[ adunamie ̄ s ananke ̄]” (Hdt. 7.172, Grene). This is an ironic inversion of the principle of compulsion of the stronger, and again an expression of political pragmatism over ideals.
The Greeks at the Isthmus finally decide to take a stand on land at
Thermopylae and on sea at Artemisium. The Persians sail and march
southward to those points (Hdt. 7.179–200). When counting up a
Persian force of over five million people including support personnel,
Herodotus concludes that, among all the men in the army, “for
handsomeness and size there was none worthier [ axioniko ̄ teros]” than Xerxes “to hold that power [ to kratos] [of supreme command]”
(Hdt. 7.187, Grene). Kratos here is “military command,” merited by appearance, he says, possibly in an ironic comment, without mention
of tactical skills.
The Persian fleet is followed to the sea above Euboea, where a storm
reduces the force by more than four hundred ships, perhaps helped by
Greek prayers to Poseidon (Hdt. 7.188–92). Xerxes’ army encamped
near Trachis, perhaps ominously the site of Heracles’ gruesome death,
and the Greeks at the “hot gates,” Thermopylae, both setting the scene
for the first great battle with Xerxes (Hdt. 7.197–201). The location is further noted as the present extent of each side’s control: Xerxes was
“master of [ epekratee] all the country to the north” of this point, while the Greeks were in control of the parts to the west and south (Hdt. 7.201,
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HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy Grene). Obviously conflicts very often take place at the border between two domains of kratos; Herodotus marks the impasse in summary form just prior to the great clash. Ephialtes, a local Greek, revealed to Xerxes a little‐known mountain path as a back route to Thermopylae, which
allowed the Persians to overcome the Greeks (Hdt. 7.213).
Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.201–39) is the place of one of the five great
battles during the war with Xerxes, along with (in order of narration)
those at Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale. The centrality of
Salamis between pairs of land and sea battles is given also a thematic
importance by the historian; it is decisive and characteristic of Greek cleverness. Thermopylae displays the outstanding valor of the Spartans, while Artemisium exhibits Athenian failure. Leonidas, the Spartan king
and hero, is the key figure at Thermopylae, in his epic‐like genealogy, his valiant decision to make a stand (spurred on by an oracle), his death, and the epic strife for his corpse. The self‐sacrificing Leonidas contrasts with the treacherous figures of Ephialtes and Demaratus. The conversa-tions of Demaratus with Xerxes frame the battle and underscore the
Spartans as “the fairest kingship and the fairest city among the Greeks, aye, and the bravest men” (Hdt. 7.209, Grene and 7.235–37;
Immerwahr 1966: 260–3). The Persians’ dismay at Greek culture is
epitomized by their amazement at the exercise and grooming of the
Spartans before battle (Hdt. 7.208–9). The strategic outcome of
Thermopylae is less important in the story than its function as a model of Greek military and moral virtue.
Book 8
The ultimate Greek withdrawal at Artemisium was neither a victory nor a defeat, as the Greeks sought to live to fight another day. Though
Artemisium compares with Thermopylae as a battle to control a narrow
passage (see Hdt. 8.15), it more sharply contrasts with it in its good
fortune of the storms, taken as divine favor that assists the Athenians and others in resisting a much larger force. Yet after three engagements the Greeks strategically withdraw. The battle of Artemisium (Hdt. 8.1–25) in other ways foreshadows issues of Salamis, with the introduction of a flexible and patriotic Themistocles and with internal, arguably productive, dissent among the Greeks. This also contrasts with the modus operandi
of the Persians. Herodotus makes the explicit point that the suppression of internal quarrels, for example over fleet command ( megiston kratos, Hdt. 8.2), allowed a unity that dissolved after the Persian Wars (Hdt.
8.3). The subsequent march of the Persians south to the oracle of Delphi
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 61
results in their fleeing in fear of divine portents and demonstrates divine displeasure at the invasion (Hdt. 8.37–9).
