Secondly, the defence of Lungi Lol would doubtless have proven untenable without the help of the villagers themselves. However, there is more to that statement, and I feel the detailed answer lies in the very fabric of the story: in the relationships and bonds that were formed between the soldiers and the villagers, which resulted from a battle to win their hearts and minds as much as the shared intention to fight against evil.
The UK military is envied throughout the world and has the reputation of being able to form effective, productive and lasting relationships with the local population within an operational area. The UK military is regarded as a force for good, which is justifiably deserved; this is due to having personnel who both understand and are capable of conducting a hearts-and-minds campaign. The ability to understand local culture and apply a sympathetic, light-handed approach is classed as a military strength, and this hearts-and-minds mentality is central to successful counter insurgency (COIN) operations.
The initial deployment to Sierra Leone in May 2000 was categorised as a non-combatant evacuation operation, but after the first three to four days in the country – and once all of the entitled personnel had been safely evacuated – the mission quickly evolved into a COIN operation. A COIN operation is essentially a battle to win support from the local population. Experience has taught us that if the affected population is not protected from insurgents by its government (as was the case with Sierra Leone’s brutal RUF rebels), and it is left exposed to violence and intimidation, then it will have no choice but to side with these groups. History is littered with examples of campaigns that failed because the local people were left to the mercy of insurgents; however, campaigns that ensured the security of these people have inevitably succeeded. It is about understanding not only the geographical terrain of a conflict but also the human terrain.
In our case, success came from dominating the ground. Since security can really only be achieved by maintaining a presence in the conflict area, the aim was to disrupt rebel activity whilst reassuring the local population. By living amongst the villagers, we not only provided them with a blanket of protection whilst marking a footprint on the ground, but we also demonstrated that we were willing to share the same risks as they were. Becoming part of the village and being adopted by its residents was a direct result of our behaviour towards them, demonstrated through a respect for their beliefs, values and traditions. We laughed, joked and played with their children, offering what limited luxuries we had in the way of chocolate and biscuits; we shared their meagre food supplies, buying their goods, such as cigarettes and soda, that were at least ten years past their sell by dates; and we generally conformed to their way of living. It was this that set us apart from an occupying force. It was this acceptance of us by the village that led to the chief or village elder offering his hand in friendship and assigning work parties to participate in the active defence of the village.
Stopping the rebel advance whilst protecting the villagers became our single mission statement, and it could not have been achieved without our presence in the village. At the very core of COIN operations lies the belief that only a permanent static presence will create the conditions for a local population to become sufficiently trusting and confident in you. This cannot be achieved by forces which surge in and out of the area, leaving gaps in the level of protection afforded to them. The villagers understood beyond doubt what would happen to them if and when the RUF marched through Lungi Lol, but this demonstration of our commitment to them and our willingness to share the risks in facing the rebels created an unbreakable bond, and they embraced us as their own.
In any conflict, the best form of intelligence is local knowledge. However, that knowledge will not come readily until a population feels safe, and they will not feel safe until they are convinced that the rebels’ stranglehold on power has been broken. Once the villagers felt sufficiently confident in our mission, they began to feed us information on rebel sightings, dispositions and movements. Any rebel or insurgent group cut off from a readily available source of manpower has to resupply, during which time information quickly becomes weak; this may lead to possible surrender or even destruction at the hands of government forces. The RUF relied totally on fear tactics, intimidation and unprecedented brutality to control the population, meaning news of the presence of British soldiers in Lungi Lol would make their power base look weak and diminished. The rebels needed to demonstrate very quickly that this was not the case and that all opposing forces were impotent against the ferocity of their might.
Operation Kill British, as it was termed by the rebels, was to be their response to this union of British soldiers and local villagers. There was to be clear, decisive action against the village outpost we occupied, which would crush any thoughts of future resistance once and for all by any villages in the area, and the killing or capturing of British soldiers would humiliate the governments of Sierra Leone and the UK. What could be better than dragging the bodies of British soldiers through the streets as a show of strength and victory? This was to be their Somalia, when the world watched helplessly as the dead, mutilated, beaten and naked bodies of US servicemen were dragged through the streets of the capital Mogadishu by the insurgents fighting to destabilise the country – events that were immortalised in the book Black Hawk Down and the subsequent movie adaptation.
I have been asked on several occasions about any correlation between our role and actions in Sierra Leone and those undertaken by US forces in Somalia in 1991 to 1993.
In 1991, Somalia was in the grip of severe fighting. Its president, Mohamed Siad Barre, had been overthrown by a coalition of opposing clans. In the civil war that followed, up to 20,000 people were killed by the end of that year. The war resulted in the destruction of Somalia’s agriculture, which in turn led to starvation in large swathes of the country. The international community responded and began sending aid supplies to halt the starvation, but with any conflict where power is dictated by those who control what the population needs for survival, this aid was intercepted and then directed to the local clan leaders, who used it as a currency to buy weapons from neighbouring countries. Rough estimations suggest that around 300,000 people died between 1991 and 1992, with at least another 1.5 million people suffering from the effects of starvation.
