by Tim Saunders
The final men of C Troop waded out to the LCAs, and fell exhausted into the bottom of the landing craft. No. 4 Commando had made good its escape. But once out of the smoke’s cover, and as they motored into view of enemy positions further along the cliff, they came under fire again. As they withdrew, the commandos returned rifle and machine-gun fire with the German infantry around the lighthouse.
The relief after battle begins to show among Lovat’s men on the passage back to England.
No. 4 Commando’s return to Newhaven on the morning of 20 August 1942.
On the passage home to Newhaven, the commandos had time to reflect on their success, lucky escapes, and those who had lost their lives in the operation. They picked up an RAF pilot who landed in his parachute virtually alongside one of the craft, and another two pilots were picked up from the motor launch marking the swept channel through the minefield.
The casualties suffered by No. 4 Commando were five officers and forty-one Other Ranks, of whom two officers and nine ORs had been killed and thirteen men were listed as missing. This was not an inconsiderable proportion of the 265 men who landed two hours and forty minutes earlier.
The raid on the Hess Battery had been a success. As with all elements of the Jubilee Force, the commandos were well trained, but their part in the operation was based on sound intelligence information. In addition Lord Lovat and his men of No 4 Commando not only had a good plan but also good fortune on their side. COHQ reported that ‘this hazardous assault on “Hess” Battery was carried out strictly according to plan and may well become a model for future operations of this kind.’
US Ranger Sergeant Sizma lighting a celebratory cigarette back in Newhaven.
Lieutenant General A. G. L. McNaughton, CB, CMG, DSO, Commander in Chief of the First Canadian Army. Before it was agreed that the Canadians were employed in the Dieppe Raid he studied the plan and satisfied himself that it was feasible, given the assurances made by Combined Operations HQ.
Churchill tanks on manoeuvres in Britain. Churchills were used by the Calgary Regiment on the Dieppe Raid.
The architect of the raid: Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, GCVO, DSO, with his staff at Combined Operations Headquarters. He was appointed as Chief of Combined Operations in April 1942. He is seen here at his headquarters with Major General J. C. Haydon, DSO, OBE and Air Vice-Marshal James Milne Robb, CB, DSO, DFC.
The inteligence overprint issued to the troops prior to the raid.
Two sketches from the official Operation Jubilee report showing the ‘outer flank’ operations conducted by the two commando units.
Drowned and knocked out Churchills photographed by the Germans after the battle.
The German view of the Dieppe Raid.
CHAPTER SIX
INNER FLANK ATTACK I: BLUE BEACH – PUYS
In addition to the commandos’ destruction of the flanking Hess and Goebbels batteries, a part of the Jubilee plan was to land two Canadian battalions on what was termed the Inner Flanks: Blue and Green Beaches. These beaches were respectively a mile to the east and west of the main frontal assault on Dieppe. The aim of the Inner Flank attacks were to clear the eastern and western headlands and to extend the raid’s frontage, thus dissipating the German force. In addition, Green Beach was to be a beachhead from which a further battalion, was to attack the German airfield to the south-west of Dieppe. Both landing grounds were relatively small beaches in the wall of cliffs to the east and west of Dieppe, where the villages of Puys (Blue Beach) and Pourville (Green Beach) had been fashionable resorts, with substantial hotels and villas.
The two assault battalions would attack at the same time as the commandos, at 0450 hours, which was half an hour after the beginning of nautical twilight, with a predicted visibility of just two hundred years. By deciding on this time, the Canadians’ approach to their two beaches would be under the cover of darkness in order to achieve ‘a sufficient measure of surprise’. The Combined Ops report goes onto explain, ‘It was essential for the plan that the Royal Regiment of Canada should touch down exactly at Zero hour, 0450 hours...’
View from the beach towards the eastern cliffs and the White House.
The view to the beach from the eastern cliffs over the White House.
The beach, seawall and the slope up which the Canadians would have to attack. Blue Beach intelligence photos
There was to be no naval gunfire support before or during the landing. As with the commandos, the Inner Flank attacks relied totally on surprise to get ashore in what was hoped would be ‘a largely unopposed landing’. The main landing at Dieppe would take place thirty minutes later at 0520 hours.
Blue Beach and the Plan
The orders for Blue Beach, given verbally to Lieutenant Colonel Catto were as follows:
‘The Royal Regiment of Canada will land on Blue Beach and secure the headland east of Jubilee [Dieppe] with a minimum of delay. There you will destroy the local objectives, which consist of machine-gun posts, heavy and light flak installations and a 4-gun howitzer battery south and east of the town. The battalion will then come into reserve and detach a company to protect an engineer demolition party operating in the gasworks and power plant.’
The beach that the Royals were to fight over was described to the Commanding Officer as being a narrow shingle beach with a tall sea wall at its rear. Beyond the wall, there was the small village of Puys and a steep valley running inland. Maps and accompanying air photographs were useful but most information was gleaned, in the best traditions of intelligence, from pre war tourist photographs and postcards, which had been assiduously collected from families across Britain. The Canadian infantrymen produced comprehensive description of the main obstacle that they would face from these sources.
