Greek Historiography
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The misinterpretation is explicitly recalled again later, at 1.71, using
“power” ( dunamin) instead of “empire” ( arche ̄ n). Then, after the fall of Sardis in the hands of the Persians, Croesus sends Lydians to Delphi to ask the oracle why he was misled after being told he would destroy
“Cyrus’ power” (Hdt. 1.90). In reply, the oracle quotes the words about destroying an “empire” ( arche ̄ n) and says that Croesus should have asked which one. The oracle explains that Croesus was fated to suffer for the crimes of his ancestor of five generations earlier, Candaules, for slaying his master Gyges. Cyrus takes pity on the fallen despot:
[Cyrus] recognized that he too was a man and it was another man, no whit less in great fortune than himself, whom he was giving alive to the fire …
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 41
he was afraid of what he must pay in retribution and thought again how
nothing of all that is in the world of men could be secure. (Hdt. 1.86, Grene)
But has Croesus really learned? He finally blames “the god of the Greeks,”
the oracle, for the mistake: “for no one is so foolish, of himself, to prefer war to peace.” We readers see even then that the king has not recognized his own faulty judgment.
The Croesus legend is a classic and paradigmatic lesson of human
tragedy and understanding, of how a people’s collective fortunes are
hampered by individual ambition. The episode also highlights the
religious dimension, a kind of “fate,” that Herodotus consistently shows behind human affairs. The well‐known formulation seen in Greek epic
and tragedy and amenable to Herodotus’ narrative traces the sequence
hubris–ate ̄ –nemesis (insolent violence–blind folly–retribution): the tragic figure is led astray by some innate fault ( hamartia, literally a “missing the mark,” most commonly seen as a display of hubris). Imperial rule, this story implies, is denied due to human insolence.
Alongside the Croesus story are digressions on and effectively intro-
ductions to the other “power players” of the period, the Athenians and
Spartans. We learn of Pisistratus’ being first ousted by the competing factions of Megacles and Lycurgus, then restored by plotting a ruse in which a girl, Phya, poses as the goddess Athena in a chariot that returns Pisistratus to rule (Hdt. 1.60). After another interlude of falling out with other factions and living in Eretria for ten years, Pisistratus takes the city (Hdt.
1.63), and roots his “tyranny” ( turannis, a term for monarchy or despotism, not necessarily pejorative) in Athens. The Lacedaemonian (Spartan) narrative also highlights the establishment of good laws by “Lycurgus”
(Hdt. 1.65); Sparta is temporarily defeated and under the rule of Tegea and then, following an oracle’s advice in the time of Croesus, defeats
Tegea. Again, collective success is established by the wise strategy of men adhering to divine guidance.
King Astyages, who ruled the Median empire and married Croesus’
sister, had a dream of his daughter, Mandane, giving birth to a vine that shaded all of Asia, which was taken to mean that she would produce a child who would replace him as king (Hdt. 1.108). He sent his general Harpagus to kill the child whom she eventually had by Cambyses, namely Cyrus II
(the Great). But the child is saved, and eventually Astyages recognizes the boy (Hdt. 1.116). In his fury with Harpagus, he feeds the man a meal of his own son (Hdt. 1.119). When Astyages is eventually deposed and
captured, he is confronted by Harpagus. Astyages calls Harpagus the
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HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy stupidest man alive, since he “turned over the power [ kratos] to someone else” (Cyrus) rather than keep it himself, and the most unjust man, since he enslaved the Medes to the Persians rather than turn the kingship
( basile ̄ ie ̄ n “royal power”) over to another Mede (Hdt. 1.129). Here kratos and basile ̄ ie ̄ are synonyms. Astyages’ reproach to Harpagus is confirmed in the next chapter: “Later the Medes repented that they had yielded to the Persians” (Hdt. 1.130, Grene). The point of the narrative is that, despite Astyages’ despotic, cruel punishment, his disloyal compatriot was blinded by a motive of vengeance so as not to act most prudently for his own
people, depriving them of self‐rule. It is a lesson in the personal motive obscuring the greater realities of political power.
Near the end of Book 1, Herodotus addresses the “power of Babylon”
in a brief excursus (191–9). In 1.191–2 we read that “in power [ dunami], Assyria [= Babylon] counts as one third of all of Asia” supplying the
Persian king with tribute for four of the twelve months of the year. “The rule [ arche ̄] of Babylon, which the Persians call a satrapy, is by some great measure the strongest [ kratiste ̄] of all rulerships [ apaseo ̄ n to ̄ n archeo ̄ n]
[under Persian sovereignty]” (Hdt. 1.192.2). Here “power” ( dunamis) indicates wealth, resources, and political importance, while “rule” ( arche ̄) is applied to political governance, and the strength of the rule is measured by its resources and strategic significance.
Book 2
The power and wonder of Egypt occupy the anomalous Book 2, which
some have speculated to be a separate work of Herodotus woven into the
Histories. In any case it is a superb illustration of his most “anthropolog-ical” bent and may well reflect his travels to that land. His principal method is that of polarity, in which Egypt is paired against Greece . The contrary things are “wonders,” tho ̄ masia. Points of comparison include women and religion (Lateiner 1989: 147–52). Nomos, the slippery Greek term meaning “custom,” “convention,” and “law” (and more), is one
Herodotean touchstone for distinguishing one culture from another.
Furthermore, nomos becomes thematically important as a geographically conditioned factor (see Xenophanes, Fr. 21 B 16 DK, followed by
Hecataeus), a discovery broadened by the Persian War experience and
“the sudden intrusion of Persians and their peoples into the narrow
Aegean orbit” (Lateiner 1989: 151). The Egyptians are another case
study for nomos and geography. In some ways Herodotus leans toward a sense of relativism in (or, better, equal respect for) each culture’s customs:
“I am not anxious to expound the divine matters in the accounts I have
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 43
heard (apart from the divine names that they have used), since I believe that all men have an equal sense [ ison … epistasthai] of them” (Hdt.
2.3.2). Compare 3.38.1–2, where the historian says that, if mankind were asked which customs ( nomoi) are the finest, each group would pick its own. We should not, however, press this “relativism” too far, since
Herodotus does not usually make judgments on the idiosyncratic actions of a people, but on the general ethical and rational rectitude of human custom and action, censuring, for example, those led on by selfish ambition, lust, and so on.
The story of the Nile occupies 2.13–34, and the great river itself is
shown to have a peculiar “power” ( dunamis), opposite in nature to that of most rivers, whereby the river is smaller in winter and greater in summer (Hdt. 2.19). The “wonders of Egypt” are surveyed at 2.35–6 and, of the
twenty‐six sights mentioned, eleven are contrasted with those of the
Greeks or other peoples (Lateiner 1989: 148). Egypt’s “inverse customs”
to those of others are catalogued at 2.35, a preface to the “customs” section generally (Hdt. 2.35–98). This is the business of cultural translation, and, however inaccurate in describing the “other,” it is a narrative
necessary to expand the horizons of the Greek readers. Devotion to the
gods occ
upies 2.37–42. We are then offered strange variant tales of
Heracles, Dionysus, and others, while Herodotus notes that some gods’
names are “native” to Greece, including Poseidon, the Dioscuri, Hera,
Hestia, Themis, and the Graces and the Nereids (Hdt. 2.50). There
follows a fascinating menagerie of Egyptian animals – crocodiles, hippopotami, the Phoenix bird, winged serpents, and many more (Hdt. 2.65–
76). Secular customs like burial or practices like medicine round out this part, before moving to a history of the land (Hdt. 2.99–182), including their legendary kings, the chronology of Egyptian and Greek gods (Hdt.
2.142–6), and the historical kings to Amasis (2.147–82). The historian
approvingly notes how King Sesostris set up pillars when he defeated
brave men and declared how he conquered them by his own power
( dunami). The king gives a euphemistic and royal tone to his inscriptions by claiming he defeated the foe not by brute force or violence ( kratos or bie ̄), but by “his own ability/power” (Hdt. 2.102), evidencing the continued motif of the uses and abuses of power.