Throughout 1992, the USA launched several attempts to bring aid to the starving masses, and in an attempt to create a stable environment within Somalia, began launching attacks against the warlords. In June 1993, a UN contingent made up of Pakistani troops was attacked, resulting in the deaths of 24 soldiers and leaving 57 wounded. In October 1993, in a final attempt to restore a legitimate government to Somalia and bring an end to the vicious, criminal rule of the clans, George H. W. Bush (snr) ordered a task force consisting of Tier 1 Special Operations troops into Mogadishu to arrest the warlord Mohamed Aidid and his top lieutenants who controlled the city. Operating out of the airport located on the outskirts of the city, a task force consisting of nineteen aircraft, twelve vehicles – of which nine were heavily armed Humvees – and 160 men began its assault.
The similarity between Sierra Leone and Somalia lay in the fact that both countries were in the midst of a civil war, and both had governments which had either been deposed or were under threat of being deposed. Rebel militias had seized power and were bleeding each country of its wealth for their own gain. The people of both countries were suffering from a lack of food, basic amenities and medical care. They were also being beaten, mutilated, raped and murdered on an industrial scale. Children were taken from the arms of their dead parents, marched into a life of drug-induced servitude and forced to pledge their allegiance to the leader of the gang: in Sierra Leone, this was Foday Sankoh of the RUF, and in Somalia, Mohamed Aidid of the disbanded Somali National Army rebel factions.
The action taken by the USA in Somalia was well intended but missing a vital component, in that the more you protect your force, the less secure you are. Ultimately, success in COIN operations is ga
ined by protecting the population, not by force protection. A population will give their allegiance to the side that best protects it. It is a matter of survival, and the population knows that a failure of security could result in death or brutal punishment. They will support their government if and when they are convinced that the state can offer them a better life, and that it can and will protect them against the enemy for ever. The US troops could not offer that protection, nor could they reassure the population. Aidid had a stranglehold on them by controlling the UN aid that was coming into the country and never allowing it to reach the people of Mogadishu.
The USA could not operate outside of the confines of their secure base. By failing to provide a static presence, they were therefore unable to bring any comfort or reassurance to the people. This in turn prevented any build-up of trust, confidence or local disruption of rebel activity, which resulted in the USA having to fight the entire population of the city. The US forces were never in a position to win over the hearts and minds of the population of Mogadishu; their approach was always with a heavy hand, and they never benefitted from reliable, accurate local information or intelligence.
After the failed attempt to arrest Aidid – which resulted in the deaths of eighteen US soldiers and seventy-three wounded, plus the unconfirmed deaths of over 200 Somalia civilians and a further 700 injured – President Clinton stated it was a mistake for the USA to play the role of police officer in Somalia and immediately announced a plan to remove all US forces from the country within six months. Subsequent observations of the pullout identified that by withdrawing from Somalia, the USA had left a lawless region ripe for an Al Qaeda takeover, handing over a whole generation of Somalis to be educated and groomed by Islamist fundamentalists.
So why did ‘Operation Kill British’ fail to do to British forces in Sierra Leone what Somali militias did to US forces in Somalia? I think it goes back to the very essence of the British military’s modus operandi, and its unique ability to win over a population through compassion, understanding and acceptance of diverse cultures, plus the application of a light-handed approach. In 1901, it was Theodore Roosevelt who said his own foreign policy as president of the USA was to ‘speak softly, and carry a big stick’. Our relationship with the villagers was amplified by our constant presence among them, through which they developed a fondness for us, trusting in our mission and confident in our ability to not only defend them but also to defeat the rebels. They understood we shared the same risks as them and that we were all putting our lives on the line. The respect and humility demonstrated by each operator when in direct contact with the villagers showcased that we did not place ourselves above them or value their contribution any less than our own. Add all of these things together in a bowl and stir, and you have the beginnings of a resistance.
WHERE ARE THEY NOW?
Richard ‘Rich’ Cantrill OBE MC
Richard Cantrill is now a Lieutenant-Colonel in command of 42 Commando Royal Marines. In 2010 he was awarded the MC for his time as Company Commander in Afghanistan (HERRICK 9). He was appointed OBE in the 2014 New Year Honours list for two busy years spent in the Operations Directorate of the MOD. He lives in Devon with his wife and three rowdy children.
Eddie ‘The White Rabbit’ Newell MBE
Eddie Newell went on to replace Wag as the Ops Warrant Officer of the Pathfinders, a job in which he remained until he left the military in 2006. On completion of his 22 years’ service he was awarded an MBE. His citation reads: ‘For distinguished and exceptional service in five operational theatres, and unstinting dedication to the unit’. He currently lives in the UK with his wife and son.
Mark ‘Jacko’ Jackson
Mark Jackson left the military in 2003 and trained as a professional sculptor and painter. In 2012 his sculptures dedicated to the Airborne Forces were unveiled by HRH Prince Charles at the National Arboretum. The two sculptures represent a Standing Paratrooper in full jump equipment and Bellerophon astride the winged horse Pegasus. Mark has his own studio in France, where he presently resides.