‘This [the sea] wall is made of masonry and is about 100 yards long with a vertical face ten to twelve feet high, with two flights of steps leading to its top, one about half-way down its length and the other at the south-west end. It runs just above the high-water line along the beach which is 250 yards long and 300 yards wide. The beach has two exits; a footpath at the north-east end and a road moving straight inland up a small valley to the village of Puys.’
In the event, the Royals found the sea wall ‘covered with heavy wire, and on the landward side was a deep and very thick obstacle of tangled wire’.
However, little was known about the enemy and the number of Germans that would be encountered but les Glycines Holiday Camp was known to be used as a small barracks. In addition, as indicated by the mission given above, photo interpreters had spotted a number of enemy positions that were marked on the overprinted intelligence map. These were mainly sandbagged field fortifications but what intelligence had not spotted was a concrete pillbox in the garden of the ‘White House’, which was carefully camouflaged and sited to cover the beach. Other skilfully sited positions, built into buildings and into the sea wall to the west of the beach, were also unidentified.
The Germans of 12 Kompanie, III/Battalion, 571 Infanterie Regiment held the area of the Eastern Headland and the village of Puys. A platoon of about forty men held the beach defences, covering the shingle of Blue Beach. Other platoon positions on the Eastern Headland could also cover the seaward approaches and parts of the Puys beach.
Lieutenant Colonel Catto’s plan was for A Company to tackle the sea wall and clear Puys. C Company was to deal with light anti-aircraft guns on the 150-foot high Eastern or le Polet headland, which had two prominent landmarks; a Church steeple and a semaphore station. A Company would then clear the area of the holiday camp and one platoon of this company would go on to attack and clear a machine-gun posts in this area. It was vital for Jubilee’s success that the headland should be in Canadian hands when the main landing started thirty minutes after the Royals touched down. On the Battalion’s left B Company would deal with a heavy anti-aircraft battery near the edge of the cliff, then capture some light anti-aircraft guns in the same area and mop up German marines in the coastguard houses on the
cliff further to the west.
The intelligence overprint showing the defences east of Dieppe and around Blue Beach at Puys.
The Royal Regiment of Canada’s plan, with reinforcement by C Company of Black Watch.
One of a series of air photographs of the Dieppe area taken on 30 June 1942.
The second wave of Battalion Headquarters and D Company of the Royals were to be followed by a third wave, consisting of the Mortar Platoon and C Company Black Watch of Canada, who were to attack an enemy defended location south of the village of Puys. This consisted of an emplaced four-gun battery (Code named Rommel), anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The Royals would subsequently establish contact with the Essex Scottish, who would be landing on the main Dieppe Beach. If time allowed, the Royal Regiment of Canada was to seize the gasworks, and, as mentioned in their orders, protect an engineer demolition party. Thereafter, the Royals would become brigade reserve, while the Black Watch and the accompanying Royal Canadian Artillery field and anti-aircraft gunners, would man any enemy guns captured intact on the Eastern Headland and use them against another German battery further inland. The gunners were also to bring back parts of what were thought to be a new patterns of German guns.
The Assault
The Portsmouth part of the Dieppe flotilla at sea on the evening of 18 August
The five hundred and fifty men of the Royals sailed from Portsmouth, split between three Landing Ships Infantry, the Queen Emma, Princess Astrid and the Duke of Wellington, escorted by a pair of gunboats. Reporter Ross Munro wrote:
‘The officers and men had been told by now that they were going to Dieppe tonight and there were hurried conferences aboard the ship, refresher briefings and eleventh-hour preparations. Few of the Royals seemed to be as confident a mood as I had known them in the “Practice Dieppe” [Yukon]. The rush to the port and the mass of details, which had to be crammed again in a few hours left everyone rather ragged.’
Their crossing went to plan and at 0258 hours, the Landing Craft Assault were lowered from the mother ships’ davits. However, there was some confusion and a delay of twenty all too vital minutes, when the LCAs mistakenly formed up on a motor gunboat from another group. Order restored but badly delayed the Royals were ready to head for the beach.
‘The passage to the beach was controlled by . . . Lieutenant Commander Goulding. He brought the Flotilla in on a course South by 5 [degrees] West, which enabled him to sight Dieppe and then to alter course to the eastward so as to pick up the valley behind “Blue Beach”, a spot very narrow and difficult to identify. As the flotilla was passing the piers of Dieppe, the harbour lights were put on and recognition signals flashed in Morse Code... As the Royal Regiment of Canada came in, searchlights began to play over the sea for as long a period as an hour, according to the estimate of a survivor.’
Even though they caught up some time on the run in to the beach the delay in forming up meant that the Royals landed seventeen minutes late, at 0507 hours, when it was already getting light. In the growing daylight the essential tactical surprise was lost and as one officer commented, ‘the enemy was ready and waiting and would have had to be asleep to miss us’.