The naval battle at Salamis is in many ways the martial climax of the
Histories, the true turning point of the action. It is built up by the indecisive conflict at Artemisium, and by Thermopylae, a glorious but also
indecisive event. Salamis results in the departure of Xerxes himself, and sets up the final defeats of the remnant Persians at Plataea and Mycale in Book 9. The Salamis episode occupies the biggest single battle narrative in the Histories, from 8.40 to 8.125, including the antecedents (Hdt. 8.40–82), the battle proper (Hdt. 8.83–96), and the aftermath
(Hdt. 8.97–125) (Immerwahr 1966: 267–87). A virtual catalog of Greek
ships gives the account a Homeric flavor (Hdt. 8.42–8). The antecedent
chapters are noteworthy for their exposition of the internal tensions indicative of the different methods of Greek and Persian dialogue. Among the Greeks, the Peloponnesians want to withdraw to the Isthmus and build a
wall, the Athenians to make a stand at sea after their city has been abandoned (Hdt. 8.49, 70–4). Among the Persians, the solitary wise advice
(of Artemisia) is not taken against the majority of generals (Hdt. 8.68–9).
On the Greek side, prominence is given to the strategy of Themistocles
regarding how essential it was to make a united stand at Salamis versus disunity and defeat in the Peloponnese (Hdt. 8.57–64). Themistocles, a
wily trickster hero in the mold of Odysseus, outflanks his fellow Greeks and forces the stand at Salamis by means of a duplicitous message to
prompt Xerxes to attack before the Greeks disperse (Hdt. 8.75). There is deliberate irony in Herodotus’ account that shows the Persians following a majority view and the Greeks manipulated by one man, but behind this
is the display of the greater flexibility and acuity of Greek strategy, whereby the sharpest leader can save the situation. The rifts among the Greeks, especially the Athenians versus the others, foreshadow the greater split leading to the Peloponnesian War of the historian’s own day.
The battle seems to take on its own topsy‐turvy life apart from any
commanders in chief. Xerxes sits on a “throne” from a mainland moun-
tain facing the island and observes noteworthy actions of the generals
(Hdt. 8.90); his men “fought with zest and in fear of Xerxes” as the king was watching them (Hdt. 8.86, Grene). Among the Persians, Artemisia is
the most praised commander when she rams a friendly ship, in error or to evade the Athenians, and prompts Xerxes, assuming that a Greek is hit, to exclaim: “My men have become women, and my women men” (Hdt.
8.87–8). The king’s misplaced commendation reflects on his poor
perception and judgment. When the Greeks hesitate at first to engage,
the phantom of a woman shouts loudly to all the Greeks: “You crazy
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HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy Greeks, how long will you continue backing water?” (Hdt. 8.84, Grene).
A phantom ship from the gods prevents the Corinthian commander from
deserting during the battle (Hdt. 8.94). The inversion of normal prowess among men and women marks the event as a felicitous paradox whose successful outcome may have relied on divine favor. The Persians are com-
pelled by a despot, but the Greeks, though as usual rivaling one other, freely display fierce courage. Almost as
if in an athletic contest, praise is meted out by the collective, first to the Aeginetans, and second to the Athenians (Hdt. 8.93). Themistocles plays no major part in the battle
proper and, though each leader votes for himself as best for the prize of valor, the Athenian is valued as second best by all commanders and his
unobtrusive genius is acknowledged (Hdt. 8.123–4).
The Salamis conflict is followed by Persian and Greek councils and the
return of Xerxes to Asia. Xerxes first prizes the advice of Artemisia, which is exactly suited to please him, namely to return home and leave Mardonius in charge of land forces to fight on; he can thereby claim victory at a distance or dissociate himself from defeat (Hdt. 8.102–3). Both are shame-
ful options in Greek terms. Themistocles’ good advice to cut the bridge at the Hellespont is rejected, and he delays an Athenian attack on the
king, secretly to preserve his own favor with Persia (Hdt. 8.109–11).
Conflicting accounts of the inglorious return of Xerxes across the
Hellespont give closure to the outbound narrative (Hdt. 8.117–20).
The end of Book 8 and beginning of Book 9 narrate mostly events
involving Mardonius’ forces and the Greek army leading up to the battle at Plataea (Hdt. 8.126–44 and 9.1–18; Immerwahr 1966: 140–3). On
the theme of power alliances, we find the lengthy episode in which
Mardonius has sent King Alexander I of Macedon as an intermediary to
Athens. The aim was to try to forge an alliance with the Athenians and
thereby overpower Greece by naval force (Hdt. 8.136). Alexander then
arrives in Athens, warns the Athenians of the power ( dunamis) of the king, and urges Athens not to oppose him but come to terms (Hdt.
8.140). The Spartan envoys beg Athens not to yield. The Athenians reply to Alexander, “We know of ourselves that the power of the Mede is many
times greater than our own … yet we have such a hunger for freedom that we will fight as long as we are able” (Hdt. 8.143). The Athenians then
turn to the Spartans and forcefully assert their devotion to keeping Greece free, citing famously the common blood, language, shrines, and habits
engendered in common (Hdt. 8.144). It is a salutary pledge in the
Greekness that transcends politics and past wars, a unity, however temporary in the Histories, that reminds readers of the principles by which Greeks could cooperate at the acme of their union. Here Herodotus
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 63
comes as close to enunciating ideals for Greece as Thucydides comes to
recapitulating Athenian ideals in Pericles’ funeral oration.
Book 9
The opening chapters (Hdt. 9.1–24) not only lead up to the narrative
of Plataea (Hdt. 9.25–89), they “reset” the people and the moods
among the two sides. The renewed Athenian confidence and indigna-
tion against the Persians is signified by their stoning of a solitary
Athenian man, Lycidas, and of his wife and children, when he supports
Mardonius’ offer of alliance with Athens (Hdt. 9.4–5). Sparta comes to
assist Athens, while Mardonius demolishes Athens and leaves for
Boeotia, where his cavalry has an advantage. An anecdote describes a
Boeotian who dines with a Persian and reveals that, “within a very short time indeed, you will see but few survivors” of the many feasting
Persians. The Persian dares not tell the prediction to Mardonius, saying:
“what comes from God, no man can turn back … we follow in the
bondage of necessity” (Hdt. 9.16). This is a sad lamentation of humanity, fatal inevitability, and fear of the reaction of the despot, resonant themes of the work (see, e.g., Hdt. 7.46 on mortality). Mardonius clearly has
the “supreme power of command” ( kratos) and the erroneous strategy is his doing (Hdt. 9.42). When in the first skirmishes a magnificent
Persian cavalry commander, Masistius, is killed, the Greeks struggle for and recover his body but do not mutilate it, as the Persians did with
Leonidas. As the Spartan king Pausanias says: “Such actions are more fit for barbarians than Greeks; and even in them we find it a matter of
offense” (Hdt. 9.22–5, 79).
Plataea and Mycale are in some ways paralleled to Thermopylae and
Artemisium, in that both supposedly happened on the same day, and the
sea battles prefigure Athenian naval might in later years (Immerwahr
1966: 287–90). At Plataea, a bitter dispute erupts between the Athenians and the Tegean allies over who should man the left wing in battle, a dispute echoing the divisive squabbling elsewhere in the war (Hdt. 9.26–7).
The divine role is highlighted in the account of Plataea. The Elean seer Tisamenus aids the Spartans in reading the omens that predict victory,
but the Persian seer Hegesistratus, also from Elis, finds the omens unfavorable for his patrons (Hdt. 9.33–6 and 37–8). Mardonius’ supreme
hubris was to cross the local Asopus River, which the oracles specifically forbade (Hdt. 9.36, 40, 59). The Spartan king Pausanias prays to Hera
and the Spartans offer sacrifice near her Plataean temple, after which the tide of battle seems to turn (Hdt. 9.61–2). The Persian Wars arose in
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HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy large part as vengeance for religious transgressions, and the historian fittingly makes the divine prominent in the last great battle.