Darren ‘Taff’ Saunders
Darren Saunders left the military in 2004 after being involved in a helicopter crash that left him with a broken neck. After making a full recovery he went on to become a private security consultant working in both the UK and abroad. He is presently employed as a consultant for a major UK oil company. He lives in the South of France.
Joe ‘H’ / ‘Tackleberry’ Harrison
Joe Harrison remained with the Pathfinders until he left the military in September 2002. He re-enlisted in the Pathfinders for the 2003 deployment to Iraq and again left the military in 2004. After a few years working in the private security industry he joined the reservists and deployed three times to Afghanistan. On one such deployment in 2010 he was awarded an MID (Mention in Dispatches). H lives in the UK where he grows his own fruit and vegetables. He is currently seeking employment, and is a self-confessed war junkie.
Neil ‘Tricky’ Dick
Neil Dick left the Pathfinders and the military in 2003 after operational deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan. He was subsequently employed by a high-profile US communications company that produces military grade radios. Tricky currently travels the world providing both practical and technical assistance to countries that employ those communications systems. He lives in Scotland with his wife and two children.
Dale ‘Ginge’ Wilson
Dale Wilson returned to his parent unit after the deployment to Sierra Leone. He remained there and undertook several posts as a senior NCO. Then he returned to the Pathfinders in 2010 as the Ops Warrant Officer. In 2012 he again returned to his parent unit to finish his military service. He and his family currently live in the UK.
Sam ‘Dolly’ Parton
Sam Parton remained with the Pathfinders until 2003, before moving on to another unit in the British military in order to receive promotion. Dolly is still serving in the military and lives in the UK with his wife and two children.
Nathan ‘Nathe’ Bell MC
Nathan Bell went on to replace Steve Heaney as the Pathfinders’ Platoon Sergeant where he remained until June 2004. During the Pathfinders’ deployment to Iraq in 2003 Nathe was awarded the MC for his actions during the Qalat Sikar operation (the story of which is related in David Blakeley’s book, Pathfinder). Nathe also served as an instructor at the UK Land Warfare Centre at War-minster before returning to 1 PARA. He left the Army in December 2011 having completed 22 years’ service. He currently lives in the UK with his wife and daughter.
Grant Harris
Grant Harris remained with the Pathfinders until 2003 as its Second-in-Command. He then returned to his parent unit in order to receive promotion. Grant is still serving in the British military elite and lives in the UK.
Graham ‘Wag’ Wardle
Graham Wardle remained as the Pathfinders’ Ops Warrant Officer until May 2002, when he left the military having completed 22 years’ service. From 2003 until 2007 he worked in Iraq on numerous Personal Security Details (PSDs), providing security for visiting businessmen and reconstruction companies. In 2008 he began working on a residential security team based in the Middle East, in which capacity he remains to this day. Wag and his wife live in the UK.
Stephen ‘Steve’ Heaney MC
Steve Heaney remained as the Pathfinders’ Platoon Sergeant until February 2001. He then took the decision to leave the military and move into the private security industry. Having trained as a Close Protection Officer (CPO) he went to work for a very high-profile businessman in London from April 2001 until January 2002, providing security and personal protection to the principal and his immediate family. In February 2002 Steve moved to the Middle East to provide military advice and training solutions across the full spectrum of close combat operations. He currently resides in the Middle East with his wife and two children.
Bryan ‘Bri’ Budd VC
Bryan Budd remained with the Pathfinders until June 2006. He returned to 3 PARA in or
der to receive promotion and then deployed to Afghanistan in July 2006. On 20 August 2006, during a patrol in the Sangin district of Helmand province, his section was ambushed by Taliban fighters. Bri led his men forward to clear the enemy position, which resulted in the section sustaining three casualties. He was wounded but continued the attack on his own. Spurred on by his actions the remainder of his men cleared the position, forcing the enemy to withdraw. Bryan died from wounds sustained during that battle. When his body was recovered it was surrounded by three dead Taliban fighters. He was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A number of people have provided me with assistance in clarifying details for this book and to those brothers in arms, my thanks: to the men I have stood shoulder to shoulder with on countless occasions – you shall forever have my respect. To my mother and father who undoubtedly sat by the telephone whilst watching news reports for a decade and a half, I apologise for those sleepless nights and offer you my eternal gratitude for your unwavering love and support. To my brother Neil, my confidant and best friend – thanks, mate, for always being my release valve and drinking partner when I needed to unwind!
Thank you to my co-author Damien Lewis for his belief and steadying hand on this project and in helping me to articulate my experiences during those long days at his home (not to mention down the pub!). Thanks also to his wife and family for putting up with my dragging him away to work on this book. A special thank you to Alan Samson, Lucinda McNeile, Jamie Tanner, Helen Ewing, Hannah Cox, Jess Gulliver, and all the sales teams at publisher Orion who worked tirelessly to ensure this book was a success. Thanks to Andy Chittock, military photographer, for your help sourcing images for the photo plates herein. To my literary agent Annabel Merullo and her assistant Laura Williams – thanks for your unflagging enthusiasm throughout. Thanks also to film agent Luke Speed, for your belief in the story getting told. Fantastic work, the lot of you!
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