A German snap shot of infantry positions on the cliffs flanking Puys.
Corporal Ellis of A Company reported ...that objects could clearly be distinguished while the craft were still half a mile from the beach and were under observation and under fire before they landed. The enemy’s plunging small arms fire from the cliff top negated much of the protection afforded by the lightly armoured sides of the LCA. The Royals were consequently suffering casualties, including Battalion Second-in-Command, Major Scholfield, before landing. However, German fire intensified as soon as the first wave of landing craft began to touchdown. Lieutenant Commander Goulding wrote ‘In several cases officers and men were killed or wounded on the ramp as they made to leave the boats’. The COHQ report recorded:
‘It was seen to be coming principally from a white houses on the left and from pillboxes on the cliff firing straight down into the craft. Most of the officers, all of whom led their men with great gallantry, were killed or wounded immediately.’
Little has changed at Puys – only a modern building and a rebuilt seawall.
Lieutenant Walter Hopener, commanding 12 Kompanie, 571 Infanterie Regiment was in a bunker over looking Blue Beach:
‘As the landing ramps fell and the attackers sprang firing onto land, they met the destructive fire of the two heavy MGs. An inferno began which was to last almost three hours. In our command post, two young soldiers who had only been here a few days threw up constantly – it was their first action.
‘We were amazed at the attacker, who fought with bravery and élan against an opponent who could not be seen. Nobody thought of giving up. Taking effective cover behind their dead comrades, they shot uninterruptedly at our positions. Thus with their bodies these dead soldiers provided their comrades with the last service of friendship.’
From the German command post instructions were passed to their artillery for defensive fire tasks. Captain Browne, the artillery Forward Observation Officer attached to the Royals wrote of the enemy battery’s response to the landing:
‘The defensive fire of the German artillery (as I was later told by a German soldier, 75 mm infantry guns) was extremely well surveyed, for the shells burst precisely at the water-line at impeccably correct intervals of timing. I saw two LCAs sunk by hits or splinters from this fire. From a gunners point of view this was admirable shooting.’
However, machine guns were causing most of the casualties. Private Creer of A Company, who were attempting to attack Puys over the sea wall, recalled in his debriefing that ‘There was a big house just back from the wall, and there seemed to be a machine gun firing from every window’. Similar fire positions in another house on the left flank enfiladed the beach. Corporal Ellis commented:
‘The beach was... plainly visible to the Germans, whose own fire positions were extraordinarily well concealed from our view. The Royals were shot down in heaps on the beach without knowing where the fire was coming from.’
Under heavy fire, the Royals attempted to cross the sea wall but as the COHQ report states that the Canadians were ‘... forced into a state of inaction, having lost heavily on crossing the beach... and still more heavily when they reached the sea-wall, about fifty yards from the water’s edge’. There were also a number of well concealed machine-gun posts built into the sea wall itself, of which the Royals had been unaware. The official historian wrote that ‘Courageous efforts were made by officers and men of the first wave to cut or blow passages through the wire obstacles on the wall and reach the enemy positions’. At least one Bangalore Torpedo was thrust under the wire and successfully blown on the eastern part of the beach by Captain Sinclair and Corporal Ellis. At this stage, the number of Canadians forcing their way through the gap in the wire was too few to overcome enemy resistance. Amongst those moving in-land were Captain Sinclair, who fell wounded, and Corporal Ellis who pressed on alone up the hill towards one of the buildings. Finding the building unoccupied, he spotted an enemy position and successfully engaged the occupants who were manning a Spandau. Meanwhile, back on the beach, some of the machine gun posts built into the sea wall itself were knocked out at a heavy cost. Captain Browne described the clearance of one of enemy positions by Lieutenant Wedd:
‘Leaving the LCA at touchdown with his platoon, he reached the wall with little more than a section, and there found he was still being fired upon by one of the wall posts, a pillbox. There being apparently no other way of attacking the weapon, he left his corner of relative shelter and sprinted the short distance directly toward the pill-box with a No. 36 grenade. With complete disregard for his own safety, and displaying great skill, he flung the grenade through the fire slit of the pillbox, killing all its occupants and putting the gun out of action. His body, riddled with bullets, was later picked up in front of the pillbox.’
The point where the Royal
s crossed the seawall at the left hand end of the beach.
The Combined Ops report recorded that ‘A and B Companies were dwindling away to nothing...’ To make matters worse, the naval gunfire support of HMS Garth, who had come into action in support of the Royals at 0520 hours, unlike the low velocity weapons mounted on gunboats at Orange and Yellow Beaches, was doing little to help the Canadians. Unsuppressed enemy batteries were forcing her to remain at a safe distance out to sea under cover of the smoke screen. In these conditions, the destroyer was unable to keep the cliff top to the right of the beach under continuous bombardment. Lieutenant Commander Scatchard reported:
