show what it can do,” Kennan commented that evening. He got no invitation to work for it, though, and this time he didn’t agonize over phones that didn’t ring. He had decided to return to Oxford during the spring of 1969, and he had a new project in mind: he would write the first full English-language history of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894. The logic of doing so was not immediately obvious, but Kennan’s academy address provided a clue.
Unlike the artists he had cited, he was neither a painter nor a playwright nor a philosopher. His poetry was chiefly whimsical, his musicianship only companionable. But he could write history: his distinction lay in the skill with which he represented the past to the present and future. World War I, Kennan believed, had been the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century, having set so many subsequent tragedies in motion. No one in 1914, however, had foreseen any of this. Each belligerent had entered the war optimistically, even enthusiastically. If his new book could explain such miscalculations, perhaps it might dispel illusions out of which new tragedies could grow.
It would have to be thorough, he explained to Joan, for late-nineteenth-century European diplomacy was “a frightfully complicated subject with an enormous existing literature.” It would have to be scholarly, because the Institute for Advanced Study expected that of him. It would take years to complete, and “since no one in this generation will be interested in it,” it would be a lonely enterprise. And why the Franco-Russian alliance? Because it had replaced Bismarck’s system of unilateral restraint, which reconciled Germany’s neighbors to its post-1871 unification, with one of multilateral deterrence, which meant risking war to prevent war. It should have been obvious, even in 1894, that any great-power clash employing modern weaponry would be “a madness from which nobody [could] benefit.” Kennan would be writing a cautionary history of wolves, preparing to eat themselves up.9
II.
With Connie Goodman on leave from the Institute to raise a family, Kennan had a new secretary, Janet Smith. She was not shy about questioning his priorities: did he really think he could isolate himself to write history? It was probably unrealistic, he acknowledged from Oxford in March 1969, to suppose “that anyone in my position—i.e., with my past, my reputation, and my connections—would be able to find the time, the privacy, and the peace of mind to do a really major, serious work of historical scholarship.” He was now sixty-five, and demands for commentary on current events had not diminished. He had also come to realize, belatedly, the benefits of inadvertence: the fact that such influence as he had accumulated over the years had more often arisen unexpectedly than from his own plans.
So he must allow for opportunities like the “long telegram,” the “X” article, the Chicago lectures, the disengagement debate, the Fulbright hearing
s, and the Swarthmore speech, even if such “unwithstandable approaches from the outside” didn’t always produce the results he wanted. However much he might wish to be a prophet, life had burdened him with the role of pundit. “Let me then accept it and be prepared to play it with distinction.”10
Oxford was friendlier than it had been in 1957–58. The Kennans’ Iffley flat was adequately heated—no need to carry coal this time—and George had an office in All Souls College. He liked having his radio free of commercials, his roads uncluttered by billboards, and telephones that rang rarely “because the English don’t phone—they send notes.” He was dining occasionally with colleagues; even student life struck him as “relatively rich and gay and confused and happy.” But he couldn’t resist controversy. What was wrong with black power anyway? Kennan asked a startled assemblage of dignitaries at a Ditchley Park conference shortly after he arrived: why shouldn’t Americans follow South Africa’s example and give blacks their own state? It had taken that to satisfy the Jews, his friend Richard Crossman helpfully added. Having tossed these grenades, the two took their leave, under a full moon, cheered by the mayhem they had left behind.11
Kennan’s chief task in Oxford was to deliver the Chichele lectures, a less demanding series than the two he had taken on twelve years earlier. He chose to analyze La Russe en 1839, the account of a trip through Russia by Astolphe Louis Léonor, the Marquis de Custine. Like Neill Brown’s dispatches from St. Petersburg in the 1850s, Custine’s book allowed viewing the recent past through a distant past, a perspective Kennan relished. Custine had been unfair to Nicholas I and his contemporaries, Kennan concluded in the published version of the lectures, which appeared in 1971, but he had accurately anticipated the Stalin regime and, to a lesser extent, those that followed. Another of Kennan’s epic sentences specified the analogies:
George F. Kennan : an American life Page 82