Book 3
This section resumes the logos (story) of Cambyses and his campaign in Egypt (mentioned last at 2.2, picked up at 3.1 and going to 3.38), organized to explain the origin of the event; then it presents the preparations
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HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy of the Persians and the Egyptians, their arrival and battle, and the
aftermath of Cambyses’ failure (Immerwahr 1966: 93–8). First, Cambyses, father of Cyrus II, campaigns against the Carthaginians (a fight never
carried out), Ammonians, and Ethiopians (including Persian spies – a
failure; Hdt. 3.17–26). In the aftermath of these campaigns comes the
narratives of Cambyses’ wounding of the calf representing Apis/Epaphus
and of his mad crimes against his relatives, Egyptians, and Persians (3.27–
38). Around this same time, according to Herodotus, occurred the
Spartan siege of Samos, where Polycrates was tyrant – perhaps a prelude to the motif of Greek campaigning initiatives to come (Immerwahr 1966:
98–9). The siege is also a chance to tell Samian stories such as that of Polycrates’ rise, his consolidation of power, and his eventually being lured away by money and murdered by Oroetes, as mentioned earlier (Hdt.
3.120–25). Polycrates took supreme power by killing one brother and
banishing the second, Syloson (Hdt. 3.39). Even the despot’s name
means “great might,” and he is said to have beaten ( krate ̄ sas) the Lesbians in a sea battle. The tale of Polycrates is clearly a “power narrative” of hybristic ambition and greed, pointed up by Herodotus’ own comment
that “Polycrates is the first of the Greeks we know to lay plans for the mastery of the sea [ thalassokrateein] [except legendary sea lords like Minos] … [he is also] the first of the human race to do so while having great hopes of mastering [ archein] Ionia and the islands” (Hdt. 3.122; Grene, adapted). He was unsurpassed among Greek despots for his proud
magnificence, says the historian (Hdt. 3.125).
The next great story concerns the revolt of the Magi after a crisis of
Persian imperialism, and then Darius’ accession to power (Hdt. 3.61–
87). The conspiracy of the seven noblemen leads to the assassination of the Magi (Hdt. 3.76–9), then to the rule of Darius (Hdt. 3.80–7). In this latter context comes the extraordinary debate on government in
Persia, with three interlocutors: Otanes, Megabyzus, and Darius. For
Otanes, monarchy ( mounarchie ̄) is unsuitable, in view of the outrages of Cambyses, for example. Monarchy “places even a good man in such a
rulership [ arche ̄ n] outside his usual thoughts; outrageousness [ hubris]
arises in him because of the goods he has, and envy [ phthonos] from a position of rule [ arche ̄ then] is inbred in a human.”
The people acting as rulers [ ple ̄ thos archon] maintain the finest name of all, equality under the law [ isonomie ̄], and secondly it does none of those things that the monarch does … It [democracy] governs all its governing offices
[ archas archei] by lot, maintains governing [ arche ̄ n] that is subject to review, and brings all proposals to public assembly. (Hdt. 3.80.6, Grene)
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 45
Megabyzus then objects that the proposal to turn over power ( kratos) to the many ( ple ̄ thos) reflects a mistaken judgment. “Nothing is more unintelligent nor outrageous [ axunetōteron … hubristoteron] than the useless mob.” “Let us choose the society of best men and entrust the power [ kratos] to them” (Hdt. 3.81, Grene). Finally, Darius (Hdt. 3.82) argues that, of the three governments in their best forms, oligarchy
arouses private enmities and generates factions, but monarchy is the
strongest ( kratiston). Proof is that our freedom came from one man (Cyrus, who freed them from Median rule), and not from the people or
from an oligarchy.
In the debate, kratos, not dunamis, is the common term for the locus of political power in the oligarchic and monarchic forms of government.