In the event, Mardonius falls and his men are routed by Spartans,
though his body is mysteriously not found (Hdt. 9.63–5, 84). In a post‐
battle assessment of bravery on each side, as at Salamis, Herodotus poi-gnantly says that the sole survivor of Thermopylae, Aristodemus, was by far the bravest but others denied him that honor since he sought to die to redress his dishonor (Hdt. 9.71). The lavish quarters of Mardonius cause Pausanias “to show the stupidity of the leader of the Medes” to the other Greeks (Hdt. 9.82). Again the theme of quantity over quality characterizes the barbarians.
The battle of Mycale immediately follows when the Samians plead with
the Greeks to come from Delos, as they do (Hdt. 9.90–2). The prophet
for the fleet was Deïphonus, whose father was cheated of territory but in the end given prophecy by the gods (Hdt. 9.92–4) – the lessons being
that justice is done in the end and divine favor is with the Greeks for now, but could turn on them if they slight the gods. The Persians opt to fight near the sea but not on it. A herald’s wand mysteriously found on the
beach is a sign that the Greeks won at Plataea on the same day, evidence of divine intervention, which encourages the Greek army (Hdt. 9.100).
The Spartans and the Athenians fight separately but in unison, the
Athenians driving the foe off (Hdt. 9.102). The action effectively frees the Ionians and islanders for the time being, reversing earlier oppression, though the Spartans choose not to stay and the Athenians remain in Ionia (Hdt. 9.106). The ongoing rivalry among Greeks continues, and the
Athenians’ clinging to Ionia is a prelude to the Athenian “empire”
(Flower and Marincola 2002: 205–7).
A penultimate scene returns us to the court of Xerxes, an ominous
presence that remains, highlighted by the story of Xerxes’ lust for the wife of his brother and general Masistes (Hdt. 9.108–13). This coda on Xerxes sharply contrasts Persian with Greek behavior, especially Pausanias’ kindness to a prostitute (Hdt. 9.76); it shows the weakness of Persian males and their women’s strength; it links, in ring composition with the Gyges–
Candaules story, the fatal promise of a man to a woman; and it illustrates the despotism that the Greeks narrowly escaped (Flower and Marincola
2002: 291–3).
The
final, terrifying tale is a masterful prism of major themes and an
ominous projection of the future. At Sestos the Athenians besiege and
take the city. Artyactes, the local governor, steals the treasure of the legendary hero Protesilaus, the first Greek slain in the Trojan War (Hom. Il.
2.700–2), and has intercourse with women in the hero shrine there, a
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 65
double sacrilege (Hdt. 9.116). Artyactes appropriately becomes the last pro‐Persian casualty in the Persian Wars, slain by Athenians. At the prom-ontory where Xerxes bridged the waters, the Athenians nail Artyactes to a board and hang him from it. His son is stoned in front of him. This
crucifixion occurs at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and is ordered by Xanthippus, father of the great Pericles. The episode thus hints at a figurative crossover of power, where a brutal Athenian hegemony promises to become heir to Xerxes’ Persia (Hdt. 9.120; Tracy 2002: 315–19).
The last chapter (Hdt. 9.122) is a flashback to the beginning of Persian imperialism, which Cyrus warned against from the outset. An ancestor of Artyactes was Artembares, who advised Cyrus that the Persians should
move to another, more fertile land, any land of their neighbors or of
those farther beyond, whom they could occupy and be “more wonderful”
( tho ̄ masto ̄ teroi) to a greater number of people. But Cyrus warns that soft lands breed soft men; so go, but be prepared to be slaves to others rather than to rule. The final injunction is to live right and to rule or be ruled.
Xerxes embodies the moral softening that Cyrus feared.
Conclusions
More than has been usually appreciated, Herodotus brings to the new
genre of history a central focus on human nature as it relates to power, desiring it, resisting it, and effecting its balance. He observes the dynamics of authority within and between cities, empires, and peoples, not by himself explicitly formulating “laws” of how or why power is established or changed, but by showing a panoply of examples from which readers can
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