Strength is what Megabyzus advocates giving to the oligarchs, and secu-
rity from strength is what Darius advocates as the virtue of monarchy. The democratic system of Otanes favors a term with fewer connotations of
might and force: arche ̄, “governing” or “rule.” (See also Hdt. 6.43.3, where the historian gives further evidence that Otanes did argue for
democratic governance in Persia: the Persian general Mardonius in Ionia disestablished the tyrannies and set up democracies in all the cities.) In the event, the majority support Darius’ proposal for monarchy, and
he is in fact chosen as king as a result of a portent, which is supposedly arbitrary but manipulated by his trickery (Hdt. 3.84–7): “Everything was full of the power of Darius” (Hdt. 3.88, Grene). The subsequent narrative is of the power and wealth of Darius (3.88–116) and, following five digression anecdotes (Hdt. 3.117–38), the story of his campaigns comprises the core of the account of the First Persian War (Hdt. 3.139–
6.140). The exposition of Darius’ wealth, including his gold from India, occasions a famous digression on the exotic “otherness” of the Indian
people on the Eastern edge of the Persian realm, which records Indian
oddities of climate, flora and fauna, people and customs, but, curiously, no history (Hdt. 3.98–106). The Alexander historians and Arrian will
continue this tradition in Indica writings.
Atossa, a wife of Darius, asks him why, with his great power ( duna-
min), he has not annexed any nation or power to Persia (Hdt. 3.134); thus she is spurring on his plan. The campaigns begin, like those earlier of Croesus, almost accidentally, with a continuation of the story of Samos, last visited when it was under Polycrates (cf. Hdt. 3.39–60 with 3.120–
5). Before Darius came to power, Syloson of Samos, “inspired by some
divine fortune” ( theie ̄ tuche ̄), gave his cloak to Darius, who said: “You are the most generous of men; when I had no power [ dunamin] at all, you gave me something even if it was a small thing; my gratitude is as great
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HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy now as if I had received something immense” (Hdt. 3.140). In return,
Syloson asks the grateful king to give him back his fatherland, Samos, to which the Great King agrees, initiating the conquest of that Greek island.
Herodotus locates divine will at work alongside human ambition here
once again.
The background to Samian rule up to this point sketches the attempt
of Maeandrius, former deputy of Polycrates, to assume the despot’s rule ( dunamis) upon his death. Maeandrius set
up an altar to Zeus Eleutherios to gain popular favor, and said: “I wish to open up his [sc. Polycrates’]
power [ arche ̄ n] to all of you and I proclaim equality before the law for the commonality entire” (3.142, Grene). The people denounced him and he
arrested those opposing him (Hdt. 3.142–3). So Syloson, with the will of the people and with Darius’ help, easily took power in Samos. This section is an object lesson in the ambitious search for power. Darius seeks power over Greek lands through deception, much as the despot
Maeandrius sought the rule of Samos through false promises of civic
equity. Even within the rule of law, power seekers can try to manipulate the people to gain power. It is to the credit of the Samians that they see through Maeandrius, but not that they accept Syloson so readily. Ironies abound with the antidespotic Maeandrius acting tyrannically, then trying to regain power by force, acting on the advice of a half‐crazed brother and on motives for revenge; Otanes, supporter of “democracy,” restores
monarchy on Samos (Hdt. 3.145–6; see Asheri et al. 2007 ad l.: 517).
Simultaneously with the Samos campaign comes one of Babylon (Hdt.
3.150–60), in which Darius “became master of” ( ekrate ̄ se) that city and pulled down its walls (Hdt. 3.159) in this second capture of it by Persia.
Book 4
A major focus here is the Scythian campaigns of Darius, which remind us of the earlier Scythian invasion of Asia (Hdt. 1.103–66) and state the
usual reasons for an imperialist drive: the people to be invaded are wealthy and the aggressor seeks an empire and revenge. The narrative slides into a lengthy ethnographic excursus that recalls the one on Egypt but posits here a particularly inverse and bellicose “other.” Hartog (1988) treats the Scythian “rhetoric of otherness”; and, although Herodotus’ characterization of the Scythians does show them as opposite to the Greeks and is
confusing on many details of geography and culture (owing to his mul-